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ABSTRACT 
While each of the dominant theories of International Relations offers segmented 
contributions to contemporary foreign policy analysis – and consequently 
contradictory prescriptions for US-China policy – none of them simultaneously 
encapsulate the overarching historical trends in US foreign policy-making and 
the contemporary dynamics of foreign policy construction. This thesis, 
therefore, offers a historical account of the trends and traditions of US foreign 
policy through the lens of grand strategy; and follows this with an in-depth 
analysis of the post-Cold War era and the forces that seek to exert influence 
over the decision- and policy-making process. This aspect of the thesis 
concentrates on the three main sectors that battle for and claim policy-making 
dominance: the media; special interests and lobbies; and the executive branch 
itself. A proper understanding of how these three sectors interact is essential 
for understanding any underlying construction of US foreign policy, and in 
particular the struggle to marshal a contemporary grand strategy for China. 
From the Federalist Papers, to “Hearst’s War” in 1898, to the CNN Effect and 
controversies over press coverage of the Iraq War, the media has been an ever-
present actor in US foreign relations; and yet its actual level of influence is 
difficult to ascertain. Like the media, the role of special interests has been a 
constant in US foreign policy and politics as a whole. Far from being the 
‘conspiracy’ of popular imagination, lobbies and special interests have, at times, 
helped guide foreign policy – because they advocate popular policy positions, or 
because they are able to exploit disengaged policy elites. A final chapter 
analyses the importance of the president and other executive offices in the 
making of policy, building on the previous two chapters to present the case for 
an engaged president. Each of these chapters uses the problem of developing a 
grand strategy for China to examine and define a pluralist approach to 
contemporary US foreign policy-making. This study will conclude by locating 
the Obama administration’s early foreign policies and international experiences 
– again focusing on China – within this framework, and offer suggestions for 
how future policy issues could be surmounted through proper process. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
CHINA AND AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY 
American foreign policy officials, scholars, and journalists have grown 
comfortable with the notion of US foreign policy pursuing a ‘Grand Strategy’, a 
unified theory and/or approach that can be followed when constructing 
America’s relations with the world at large. For much of its history, the United 
States has been able to follow a form of grand strategy, as global affairs and the 
international structure allowed for clear divisions and categorisation of states 
and actors, and how best to deal with them. The Cold War, in particular, allowed 
for a relatively easy construction of a grand strategy, based on ideological 
opposition to Communism and easy categorisation of allies and ‘enemies’ or 
‘competitors’. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of 
globalisation and regionalism, a single grand strategy has remained elusive, as 
the proliferation of urgent or important issues has given rise to a concurrent 
proliferation of actors in America attempting to influence the foreign policy 
decision-making process. With a pluralisation of process, it is perhaps correct to 
argue that there has been a pluralisation of core (if not grand) strategies, each 
dealing with key issues and nations in foreign policy. 
One of the main complicating factors about American foreign policy is that 
it evolves not just from the world-view of statesmen and diplomatic craft, but 
out of the US political process; from what the country wants, or at least what 
key actors believe it should want. As far back as the 1970s, scholars were 
arguing that the domestic underpinnings of US foreign policy were sorely in 
need of fresh consideration. The widely-sensed failure of US foreign policy 
during the 1960s spurred non-traditional governmental institutions and 
broader segments of the public to try to share policy control with the Executive. 
Stefan Fergus PhD: Introduction 
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In addition, disenchantment with the notion of a ‘bipartisan consensus’ (which 
is sometimes argued to have been deployed to choke off debate) also explains 
congressional and public readiness to challenge the President and his advisors 
on foreign policy. Writing in 1974, Rosenfeld explained how “Serious discussion 
of our government’s role in the world now begins and ends with the 
government’s role at home,” and that foreign policy decision-making had 
become ever-more influenced by the question, “What state of domestic affairs 
do we wish to preserve or establish by our international policy?” Rosenfeld 
posited that, as the interrelatedness of foreign and domestic policy deepens (or, 
as pluralisation expands), one can expect that foreign-policy debates would 
place less emphasis on whether a particular policy or strategy responds to a 
‘vital national interest’, and instead place more emphasis on what domestic 
interests, interest groups and values are served.1 Many argue that this is most 
certainly the case today when, since the end of the Cold War and the enhanced 
pluralisation of the foreign policy-making process, an ever-increasing number 
of parochial interests are clamouring to be heard. 
There has been much literature and analysis produced on the influence of 
the media, special interests, and the Executive Branch of government on policy 
making, on both domestic and foreign policy. There remains, however, little 
consensus as to the levels of influence enjoyed by these three sectors. This is a 
gap in the literature the thesis aims to help fill. Some argue that the centrality of 
the President and governmental organisations is paramount, disregarding the 
media and lobbies as so much white noise. Others argue that, in certain times of 
crisis, the media’s influence can be substantial, as it can move much quicker and 
more freely than government organisations into zones of conflict and tension. 
Lobbies, with their specialist and extensive knowledge in issues dear to their 
political hearts, can provide necessary information for a government short on 
manpower (a role the media can also provide), but bring with them a zeal that 
can theoretically push policy proposals in certain directions. This thesis, 
therefore, seeks to fill some of the gap that remains in the study of American 
                                                     
1
 Rosenfeld (Jan.1974), pp.263-266 
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pluralism; offering an original take on the study of domestic pluralism by 
looking at all three sectors and how they relate to and interact with each other. 
Zbigniew Brzezinski has identified three domestic impediments to 
‘proper’ and executive-led foreign policy, which complicate presidential efforts 
to gain public support for a rational foreign policy “attuned to the complexity of 
the global dilemmas facing the United States.”2 The first is the fact that foreign 
policy lobbies have, through increased access to Congress, become more 
influential in American politics. These lobbies, especially those financially well-
endowed, have promoted legislative intervention in foreign policy-making, be it 
military or, more successfully, economic. To cite Rosenfeld once more, foreign 
policy has become “domesticated” and “forced to go over the same political 
hurdles and to submit to the same political processes that are for the domestic 
course.”3 More than ever, Brzezinski argues, “Congress not only actively 
opposes foreign policy decisions but even imposes some on the president”. 
Congressional intervention such as this, undoubtedly promoted by lobbies, is “a 
serious handicap in shaping a foreign policy meant to be responsive to the ever-
changing realities of global politics”, and makes it increasingly difficult to 
ensure that American interests are being served.4 
Brzezinski’s second obstacle is the “deepening ideological cleavage” in 
American politics, which is “reducing the prospects for effective bipartisanship 
in foreign policy.” The resulting polarization “encourages the infusion of 
demagogy into policy conflicts”, and “poisons the public discourse.” The role of 
the media, therefore, becomes more important, as the polarisation of domestic 
and foreign policy discourse also informs reporting in both print and broadcast 
media, with clear ideological biases freely (some might say gleefully) displayed. 
“Still worse, personal vilification and hateful, as well as potentially violent, 
rhetoric are becoming widespread in that realm of political debate that is 
subject to neither fact checking nor libel laws: the blogosphere.”5 
                                                     
2
 Brzezinski (Jan/Feb 2010), p.28 
3
 Rosenfeld (Jan.1974), p.267 
4
 Brzezinski (Jan/Feb 2010), pp.28-29 
5
 Brzezinski (Jan/Feb 2010), p.29 
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The final obstacle is that of America’s uninformed public. Of the large 
democratic countries, the United States has one of the “least informed publics 
when it comes to global affairs”, despite having what can only be described as a 
vast and vibrant ‘news’ media. Brzezinski attributes poor levels of knowledge to 
the “accelerating decline in the circulation of newspapers” and the 
“trivialization of once genuinely informative television reporting”. One can 
connect this domestic obstacle with the ideological cleavage mentioned above, 
as remaining print publications (but also broadcast media) attempt to carve out 
niches in such a polarized political and media market. In conjunction, these 
amount to a decrease in availability of reliable and timely news about critical 
global issues. In this context, “demagogically formulated solutions tend to 
become more appealing, especially in critical moments.”6 
It is in this context of deepening pluralisation around the foreign policy 
process and widening in the range and complexity of different ‘core strategies’ 
that we need to locate the evolving US-China relationship. The relationship 
stands apart from all others. Over time, but especially since China’s economic 
opening in the 1980s, the United States and China have become inextricably 
linked economically and increasingly at odds politically. The state of economics 
between the two nations has been described as a “superfusion”7 that has even 
given birth to a new economic term, “Chimerica”.8 The US-China relationship 
has shown “enormous change over time, with patterns of confrontation, 
conflict, and suspicion much more prevalent than patterns of accommodation 
and cooperation.” The bilateral relationship has shown some remarkable 
improvements over the past forty years, as both American and Chinese leaders 
have “pursued practical benefits through pragmatic means.” However, these 
relational improvements are often “incomplete, thin, and dependent on 
changeable circumstances at home and abroad”, and therefore short-lived, as a 
result of salient differences between the two governments when it comes to 
critical issues of security, economics, and also values.9 
                                                     
6
 Brzezinski (Jan/Feb 2010), pp.29-30 
7
 Karabell (2009) 
8
 Fergusson (2008), pp.333-341 
9
 Sutter (2010), pp.2-3 
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After 1989, China tied its fortunes to the US, and many American 
companies (particularly manufacturing and services corporations) tied theirs to 
China. This inadvertently led the US governmental balance sheet to become 
more reliant on China, as well as making China more vulnerable to the global 
economic systems than authorities in Beijing intended, or perhaps fully 
realized: “In the United States, there was complacency that risk had been 
banished. In China, there was complacency that the domestic economy was still 
insulated from the global.” The financial crisis of 2008 would expose the fallacy 
of these assumptions.10 
Since the Tiananmen Square Massacre, the Sino-American relationship 
has remained one of “wary distrust that occasionally deteriorates into enmity.” 
Accusations from 1989 have neither been forgiven nor forgotten, and their 
influence remains evident in both American and Chinese policy and media 
coverage.11 Robert Suettinger argues that, “after Tiananmen, the bilateral 
relationship lost its insulation from domestic politics.”12 However, as will be 
explained through the course of this thesis, US-China policy was never fully 
insulated from domestic politics in the first place, as economic forces and other 
special interests have jockeyed for influence over how and when the United 
States interacted with China, and in what form that interaction took. 
The events at Tiananmen “demonstrated the enormous gap between the 
values held dear by the American people and those that motivated the Chinese 
government.” At the same time, China’s “great capacity for jeopardising 
American interests around the world” made it essential to develop a good 
working relationship, to accept differences, work together, and avoid conflict. 
Clinton’s “comprehensive engagement” strategy was remarkably similar to 
George H.W. Bush’s, of which he had been so contemptuous during the 1992 
campaign.13 George W. Bush’s approach to China would eventually mirror that 
of his two predecessors, as the majority of his administration’s attention would 
be consumed by events in the Middle East. By all reckonings, the Obama 
                                                     
10
 Karabell (2009), p.284 
11
 Suettinger (2003), pp.2-3 
12
 Suettinger (2003), p.5 
13
 Cohen (2010), p.257 
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administration is pursuing the same (or similar) strategy. It is for this reason 
that the chapters in part two of this thesis focus on post-1989 US-China policy. 
Zachary Karabell, who coined the term “superfusion”, has described the 
US-China relationship as “every bit the special relationship that once existed 
between the United States and Great Britain before World War II”; however, it 
faces considerable obstacles. The challenge facing the relationship is whether 
“Chimerica will be allowed to grow and evolve or whether it will be stifled”: As 
strong as support for fusion between the US and China has been in the past, “the 
fact that it has taken place beneath the collective radar has been beneficial.” The 
greater the awareness people in both China and the US have of the countries’ 
interconnectedness, the greater the discomfort.14 
This discomfort has various roots – not least the erosion of sovereignty 
perceived in China’s vast holdings of US government debt, and the potential 
damage that could be done to the US economy, should Beijing decide to divest 
itself of these bonds. The stark differences between US and Chinese impressions 
of what constitutes human rights and proper international comportment (for 
example, China’s willingness to deal with unsavoury regimes to meet its ever-
growing demand for resources and markets, despite the frequent hypocrisy 
inherent in America’s opposition) could also be a source of discomfort for 
increased interdependence between the two nations. During the trade tension 
with Japan in the 1980-90s, many Americans came to view Free Trade as a loss 
for them and their way of life, because it was not reciprocal. Therefore, even 
before the 2008 credit meltdown, Americans as a whole had become “more 
ambivalent about free trade, more insecure about their place in the world, and 
more antagonistic toward China.” This was not solely seen as a foreign-born 
problem, however, as the reaction was also partly against the excesses of free-
market ideology, the erosion of the middle class, the incredible increase in elite 
wealth, as well as a perceived loss of sovereignty due to superfusion.15  
There has always been an “inherent tension” between what is best for 
markets and what is best for states, and much of modern history has been the 
                                                     
14
 Karabell (2009), p.287 
15
 Karabell (2009), p.292 
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story of this tension. States have usually attempted to control commerce for 
their own self-interest, and the United States is certainly no exception. One 
reason America was a such a passionate advocate for free trade in the twentieth 
century is because “its interests were well served by a world that was more 
open to its capital and its companies, given that both... were in a dominant 
position and usually had the upper hand wherever they had free reign.” For this 
reason, many on both the right and left of America’s political spectrum drew 
little distinction between U.S. military power and economic power: “both served 
to enhance the dominance of the United States globally.”16 
Napoleon Bonaparte is reported to have cautioned, “Let China sleep, for 
when she wakes, she will shake the world”.17 It would appear that American 
political rhetoric may have had this quotation in mind, recently, as China is 
frequently identified as a rising, imminent threat. However, despite the 
aggressive, sometimes jingoistic rhetoric of American leaders, US-China 
relations have remained predominantly steady and businesslike. Why is this? 
There appears to be a central conflict between what American media and 
politicians say about China, and the policies that are actually in force. What 
forces exert themselves on the decision-making process, and how does this 
rhetoric impact governmental policy and official rhetoric? Is fiery, anti-Chinese 
rhetoric heartfelt, or is it a cynical political ploy to play to the electorate’s fears? 
Answering these questions can help scholars and policy-makers sift through 
China reporting, and come to sensible and rational conclusions about US-China 
relations and how best to approach them. 
Ever since the attacks of 9/11, American foreign policy has been 
particularly focused on the struggle against global terrorism. Terrorism will 
continue to challenge societies everywhere for some time, but the relationship 
between China and the United States is the crucial issue for the 21st Century.18 
As the two largest economies in the world, with the two strongest and largest 
militaries, it is inevitable that relations between the two nations will help shape 
international relations for decades to come. Cooperation will likely benefit the 
                                                     
16
 Karabell (2009), p.293 
17
 Bonaparte, quoted in Kynge (2007), p.7 – The quote is considered by many to be apocryphal. 
18
 Karabell (2009), p.3 
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international system, just as conflict could have repercussions or ripple-effects 
in all regions of the globe. In addition, American self-consciousness will be an 
important factor in coming years, as it attempts to get its house in order after 
the 2008 financial crisis and the blow to its economic legitimacy. That America 
is distracted from issues regarding China at present is not new, as will be shown 
in the history chapters of Part One of the thesis. 
In order to understand the current and potential future course of US-
China relations, one must be able to understand and appreciate the shared 
history of the two nations. In this regard, certain trends and traditions will 
become visible, as potential handles for assessing current relations in the 
context of shared history and relations. 
 
AIMS AND CORE HYPOTHESIS 
The aim of this thesis, therefore, is to discuss the development of US ‘grand 
strategy’ towards China against the background of domestic pluralism: that is, 
against the background of competing domestic pressures. The argument 
advanced is that US-China policy has always, to some degree or another, been 
influenced by various competing special interest groups. However, since 1989, 
US-China policy has become increasingly ‘pluralised’ and ‘domesticated’, as 
changes in the American political environment and system have subjected 
policy-making in general to the increasing influence of lobbies, media, and 
Congress. This increased domestication of US-China policy has had a strong 
impact on China policy and also how China policy is presented (by both the 
media and politicians). 
None of the dominant epistemologies fully capture the essence of United 
States foreign policy, particularly US-China policy. This thesis will advance the 
political concepts of pluralism and grand strategy in order to attempt a more 
complete explanation of US foreign and China policy-making. Positivist social 
science is focussed on testing. Therefore, certain hypotheses need to stated and 
Stefan Fergus PhD: Introduction 
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subsequently tested over the course of the thesis. Research questions designed 
to allow hypotheses to be tested will be stated, below. 
As state-centrality has declined in US foreign policy-making, so too have 
domestic interests become more central. The expansive, pluralist nature of 
American domestic politics leads to the belief that domestic interests can have a 
considerable impact on US foreign policy, or put another way, in foreign policy 
“agency lies everywhere”.19 This thesis will test this hypothesis, to ascertain 
whether or not this is accurate for US-China relations. 
There remain some core assumptions, trends and traditions that continue 
to inform US foreign policy in ‘normal’ relations (that is, excepting for 
international or bilateral shocks or crises), with which domestic sources of 
influence must contend, and which they can rarely circumvent. For this reason, 
this thesis will identify the trends evident in the history of US-China relations, 
and ascertain whether they continue to exert influence over the conduct of the 
bilateral relationship. What is unclear is how much domestic political 
considerations can influence the policy-making process, and also what types of 
influence domestic actors can have. In recent history, according to many 
scholars, it has become increasingly the case that, “Less and less does foreign 
policy evolve from a professed and coherent world view. More and more does it 
reflect a test of strength among competing domestic forces.”20 Inderjeet Parmar 
agrees, stating that, “the line demarcating private and public spheres in modern 
life has become indistinct”, a result of closer connections developed between 
the state and various organised interests – connections that have resulted in a 
series of new domestic and international political, economic and financial 
institutions. It is my belief that domestic pluralism, which often sees the state as 
a “relatively neutral umpire brokering the demands of competing interest 
groups... particular social class, or... overshadowed by powerful private 
interests”,21 is in the case of the United States, a valid theory for inclusion in the 
study of its foreign policy – it cannot stand on its own, but it can inform a 
pluralist theory of American foreign policy and international relations. 
                                                     
19
 Hill (2003), p.3 
20
 Rosenfeld (Jan.1974), p.267 
21
 Parmar (Apr.1995), pp.73-74 
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If the American foreign policy process is heavily or even partially 
influenced by domestic interests, is the realist claim that elites dominate the 
decision process and therefore foreign policy-making wrong? This question is of 
particular interest to this study, and poses a number of further questions about 
the American foreign policy-making process. If members of the foreign policy 
elite are disinterested in or disengaged from policy-making, or lacking in 
expertise – be they members of the Executive Office or members of Congress – 
do non-governmental interests rise to the task, taking over the responsibility of 
producing foreign, and particularly China-policy? How much of an impact does 
elite disinterest, disengagement or lack of expertise have on the process, and 
what sort of alternative mechanisms can arise in such instances? Does elite 
disinterest prevent policy coherence, or outright policy construction? If this is 
the case, will policies be suboptimal, based on incomplete or popular sources of 
information and intelligence (such as the media or non-governmental 
organisations and interests)? The truth, as will be explained in this thesis, is 
that foreign policies are not the product of “pristine calculations of national 
interests by trained experts with all the facts at their disposal”. Rather, 
American foreign policy is often the result of “profoundly political processes in 
which differing, sometimes competing, domestic interests, bureaucracies, and 
individuals affect the outcome.”22 In addition, this thesis advances a neutral 
position on the pluralisation of American foreign policy-making, as the role of 
the media and special interests is neither uniformly negative nor positive. 
Despite the important role the media and lobbies play in the formulation 
of US foreign policy, it remains the contention of this thesis that the Executive, 
and the President in particular, remain central to actual policy-making and 
strategising. As Colin Dueck has posited, presidents act as focal points for their 
party when it comes to foreign policy, and the latitude they enjoy when making 
foreign policy ensures their central role in the process. Dueck argues that after 
all external forces are taken into consideration, “the triumph of one foreign 
policy tendency over another is crucially shaped by the president’s own 
                                                     
22
 Suettinger (2003), pp.5-6 
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choices,” and that “foreign policy is what the president says it is.”23 As will be 
explained over the course of this thesis – particularly in Part Two – Dueck is not 
strictly speaking wrong, as the personal beliefs and biases of a president and his 
immediate staff are, indeed, important to understanding which policies he is 
likely to favour. However, Dueck attributes too much power to the president. 
This is not an unusual mistake to make. The president is not omnipotent, and 
foreign policy is not made in an immaculate vacuum, deaf to the clamouring 
voices of public discourse. Rather, policy issues and proposals are filtered 
through various levels of government that are open to external pressures to 
varying degrees. 
External forces that are presumed to push presidential decision-making 
one way or another – namely, economic interests, political considerations, 
international pressures, and public intellectuals – are important, but many 
dismiss them too readily. Dueck’s contention is that these influences are more 
important when considering domestic politics, and should not be given too 
much credit when it comes to foreign policy because, “foreign policy is not 
made in exactly the same way as domestic policy in the United States.”24 This is 
irrefutable, but what Dueck and others of his ilk fail to realise is that, following 
the end of the Cold War, foreign policy has gradually lost its traditional isolation 
from domestic political considerations and discourse that grew out of the 
unifying security needs of that era. As will be shown in the historical chapter, in 
the post-Cold War world, we are seeing a reversion to form in US foreign policy-
making, exaggerated and exacerbated by technological advances in the media. 
With the lack of a central thread or focus since the end of the Cold War, 
and the relative decline of the USA as new powers rise – India, China in 
particular, and also a resurgent Russia – it is both timely and necessary to 
understand the processes by which eventual foreign policy decisions percolate 
through the American system before reaching the Oval Office, becoming 
strategy, and then being implemented. Therefore, this thesis, aims to test the 
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hypothesis that the United States has had much more difficulty in defining a 
consistent and consensual strategy for China than for any other relationship.  
The core research question is not, in this case why; rather, it is more 
complex. Specifically, what is it about the different social, economic, political 
and constitutional forces that come together around foreign policy-making in 
the United States that makes the China policy case particularly difficult to be 
consistent and consensual about? Why is China not one thing to all (as with the 
USSR), but rather different things to different forces, and arguably at different 
times? 
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis is based around three specific research questions, one empirical and 
two analytical. The empirical question seeks to develop our understanding of 
the pluralistic forces, intellectual and social, that shape the foreign policy 
process in the United States. The following two questions employ the problem 
of establishing a grand strategy for China as a way of exploring contemporary 
pluralism. Therefore the questions are: 
1. What are the dominant formative processes that constitute US Foreign 
Policy in terms of intellectual trends and traditions and the multiple 
social and constitutional institutions that translate ideas about America’s 
role in the world into a foreign policy posture that is recognisably a 
‘grand strategy’? 
2. What does a case study approach that balances the conventional concern 
for executive decision-making in foreign policy with analysis of the role 
of social institutions, like the media and special interest groups, have to 
tell us about the pluralised nature of the foreign policy process in 
contemporary America? 
3. Why has China remained such a persistent problem for the US tradition 
of deploying grand strategy? Is this because China is a difficult case; or 
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because, unlike the Soviet Union or the European Union as evident 
negative or positive cases, China divides rather than unites the pluralist 
interests and perspectives of US foreign policy pluralism? 
The research approach adopted to answer these questions is a 
conventional qualitative one, where I will follow King, Keohane, and Verba’s 
definition of qualitative research as focusing on 
“one or a small number of cases, to use in-depth interviews or 
intensive analyses of historical materials, to be discursive in method, 
and to be concerned with a rounded or comprehensive account of 
some event or unit.”25 
In the case of this thesis, this approach leads to the following framework 
of analysis: an extensive survey of historical materials will provide the 
information and evidence to identify key issues areas and construct a number of 
smaller case studies across the three main empirical chapters (Chapters Four to 
Six), and one single chapter-length case study. These case studies offer a 
number of perspectives from which to approach these key issues, and as a 
result the thesis offers an in-depth, comprehensive account of US-China 
relations and the impact of domestic pluralism. 
 
THESIS STRUCTURE 
The fusion of America’s and China’s economies, the two most powerful in the 
world today, is “upending conventional wisdom and reshaping the global 
system.”26 Emerging from the financial crisis of 2008, how the United States and 
China adapt to the changing system will dictate largely the future course of 
International Relations and global economics. Just as it is important to look to 
the future, it is also valuable to look at history to understand the evolution of 
both US foreign policy as a whole, and US-China policy in particular. This thesis 
will examine the US-China policy-making-process, how trends and traditions 
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influence policy, and how domestic actors in America interact with each other 
and, more importantly, with government officials, in the US’s increasingly 
pluralistic foreign policy-making system. It is for this reason that the chapter 
topics have been chosen, as follows. 
Part One of the thesis (Chapters Two and Three) addresses the theory 
and history of US Foreign Policy and China policy. Chapter Two addresses and 
outlines key theories of foreign policy (realism, liberalism, and constructivism) 
and how they relate to US foreign policy in particular. The chapter then 
examines and explains the idea of ‘Grand Strategy’. The second half of the 
chapter gives a detailed account and analysis of pluralist theory (with specific 
sections dealing with the media and Congress), and finishes with a methodology 
to advance a pluralist approach. Chapter Three provides a historical overview 
of US-China policy from the beginning of the Republic until the end of President 
George W. Bush’s administration (2008). It locates US-China relations in the 
grand sweep of American foreign policy, highlighting key trends and traditions 
that have become inherent in US foreign policy. 
After the outline of the history of US foreign policy in Part One, the three 
chapters that comprise Part Two of the thesis (Chapters Four, Five, and Six) 
provide a closer analysis of the US foreign policy decision-making process, and 
the actors operating within it. The chapters utilise key issue areas to ascertain 
how or why China policy is constructed as it is. Each chapter addresses first US 
foreign policy as a whole, before focusing on US-China relations, and addresses 
issues of economics, security and normative values. Chapter Four addresses 
the American Media and foreign policy, and is followed by an in-depth case 
study of the American media’s treatment of a key turning-point event from US-
China relations: the Tiananmen Square incident (this is identified as Chapter 
Four-II). Chapter Five addresses the role and influence of special interests and 
lobbies in the US foreign policy-making process, and contains three case studies 
of varying length on the role of business and special interests and China policy. 
Chapter Six brings the analysis into the Executive Branch and government 
institutions, assessing how presidential appointees and government 
bureaucracies account for and adjust to the increasing pluralism in US foreign 
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policy (and politics as a whole). The influence and part played by Congress is 
discussed throughout the thesis, as to separate it would be to undermine the 
fact that each sector is both impacted by and has an impact on the US Congress. 
Academics’ and think tanks’ role in the foreign policy-making process is, 
likewise, discussed across these chapters. 
Chapter Seven, the concluding chapter of the thesis, draws together and 
synthesises the conclusions from all previous chapters to answer explicitly the 
research questions, address the hypothesis presented in this chapter, and also 
will attempt to ascertain the key domestic influences on US foreign and China 
policy, and the impact of political pluralisation on the policy-making process. 
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CHAPTER II 
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, THEORY & PLURALISM 
The study and formation of American foreign policy presents a two-level 
problem of analysis: Grand Strategy is a paradigmatic issue, while pluralism 
operates on a constitutional level. How, therefore, could paradigmatic 
international relations theory interact with pluralism? According to Daniel 
Drezner, a grand strategy “consists of a clear articulation of national interests 
married to a set of operational plans for advancing them.” Sometimes, grand 
strategies are articulated in advance of policy. At other times, strategic 
narratives are offered as “coherent explanations connecting past policies with 
future ones”. Whether articulated before or after policy implementation, a well-
articulated grand strategy can offer an “interpretive framework” through which 
everybody, including foreign policy officials, can understand an administration’s 
behaviour.1 Pluralism is a method through which we can see how certain 
paradigms are reached for foreign policy: how domestic actors and groups work 
with or against others in their attempts to influence foreign policy to further 
their own agendas, and also perhaps how articulated or perceived Grand 
Strategies are interpreted by domestic actors. 
Foreign Policy Analysis emerged in the 1950s, a reaction to both the Cold 
War and its associated crises and the realist preoccupation with explaining 
scientifically external state behaviour.2 This environment made it crucial for 
international relations specialists and scholars to make sense of state behaviour 
and interaction. Following the end of the Cold War, and the implosion of the 
Soviet Union, it became apparent to scholars that existing theories might not be 
                                                          
1
 Drezner (Jul/Aug.2011), pp.58-59 
2
 White (2003), pp.1-2 
Stefan Fergus Chapter II: American Foreign Policy, Theory & Pluralism 
18 
 
as relevant in the new environment, in part because they had failed to predict 
the decline of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. According to David 
Kerr, analysts began referring to a state of “paradigms lost”, as a crisis of 
confidence emerged within the IR community, as scholars questioned the 
theoretical ability “to assert its intellectual grasp over the dynamic, complex 
and interdependent world order”.3 
The study of foreign policy has remained problematic, as differing theories 
and assumptions are made on the proper way to pursue FPA by IR scholars. As 
Walter Carlsnaes suggests, while there is “relatively stable consensus” on what 
constitutes the subject matter of foreign policy analysis, there are “deep-rooted 
disagreements within the field regarding both its conceptual boundaries and 
the most appropriate manner to analyse its substance”.4 This lack of consensus 
on how to approach foreign policy analysis has caused ruptures between and 
within different schools of thought, robbing FPA of a “sub-disciplinary identity”. 
Indeed, Carlsnaes continues by referring to the notion that the attitude towards 
foreign policy analysis is, to paraphrase Mao Zedong, one of ‘allowing a hundred 
flowers to bloom’, with reference to the number of theories and sub-divisions 
that have come to populate the foreign policy analysis sphere.5 Carlsnaes points 
out that in the 1970s, there was an “unquestioned assumption that the subject 
matter of foreign policy belongs naturally to the empirical domain of public 
policy rather than international relations”, and it is for this reason that most 
treatises on foreign policy and FPA in textbooks could be found within policy 
chapters or inserted alongside or within chapters on diplomacy.6 
Foreign policy, therefore, inhabits a strange, elusive position in the world 
of international relations theory. It is a “kind of free-floating enterprise, logically 
unconnected to, and disconnected from, the main theories of international 
relations”.7 Often, foreign policy is dismissed as a way of looking at system level 
and unit level theories. The ‘free-floating’ nature of the study does allow for 
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great freedom in the study of foreign policy, offering near-endless opportunities 
and scope for analysis. 
There remains the question of what foreign policy actually is, and how to 
deal with its study. Carlsnaes defines foreign policy as consisting of: 
“those actions which, expressed in the form of explicitly stated goals, 
commitments and/or directives, and pursued by governmental 
representatives acting on behalf of their sovereign communities, are 
directed toward objectives, conditions and actors – both 
governmental and non-governmental – which they want to affect and 
which lie beyond their territorial legitimacy”8 
Christopher Hill proposes two slightly different definitions of foreign 
policy: 
“Broadly interpreted, foreign policy is about the fundamental issue of 
how organised groups, at least in part strangers to each other, 
interrelate. The nature of these groups and their interrelations is 
naturally in evolution.”9 
And, even more succinctly: “The sum of official external relations 
conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in international 
relations.”10 
In terms of what foreign policy analysis should focus on, Hill outlines the 
two extremes of approach. The first, which is a study purely of what diplomats 
say to each other, he claims, would “leave out many of the most interesting 
aspects of international politics”. The second is a broader study that “include[s] 
almost everything that emanates from every actor on the world scene”. Hill 
rightly believes that the best solution is to find a balance between these two 
approaches, but that definitions of foreign policy are difficult to conceptualise 
given the changing nature of the field: “Now that foreign offices do not 
monopolise external relations” there is a need to decide on which personnel are 
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to be counted as foreign policy decision-makers,11 and essential to understand 
what informs their decisions. 
One approach to the question of foreign policy formulation believes that 
“agency lies elsewhere”, with a proliferation of actors in the process, which 
wield increasing and varying amounts of influence on a nation’s international 
affairs. Other theorists have chosen “to ignore agency altogether… concentrating 
their attention on structures”.12 
Given the nature of the United States policy-making system and political 
environment, this thesis adheres to the former approach, that agency is as 
important as structure, and that domestic actors in the United States are 
important in the American conception and creation of foreign policy, and that 
they are able to exert influence on foreign policy (although, as will be explained 
later, measuring influence is extremely difficult). To speak of ‘US foreign policy’, 
“is really to speak of a number of foreign policy decisions determined by 
competition among a number of actors,”13 because “the decision is not made by 
some abstract entity called ‘the United States’ but by some combination of actors 
within the foreign policy establishment.”14 It is this belief in the importance of 
domestic actors that requires a pluralist approach to the study of American 
foreign policy. “Competition, coalition building, and compromise will often 
result in a decision that is then announced in the name of the United States”. The 
reality is that a ‘state decision’ may be the result of lobbying carried out by a 
multitude of nongovernmental actors (including, for example, multinational 
corporations or interest groups), or it may be influenced by something as 
amorphous and immeasurable as public opinion or media coverage. 
A nation’s foreign policies “are not the product of pristine calculations of 
national interests by trained experts with all the facts at their disposal”, as 
realists might have us believe. Rather, foreign policies are “the result of a 
profoundly political process in which differing, sometimes competing, domestic 
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interests, bureaucracies, and individuals affect the outcome.”15 While some 
policymakers may well be experts (Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger, Sandy 
Berger, Brent Scowcroft, George H.W. Bush, to name but a handful), “they are 
often working with incorrect or incomplete information, as well as inaccurate 
assumptions and cultural prejudices.”16 
This thesis looks at decision- and policy-making, the “very human process 
by which ideas, beliefs, strategies, theories, prejudices, pressures, trade-offs, and 
choices become identifiable foreign policies”. A “complex and confusing process, 
often misunderstood, especially by those who look only at the policy 
outcomes,”17 it can help understand why certain policies are pursued, who 
might influence them, and how they are conceived. As no single theory of 
international relations can account for or explain US foreign policy-making, a 
pluralist approach will be taken – an explanation of pluralism follows 
immediately after the brief descriptions of key international relations theories 
that are traditionally used to discuss American foreign policy and grand 
strategy. By first briefly outlining what American foreign policies have been, in 
Chapter Three, the second and main part of the thesis will take a closer to look 
at which actors and sectors of domestic political society try to exert influence on 
the foreign policy-making process, how they operate, and attempt to ascertain 
the level of their respective influence. 
 
THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, AGENCY & STRUCTURE 
American foreign policymakers may or may not identify themselves as “realists”, 
but many will nevertheless share some or many realist assumptions (possibly 
unstated), and therefore see international relations and foreign policy-making 
through a realist lens. Other policymakers may be liberal internationalists, 
neoliberal institutionalists, or constructivists, “even if such terms are foreign to 
them.” Whether or not policymakers consciously identify with an international 
                                                          
15
 Suettinger (2003), pp.5-6 
16
 Suettinger (2003), p.5 
17
 Suettinger (2003), p.5 
Stefan Fergus Chapter II: American Foreign Policy, Theory & Pluralism 
22 
 
relations ideology, they “nevertheless tend to have internalised the set or sets of 
assumptions, material and ideational understandings, and theories offered by 
one or another of these camps.”18 Therefore, it is important to understand what 
these theories have to say about the conduct of international relations. This 
section will briefly outline realism, liberalism, and constructivism. 
There is an ongoing and important debate in international relations, the 
Agent-Structure argument, which argues over the best way to conceptualise the 
relationship between the international system and (state) actors. Introduced by 
Alexander Wendt in 1987, the paradigm was framed thus: 
“1) human beings and their organizations are purposeful actors 
whose actions help reproduce or transform the society in which they 
live; and 2) society is made up of social relationships, which structure 
the interactions between these purposeful actors”.19 
It is within the discussion of this debate that FPA can become increasingly 
difficult, as well as diminished. The world of politics and international relations 
is populated by agents – for example, states, human individuals, corporations – 
and the structures within which they operate. These structures can be either 
international organisations, treaties, or global regions (for example, East Asia). 
Agent-Structure theories can be split between those who preference the 
influence of agents, those that preference structures, and a third group that 
argues for the mutual influence of both agents and structures. The debate has 
been “the root cause of a number of deeply entrenched disputes, stretching from 
the late medieval differentiation between individual and the state to 
contemporary metatheoretical controversies within science, epistemology, and 
political philosophy”.20 
Waltz, considered a structural realist or neo-realist, argued that while 
states are obliged to look after themselves and regard other states as potential 
threats, they are not inherently aggressive. Rather, it is the nature of the 
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international system (or structure) that forces them to adjust their stance in the 
world in accordance with their perceptions of other states’ power in relation to 
their own.21 What this does not take into account, however, is that different 
actors within states will view international events in different ways, and 
therefore make different decisions. This will prove to be a major hindrance to 
attempts to apply any of the traditional theoretical models to the formation of 
American foreign policy. 
At the heart of the agent-structure debate, as Carlsnaes points out, lies “an 
increasingly wide-spread recognition that, instead of being antagonistic 
partners in a zero-sum relationship, human agents and social structures are in a 
fundamental sense inter-related entities, and hence that we cannot account fully 
for one without invoking the other”, or in other words: “the properties of both 
agents and social structures are relevant to a proper understanding of social 
behaviour”.22 
The theory most often utilised in foreign policy analysis is that of Realism. 
The realist image of foreign policy sees the State as the main, unitary and 
rational actor in foreign policy and international relations, seeking to maximise 
its national interest or objectives, usually starting from the emphasis on 
international security.23 Put differently, realism argues that “politics, like society 
in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human 
nature”.24 After the inter-war period, realism became the orthodoxy in academic 
writing, and during the Cold War period, it appeared “self-evident that states, 
and military force, were the main features of the international system”.25 
From a realist state-centric stand-point, agents will pursue their national 
interests regardless of the system/structure in which they operate. As 
Morgenthau states, the absence of a world government in the international 
system forces states to pursue their national interests by increasing their power. 
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Indeed, when national interests can only be pursued by power, the pursuit of 
power itself becomes a national interest, or in Morgenthau’s terms, “statesmen 
think and act in terms of interest defined as power.”26 
Philip Bobbitt agrees with realism’s central premise that the national 
interest is key in understanding – as well as forming – foreign policy. Bobbitt 
argues that neither internal changes to strategy, nor changes to the international 
system will cause wars or conflict. Rather, 
“Wars are fought over the usual mix of ambition and fear that has 
characterised state conflict from the time states began. The causes of 
epochal wars are no different from the causes of war generally.”27 
In addition to this, the realist perspective holds that only government 
policy elites are of consequence in foreign policy-making. Jacobs and Shapiro 
suggest that the President “is the single source of decisive direction in American 
foreign policy making and the primary force for counteracting rampant 
fragmentation and division”. It is the President who “lead[s] public opinion to 
unify elites”, and a chief executive that can “mobilise public support behind [his] 
foreign policy ha[s] a powerful resource for imposing direction on the separate, 
uncoordinated actions of countless government institutions and elites.” Realists 
require policy elites to make the distinction between a good foreign policy 
informed by intelligence and elite opinions, and a poor or sub-optimal foreign 
policy informed by public opinion. “Elites are uniquely qualified to make foreign 
policy because they possess substantial objective knowledge and capacity for 
complex and hard-headed reasoning about the realities of global power 
struggles,” and are more likely to take into account the ‘long-view’ of 
international relations by not bowing to fleeting, emotional preferences of the 
public.28 Morgenthau argues that to base foreign policy decisions on public 
opinion is to “sacrifice... good policy on the altar of public opinion... exchanging 
short-lived political advantage for the permanent interests of the country.”29 
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In Morgenthau’s realist tradition, “the pursuit of, and the struggle for, 
power in international politics is both reasonable and natural”.30 Morgenthau 
observed “that statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power, 
and the evidence of history bears that assumption out”. Morgenthau argues that 
using this assumption “imposes intellectual discipline on the observer” of 
foreign policy processes and practitioners, bringing a rational order into the 
matter of politics and making a theoretical understanding of politics possible. 
Morgenthau suggests realism’s superiority by pointing out that using a realist 
theory of international relations “will guard against two popular fallacies: the 
concern with motives and the concern with ideological preferences”, because it 
allows for continuity – able to make “American, British, or Russian foreign policy 
appear as an intelligible, rational continuum, by and large consistent within 
itself, regardless of the different motives, preferences, and intellectual and moral 
qualities of successive statesmen”, allowing for greater comparison between 
different states’ policies.31 This thesis does not deny Morgenthau’s assertion of 
power and the national interest’s dominance in foreign policy. Where I will 
diverge from Morgenthau, rather, is how the national interest is defined in the 
United States. 
Neoliberalism, which also recognises the primacy of the state in the 
international system, grew as a response to neorealism. Neoliberals also believe 
that states “behave like egoistic value maximisers”, and that the international 
system is “essentially anarchic”. Neoliberalism is a “structural, systemic and top-
down view” of international relations.32 
Neoliberals differ from realists in their belief that international 
cooperation is possible in an anarchic international system between 
autonomous, rational states and institutions, even if they pursue their own 
interests. This is because the system, while in a state of anarchy, “can 
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nevertheless be positively affected by the institutional provision of information 
and common rules in the form of functional regimes.”33 
Neoliberalism can work as a structural approach to foreign policy analysis 
at the sub-systemic level, focussing on the causal relationship between states 
and the agencies within them (and how agencies conform to the demands of the 
state). For neoliberals, individual decision-makers can be a focus of study; 
assessing how structural confines dictate how these individuals operate within 
the state or agency.34 Equally, liberal theory emphasises the positive role public 
opinion can play in “providing guidance to state officials and producing good 
public policy, including foreign policy.”35 
Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr, two leading neoliberalists, refute 
the realist importance of egoistic national interest (in a contemporary context) 
as a primary driving force in international relations. Particularly, Keohane has 
disagreed with Mearsheimer’s statement that “institutions cannot get states to 
stop behaving as short-term maximizers”,36 because, Keohane argues, 
neorealism does not account for the investments that states make in 
international organisations such as the European Union, NATO and the United 
Nations.37 Keohane and Nye believe we are “presented [with] a world of 
complex interdependence, with states maintaining contacts at various levels and 
in various dimensions.” They believe that “the interdependence paradigm sees 
inter-state relations as disaggregated, international co-operation as feasible and 
actual, and the ‘national interest’ of realist theory as illusory.”38 
Keohane and Nye accurately point out that the line between domestic and 
international issues is blurring, with issues that bridge both categories (known 
by some as ‘intermestic’ issues) becoming central (for example, oil prices). 
Keohane and Nye argue that, in international politics, there are multiple 
channels through which states are connected, including informal governmental 
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ties, multinational corporations and also other organisations that operate in the 
international system (such as Non-Governmental Organisations), and that “The 
rise of integrated world markets for capital constitutes another dimension of 
contemporary interdependence.”39 Keohane & Nye, in Power and 
Interdependence (1977), argued that increased interdependence, binding 
economic and political interests ever more tightly, could help promote peace 
and stability by limiting the use of force, the cost of which would become 
prohibitive; this would mean the role of the military as problem-solver between 
countries in which complex interdependence exists, would be reduced.  
The constructivist theory of foreign policy holds that international 
relations are, to a considerable degree, shaped by subjective factors, “by the 
beliefs and ideas that people carry around in their heads and that cause them to 
interpret events and data in particular ways”.40 The nature of relations and 
interactions between two states is not just the result of objective and material 
factors, such as comparative military power and the balance of bilateral trade. 
Constructivists believe that international relations are “socially constructed”.41 
As a school of thought, constructivism is far from unified, and it is 
becoming less so as more literature is produced.42 There are, however, some 
uniformly-accepted elements to the school. Constructivist theory, like realist 
theory, accepts that the world of international relations is generally anarchic; 
constructivists, however, believe this to be the case for very different reasons. At 
a most general level, “constructivists assert that international politics tends to 
be competitive and violent, not because some immutable principles of human 
behaviour require that it be so but rather because, across the centuries, national 
leaders have tended to believe this to be the case.”43 In other words, as 
Alexander Wendt says, “realism is a self-fulfilling prophecy.”44 
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A handicap of constructivism is that it is difficult to measure. Hedley Bull is 
deeply committed to the centrality of norms and institutions in international 
politics, and to the “notion that society is constituted through diverse political 
practices built around shared, inter-subjective understandings – that is, 
understandings that exist between and amongst actors”.45 In a nod towards 
realist thought, Bull also believes that “brute material facts and cold power 
politics could act as a powerful check on both the aspirations of practitioners 
and the methods of the analyst”.46 Constructivism studies the process by which 
international institutions and ideas are socially constructed over time, and how 
they influence nations’ interaction on the international stage. This is, of course, 
important and could suggest it is a better theory for the purposes of this thesis. 
However, domestic pluralism will be favoured over constructivism for the 
simple reason that this latter theory (detailed below) examines the role of 
domestic non-state actors operating in the policy-making system, which 
constructivism does not account for sufficiently. 
Neoliberals and neo-realists, in the wake of the Cold War, offered 
influential structuralist approaches to the study of international relations and 
foreign policy, diminishing the importance of the state as actor within the 
international system.47 Wendt (along with Kenneth Waltz) took a similar 
position, and therefore is “interested in international politics, not foreign 
policy”.48 Such separation between international relations and the individual 
foreign policies that feed into them seems absurd, and has been contested. 
James Fearon takes issue with Wendt’s and Waltz’s insistence that it is an 
“error” to conflate theories of international politics and theories of foreign 
policy.49 Specifically, Fearon points out that “the things that structural realist 
theory seeks to explain – such as balancing, the probability of major power war, 
or a general disposition to competitive interstate relations – are either foreign 
policies or the direct (if sometimes unintended) result of foreign policies.”50 In 
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other words, within the broader structure of international relations are 
interacting foreign policies determined by individual states. Fearon’s position 
converges with the overall thesis of my research – that international relations 
are the product of foreign policies which are, in turn, products of the domestic 
political systems in which they are made, that the state and its internal 
composition are actually very important in the examination of its foreign policy. 
If domestic actors and structures are to be examined as contributing factors 
towards foreign policy, therefore, the previously discussed international 
relations theories will not suffice. 
The changing nature of international relations, and the difficulty in 
qualifying its study within one theory or approach has long been recognised. 
Henry Kissinger, one of the world’s most famous realist practitioners, was 
already aware of the growing importance of a pluralist appreciation of 
international relations, in 1975: 
“progress in dealing with the traditional agenda is no longer enough. 
A new and unprecedented kind of issue has emerged. The problems 
of energy, resources, environment, pollution, the uses of space and 
the seas now rank with questions of military security, ideology, and 
territorial rivalry which have traditionally made up the diplomatic 
agenda.”51 
Waltz, however, “find[s] it hard to believe that economic processes direct 
or determine a nation’s policies, that spontaneously arrived at decisions about 
where to place resources reward or punish a national economy so strongly that 
a government either does what pleases the ‘herd’ or its economy fails to prosper 
or even risks collapse.”52 To Waltz, the 21st Century is going to be another 
century of the nation-state.53 Perhaps a better understanding of economics in 
the agent-structure debate is to detach multinational corporations from their 
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state-moorings, and to consider them individual actors in their own right.54 As 
will be shown, however, economic concerns can influence a nation’s foreign 
policy – and, referring specifically to the work in the upcoming chapters, 
America’s experience with China has frequently been informed by economic 
decisions in the past and continues to be so today. 
While each of the three theories discussed above have strong components 
for the study of international relations, they are each flawed for the purposes of 
studying how foreign policy is influenced by domestic actors – each of the 
theories has components that could be used to study the role of the Executive 
(realism), special interests (liberalism), and also the media (constructivism). 
Individually, however, they do not account for the reality of American domestic 
politics, despite the frequent presentation of foreign policy in both realist and 
liberal terms. In order to better understand the domestic forces at work in the 
American foreign policy-making system, this study will draw on pluralist theory 
to consider the role of the media, special interests and government institutions. 
Before looking at pluralism, however, we need to take a look at ‘Grand Strategy’ 
in US foreign policy history. 
 
UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY & GRAND STRATEGY 
“[T]he subject of foreign policy in the United States is like the subject of 
snakes in Ireland. There are no snakes in Ireland.”55 
Lord Bryce, UK Ambassador to the USA (1907-13) 
Throughout its history, like all other nations of the world, the US has acted in 
defence of its national interests, “but a continuous thread of idealism has also 
found a place in American foreign policy”. This idealism is based around the 
belief in America that it has a duty (or, in Cameron’s words, “a unique mission”) 
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to promote its values of “freedom, independence, and democracy”, as well as its 
market economy or capitalist economic system.56 This mix of realism and 
idealism combines to inform the idea of an American Grand Strategy, which 
many scholars believe is in evidence throughout US history. 
Walter Russell Mead, a noted foreign policy historian, has argued that 
“American grand strategy is almost a contradiction in terms, in the sense that 
very few administrations are able to consistently develop a strategy that they 
can then maintain over a long period of time.” However, he continues, “over the 
decades and even centuries, one does see the tracks of a grand strategy in 
American history.”57 Or, as Daniel Drezner’s explains it, the “tyranny of the 
status quo” prohibits new administrations from rebranding or diverging much 
from traditional conceptions of American grand strategy.58 Mead argues that US 
Grand Strategy began with the idea of a US monopoly of the Western 
Hemisphere, “along with balances of power in the chief theatres of the world; 
with belief in the primacy of sea and air power and the need for an economic 
system to support these; and the objective of transforming international 
politics.”59 
A survivor of the 18th Century is the language used by the Founding 
Fathers, and their characterisations of international relations have proved 
stubbornly institutionalised in the American political psyche. In his 1796 
Farewell Address, George Washington warned that “No nation is to be trusted 
farther than it is bound by interest; and no prudent statesman or politician will 
venture to depart from it.” Washington also added that nations don’t act to the 
benefit of others, “unless both [nations’] interests happen to be assimilated.”60 
Therefore, in colonial Americans’ hierarchy of values, “there was no expectation 
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that states would or should pursue anything other than their own interests, and 
political science was tasked with finding where that true interest lay.”61 
According to Alexis de Tocqueville, Washington’s and Jefferson’s principles 
of neutrality and opposition to entangling alliances, and solicitation of special 
privileges from foreign nations (the ‘Great Rule’, as McDougall refers to these 
principles), were 
“easily understood by the people, [and] have greatly simplified the 
foreign policy of the United States. As the Union takes no part in the 
affairs of Europe, it has, properly speaking, no foreign interests to 
discuss, since it has, as yet, no powerful neighbours on the American 
continent... The foreign policy of the United States is eminently 
expectant; it consists more in abstaining than in acting.”62 
McDougall understands de Tocqueville’s point as, the United States at this 
time was “a nation... uninterested in practicing grand strategy as the rest of the 
civilised human race understood it – hence the Great Rule obeyed since 
Washington’s time”.63 
The American conception of grand strategy has evolved since the country’s 
inception, yet many of the politically-charged topics of the 18th Century have 
survived into the modern era. Specifically, these topics revolve around trade, 
national defence in a hostile world environment, and individual states’ interests. 
Economics and foreign policy and grand strategy have been inextricably 
linked since the end of the Revolutionary War.64 In McDougall’s characterisation 
of economic grand strategy, “the real motive for U.S. foreign policy during all 
eras of history was not security or liberty, but the capitalist appetite for new 
markets, resources, and customers, at home and increasingly abroad. So the 
American Dream was real, but therein lay tragedy because in order to meet the 
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growing expectations of a growing population the United States was ineluctably 
drawn to imperialism that belied its liberationist rhetoric.”65 
The pursuit of an economic grand strategy also has its roots in the early 
language of the Republic. Beyond James Madison’s Federalist No.10, which called 
for a proto-pluralist societal system comprised of multiple “factions” with broad 
interests that would aid the expansion and economic improvement of the 
fledgling nation, a Congressional address to the American public, on May 8th 
1778, announced that, 
“The sweets of a free commerce with every part of the earth will soon 
reimburse you for all the losses you have sustained. The full tide of 
wealth will flow in upon your shores, free from the arbitrary 
impositions of those whose interest and whose declared policy it was 
to check your growth.”66 
There was little doubt among political leaders of the time that it was in the 
United States’ particular interests to pursue free trade with the rest of the world, 
and that the US would inevitably be the main beneficiaries of such a policy.67 
In conjunction with Americans’ focus on economic expansion is an 
idealistic component to American foreign relations. ‘Doing the right thing’ is 
very important to Americans “as to no other people”, making “American 
politics... like politics nowhere else”.68 John Dumbrell has identified this idealist 
impression of America’s duty as a form of liberalism, and that this liberalism – 
the combination of idealism and economics – forms “the ideological core of 
American foreign policy”.69 To further explain: “An optimistic interpretation of 
the relationship between capitalism and democracy is central to the driving 
ideology of US foreign policy: [this is] the ideology of liberalism.”70 At the same 
time, Americans’ feelings about the “justice of their cause” runs deep. “Practical 
idealism”, Hendrickson writes, would become the “American leitmotif”, and the 
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Founding generation would understand the language of interests, yet speak in 
morally idealistic terms.71 
Conventional wisdom holds that “no country can escape its geography and 
history when it comes to establishing its foreign policy principles and 
priorities,”72 and this was certainly the case with the new American Republic. 
Along with US dominance of the Western Hemisphere (as outlined in the 
Monroe Doctrine and later Roosevelt Corollary), US grand strategy has strong 
roots in a British legacy, and the early Republic would aspire to Britain’s 
“geopolitical advantages as an insular, maritime, commercial power benefitting 
from the rivalries and balance of power prevailing among its continental 
European rivals”.73 
In the late 19th Century, there grew the realisation that the undefined 
nature of American Grand Strategy would have to be institutionalised in a 
strategic environment facing rapid change – revolutions in commerce, shipping, 
communications, and other technologies “were forging a global economic and 
military arena” in which “Britain and her many challengers for naval and 
colonial power bumped up against U.S. interests and spheres of influence”.74 The 
input of a number of influential men would help codify US grand strategy. 
Commodore Stephen B. Luce (founder of the Naval War College, in 1884), 
Captain A.T. Mahan, and Secretary of the Navy Benjamin Tracy convinced 
Congress to fund a two-ocean US Navy. Business leaders, especially those 
involved in ship-building-related industries, would form the US’s “first military-
industrial-complex” to boost military expenditure. Finally, operating in the 
slipstream of powerful publicists, and journalists – including, for example, 
William Randolph Hearst – politicians such as Theodore Roosevelt and Henry 
Cabot Lodge would articulate the new US grand strategy, a “great equation” of 
“federal policies to promote defence, exports, sustainable growth, conservation, 
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assimilation of immigrants, free enterprise with measures to check its worst 
abuses, and both secular and Social Gospel safety nets”.75 
For example, the focus on maintaining sea and air power would enable the 
United States to protect its interests wherever they might be threatened. The 
American economic strategy also developed from the British power experience: 
“America will build an economic system, given this balance-of-power 
policy, that will make it rich enough to afford the military 
investments necessary to maintain its power strategy, just as in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the British made enough money 
from trade to be able to afford subsidies to their continental allies 
and to maintain the forces necessary to meet their military 
objectives.”76 
In addition to enhancing its way of life, the US also hoped to use its 
economic system to pacify other countries. Both Germany and Japan, for 
example, were able to increase their wealth dramatically after World War II by 
participating in the US economic system. A contemporary example of this, 
argues Mead, is that “Washington is trying to keep the Chinese focused on their 
ability to enrich themselves by participating in the world’s economic system, so 
they aren’t tempted to overturn it.” Exclusion from the system is almost as 
strong a factor as participation. To continue the China-example:  
“as China industrialises, it becomes more dependent on exports to the 
United States. That dependence would make China think two or three 
times before entering into war with America... Washington is 
encouraging China to be globalised, dependent on commodities they 
do not have that come from all over the world, where U.S. air and sea 
power, if necessary, can interdict these supplies.”77 
Mead’s greatest contribution to the study of US foreign policy was his 
identification and subsequent categorisation of the four ‘schools’ of American 
foreign policy grand strategy. “Americans through the centuries seem to have 
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had four basic ways of looking at foreign policy, which have contrasted with or 
sometimes complimented their ways of looking at domestic policy. These 
approaches appear early in American history, and while they have each evolved 
in response to changes in the international order and in American society, they 
have also remained identifiable over the centuries... They reflect deep-seated 
regional, economic, social, and class interests; they embody visions for domestic 
as well as foreign policy; they express moral and political values as well as 
socioeconomic and political interests.”78 These four schools are the 
Hamiltonians, Wilsonians, Jeffersonians, and Jacksonians (useful terminology for 
this discussion here, but they will feature little in the following chapters). 
For Hamiltonians, the “first task of American government [is] promoting 
the health of American enterprise at home and abroad,” which requires a 
“strong alliance between the national government and big business”, and have 
long espoused a need for the nation to be “integrated into the global economy on 
favourable terms”. The Wilsonian school are less concerned with economic 
agendas, and favour moral and legal international concerns, believing America 
has a “moral obligation and an important national interest in spreading 
American democratic and social values throughout the world”, the result of 
which would be a peaceful international community. Jeffersonians are more 
domestically-minded, and argue US foreign policy should be “less concerned 
[with] spreading democracy abroad than about safeguarding it at home”, and 
adhere strongly to Washington’s caution against foreign entangling alliances. 
Mead’s final school, the Jacksonians, “believe that the most important goal of the 
U.S. government in both foreign and domestic policy should be the physical 
security and the economic well-being of the American people.” Jacksonians 
believe America should not seek out foreign quarrels, but there is no question 
that there is no substitute for victory against belligerents.79 
All four schools made necessary adjustments following the decline of the 
British Empire and the changes in the international environment this entailed. 
Hamiltonians “dropped their historic protectionism and supported free trade as 
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a necessary economic policy for a hegemonic power”; Jeffersonians “modified 
their historic aversion to great-power politics to provide critical support for the 
Cold War”; Wilsonians “linked their vision of a universal moral order... to the 
concrete needs of the American hegemony”; and the Jacksonians provided “forty 
years of broad and unwavering popular support” for the Cold War, as the 
predominant group favouring containment.80 
There are clearly certain areas of overlap between these four schools, but 
Mead’s categories provide a good base with which we can systematically study 
differing approaches to US foreign policy throughout its history. 
Grand strategies are useful tools for identifying what an administration 
believes US foreign policy to be, and to make plans accordingly. They are easy to 
devise, because “they are forward-looking, operate in generalities”, and are 
useful as a signalling device for both domestic and foreign audiences. During 
normal times, foreign policy decision-makers will “extrapolate from current 
capabilities or past actions to predict the behaviour of others.” This is also true 
of uncertain times. As Drezner explains, “Ideas matter most when actors are 
operating in uncharted waters. They can function as cognitive beacons, guiding 
countries to safety” and, during these times, grand strategies “can signal to 
outsiders the future intentions of a country’s policymakers, reassuring or 
repulsing important audiences.” Foreign policy officials can infer what to do 
from their government’s strategic documents, which actors abroad can also use 
to develop expectations about the future: “foreign governments will care about 
how much a country’s proposed response to uncertainty seeks to revise or 
reinforce the status quo. Countries prefer devils they know.”81 
Despite each new administration’s attempts to re-articulate or rebrand 
grand strategy (often to differentiate themselves from immediate 
predecessors), the “tyranny of the status quo often renders grand strategy a 
constant rather than a variable”.82 The biggest obstacle a new strategy can face 
is troublesome domestic politics: “Viable grand strategies need to rest on a 
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wellspring of domestic support.” When constructing and articulating a grand 
strategy, presidents and officials are often handicapped by the “mismatch 
between the complexity of the global system and the simplicity of U.S. foreign 
policy rhetoric.” For example, politicians and the American public have little 
difficulty understanding the differences between “friends” and “enemies” and 
the policies that these would suggest. At the same time, however, they have 
greater difficulty understanding the more nuanced term, “rivals”. This means it 
can be difficult for an administration to use the potential threat posed by rising 
powers as a way to goad the United States or a recalcitrant Congress into action, 
without at the same time stimulating excessive demagoguery about, for 
example, China: “Official rhetoric is at least partly to blame for inflated public 
fears about Chinese power.” Therefore, because “politics abhors a rhetorical 
vacuum”, a president who is not clear about his grand strategy will leave his 
policy open to attack from foreign policy critics and political opponents, and 
also domestic interest groups, who “will be happy to define it for him, using less 
than flattering language”,83 as a means to further their own political agendas. 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, international relations 
theories are not enough to fully conceptualise the policy-making process in the 
United States. The fractured and porous policy-making system, not to mention 
the articulated economic focus of US foreign policy presents a problem for 
administrations, in that it “increases the likelihood of domestic discord” and 
opens up foreign policy further to domestic partisan and special interest 
politics. Demographic and political changes in the United States are having an 
impact on any domestic foreign policy consensus that may have existed (for 
example, the right’s increased rejection of multilateralism and the left’s 
rejection of power projection).84 Therefore, the increased encroachment of 
domestic politics and considerations creates an imperative to study American 
foreign policy – and particularly, China policy – through the lens of pluralism, 
which is better suited to understanding the forces, influences and actors at 
work in the American foreign policy-making system. With this in mind, we now 
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turn our attention to a brief explanation of pluralist theory, and how the media, 
Executive and Congress are seen through the lens of pluralism. 
 
PLURALISM 
Perhaps no other country displays so clearly the myriad influences that now go 
into creating a nation’s foreign policy than the United States: evidence of a 
growing number of non-governmental actors participating in or influencing the 
policy-making process only increases the importance of a pluralist approach to 
its study. The United States’ highly pluralistic domestic political system informs 
not only policy decisions and implementation at home, but also America’s 
interaction with the rest of the world. Much of pluralist theory is based on a 
refutation of specific realist assumptions, but it is not in itself a wholesale 
rejection of realist principles. This thesis will take an approach that attempts to 
find the connection between realism and pluralism. 
American academics “are prone to see international politics through 
domestic political lenses”, and the image some of them hold “can be understood 
as a projection of American political processes onto the entire globe.” In other 
words, American domestic political processes are not all that different from 
American international relations processes, “and may even be considered an 
extension of those conducted within the boundaries of a given state.” Therefore, 
pluralists tend to reject realism’s distinction between “international” and 
“domestic” politics, as the line demarcating the two has become increasingly 
blurred over time.85 
Pluralism takes particular issue with the realist conception of the role of 
domestic actors. According to realists, “domestic influences over a nation’s 
foreign policy are held to have been aggregated at the level of the nation-state,” 
and therefore the impact of domestic actors hold little interest to their analysis 
of foreign affairs.86 Presidents, cabinet secretaries, mayors, governors, 
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legislators and bureaucrats are certainly the most visible actors in the American 
policy-making process, and they tend to receive the lion’s share of media 
attention, and also in courses about politics and public policy, and therefore also 
in the public mind. But public policies are made in a complex political system, 
and cannot be understood primarily by looking at presidential and 
governmental actions.87 Therefore, any observer of the American political 
process will recognise that, in the United States, domestic policies and agendas 
are clearly relevant to the formation and implementation of foreign policy. 
To illustrate the fractured and broad policy-making structure in the 
United States, Sir Nicholas Henderson, a former British Ambassador to 
Washington, once noted in evidence to the UK Parliamentary Select Committee, 
“When you say the US administration, I am sorry to be pedantic, but there is the 
Pentagon view, the State Department view, and the White House view.”88 The 
formation of US foreign policy is certainly not limited to these three 
governmental bodies, however. American foreign policy “is also the product of a 
militarised economy, of unaccountable and private power, and of periodic 
drives towards secrecy which seem to be stimulated by the fragmentation of its 
policy-making structure.”89 
Central to pluralism is the role of interest groups and non-state actors, 
creating a “policy-making environment characterised by fragmentation.”90 
According to David Truman, an early pioneer of pluralist theory, “the 
outstanding characteristic of American politics... [is the] multiplicity of co-
ordinate or near co-ordinate points of access to governmental decisions.”91 The 
access points draw the attention of a considerable number of domestic actors, 
drawn from the media, business, lobbying groups, labour unions and many 
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others. It is difficult to see how domestic politics can be pushed aside when 
discussing or analysing the American foreign policy-making process.  
Despite the fragmentation of the US foreign policy-making system, Richard 
Immerman has argued that the most important element in understanding the 
development of the American approach to foreign policy is individual choices: 
“This is not to play down the power of broad political, economic, 
social, and cultural forces at the national and international levels. But 
when one sifts through the multiple influences that are the stuff of 
history, one ends up with individuals who choose to do one thing and 
not another. That is the crucial ingredient of contingency.”92 
Immerman continues, pointing out that “neither the formulation nor 
implementation of U.S. foreign policy is democratic”, but instead “only an elite 
few” get to ‘vote’ on policy decisions, despite the pluralistic nature of American 
society and its political system. While this may appear to support the 
realist/statist, elite-centric conception of foreign policy-making, Immerman 
continues by adding a qualifier: “Without broad public support, policies are 
unlikely to succeed,”93 and it is, for this reason, important to identify and 
understand the role of the media, public opinion and special interest lobbies in 
US foreign policy-making. 
Pluralism, as opposed to realism and statism, is a weak state theory, in 
which government reacts to external pressures: Though state officials ‘make’ 
policy, pluralists argue that “they do so under the pressure of demands made by 
more powerful special interests”. The role of government, therefore, “is to 
‘weigh up’ conflicting demands so that a ‘balanced’ policy emerges that satisfies 
a broader general interest.”94 In addition, the plethora of interest groups at 
work in the system is believed to be self-corrective and self-regulating. Pluralist 
politics are “applauded as fair and desirable” due to their self-regulating nature. 
Robert Reich has paraphrased Adam Smith’s famous adage on the market and 
attributed it to the pluralist political system, in that they have their own 
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‘invisible hand’ (the interest groups and factions) guiding them, which “renders 
a more socially optimal result”.95 
No discussion of pluralism and how it can be used to discuss the United 
States’ policy-making process is complete without a brief description of the 
evolution of the theory itself. The pluralist theoretical ‘discipline’ was begun 
with Arthur F. Bentley’s The Process of Government (1908), and followed by 
David Truman’s The Governmental Process (1951). Bentley’s text revolutionised 
the field of American political studies and analysis, by asserting that the formal 
political institutions in the United States were not as important as had 
traditionally been believed. According to Bentley, governmental institutions 
offer little more than a ‘playing-field’ upon which a range of ‘interests’ compete 
over scarce political power, influence, and policy outcomes. Politics, therefore, 
is not found in competition between political parties, the work of government 
bureaucrats and federal judges, or social class struggles. Politics is found 
instead in the interaction of myriad interest groups (defined by shared material, 
ideological, cultural and social values and agendas), in a “great moving process” 
of competition and coalition building.96 Truman stressed the importance of 
countervailing group organisation – that is, the formation of groups to combat 
the potential influence of other groups, which is certainly apparent in American 
politics97 (for example, labour groups organising to combat business groups; 
also, in a way, Fox News forming to counterbalance the perceived ‘liberal bias’ 
of the mainstream media). 
Of all contributors to pluralist theory and analysis, none has been as 
influential as Robert Dahl, whose book Who Governs? (1961) is still cited 
repeatedly in key texts on the subject;98 even attempts to refute Dahl’s 
arguments tend to accept his more fundamental pluralist assumptions and 
observations. New texts have acted as updates to, and qualifications of, Who 
Governs?, taking account of subsequent developments in both American politics 
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and technology, which has allowed greater transparency of special interest 
activity and data. 
Dahl identified the core issue when studying American politics, which in 
turn is a central question of pluralist analysis: “In a political system where 
nearly every adult may vote but where knowledge, wealth, social position, 
access to officials, and other resources are unequally distributed, who actually 
governs?” This question, Dahl writes, is “peculiarly relevant” to the United 
States,99 because “if... there are great inequalities in the conditions of different 
citizens, must there not also be great inequalities in the capacities of different 
citizens to influence the decisions of their various governments?”100 
Pluralist analysis begins with the assumption that political power and 
resources are widely dispersed, and not evenly distributed among political 
actors. An individual, pluralists argue, is politically quite helpless, “but a group 
unites the resources of individuals into an effective force.” In this environment, 
individuals with similar interests and agendas will form interest groups, and it 
is these groups that pluralism takes as its prime unit of political action and 
analysis. These groups use their resources to advance their interests (often, but 
not solely, economic) in the political system. In the United States, this would 
take the form of lobbying – government, media, and also business interests, in 
some instances. Therefore, Dahl writes, “most of the actions of government can 
be explained... simply as the result of struggles among groups of individuals 
with differing interests and varying resources of influence.”101 
In a later work, Dahl described the “fundamental axiom” in the theory and 
practice of American pluralism as follows: “Instead of a single centre of 
sovereign power there must be multiple centres of power, none of which is or 
can be wholly sovereign.” American pluralism in theory and practice, he 
continues, assumes that the existence of multiple centres of power “may indeed 
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be necessary” to help tame power, secure the consent of all, and peacefully 
settle conflicts.102 
One of the limitations of the explanations and theories of pluralist politics 
that came before Dahl’s book was that they “left very little room for the 
politician. He was usually regarded merely as an agent – of majority will, the 
political parties, interest groups, or the elite. He had no independent 
influence.”103 Dahl does not offer an opposing opinion, describing a system 
“dominated by many different sets of leaders, each having access to a different 
combination of political resources”104 – in other words, a system in which 
governmental leaders are just one group among many (including those who 
lead interest groups, and business and the media, with some operating in 
overlapping spheres – such as corporate owners of media outlets). 
Theodore Lowi is equally concerned with the role of government and 
politicians in pluralist theory, and disapproves of “the zeal of pluralism for the 
group and its belief in a natural harmony of group competition.” Lowi’s criticism 
is that pluralism “break[s] down the very ethic of government by reducing the 
essential conception of government to nothing more than another set of mere 
interest groups.”105 Despite Lowi’s dislike for this conception of American 
politics, it is nonetheless possible to witness this dynamic at work in the United 
States, where non-governmental groups are also in competition with groups 
formed within government. However, what is also clear is that the White House 
and Executive Branch do retain sufficient power and control to bring the 
multitude of governmental organisations into line.106 
The role of groups in American politics is as old as the Republic. In 
Federalist #9, Hamilton argued that the new government must work as a 
“barrier” against the “horror” of “factions”.107 In Federalist #10, Madison wrote 
of the importance of regulating these factions. According to Lowi, Madison and 
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his supporters believed that groups were “a necessary evil in need of 
regulation”.108 Madison was concerned that, left unchecked, these factions could 
run amok and corrupt the new democracy, arguing that “The regulation of these 
various and interfering interests forms the principle task of modern 
legislation”.109 In Madison’s conception, no single group can dominate the 
system, and therefore all groups will learn to cooperate, bargain, and deliberate. 
They will learn to ally with other groups, and translate their specific interests 
into the “language and reality of public interest”. Interest groups that fail to 
learn these lessons will drop out of existence as they lost influence.110 
To modern pluralists, interest groups are “good, requiring only 
accommodation.” Lowi argues that pluralism’s faith in interests groups “has 
badly served liberalism by propagating the faith that a system built primarily 
upon groups and bargaining is self-corrective.”111 The findings of this thesis 
suggest that American pluralism is far more Madisonian than Lowi’s 
interpretation would suggest – the government does ‘regulate’ special interest 
influence by acting as a filter and arbiter of the cacophony of modern interest 
groups. This does not, however, mean that certain presidents and legislators are 
immune from being ‘captured’ by interest groups who attempt to win their 
attention. 
Dahl, despite his general assertion that “leaders are enormously 
influential”, does differentiate the levels of influence certain leaders will have. 
Most importantly, and something that will be supported by Chapter Six, “among 
all the persons who influence a decision, some do so more directly than others 
in the sense that they are closer to the stage where concrete alternatives are 
initiated or vetoed in an explicit and immediate way.”112 This would suggest 
that governmental leaders, specifically those close to Congressional legislators 
and also members of the Executive Branch, will wield greater influence over the 
policy-making process by virtue of their perceived proximity to power. For this 
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reason as well, they are likely to be the actors whose attention is most coveted 
by special interest lobbies. 
Neopluralism, a progression from Dahl et al’s initial conception of 
pluralism, gives priority to the recognition that there is a plurality of issue areas 
as well, often characterised by their own plurality of interest groups and elites 
operating within and around them. These are called “policy niches” by 
McFarland, and further divide the policy-making arena into perhaps hundreds 
of separate policy areas in which very few interest groups may be active.113 
Research in the 1990s into policy niches discovered a considerable issue 
proliferation, and that in many of these niches special interest influence was 
potentially greater, given the lower number of active participating groups 
attempting to influence policy outcomes.114 “Multiple elitists”, to use 
McFarland’s terminology, “viewed the American political process as fragmented 
into the hands of a multitude of separate elites controlling their own policy 
turf.”115 These elites are not only comprised of extra-governmental actors, but 
also governmental and state actors. 
Pluralism and neopluralism now identify “government officials, their 
associations, and their departments or agencies as playing interest-group roles” 
– so, for example, the Departments of Defence and State could be viewed as 
specific intra-governmental interest groups. Any “policy-influencing 
interactions of government officials that go well beyond the direct use of their 
authority” or beyond the jurisdiction and purview of their departments, “often 
is not very different from that of private interest groups.” This considerably 
expanded the scope of interest-group studies, and has enriched the broader 
understanding of the US political system. Lindblom and Woodhouse offer some 
examples of how intra-governmental institutions operate like interest groups: 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff play an interest-group role by influencing Congress. 
Congressional committees and individual representatives sometimes try, in 
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turn, to influence the Department of Defence by, for example, convincing it to 
locate a new military installation in a particular congressional district.116 
Pluralist theory rejects a core assumption of statism, that power and 
control are properties of the state – a notion that, according to Lowi, pluralism 
“renders absurd”.117 Pluralism recognises instead that there are multiple 
sources of power and control other than the state, and that they are instead 
widely distributed and ubiquitous, represented by organisations able and 
willing to use power, rejecting notions of “a national distinction between the 
functions of government and functions of nongovernmental institutions.”118 
That being said, special interest group competition on any given issue 
“provide[s] leeway for governmental agency autonomy or ‘statism’”,119 in which 
case the state is able to reassert a greater level of control over the process. 
The realist perspective of the state as a unitary actor is rejected by 
pluralists as “an abstraction that masks the essence of politics” found within 
states. The state, pluralists contend, is “not some reified entity – an abstraction 
to be treated as if it were a physical being that acts with single-minded 
determination, always in a coherent manner.” Instead, states are composed of 
individual government bureaucracies, a multitude of interest groups, and 
individuals that attempt to influence the formulation of foreign policy. 
Competition, coalition building, conflict, and compromise among these actors 
form the essence of politics. Pluralism therefore challenges the notion of the 
State as a rational actor, “which follows logically from the pluralist image of the 
disaggregated state in which the foreign policy decision-making process is the 
result of clashes, bargaining, and compromise between and among different 
actors.”120 Statesmen and policymakers may be “tempted to take their cue from 
public opinion polls, evincing more concern for their personal standing or 
power position than for the good of their country as a whole”.121 This possibility 
that a policy may be proposed in order to enhance the bureaucratic power and 
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prestige of one organisation or department at the expense of another challenges 
the rational actor model, even if it doesn’t discount the realist assumption of the 
importance of the ‘national interest’. Pluralists “disaggregate the state – break it 
into its component parts,” and pluralism therefore “offers greater complexity” 
and breadth than realism,122 and “reject[s] the high politics versus low politics 
dichotomy accepted by most realists.”123 
Dahl has identified two main factors that he believes sustain the political 
status quo and consensus in US politics: education and the media. For the 
former, “the amount of formal education appears as a highly significant variable” 
as the greater one’s formal education, the more likely one is to endorse key 
propositions in prevailing political ideologies.124 For the purposes of this thesis, 
however, the role of the media is of far more interest and import, and will be 
discussed within a pluralist framework below, after a brief outline of the 
evolution of the media and foreign policy. 
The role of special interest groups such as lobbies in the pluralist 
framework is clear – they are the clearest examples of non-governmental actors 
contributing (or attempting to contribute) to policy-making. There are two key 
sectors that must also be addressed individually within the framework of 
pluralism: the government itself (the Executive Branch and the Congress) and 
also the Media. Each receives a section, below. 
 
THE MEDIA, US FOREIGN POLICY, & PLURALISM 
The role of the news media, writes Philip Bobbitt, has “changed, constitutionally 
speaking, in the last three periods of the state.” In the era of the state-nation – 
that is, states that provide their people “civil and political rights of popular 
sovereignty”, “not responsible to the nation... [but] for the nation” – the 
“constitutional role of the press was foremost to transmit the political 
leadership’s views. This often amounted to functioning as an organ to shape 
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public opinion.” A good example of this would be Napoleon’s ‘Bulletins’, through 
which he disseminated his administration’s version of his wars. Similarly, the 
Federalist Papers were “first published as essentially op-ed pieces”125 by the 
framers who wished to acquire support for their particular views on how the 
constitution should be written and what it should allow. 
In the preceding section on general pluralist theory, direct influence was 
discussed (that is, the influence enjoyed by those closest to the policy-making 
process). It is equally important, from a pluralist perspective, to discuss the role 
of indirect influence on the policy-making system. Special interest groups could 
enjoy considerable indirect influence, but it is in the role of the media where, I 
believe, greater indirect influence can be inferred, if not proven. Indirect 
influence, Dahl writes, “might be very great but comparatively difficult to 
observe and weigh. Yet to ignore indirect influence in analysis of the distribution 
of influence would be to exclude what might well prove to be a highly significant 
process of control in a pluralist democracy.”126 
When state-nations evolved, with the addition of democracy, into nation-
states, the role of the media evolved as well, with the addition of the “function of 
informing leaders about the public reaction as the public spoke back to 
government through the media.” In the late 19th Century, William Randolph 
Hearst had a particularly shrewd appreciation of the power of his and others’ 
newspapers to funnel and shape public opinion to suit certain needs and 
agendas.127 In the United States, the media has particular power in shaping 
public and political discourse on major domestic and foreign policies or issues 
(particularly war): 
“The pivotal role played by the New York Times in opposing the War 
in Vietnam that it had so heartily supported and the Washington 
Post’s crucial exposure of Watergate felonies both showed the press 
not only leading the public but also constantly reporting trends in 
public opinion on the same issues. Editorial opinion and its 
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counterparts in the electronic media eventually stood for public 
opinion. When the CBS anchorman Walter Cronkite turned against 
the Vietnam War, President Johnson is reported to have concluded 
that his war policies no longer had the confidence of the public.”128 
The media’s reporting of negative public opinion would be revived in 
particular following the invasion of Iraq in 2003, as growing opposition to the 
war led many reporters and commentators to recant their initial support for the 
invasion. 
To continue with Bobbitt’s era-classifications, the state has now moved 
into the “market-state” era, and once again the role of the media has evolved to 
match the times. The media, Bobbitt argues, “have begun to act in direct 
competition with the government of the day,” and “the switch in roles by the 
media, which retains the credibility of reportage... now also have the mission of 
opposition,” which appears now to be their sole driving purpose. 
“The media are well situated to succeed in this competition because 
they are trained to work in the marketplace, are more nimble than 
bureaucrats hampered by procedural rules, are quick to spot public 
trends, can call on huge capitalisations, can rely on sophisticated 
managers and technocrats, and are the most capable of users – far 
out-pacing politicians – of the contemporary techniques of 
advertising and public relations.”129 
In addition to these operational advantages, “protected in many countries 
by statutes and constitutional amendments”, the media “are free of many of the 
legal and political restraints that bind government officials.” Beyond the role of 
opposition, the focus of news is also changing. As a state’s understanding of 
popular welfare changes to economic and employment opportunity, “Business 
activities – and the activities of business leaders – are replacing politics as the 
central source of news about the welfare of the people.”130 
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When considering the American case, however, Bobbitt’s impression of the 
media’s overarching role as opposition to the government is limited and 
potentially flawed. The media arena in the United States is more demarcated 
than many (if not all) other nations. Indeed, one might say that the US media 
arena is as pluralistic as its political and policy-making arena. Depending on 
one’s political ideology and biases, there are leading publications, television 
news channels, and websites to provide the viewer or reader with appropriately 
slanted news. Depending on the party in power at any given time, one or other 
section of the news spectrum will be acting in opposition to the 
administration.131 
There is another point to be made in addressing the impression of the 
media as hostile to government, in that there is also the widespread impression 
that the media serves the needs and agendas of elites. This, according to 
Lindblom and Woodhouse is “not because of any conspiracy, but for perfectly 
mundane reasons.” In a society such as the United States, it is “entirely natural” 
for journalists to base their stories largely on what elites are saying and doing. 
The nature of the journalism business also “imposes a gentle tyranny” (the 
deadline) on journalists who can rarely afford the time and expense of extended, 
in-depth research. Government elites hold news conferences, pass out news 
releases, issue reports, which provide journalists much of what they need to file 
their stories on deadline. “The effect of continual quoting of persons in positions 
of authority is that their opinions often come to circulate as fact.”132 
In a nation where politics sometimes appears guided by the press, polling 
data and public opinion, a brief discussion of how public opinion can affect the 
decision-making process, as well as theories on where public opinion belongs (if 
at all) in the foreign policy-making process is necessary. It would be particularly 
useful to place public opinion within the Realist-Liberal debate, outlined earlier 
in this chapter. While differences between realist and liberal theories extend 
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across virtually all central questions and issues of foreign policy, international 
relations and statecraft, “the appropriate role for public opinion in foreign 
policy-making is at the centre of persisting debates between the two approaches 
to international affairs.” One of Holsti’s questions about the role of public 
opinion is if it is “a force for enlightenment – indeed, a necessary if not sufficient 
condition for sound foreign policy and, thus, a significant contributor to peaceful 
relations among nations – as celebrated by Woodrow Wilson and many other 
liberals?” Or, if not a force for good, “is the public more appropriately described 
as a source of emotional and short-sighted thinking that can only impede the 
effective pursuit and defence of vital national interests?”133 
Holsti outlines the liberal argument as for the inclusion of public opinion in 
the policy-making process, stating that “the essence of the liberal thesis is… a 
distinction between the peaceful public and leaders who may, for a broad range 
of reasons, pursue policies that lead to war.” This is because the liberal vision 
favours the pacific settlement of disputes, rather than the bloody recourse to 
forceful resolutions.  
On the realist side of the argument, there is a far more formidable lineage 
of theorists and statesmen that have taken a sceptical position on the public’s 
contribution to “enlightened and effective diplomacy”. According to realists, 
“man is by nature self-regarding and is largely motivated by such passions as 
greed and fear, qualities that are not lost when men are aggregated into political 
units such as nation-states.” For realists, therefore, public opinion is usually 
considered a barrier to creating a coherent and sensible foreign policy, 
“hindering efforts to promote national interests that may transcend the moods 
and passions of the moment.”134 This viewpoint helps to explain some 
developments in US foreign policy in the past decade: if the US is a nation 
seemingly addicted to polling and gathering information about public opinion, 
then how come the George W. Bush administration appears to not actually pay 
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too much attention to the results?135 Realism’s grounding in pessimistic theories 
of human nature, therefore, places it in stark contrast to liberal, relatively 
optimistic opinions of public intentions. 
If international relations theories conflict over the role of the media in the 
policy-making process, pluralism offers a more concrete explanation of its 
place, with one important caveat – media influence is very difficult to accurately 
measure. The mass media are “a kind of filter for information and influence.” 
Only a relatively small selection of the American public ever has much 
immediate experience in politics, and most of what they perceive about politics 
comes filtered through the mass media. “Those who want to influence the 
electorate must do so through the mass media.” The same is true for those who 
wish to (indirectly) influence governmental institutions and officials. As will be 
explained in Chapter Six, governmental actors are as conscious of the media’s 
portrayal of issues as are the voting public. The media (newspapers, television, 
radio, magazines) “enjoy a unique immediacy and directness in their contact 
with citizens”, and that is that “they do not force their way in [to peoples’ 
homes]; they are invited.” This willing exposure to media – be it favoured 
newspapers, magazines, or television channels – suggests a potential, 
considerable influence on the views of the sections of the electorate who 
consume them. By willingly exposing themselves to the views and commentary 
of any given source, one can assume a high-level of acceptance of any issue 
framing. However, despite this considerable opportunity, “one cannot say with 
confidence exactly what or how much effect” the media have on influencing the 
electorate,136 or how much effect they have on influencing the Executive Branch, 
Congress, or other governmental decision-makers. 
The level of influence a media source has on the policy-making process, 
specifically with regard to governmental actors, is dependent on the actors’ 
assumption of how much any given media source can influence public opinion: 
“If politicians are convinced that the newspapers [or other media] can influence 
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‘public opinion’, a publisher [or news editor] can exercise a fair measure of 
control over the choices politicians are likely to make.” Therefore, the influence 
of the media on politicians depends largely “on a belief by politicians in the 
actual or potential influence” of the media on voters.137  
One of the most important roles the media plays in a pluralist, democratic 
society is that of arbiter of traditional and societal norms. In pluralistic political 
systems like the United States, “the range of acceptable strategies is narrowed 
by beliefs and habits rooted in traditions of legality, constitutionality, and 
legitimacy”. These traditions are “constantly reinforced by a great variety of 
social processes for generating agreement on and adherence to political norms.” 
Any group that departs from acceptable strategies based on these norms will 
likely incur a “high risk of defeat”, because the resources that can be “mounted 
against the political deviant” will almost certainly be “vastly greater than the 
resources the political deviant can himself muster.”138 
Shared social values can help shape the values of those who govern, and if 
politicians and leaders perceive an issue as important because of the frequency 
or way that the media portrays it for the engaged public, then the media 
acquires considerable indirect influence. A public who, for example, sees China’s 
human rights record as reprehensible – due to the frequent critical reports 
offered by the media – will likely pass this on to politicians and representatives. 
“If it were not for elections and competitive parties, this sharing would – other 
things remaining the same – rapidly decline.”139 
As a result of this important norms-arbitration role, identifying perceived 
trends and traditions in American politics and foreign policy (or, the politics of 
foreign policy) is very important. On only rare and exceptional circumstances 
has a president or other political figure been able to break with orthodoxy to 
reinvent foreign policy (see, for example, Nixon’s opening to China). The media 
in particular are strong influences on maintaining the traditional conception of 
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(foreign) policy issues and norms, while also acting as framers and public 
agenda-setters.140 
We can see that Dahl’s assertions hold true in today’s political 
environment: the New York Times, Washington Post and Wall Street Journal are 
widely perceived as highly influential on their readers, just as Fox News and 
MSNBC are perceived to be influential, respectively, on their conservative and 
liberal audiences. As a result, politicians are more likely to court these media 
over others. The same can be said for lobbying groups who are most likely to 
approach those media outlets that adhere closely to a lobby’s own ideological 
position.  
However, where the media have logical and obvious reasons for paying 
attention to the activities of the US government, this is not true for special 
interest groups. This, then, is where Dahl’s portrayal of the media’s place in 
politics comes under some criticism. Lindblom argues that the US political, 
business and media environment does not offer a level playing field in which 
multiple actors are self-regulating or ensure the most democratic outcomes. 
Lindblom argues that while “ordinary citizens can hypothetically reach vast 
audiences through press and broadcasting, doing so is too expensive.” The 
market-driven aspect of the media means that “Speech is costly rather than 
free.” In addition, “newspapers and broadcasting stations are owned and 
operated by market elites,”141 which gives an unfair advantage to corporate 
owners of media outlets who have much easier access and ability to potentially 
influence media reporting. 
As with other indirect influences, that of the mass media is much “harder 
to assess”, and comes under fire from both sides of the ideological spectrum. 
Critics on the left argue that the “great bulk of Americans are lulled by the mass 
media into a complacent acceptance of the values in the prevailing ideology” – 
specifically, the emphasis on private property and personal success, which, in 
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turn, is said to protect the position of important elite and business groups.142 
Lindblom takes a look at the media through the lens of the market system and 
operations of the market elite, therefore presenting an image of media’s 
function as manipulated by market elites and politicians. He argues that the role 
of the media is “obfuscation”, focussing on “sales promotion and political 
persuasion... often intend[ed] to confuse rather than clarify.”143 Critics on the 
“radical right”, however, see the media (as well as the educational system) as 
major instruments with which the ‘liberal establishment’ “acquires and retains 
its dominance over American institutions and attitudes.”144 It would appear, 
from the findings outlined in Chapter Four, that both critical factions may be 
correct, as the media appears to reinforce both ‘right’ and ‘left’ ideologies and 
status quos. In terms of foreign policy and China, the media helps to reinforce 
the trends and traditions of US foreign policy, explaining why both realist and 
liberal agendas are promoted by most, if not all, media sources. In order to 
show this, an identification of said trends and traditions will be provided in the 
historical overview (Chapter Three).  
There is one other assertion by Dahl that should be addressed with regard 
to the contemporary media environment. Dahl claimed that it was difficult to 
find non-status quo reporting,145 but it could be argued that this is no longer the 
case, or at the very least needs to be updated for today. Given the proliferation 
of ideological press and media, it could be argued that, if not presenting ‘non-
status quo’ reporting, in the current media environment there is more than one 
status quo to report; for example, a conservative and a liberal status quo – 
which are reinforced, respectively (but not exclusively), by Fox News, Wall 
Street Journal, The Weekly Standard and National Review; and MSNBC, New York 
Times, Washington Post, The American Prospect, and The Nation. 
The capacity of the news media to influence specific public attitudes is 
“highly complex and variable”,146 and there are three critical limits on the levels 
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of potential influence that any one media can achieve. First is the “distinct 
handicap of being widely regarded as politically biased and even eccentric”,147 
which is even more of an issue with the proliferation of ideologically-identified 
media. Individual political media are prevented from reaching monopolies of 
influence due to the variety and multiplicity of media formats and sources – 
politically active members of the public are unlikely to acquire information 
from a single source of news.148 In addition, the “relatively low salience of 
politics in the life of the individual”, or apathy, further hinders the media’s 
abilities to exert greater influence on politics: “Political indifference,” Dahl 
points out, “surrounds a great many citizens like impenetrable armour plate 
and makes them difficult targets for propaganda.”149 Here we could argue that 
ideological sides of the media can acquire levels of influence that individual 
sources cannot – it is unlikely that a member of the public will read or watch 
widely and from all sides of the ideological spectrum, unless they were 
somehow invested in understanding the differences between conservative and 
liberal media portrayals of political issues. This could account for the perceived 
growth in influence dependent on ideological consistency between media 
outlets and the administration in office and in the Congressional and Senate 
majorities. 
There are examples throughout American history of foreign policy 
decisions possibly influenced by public opinion, which were not considered in 
the best interests of the nation. For example, in 1812, when President James 
Madison went to war with Great Britain; in 1898, the US went to war with Spain 
because of growing resentment and tension (fuelled by “yellow journalism”); 
and during World War II, President Franklin Roosevelt was warned off 
involvement in Europe by strong public opposition.  
For some traditional domestic political theories – not only pluralism, but 
also Marxism, and elitism – the state is assumed to be ‘weak’. This is a position 
that has been endorsed by a number of recent studies of American politics. 
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These studies can see the state as “a relatively neutral umpire brokering the 
demands of competing interest groups”.150 Increasingly, this is the perception of 
American foreign policy-making as well. In this context, domestic pluralism is 
becoming a more viable theory for the study of US foreign policy-making, given 
the blurring of the borders that delineate domestic and international issues. 
“The democratic features of the [American] political system and the 
diversity of attitudes and interests in a continental-sized nation... 
ensure that the state cannot lead without national mobilisation; and 
cannot mobilise without taking due regard of the major social, 
economic and political interests within the United States.”151 
A pluralist approach to American domestic and foreign policy posits that 
American political culture and institutions are “characterised by openness, 
accessibility, equity and free and fair organised competition between opposing 
social, economic and political forces.” In this representation, the political system 
is “more or less dominated by organised interest groups”. While state officials 
indeed ‘make’ policy, pluralists argue that they do so “under the pressure of 
demands made by more powerful special interests”, relegating the role of 
government to ‘weighing-up’ conflicting demands so that a balanced policy that 
satisfies the national interest can emerge.152 It is the contention of this thesis 
that this is only partly correct. The US federal government must, indeed, weigh 
and balance domestic considerations (ones frequently brought to their 
attention by lobbies or the media). However, the entrenched, traditional 
conception of the national interest exerts equal, if not more, pressure on what is 
or is not acceptable in the construction of American foreign and China policy. 
 
CONGRESS & PLURALISM 
The role of Congress is extremely important in the US foreign policy-making 
system. However, it is also exceedingly broad, extending across all three sectors 
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that will be discussed in Part Two of the thesis. Therefore, this brief section will 
outline some pluralist perceptions of the role of Congress in the American 
system, related to the Executive Office and also special interests. 
As per the Constitution, there were three minimum functions expected of 
the Congress: to represent ‘the people’ of America, to make national laws, and to 
check the power of the Chief Executive.153 In terms of the pluralist nature of US 
politics, however, “even if it is taken for granted that Congress is to ‘represent 
the people’, in some sense, should it represent each citizen equally, or should 
some minorities or ‘interests’ be given extra protection by means of extra 
weight in the national legislature?”154 This question, posed by Dahl, is important 
to understanding the role of Congress. Active and vocal interest groups present 
issues and problems that need addressing. Silent majorities do not.  
In the American system, ‘sub-governments’ abound – that is, groups of 
elites who operate in specific policy niche areas, somewhat autonomously. 
Lindblom and Woodhouse identify the congressional committee system as part 
of this “government within a government”: legislation usually comes to the floor 
of the House or Senate only after a committee has considered it. Very few bills 
survive committee scrutiny, and of those that do, fellow legislators “more often 
than not follow committee recommendations”.155 
Without the supervision of any kind of “supercommittee” or coordinating 
body such as a legislative cabinet, “committees and even subcommittees 
practice a striking degree of autonomy.”156 Tight focus on specific issues can 
also open them up to “capture” by outside interests who will target them for 
lobbying. The same is true for bureaucratic departments and employees, who 
enjoy the “time, expertise, and closeness” to issues and are equally specialised 
(as Congressional and Senate Committee members),157 and can “pretty much go 
their own way” on their particular issue-areas.158 In addition, as policy is made 
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by lower levels within an agency, it can become difficult to ensure the process is 
not corrupted (by political agendas or outside influence), and that the resulting 
policy proposals and prescriptions are relevant and intelligent.159 Despite their 
autonomy, committees and subcommittees are faced with an ever-more 
complex and technical overall policy agenda, which has resulted in a premium 
on expertise.160 This has meant that lobbies and interest groups who can 
provide the relevant expertise, research and data, can increase their influence 
by providing members and staffers of (sub)committees with the relevant 
information they need to properly conduct their work. With recent 
Congressional bans on “earmarks”, however, bills are becoming more 
straightforward and less open to padding (at the same time, this closes off a 
negotiating tool for getting hesitant legislators on board for any given bill). 
Many of the most important foreign and military decisions do not require 
direct legislative action or involvement. Dahl has characterised the dynamic 
between the Executive and Legislative branches as the President acting as “the 
motor in the system”, while the Congress “applies the brakes.”161 For example, 
in the case of sudden military action: the president acts as the motor, driving 
the policy (to continue Dahl’s metaphor), while the Congress then has to act as 
either the brakes or the fuel (by appropriating the funds for the action or not). 
In addition, Executive Office elites must also contend with frequent legislative 
opposition because of more parochial considerations: Congress operates mainly 
with an eye to the domestic, which can mean that when a leader is “ready to 
launch a grand design”, a congressman can come in and apply the brakes 
“because one or another aspect of it might discomfit some industry in their 
state.”162 
Therefore, “the relative importance of President and Congress in policy-
making is not and probably cannot be static.” The roles vary depending on the 
circumstances and stakes involved. For example, despite its reputation for 
inactivity and legislative lethargy, the Congress can sometimes act with 
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“exceptional dispatch”. Nevertheless, the legislature is not as suitable as the 
Executive Branch for handling emergencies; “Like all legislatures, Congress is 
most handicapped in times of crisis and in dealing with military and foreign 
affairs.”163 
There are other avenues Congress can take in the foreign policy arena, in 
order to retain or acquire a modicum of control over the process and temper 
any Executive exuberance or enthusiasm. Through a “plethora of sanctions”, 
Henry Kissinger has pointed out, Congress has sought not only to legislate the 
tactics of foreign policy, but also to “impose a code of conduct on other nations”. 
Usually defined by the dominant party in Congress at the time, these sanctions 
can lean towards protectionist policies (predominantly a Democratic favourite) 
and also improvement of human rights (usually a Republican and conservative 
requirement, but also popular with Democrats).  
“Successive administrations have acquiesced [to Congressional 
demands], in part as a compromise to gain approval for other 
programs, in part because, absent an immediate outside danger, 
domestic politics has become more important to political survival 
than handling of foreign policy.”164 
Domestic interest groups are not created equally. Differences in resources, 
incentives, the skills of group leaders, their allies, and their opponents have 
prevented, and likely will always prevent, “a close approximation of perfect 
equality” among citizens and their ability to influence government conduct. 
That being said, there are few groups in the United States determined to 
influence the government – “certainly few if any groups of citizens who are 
organised, active, and persistent” – who lack the opportunity or ability to 
influence officials somewhere in the political system in order to achieve at least 
some of their goals.165 
An individual, group, organisation, or movement that seeks a major 
change in government policies must turn to the White House for leadership. 
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Groups with less ambitious goals, however, may be able to achieve them with 
the cooperation of a handful of Congressmen. They can use Congress in a 
number of ways to do this. For example, Congressmen can be convinced to veto, 
delay, or amend hostile measures proposed by the President. Strategically 
placed support in Congress may be enough to influence marginal changes to 
existing policies: crafting loopholes, altering appropriation levels, launching 
investigations, Senate floor speeches in favour or opposition to specific policies. 
A Senator or Representative can also serve as a group’s ambassador to relevant 
administrative agencies. Sometimes, groups may seek to achieve their ends by 
directly approaching administrative agencies, with or without the help of 
lobbyists. In these instances, the relationship that develops can be antagonistic, 
as groups push against the agency’s official marching orders or Executive 
preferences. Occasionally, however, an interest group “may virtually capture 
the government agency.”166 But, it is not just agencies that can be “captured”; 
indeed, many influential leaders in Congress can appear to be “captives of their 
constituents”.167 
Yet another option for an interest group, if they find their overtures 
ignored or blocked at the Executive and Congressional levels, is to try to 
influence local governments. State and local governments “are in many ways 
duplicates of the national government on a local scale,” and groups may succeed 
at these levels in achieving what they could not at the national level.168 
 
METHODOLOGY 
In order to ascertain what level of influence governmental and non-
governmental actors can exert on the foreign policy-making process, and to 
what extent the existing traditions of American national interest exert reverse 
pressure, the roles of the media, special interests, and the legislative and the 
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executive branches of the US government will be discussed in the second part of 
this thesis. Through a pluralist analysis of these sectors, this thesis will 
ascertain whether or not the relevant agencies in the American federal 
government can plan, coordinate, and execute a grand strategy to secure the 
nation and defend its vital interests, in general and in the case of China policy. In 
order to achieve this goal, it is first important to obtain an overall view of the 
history of American foreign policy, and an understanding of the trends and 
traditions that help inform the United States’ approach to the world and China 
(Chapter Three). 
An analytical and descriptive route will be pursued, in order to answer the 
research questions and test the hypotheses posed in this introduction, through 
an extensive review of literature and the use of case studies of varying length. 
The nature and scope of this research is qualitative, dealing predominantly with 
accounts and appraisals of historical events, incorporating original analysis, 
before offering conclusions. Therefore, existing literature is qualitatively 
reviewed in order to tease forth the relevant information regarding the 
construction of American foreign and China policy. 
The range of primary sources drawn from is particularly broad. Extensive 
use is made of news pieces and long-form journalism, which offer the timeliest 
and ‘immediate’ impressions of foreign policy events and governmental 
decision-making (the ‘first draft of history’, to use a favourite phrase of many 
journalists), from a sector of key importance to this study. The media sources 
drawn from are those considered part of the ‘elite’ media (in its broadest 
conception). This included newspapers such as The New York Times, 
Washington Post, and Wall Street Journal, universally accepted as those most 
likely to be read by Washington officials and the ‘politically-informed public’. 
News magazines, a particularly valuable source, were selected based on the 
ideological and/or party biases they evinced, and an attempt was made to draw 
from across the political/ideological spectrum – for example, The Weekly 
Standard and National Review on the right; The Nation, The American Prospect 
and also Rolling Stone on the left; and also more centrist (or ideologically 
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flexible) publications, such as The Atlantic and The New Republic – this ensured 
that a more general impression of media perspectives of foreign policy, and 
China in particular, was acquired. The online ‘newspaper’, The Hill, was also a 
valuable source of quotations and opinions from and by legislators in the House 
and Senate. 
Transcripts of interviews with policy-makers and also official speeches 
were used, in order to gather government impressions and public explanations 
for certain policy decisions – a particularly useful source for these documents 
was the US State Department Dispatch (readily and freely available online as 
PDFs), which collects major speech transcripts and articles written by State 
Department officials and employees, as well as other government officials and 
advisors.  
Presidential Libraries – particularly the George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton 
Presidential Libraries – were also valuable sources of presidential and 
executive-level material and documentation.169 Where possible, the published 
personal memoirs or histories written by those involved in the policy process 
were acquired and reviewed – these texts proved particularly valuable in 
advancing the study by providing personal insights, reflections and impressions 
of the American foreign policy system, structure, and the actors involved in 
relation to specific strategic and political decisions that were made (particularly 
valuable, as it turned out, were the memoirs of James A Baker III and Warren 
Christopher, and books by Peter Rodman, Leslie Gelb, Warren Cohen, and 
Zbigniew Brzezinski).  
The United States Congress and Senate Committee websites170 and the 
Library of Congress website171 were equally valuable sources of primary source 
information: particularly transcripts of hearings, press releases, and House and 
Senate legislation (passed and proposed) from which lobby and media activity 
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can be inferred.172 In addition, the “Open CRS” website, part of the Wikileaks 
effort to release documents pertaining to the functioning of the US government 
and its diplomacy, was also a useful source of information.173 
For secondary sources, this thesis draws on a broad range of published 
literature: primarily scholarly texts, books by investigative journalists, 
historical accounts and treatises, and also a wealth of journal articles on 
international relations, foreign policy analysis, domestic politics, presidential 
and governmental studies, and historical analysis. These sources have provided 
a mix of timely scholarly analysis (far more in-depth than a journalistic piece 
could achieve), and more extensive and in-depth works that benefit from 
hindsight. A preference for recently-published texts must be admitted, given the 
increased chances that authors of these texts will have benefitted from being 
able to draw upon the ever-increasing number of declassified documents. Given 
the predominantly empirical nature of this research – that is, its focus on what, 
how, and why certain policies and decisions were chosen by policy-makers, and 
how they fit in with the traditional American foreign policy framework – these 
sources are essential and invaluable for compiling as complete a picture as 
possible of the foreign policy-making process. 
All of these sources, primary and secondary, are not without their 
limitations. For example, scholarly or investigative books can quickly become 
dated or superseded by newer volumes (hence the bias for recent publications 
wherever possible) when discussing contemporary events. Journalism is prone 
to being ill-informed, and can rapidly become obsolete by later, more thorough 
pieces – this should explain the clear bias towards weekly, fortnightly and 
monthly publications drawn from for this research, as they benefit from more 
time to establish and check facts and chronologies than do daily newspapers. In 
addition, ideological and political bias often informs the angles of reportage, 
particularly on China (as will be shown in Chapter Four), and must be taken into 
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account – that many American media outlets and publications flaunt their 
political bias does, of course, make it easier to apply one’s own ‘filter’ through 
which to read or watch American political reporting. Personal memoirs can 
suffer from the authors’ desire to defend their own actions, pass blame, or 
‘white-wash’ poor decisions, while also suffering from the authors’ personal 
ideological and political biases. These limitations can be somewhat overcome by 
comparing the way memoirs by different officials, or articles published in 
ideologically opposed publications, represent the same issues, events, and key 
decisions and the processes through which they were made. In other words, 
none of these sources can be taken on their own, and must stand alongside 
other sources in order to get to the ‘truth’ of policy- and decision-making. 
The chapters on the media, lobbies, and government institutions will each 
look at three predominant themes in US-China relations: normative, economic, 
and security. By keeping to these three issue areas, clear continuity and also 
proper comparisons can be drawn. Pluralism favours decision-making analysis 
when discussing the issue of policy influence. Many pluralists have argued that 
influence over policy-making is best determined by isolating and reconstructing 
key decisions and how they were reached, “thereby allowing observers to 
decide which particular actor or actors played the most significant role” in 
defining the policy direction taken.174 In order to assess the influence of 
nongovernmental actors in foreign policy-making, select issues in US-China 
relations will be identified and discussed individually as specific case studies. 
These case studies will take different forms in each chapter, dependent on the 
subject of the study. The media chapter will be followed by a single, long-form 
case study of the media’s treatment of the Tiananmen Square crackdown and its 
legacy in the US media’s reporting of China. The lobby chapter will look at three 
case studies, each related to one specific corporation and its experiences with 
China, and also an issue case study on China’s Most-Favoured-Nation trade 
status debate that became a political battleground following Tiananmen. The 
chapter looking at governmental institutions will look at specific issues and how 
the government has addressed these issues. 
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By drawing on these media, it will be possible to ascertain the ways in 
which certain actors influence, or at the very least participate, in the American 
foreign policy-making process. 
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CHAPTER III 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF US-CHINA POLICY 
Perhaps no other country displays so clearly the myriad influences that now go 
into creating a nation’s foreign policy than the United States. As a result, the 
United States is a perfect candidate for the study of the changing nature of 
foreign policy. For the purposes of this thesis – that is, the domestic sources of 
US-China policy – it is important to look at the historical development of US-
China policy, before identifying and discussing the roles of domestic foreign 
policy actors. This chapter provides a brief look at the history of US-China 
relations, and places it within the context of the wider history of American 
foreign policy. 
An examination of the literature on American foreign policy will clearly 
show that, for over two centuries, American foreign policy has sought to protect 
two main elements of republican liberty: that of “a synthesis of two traditions, 
liberal institutionalism and realism.”1 
While some believe these two schools to be antithetical, as “liberal 
internationalists emphasize the norms of world order [and] realists 
[emphasise] the realities of power politics”, it can also be argued, as Michael 
Lind has, that they actually complement each other.2 This complementary 
aspect of the theories is a basis for a pluralist approach to international 
relations. Michael C. Desch, has described American liberalism as “a political 
system or a set of political values based on some combination of individual 
freedom, equality of opportunity, free markets, and political representation.”3 
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Over the course of this chapter, it will become clear just how important free 
markets are to the formation of US foreign and, particularly, China policy. 
Any attempt to discern the likely trajectory of America’s future 
engagement with China (and the world at large) first requires knowledge of 
what has come before. Therefore, this chapter will develop an analysis of the arc 
and evolution of US China policy, providing the context within which the 
chapters to come will analyse the impact and influence of domestic actors on 
the policy- and decision-making process. The chapter is split into six sections, 
dealing with significant time periods, and will conclude with a summary 
identifying the thematic trends and traditions of US China policy (the focus on 
China also explains the less-orthodox time periods). 
 
1776-1850s 
Conventional wisdom holds that “no country can escape its geography and 
history when it comes to establishing its foreign policy principles and 
priorities,”4 so it is instructive to go back to the beginnings of the American 
Nation. This was a turbulent time when the fledgling United States was still 
coming to terms with itself as a new nation, and what this meant in terms of 
international relations – specifically, the contested American tradition of 
‘isolationism’. 
Following Independence, the US faced an uncertain political future. Surrounded 
as it was by territory controlled by hostile European powers, and reliant on 
foreign aid from others, the first century of American foreign policy was 
concerned with expanding and consolidating territory, to ensure national 
security by removing all potential threats from the continent. Only after this 
process was complete, did the United States start looking at competition with 
Europe. 
Recurring themes in American foreign policy literature identify two 
common phases. The first is so-called “isolationism”, the second 
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internationalism. Many see US foreign policy in the late-18th and 19th centuries 
as falling within the former, intent on avoiding the entangling alliances 
cautioned against in Washington’s Farewell Address. As Perkins has written, “In 
the first hundred years and more of the history of American foreign policy the 
distinctive feature, outside of the expansion of territory, is the crystallisation of 
the tradition of what has come to be called isolationism.”5 The years following 
(and including) the two World Wars are often considered the beginning of the 
internationalist phase. These simple categories are imperfect. 
As Andrew J. Bacevich has pointed out, “only by the loosest conceivable 
definition… could ‘isolation’ be said to represent the reality of United States 
policy during the first century-and-a-half of American independence.” This is 
because, by 1900, America “had quadrupled its land mass at the expense of 
other claimants, engaged in multiple wars of conquest, vigorously pursued 
access to markets in every quarter of the globe, and acquired by force an 
overseas empire.” This does not represent the actions of an “isolationist” nation, 
in any meaningful sense of the word.6 
The isolationist period of American foreign policy coincided with an era 
when European empires still dominated international relations. Considering the 
uncertainty about the viability of the American experiment, it is little wonder 
the fledgling nation wished to separate itself from the machinations and 
conflicts of Europe, seen as a “perpetual menace to American liberties”, as they 
sought “to involve the republic in their tangled affairs”. Because some American 
statesmen were not always as deaf as they ought to be to Europe’s pleas and 
seductions, safety was seen to lie in “complete abstention from political contact 
with Europe”.7 In the face of the perceived insidious nature of European politics, 
John Quincy Adams wrote in 1793 that it was the duty of all American 
statesmen “to remain the peaceable and silent, though sorrowful, spectators of 
the sanguinary scene” of European affairs.8 This statement ultimately inspired 
the enduring isolationism from European affairs that characterised early 
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American foreign policy – an aspect that would be severely tested in the first 
half of the twentieth century, and ultimately jettisoned during the Cold War. 
The Founding Fathers knew the United States needed a foreign policy, a 
need to find foreign support where it could, and it certainly needed 
opportunities to trade; in other words, it needed at least some international 
involvement. Both idealists and realists in American government were 
comfortable with this strategy of isolation, believing the country could “get 
what it needed – growing commerce – without making enduring political or 
military commitments to other states.” By not choosing sides, it was believed, 
“the republic would be able to enjoy free trade with all [European] parties.”9 
From the very beginning, American leaders have been intent on protecting 
and fostering its strong economy. George Washington and his successors 
pursued foreign trade to the extent that it contributed to American prosperity, 
seeking to develop commercial relations with as little political connection as 
possible. To this end, approximately 70 percent of all treaties and international 
agreements signed by the US in the nineteenth century were related to trade 
and commerce.10 Its frequent minor forays into internationalism during the first 
century-and-a-half were the result of commercial concerns (particularly in Latin 
America), interested more in protecting commerce than shaping any balance of 
power. Commerce would also fuel American continental expansion. Planters 
were searching for more fertile land to expand into (Texas, in particular, was 
seen as ideal for further cotton production), and expansion to the West Coast 
was seen as a way for both farmers and traders to broaden access to East Asian 
markets.11 
Understanding that it served the fledgling nation to draw upon lessons 
from Europe, but equally intent on leaving behind for good “Europe’s social ills, 
religious quarrels, and political jealousies”,12 American leaders split into realist 
and idealist factions. Led by Alexander Hamilton and John Jay, American realists 
“attacked the notion that increased trade would lead to perpetual peace,” 
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specifically refuting the idealist position that increased interdependence breeds 
more stability in the international environment.13 Hamilton in particular 
exhibited little patience (in Federalist 6) with the idea of democratic or 
commercial peace: 
“Has commerce hitherto done anything more than change the objects 
of war? Is not the love of wealth as domineering and enterprising a 
passion as that of power and glory?”14 
John Jay wrote, in Federalist 4, that no matter what anyone might wish or 
hope for, “it is too true, however disgraceful it may be to human nature, that 
nations in general will make war whenever they have a prospect of getting 
anything by it.”15 In the realist’s opinion, the United States should be guided by 
“sober self-interest just like any other country”. Interestingly, Hamilton and 
Jay’s realist faction do not appear to have shared the opinion that expanding 
economic opportunities around the globe was serving the American national 
interest. The idealist camp, most prominent in which were Thomas Jefferson 
and Thomas Paine, believed that the United States should make a clean break 
from the then-traditional methods of foreign policy, replacing the power politics 
of Europe with “a foreign policy guided by law and reason”.16 
In his farewell address of 1796, George Washington laid down the 
foundations of a realist tradition in American foreign policy: “No nation is to be 
trusted farther than it is bound by interest; and no prudent statesman or 
politician will venture to depart from it.” He went on to add that nations don’t 
act to the benefit of others, “unless both [nations’] interests happen to be 
assimilated.”17 The arena in which mutual interests were most likely to be 
enjoyed, of course, was trade. Hamilton, exhibiting shrewd realist instincts, and 
adhering to Washington’s advice, “was perfectly willing to make arrangements 
with European governments as long as they promised to bring tangible 
advantages to his country.” Unlike John Adams and Thomas Jefferson, he 
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objected “to the basing of foreign policy upon sentimental affinity or gratitude 
or any other emotion” which would involve “sacrifices of our substantial 
interests, preferences inconsistent with sound policy, or complaisances [sic] 
with our safety”.18 
As the United States became more secure in its position (after its first half-
century), the American notion of isolation did not preclude assertions of power 
and interests in its own hemisphere. The Monroe Doctrine would codify 
American hegemony in the Western Hemisphere, crafted by then-Secretary of 
State John Quincy Adams for President Monroe in 1823, but solidified by 
President James K. Polk in the late 1840s. The Monroe Doctrine “boldly 
expanded Adams’s proposition that the United States refrain from entangling 
itself in European affairs into a warning to Europe not to entangle itself in 
American affairs, defined as embracing the entire Western Hemisphere”. 
President Monroe asserted that any efforts on the part of colonial powers in 
South America would be seen as “dangerous to our peace and safety”, and 
therefore would be treated as a casus belli, requiring American intervention.19 
The United States conducted a large number of foreign adventures 
throughout the nineteenth century – including Tripoli (1801-1805), Algiers 
(1815), Greece (1827), Sumatra (1832, 1838-1839), Liberia (1843), 
considerable interest in China (1843, 1854, and 1856 – see below), Angola 
(1860), Japan (1863-1864 and 1868), and Korea (1871). The objectives of these 
adventures, despite the number of operations outside of the Western 
Hemisphere, were “limited to defending U.S. traders and civilians,” supported 
by small “squadrons” of only a handful of vessels. President Polk would later 
blend idealism and realism in his pronouncement that the United States “ever 
maintain that people of this continent alone have a right to decide their own 
destiny” stating that any territories that wished to join the Union were free to 
do so, and warning the Europeans to keep their rivalries out of the American 
continent.20 
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With regards to US relations with China, ‘first contact’ occurred when the aptly-
named Empress of China merchant ship docked in Canton in August 1784. While 
diplomatic relations with China were not formalised until 1844, consular 
officials were present in China from 1786, when Secretary of Foreign Affairs 
John Jay named Samuel Shaw (who sailed on the Empress of China) the first 
American consul to Canton. Shaw, a member of a prominent New England 
merchant family with trade interests through Hong Kong, devoted most of his 
energies to his family’s affairs and had only “very limited influence over the 
other American traders or with the Chinese government itself.”21 
Relations between America and China would revolve around the ongoing 
diplomatic and military conflicts of the British and French, who aspired to 
“wring commercial concessions” from the Chinese Empire.22 American 
businessmen and diplomats did not initiate the treaty system that emerged 
from British and French activities, but “they offered no alternatives” and, 
worried that Britain’s successes might limit their own access to China, 
pragmatically took part in them demanding the same privileged status as the 
Europeans within the ‘treaty ports’.23 
During the Opium War, America sat on the sidelines in neutrality, while 
China (unsuccessfully) looked for a way to use the US to its advantage against 
the “obstinate English barbarians”. This would become a common theme in this 
period – while the US enjoyed the same benefits as other Western powers 
meddling in China’s affairs, the Americans were the least problematic and 
belligerent. The origin of the ‘Open Door’ (which called for equal opportunity 
for all traders), was designed by the Chinese to “elicit gratitude from the United 
States ‘and others’, in the hope of banking goodwill that might later be turned to 
China’s advantage.” Therefore, “without firing a shot and without issuing a 
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threat,” the US was able to expand its commercial operations along the Chinese 
coast.24 
Responding to concerned business interests in China, Congress 
appropriated funds for a major diplomatic mission, and President John Tyler 
named Massachusetts congressman Caleb Cushing commander of a small naval 
squadron to emphasise U.S. strength and intentions. Cushing was able to 
negotiate the 1844 Treaty of Wangshia, which bestowed most favoured nation 
status on the US, granting it the same privileges as the British and French.25 
 
1850S & ANTEBELLUM AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
American foreign policy in the 1850s and ’60s (during and after the Civil War) 
was predominantly focused on generating support and funds for the different 
sides in the war. 
Despite the US Commissioner Humphrey Marshall (1852-4) believing that 
the British were attempting to destabilize China to further their own imperial 
designs, the Pierce administration (which inherited Marshall from the Fillmore 
administration) had no interest in getting involved. Adhering to a recurring 
theme in US-China relations for the next sixty years, government apathy and 
“the remoteness of events in China from the focus of the Department of State’s 
attention”, American representatives could “do almost anything – provided they 
did not require support” from the government in Washington.26 
In 1856, when the Western powers’ treaties were due for renegotiation, 
the Anglo-French War with China brought about a number of humiliating 
defeats for China, and the 1858 Treaty of Tientsin granted further benefits to 
the British, French and also Americans. After acquiring a more solid treaty, the 
US government once again took little interest in China.27 
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At this juncture, the United States enjoyed a solid position in China, which 
should have allowed it to exploit the burgeoning China market to its fullest. 
However, the outbreak of the American Civil War focused the nation’s attention 
inward. During the Civil War, the Confederate Navy wreaked so much damage 
on the U.S. merchant marine that the China market remained “a minor element” 
of America’s international commerce “until interest revived at the time of the 
Spanish-American War”.28 
William Seward, Lincoln’s Secretary of State, had a profound influence on 
the future focus of US foreign policy. Like his mentor, John Quincy Adams, he 
was a believer in America’s ‘mission’ to spread democracy and civilisation 
around the world, and also the important role economics should play in 
fulfilling this mission. Because the Union had already expanded its borders to 
the West Coast, Seward looked even further westward than Adams, out to the 
Pacific.29 With territorial security came an enhanced interest in the economic 
security of the United States, the key to which lay in commerce, “specifically, in 
the establishment of a commercial empire.” The principle economic ‘battlefield’, 
Seward believed, would be the Far East.30 Seward was “the pioneering figure 
before the Civil War to recast territorial empire into a commercial [empire]”. 
Along with its manufactures, Seward believed, the US would export its ideals, 
values, and principles; it would be an empire expanded “not by force of arms, 
but attraction.”31 He envisioned an empire that eventually stretched across all of 
North America, including Canada and Mexico. “Achieved through commercial 
ties and political gravitation, however, the empire’s cost to American lives, 
treasure, or ideals... would be negligible.” Seward would be among the first 
American statesmen to recommend the acquisition of strategically-located 
Pacific and Caribbean islands (or, at minimum, control of their ports), to act as 
way-stations for America’s growing international commercial interests – this 
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also explains his support for the acquisition of Alaska, and why he would start 
the process of acquiring the Hawaiian islands.32 
During the Civil War, US-China relations offered some potential benefit. 
Seward and other foreign policy leaders believed that, if the US (at least, the 
Unionist North) stood shoulder-to-shoulder with the European powers in 
Chinese and Japanese affairs, the Europeans would have less reason to support 
the Confederates than they would if America posed an obstacle to their plans in 
Asia. Therefore, a policy of cooperating with Great Britain and France “proved 
remarkably easy for the United State and, in Seward’s time, of some value to the 
Chinese.”33 
Seward would eventually sign the Burlingame Treaty with the Chinese, 
which granted them Most Favoured Nation status (the beginning of a long 
history of US-China MFN treaties). With this treaty, he was dealing with both a 
domestic and international concern; attempting to both regulate and stimulate 
Chinese immigration. In 1868, there were over 100,000 Chinese (‘coolies’) in 
the US, who had been instrumental in the rapid development of the railroads 
and the American West. The Burlingame Treaty, in an example of economic 
policy trumping public opinion, flew in the face of growing domestic opposition, 
as Americans were starting to agitate for reducing the number of Chinese 
labourers in America (they demanded much lower wages than Americans). 
Violence against Chinese became widespread in the West, particularly 
California, especially in the 1870s and 1880s.34 
There is no denying that the US-China relationship at this time was 
uneven, in America’s favour. In the US, Chinese were frequently treated brutally, 
and the Chinese government had no recourse. On the other hand, as a result of 
Western involvement and the treaty system, China was “forced to admit 
foreigners to its territory and American gunboats patrolled her waters to 
protect the lives and property of Americans in China.”35 
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Given America’s still largely isolated position towards the end of the 19th 
Century, “for nearly fifty years” the US did not have a “settled and generally 
accepted foreign policy”.36 This is not to say that the country was idle or 
immune to geopolitical realities, and a lack of a clear foreign policy goal did not 
prevent it from pursuing its own interests. 
Guided by the Monroe Doctrine, and the prospect that the Philippines 
might be seized by Germany (or another great power), the McKinley 
administration decided to turn the entire archipelago into an American 
protectorate and, in 1898, the same rationale led to the annexation of Guam and 
Hawaii.37 If Germany had managed to get a foothold in any of these territories, it 
was felt, it would have a base from which it could more easily spread its 
influence into the Western Hemisphere which, up until then, had been 
inviolable. The acquisition of the Philippines, however, was not only informed 
by balance of power considerations. Corporate and Executive Office concerns 
that European and Japanese imperialists were “in the process of closing the 
door to American commerce in China” forced the McKinley administration to 
rethink America’s imperial ambitions. Despite McKinley’s assurances that the 
Europeans weren’t discriminating against the US, he was unable to placate 
those with commercial interests in Asia. The addition of naval interest in a 
coaling station and base of operations in Asia “focused public attention on East 
Asia in a way that exceeded even the hopes of the lobbyists and publicists of the 
American Asiatic Association.”38 
In September and November 1898, Secretary of State John Hay sent his 
‘Open Door’ notes to the Western powers with interests in China, requesting 
they agree to uphold Chinese territorial and administrative integrity, and 
adhere to a policy of open trade in all treaty ports (as outlined by the numerous 
treaties). This policy would relieve pressure from those in America concerned 
with power politics, from those who sought to expand American economic 
interests, and also from “romantic nationalists eager to see the United States 
play a larger role in world affairs.” This was to be achieved without risking 
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overseas intervention, which would surely disturb a nation that remained 
“notoriously skittish about foreign entanglements.”39 China ‘experts’ of the time 
believed China needed the ability to secure and control its own territories in 
order to maintain the Asian balance of power and stability. This, in turn, would 
help protect American interests (both economic and imperial) in Asia.40 
In 1900-1901, the McKinley administration “recognised that public 
interest in China was superficial”, and that – aside from business interests – 
public interest was “neither broad enough nor deep enough for the government 
to be able to muster the support it would need to become involved in [Asian] 
power politics”. Additionally, Hay and McKinley realised that even though the 
United States was of necessity concerned with the balance of power in East Asia 
(through tangible economic and humanitarian interests there), “none of these 
concerns or interests were worth fighting for.”41 It is clear, therefore, that 
suspicion of foreign entanglements remained ingrained in  the American 
psyche; perhaps as the latest example of an expression of John Quincy Adams’ 
warning to not go abroad ‘in search of monsters’. 
 
REALISTIC ECONOMICS & CAUTION (MCKINLEY, ROOSEVELT, TAFT & 
WILSON): 1900-1920 
Throughout this period, American foreign policy has been presented and 
accepted as being “committed to the defence and advancement of liberty and 
democracy in the world.” This is not, however, entirely the case, given the 
“rampant interventionism” of the time.42 There is little doubt that after 1900 the 
United States could no longer be considered isolationist: with the wider 
horizons that came with the end of the Spanish-American War and the growth 
of American imperialism, “the scene changed and the story became more 
complex.”43 
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“By 1899, the United States had become a world power in the sense 
that it was not only the greatest industrial nation, but it was also 
willing to use its new power militarily, after the fashion of the 
European states American leaders sought to emulate.”44 
Despite their differences, the four administrations of the turn of the 
century (McKinley to Wilson) all sought to articulate a coherent world view, and 
to determine America’s responsibilities. Their assumptions would have a 
profound impact on American diplomacy in the decades to come. There is a 
growing literature that argues American foreign policy of this time was highly 
influenced by social evolutionary thought or Social Darwinism.45 However, 
while it is certainly true that many American policy elites evinced support for 
such theories that placed Americans (or, more generally, Anglo-Saxons) at the 
top of the evolutionary pyramid, more realistic leaders and policies better 
explain the foreign relations of this time. 
America’s rising power would have a lasting impact on its foreign policy, 
and its policy towards China would remain stubbornly durable and unchanging, 
despite considerable evolutions in other areas and different ideologies in 
subsequent administrations: 
“Despite the importance that businessmen and missionaries attached 
to their activities in China, neither the people nor the government of 
the United States could long focus on Asian affairs. There were much 
more important problems to be dealt with at home.”46 
America’s new imperialism, which resulted from the “splendidly 
profitable”47 war with Spain, consisted of its acquisition of Hawaii, Puerto Rico, 
the Philippines, Guam, Samoa, the Panama Canal Zone, and (briefly) Cuba.48 Far 
from just being an expression of messianic imperialism, the fervour for 
expansion also had its roots in economic determinism, itself an outgrowth of the 
industrial successes of the American North. The dominant concern of US 
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diplomacy in the two decades preceding the First World War is “best captured 
in the era’s constant references to the Monroe Doctrine and the open door”, two 
policies with which the US, as the world’s newest rising political-economic 
force, hoped to “shore up and institutionalise the political boundaries and 
frameworks for trade” that prevailed in the Western Hemisphere and Asia.49 
The Open Door ideology – most commonly connected with China – was a policy 
that would allow American policy makers to “seek to realise and sustain their 
vision of the good society at home through open door marketplace expansion 
abroad”. Hannigan has argued that through this approach its author William A. 
Williams was able to “establish the vital importance of economics in U.S. foreign 
policy” for this time.50 
Theodore Roosevelt continued this fervour following the 1901 
assassination of President McKinley, expanding the Monroe Doctrine with what 
came to be known as the “Roosevelt Corollary”. This corollary declared that the 
United States was to take on the mantle of international policeman in the 
Western Hemisphere, thereby justifying American intervention while at the 
same time forbidding others the same rights: 
“Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general 
loosening of the ties of civilised society, may in America, as 
elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilised nation, 
and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to 
the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however 
reluctantly, in flagrant case of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the 
exercise of an international police power.” 51 
America’s involvement in China, during this time and prior to World War I, 
was liberal interventionist in nature, and like its involvement in Latin America, 
American interest in China was largely economic.52 The level of interest and will 
to act in the American economic interest was dependent on both the 
administration in office and also the global environment of the time. The turn of 
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the century allows for a clear analysis of how changes in three administrations 
can affect American foreign (specifically China) policy, and also the continuities 
of overall US traditions of Grand Strategy. 
The US focused much of its 20th Century expansionist energies on trying to 
promote stable governments that would provide markets for US products and 
access for US businesses. President Roosevelt issued his corollary to the Monroe 
Doctrine, designed to promote stability in the Western Hemisphere, but when 
stability proved elusive, Roosevelt’s successor, William Howard Taft, proudly 
announced the “even more intrusive policy of Dollar Diplomacy” which hoped 
to effectively “buy” stability and open access to international markets.53 
From McKinley’s assassination until the 1904 Russo-Japanese War, Far 
Eastern policy in the US was John Hay’s near-exclusive domain. During these 
years, focus on domestic concerns and events in Europe meant interest in China 
was negligible. American material interests fared badly and trade declined. 
Russian adventurism threatened the Asian balance of power, and when Russia 
threatened Manchuria, the US was forced to take note: Manchuria absorbed 
90% of the US textile exports to China. The business press and American Asiatic 
Association expressed fear of Russia’s imperialist agenda, but Roosevelt was 
initially ambivalent, believing that it was Western civilisation being brought to 
the barbarians. Japan approached the US for joint military action and an alliance 
against Russia, but was rebuffed: Americans still believed their military was 
only for the protection of Americans and their existing territories.54 
Despite the rhetoric of his friends, including Brooks Adams and Alfred 
Mahan, and despite some of his own earlier beliefs, as president, Roosevelt 
identified no vital American interest in China, and therefore devoted little 
attention to it. American indifference to China “derived not only from the 
relatively greater pressures of more urgent affairs, but also the decline in 
American economic interests there”: trade declined sharply in North China and 
Manchuria, where American cotton and textile exports prospered in the 1890s. 
Equally, the realities of doing business in China were well known to the US 
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business community. They had become increasingly aware that the Chinese 
neither had, nor were likely to have for some considerable time, “meaningful 
purchasing power” to absorb American products. Add to this the lack of a 
domestic communications system and poor infrastructure, China was simply 
not an attractive investment market. Cohen also suggests that this was 
especially true after the economic panic of the 1890s: “the quest for overseas 
markets became less frantic and, though never abandoned, was pursued more 
rationally in less exotic places.”55 
Equally, because the Japanese succeeded in checking Russian expansion, 
the years immediately following the end of the Boxer Rebellion saw little threat 
to the partition of China. Therefore, to the extent that Roosevelt remained 
interested in the Asian balance of power and its relation to American security, 
China ceased to be of importance, without economic or security significance. 
With neither a realist nor liberal justification to remain involved or engaged in 
China, the US simply didn’t. The president was therefore unwilling to provide 
more than rhetorical support for China’s aspirations for modernisation and 
independence from Japanese imperialism. This policy was predominantly 
rooted in his preference to avoid – at all costs – the risk of war with Japan.56 
Roosevelt would caution Secretary of War William Howard Taft that American 
interests in Asia were “unimportant, and not such that the American people 
would be content to run the slightest risk of collision about them”.57 This was 
especially true when stacked against the relative importance of Asia to the 
Japanese. This cautious policy likely reflected the duelling approaches toward 
China that Roosevelt inherited: domestically, many voters demanded Chinese 
exclusion from the American workforce, while American businesses demanded 
adherence to the Open Door.58 
Theodore Roosevelt was the first president since the Founding Fathers to 
resurrect Hamilton’s approach of treating the balance of power as “the 
distinctive feature of international relations and to undertake an active 
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American role in shaping it.” Roosevelt’s involvement in finding a solution to the 
Russo-Japanese War of 1904 was a perfect example of this. Roosevelt “feared 
that a Russian victory might enable it to dominate Asia and thereby threaten the 
global balance of power”, and, though wanting Russia weakened, “resisted 
carrying [its] defeat… to the point where a Japanese threat would substitute for 
a Russian one.” The settlement reached (for which Roosevelt received the Nobel 
Peace Prize) was based on the premise of a balance of power in Asia, in which 
Japan, with British support, would “offset Imperial Russia, with the United 
States maintaining the ultimate balance between the two sides in Asia, much as 
Britain protected the equilibrium in Europe.”59 
The president’s opposition to greater involvement in China’s struggle for 
independence survived despite China’s supporters within his administration. 
For example, Taft, after a 1907 visit to China, became “convinced” of the need to 
“stand against the Japanese threat to economic interests of Americans in China”; 
William Straight, the American consul general at Mukden, “conspired with 
Chinese officials” to use American capital against Japan; and Assistant Secretary 
of State Huntington Wilson “shared Straight’s hostility toward Japan”. 
Nonetheless, Roosevelt would remain careful, because he still “did not consider 
the sum of the interest of Americans in Manchuria or China proper equivalent to 
a vital national interest.” This did not mean he would ignore the government’s 
responsibility to look out for the interests of its citizens and businesses. Where 
there was clear evidence of discrimination against American goods, the 
Washington would protest to the offending power, whether Japan or any other 
nation. Given the limited importance of this trade, however, “such protests 
would never be pushed to the point of precipitating a crisis.” The 
administration’s policy of protecting commercial interests, while avoiding 
confrontation, would be formalised in the 1908 Root-Takahira Agreement.60 
Despite being Theodore Roosevelt’s hand-picked successor, within a few 
months of his inauguration, “Taft left no doubt that he was determined to be his 
own man”. The sharpest departure from Roosevelt’s (and earlier) policies lay in 
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the new administration’s Asian policy. Taft’s ideas about Asia were formed 
during his time as Governor of the Philippines, and also as part of the diplomatic 
Pacific cruise dispatched by Theodore Roosevelt, during which he developed 
sympathy for the Chinese. He would elevate former Roosevelt officials who 
shared his sympathy for the Chinese and opposition to Japanese imperialism. 
The Taft administration’s diplomacy focussed on “aggressively promoting the 
economic interests of the United States to an extent never before attempted and 
not matched until the late 1990s”, as a part of a considerable effort to expand 
American trade and investments throughout the world. This economic push 
was most striking in Asia because of the contrast it offered to Roosevelt 
administration policy, “particularly in terms of Taft’s willingness to press 
American interests in the face of Japanese power.” In many ways, Taft’s 
approach to Asia is a synthesis of American foreign policy traditions and 
ideologies. Alongside his genuine belief in the potential for expanded markets 
for US products offered by a modernised China, he believed improving China’s 
situation would serve the US national interest. Serving the realist tradition, Taft 
saw restoring control of China’s sovereignty to the Chinese as a way of 
stabilising the balance of power in the region, checking Japanese expansion, and 
making the region safe for American economic interests. Serving the idealistic 
tradition, Taft and his Asia team honestly believed that by pursuing their own 
interests, they would also help China, as their aspirations were consistent with 
both the ideals and interests of the American people.61 
Taft’s policy would be known as ‘Dollar Diplomacy’, and in the face of 
scepticism from the American financial community, he offered a defence and 
explanation of its benefits in his December 1912 Annual Message to Congress: 
“The diplomacy of the present administration has sought to respond 
to modern ideas of commercial intercourse. This policy has been 
characterized as substituting dollars for bullets. It is one that appeals 
alike to idealistic humanitarian sentiments, to the dictates of sound 
policy and strategy, and to legitimate commercial aims. It is an effort 
frankly directed to the increase of American trade upon the axiomatic 
                                                          
61
 Cohen (2010), p.70,74 
Stefan Fergus Chapter III: A Brief History of US-China Policy 
87 
 
principle that the government of the United States shall extend all 
proper support to every legitimate and beneficial American 
enterprise abroad... Because modern diplomacy is commercial, there 
has been a disposition in some quarters to attribute to it none but 
materialistic aims. How strikingly erroneous is such an impression 
may be seen from a study of the results by which the diplomacy of the 
United States can be judged.” 
In the same address, Taft defended Dollar Diplomacy by pointing to the 
“enormous increase in the importance and activities of those relations”. Indeed, 
the president would argue that the US had not done enough to further boost the 
strength of the American economy, and that, 
“If this government is really to preserve to the American people that 
free opportunity in foreign markets which will soon be indispensable 
to our prosperity, even greater efforts must be made. Otherwise the 
American merchant, manufacturer, and exporter will find many a 
field in which American trade should logically predominate pre-
empted through the more energetic efforts of other governments and 
other commercial nations.”62 
Taft, long overshadowed by his predecessor and successor, actually 
brought about an important and lasting change in American China policy. Much 
of American foreign policy in the 20th century “resembled a direct or indirect 
application of Dollar Diplomacy”. Even though specific schemes and proposals 
for China failed, “a form of Dollar Diplomacy continued to play a major role in 
Sino-U.S. relations right through the 1930s.” Another, more dramatic example of 
Dollar Diplomacy can be seen in the Marshall Plan of the late 1940s. Dobson 
argues that, while “It may have been couched in noble, philanthropic language... 
it had much the same goal as Taft’s Dollar Diplomacy: to stabilize economies 
and governments, in this instance in Europe, through the infusion of massive 
numbers of U.S. dollars.”63 
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As with the Roosevelt administration, the realities of the Asian balance of 
power precluded the US from granting China much autonomy – Japan and the 
European Imperial powers were simply too powerful, a fact that even the 
Chinese recognised by continuing to angle for support from other powers and 
policies that avoided angering their oppressors. Taft’s personal interest in and 
hopes for China simply did not match the geopolitical realities of the time.64 
During Woodrow Wilson’s administration, it has been argued, the US 
exhibited more idealistic aims and policies, with realism taking a back-seat to 
the new president’s high-minded goals. The first reaction of the United States 
when war broke out in Europe was neutrality, which it had adhered to through 
Europe’s multiple conflicts of the nineteenth century. Walter Lippmann, highly 
critical of Wilson’s foreign policy (and one-time advisor of the president), 
observed in 1943 that, “[w]hen the long-expected war in Europe broke out in 
1914, the United States had no foreign policy which enabled the nation to 
determine its interests in the conflict.” He added that Wilson’s lack of a foreign 
policy “gave him [no] means of judging whether, why, when, where, how, and to 
what end, the United States must take its position in the war.” Wilson’s policy 
“took a zigzag course” as he and his advisers tried to ascertain what its interests 
actually were; at first angry “because the British blockade infringed the 
American doctrine of freedom of the seas”, then “because German ruthlessness 
outraged American sensibilities”.65 
The Wilson administration’s foreign policy is generally well known, but its 
China policy (understandably) receives nowhere near as much attention as does 
the President’s role in World War I and its aftermath. Wilson’s China policy 
would contain foreshadowing elements of future Sino-American relations. 
While Wilson came into office with high-minded ideals of changing the tone of 
China policy, the realities of international relations – not to mention 
distractions in other parts of the world – would eventually result in a 
realignment of policy towards an economic focus. At first, Wilson’s China policy 
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was to oppose the Taft administration’s Dollar Diplomacy, which led to growing 
nervousness among American investors in China. 
“In his first year as president, Wilson’s handling of American policy 
toward China indicated less concern for power politics than 
Roosevelt had shown and less concern for Wall Street than Taft had 
shown.”66 
America’s approach to China during Wilson’s administration can largely 
be described as disinterested: without governmental support, business interests 
were uninterested in remaining in China. Despite pledging the US government 
to play a greater role in the promotion of American trade, Wilson’s opposition 
to previous policy in China was rooted in his belief that policy had been 
“subordinated to the narrow self-interest” of those banks and businesses that 
formed the American Group before becoming part of the international 
consortium in China. Wilson believed such practices “artificially restricted 
entrepreneurial opportunity in the U.S.”, “had a debilitating effect on overall 
economic development”, and “undermined public support for the business 
system.”67 Wilson and Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan “mistrusted” 
the bureaucracy, were “hostile to the imperialists”, and were “unwilling to 
accept advice from those steeped in the old politics of the Old World.” Wilson’s 
China policy was therefore made without consultation with the State 
Department or the other nations involved in the China consortium. Progress 
towards a better world, Wilson believed, “could not be based on the wisdom of 
imperialism and avarice.”68 
In 1913, Washington extended recognition to the Republic of China, which 
had arisen from the ashes of the civil war. In doing so, Wilson effectively 
ignored conditions in China and the fact that his preferred Chinese leader, Yuan 
Shi-kai, was implicated in the murder of another prominent Chinese.69 In order 
to consolidate his control, Yuan Shi-kai approached the US with contracts for 
infrastructure and investment projects. The Americans eagerly accepted these, 
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but they did not lead to a substantial increase in America’s economic role in 
China, which was still dominated by other powers. The outbreak of World War 
I, in conjunction with American withdrawal from the consortium, created 
conditions under which Japan could take advantage of European distraction to 
enhance its position in China.70 
Sympathetic Americans in China requested government help to combat 
Japan’s attempts to run roughshod over China’s sovereignty, but the realities of 
America’s position limited its action. State Department Counsellor Robert 
Lansing stated that, while the US was a friend of China, “it would be quixotic in 
the extreme to allow the question of China’s territorial integrity to entangle the 
United States in international difficulties”. In Lansing’s view, “American 
interests in China were commercial only”, and a Japanese guarantee that 
American goods would receive equal treatment in China was enough to satisfy 
Open Door requirements.71 As American interests in Asia were considered 
minor, they simply could not compete for Wilson’s attention while the First 
World War unfolded, and ultimately drew the US in. 
Under the guidance of Division of Far Eastern Affairs chief E.T. Williams, 
China did remain at least a peripheral concern for Wilson. During the World 
War, Wilson would issue statements opposing Japanese imperialism, but go no 
further. This harmed the impression the president wished to create of the US as 
champion of oppressed people everywhere. However, Wilson slowly came to 
see expansion of American economic interests in China as a way of checking 
Japan’s imperial expansion in the Asian arena. He came to discard his 
opposition to the much-criticised Taft-era dollar diplomacy and, in East Asia, 
embraced the policy offering businessmen support in contract negotiations.72 
In May 1917, the Wilson administration conceded that Japan had a 
“special” position in China, different to any Western power’s, at the same time 
as reaffirming a commitment to the open door. This, according to some in the 
administration, caused considerable damage to America’s standing with the 
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Chinese, which up until now had considered America the lesser of the barbarian 
interlopers. China’s interests would suffer yet further at Versailles, when, in 
order to keep them at the negotiating table, Wilson acquiesced to Japanese 
demands regarding their Chinese conquests (specifically, Shantung). This is 
unfortunate, as the League of Nations was meant in part to be an organisation 
that could do for China what the US could not do alone: secure its territorial 
integrity and sovereignty.73 Here we see that Wilson, like Theodore Roosevelt, 
was unwilling to follow any idealistic hopes they may have had for China into a 
confrontation with Japan.74 
 
A STRONG RETURN TO THE GLOBAL ARENA & BUSINESS AS USUAL IN ASIA 
(1920-1945) 
With the defeat of League ratification, and the rise in disenchantment with 
international involvement among the electorate, Warren G. Harding won the 
presidential election in 1920 on an “America First” platform. In his inaugural 
address, Harding announced his opposition to American internationalism: “The 
recorded progress of our Republic, materially and spiritually, in itself proves the 
wisdom of our inherited policy of non-involvement in Old World affairs.”75 
What followed was a period of increased isolationism and protectionism, 
during which America resorted to its historically-favoured methods of dealing 
with international relations, such as throwing up tariffs to protect its own 
industries from foreign competition, and withdrawing from the politics of the 
European continent. 
“The twenties and thirties are popularly thought of as the 
height of isolationism in U.S. foreign policy. There is some truth 
to this, evidenced by the U.S. rejection of American 
participation in the League of Nations, the rise of isolationist 
sentiment among the American public and a strong peace 
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movement, and its reluctance to become actively involved in 
European conflicts (especially following the Great Depression 
and during the early years of World War II).”76 
After World War I, Washington officials still played a leading role in 
disarmament negotiations, and also helped design and manage a new 
international monetary system. Where it remained ‘isolationist’ was by steering 
clear of alliances and commitments to collective security, save for the Kellogg-
Briand Pact of 1928, which was an unrealistic attempt to condemn war and 
commit signatories to peaceful conflict resolutions.77 
In China, the United States and other Western powers remained 
committed to the imperialist treaty system, making no moves to alter the status 
quo, and resisted Chinese overtures for change. During this period, China 
experienced considerable internal strife, as factions within the country tried to 
consolidate or usurp power from the warlords who held de facto control. The 
internal conflict led many in America to believe they should stay engaged in 
China, protecting its economy and the Western interests therein – even in the 
face of increased and ever-more violent anti-Western protests. Because China 
remained of peripheral concern to the US government, policy was the sole 
responsibility of two people, who were unable to attract governmental 
attention for long. “A combination of sterile legislation and a rigid insistence on 
order” shaped America’s China policy, insisting that the troubled nation remain 
committed to honouring its treaty commitments. Even in the face of the May 
30th Movement, which brought increasingly violent anti-Western protests, and 
demands from the American business community in China for protection, 
Secretary of State Frank Kellogg refused to act. He felt American public opinion 
“would no longer tolerate gunboat diplomacy”. Of equal significance in Kellogg’s 
thinking was the popular American belief that its involvement in World War I 
had been “to serve the selfish ends of a privileged few”; this sentiment instilled 
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a profound reluctance  to get militarily involved in China to protect its business 
interests.78 
Through much of this period, therefore, America was “troubled and 
confused” by events in China. Administrative and public apathy led not only to 
ineffective policies, but also insufficient understanding of the realities unfolding 
in China’s civil war. There was, however, one positive outcome from America’s 
hands-off approach: as the least-interfering power, the US was able to reach a 
rapprochement with Nationalist China, while both Japan and the USSR were 
excluded. This being said, diplomats at the time – including Coolidge’s 
Undersecretary of State, William Castle – held views similar to those of Teddy 
Roosevelt and his time, deferring to Japan’s interests on the Asian mainland.79 
With the onset of the Great Depression, isolationist sentiment in the 
United States would only grow. Hamilton Fish Armstrong attributes American 
isolation during these years to the attitude that “Having won the war for their 
allies… Americans considered that they were entitled to attend to their own 
affairs exclusively.”80  
Opposition to Japanese militarism in the late 1920s and early 1930s would 
continue to inform US policy towards Asia, but the Roosevelt tradition of semi-
engagement continued but to an even greater extent:  domestic concerns were 
the overriding priority as the Hoover administration sought a solution to the 
economic stagnation afflicting the country. Insofar as foreign affairs encroached 
on public opinion, the collection of war debts owed by European allies was the 
only policy of interest. When China approached the US and Europe for help 
against Japan, there was simply no support for foreign entanglements or 
intervention. America was once again confronted with the dilemma Roosevelt 
and Knox had struggled with in 1910: the choice of abandoning their economic 
interests in the region or risking war with Japan to protect China’s sovereign 
and territorial integrity. Within the State Department, “there was essential 
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agreement that American interests in Manchuria in particular and China in 
general were insignificant; there was no reason to fight.”81  
In the broader scope of international relations, Japan’s invasion of China 
would become an abstraction with which internationally-minded Americans 
and others would contemplate the stability of the system put in place after 
World War I. Japan’s actions violated her treaty obligations, made a mockery of 
the mutual-security obligation of the League of Nations, and violated the Nine-
Power Treaty and Kellogg-Briand Pact, thereby threatening the peace system 
intended to keep nations – specifically, the United States – out of war. Hoover’s 
Secretary of State, Henry Stimson, would attempt to influence events in Asia, 
but due to a lack of both international will and preoccupation with domestic 
troubles, he was able to offer nothing more than rhetorical support for China – 
neither the Congress nor Senate would concede that Japan’s aggression 
threatened US interests, thereby limiting the actions available to Stimson and 
others sympathetic towards China.82 In the interwar period, therefore,  
“China became an abstraction – the victim in a test case of the 
interwar peace system. The system failed the test; the world lost the 
system – and China lost Manchuria.”83 
 
With the onset of World War II, America was once again a spectator to another 
European war, and again the White House was occupied by an idealistic 
president, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who wished to help protect democracy 
around the world. However, in the decade leading up to Pearl Harbor, there 
were sharp differences within the US about how the growing military power 
and increasingly transparent expansionist ambitions of European and Far 
Eastern dictators should be dealt with, if at all.84 The differences centred (as 
always) around how best to serve the United States’ national interests. 
American policymakers were split over the question of how to react to the 
outbreak of war: Isolationists were against any steps that might lead to aid for 
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the democracies, fearing a repeat of 1917, whereby the United States would 
become so committed to an Allied victory that “she would be drawn into war 
against her will”. Interventionists, on the other hand, “wanted to abandon 
neutrality and give military aid to Britain and France.”85 
Despite avoiding any semblance of picking sides in the escalating conflict 
in Europe and Asia, “almost none of the so-called isolationists declared that the 
[imperial] commitments of the United States should be reduced”; there was no 
discussion of revoking the Monroe Doctrine, that the Philippines should not be 
defended, or that Japan should be given free rein in China, which she demanded 
as the price of peace (repeating their Versailles demands). Instead of preparing 
for the coming war, American policymakers devoted their efforts to opposing 
the alliances that were “needed in order to validate the commitments,” so 
blinded were they by the illusions of America’s traditional non-entanglement.86 
Some, including President Roosevelt, feared that aggressive German and 
Japanese ambitions represented long-term threats to American security and 
also the survival of democracy. With this in mind, “it was thus vital for the 
United States to support those resisting these dictatorships.” However, the 
counter-argument for this early form of pre-emptive foreign policy was that 
“war itself, not the European or Asian balance of power, most directly 
threatened America’s interests and democratic institutions.” Therefore, every 
effort should be made to “avoid once again being drawn into distant conflicts 
that pose no clear and present danger to the preservation of the Republic or its 
key institutions.”87 
When FDR began his presidency, the “horrors of the depression” were a 
more immediate threat to the interests of the United States than events in 
Asia.88 Therefore, the president focussed attentions on pressing domestic 
politics, such as post-War and post-Depression reconstruction and also the nine 
million unemployed workers in America.89 Roosevelt’s “spectacular measures” 
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of reform gave America hope again, but there remained “little energy left to 
think about the troubles and dangers of others.”90 When it came to China, and 
Japan’s continued aggression therein, Franklin Roosevelt would follow a path 
similar to his cousin, Theodore. Specifically, this meant appeasing Japan. Indeed, 
despite lingering sympathies in the State Department’s Division of Far Eastern 
Affairs, all new China projects China were “screened to avoid irritating Japan.”91 
The need to ease suffering at home naturally took precedence over creating 
tension abroad – the national interest trumped all, and at the time interests 
were conceived of in measurable terms such as “commerce, investments, and 
occasionally missionary interests.”92 Simply put, involvement in China displayed 
no tangible benefits. During the late 1930s, when Japan stepped up its 
campaigns in China, and the resultant destruction of American property, 
American deaths, and the disruption to American commerce, FDR still refused 
to get involved – the ‘lessons’ of World War I prevailed, and the US was not 
willing to go to war for the advantage of the few.93 
According to Cohen, in the early years of conflict, “there was no shortage 
of sympathy for China” in America, but there was “simply doubt as to the 
relevance of Asia at a time when the ‘real world’ was endangered by Hitlerism.” 
This sentiment would change dramatically only after Japan signed the 1940 
Tripartite Pact with Nazi Germany and Italy, and China became an official US 
ally. The US would continue selling oil to Japan until 1941 (thereby facilitating 
its war effort), but they also froze Japanese assets in America as the Japanese 
joined the side of the aggressors. In retaliation, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, 
and America was drawn into World War II.94 This marked the beginning of a 
new trend in American foreign economic policy as, from now on, the United 
States would use economic warfare, to varying degrees of severity and success, 
against a number of nations that were perceived to be “rogue” or threats. 
Only after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, in December 1941, was 
Roosevelt able to mobilise support to get involved. Before the attack, Roosevelt 
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had known that the autocracies presented potential threats to the United States, 
and that if threatened, America “might wade in with everything we have to 
give”.95 Once again, China dropped off the policy radar. 
In China, the Roosevelt years “demonstrated that American policy was 
designed to serve American interests without particular regard to China.” That 
Japan’s belligerence resulted in loans and other beneficial treatment of China, 
was incidental to America’s agenda.96 
 
TRUMAN, THE ABERRATION, & NORMALIZATION (1945-1972) 
President Roosevelt implemented one of the greatest shifts in US foreign policy, 
“convincing Americans of the merits of not only global engagement, but of a 
liberal, multinational brand.” After joining the United Nations, the United States 
continued to participate actively in fashioning an international network of 
political and economic institutions aimed at managing the new international 
system. Roosevelt’s successes did not immediately lay to rest the spectre of 
America’s traditional isolation, as unmistakeable signs of a retreat from the 
international scene arose soon after the war ended. Specifically, America 
wanted to return to pre-war levels of armament, and there was a substantial 
decline in defence spending: in the two years after hostilities ended, US defence 
spending fell from $81 billion to $13 billion, and troop levels dropped from 12.1 
million to 1.6 million,97 with planned future reductions. 
Truman’s administration would see a number of revolutions in US foreign 
policy that would reverse America’s demilitarisation, and experience a 
considerable revolution in the practices and ideologies behind the United 
States’ perceived position and role in the world. The onset of the Cold War and 
the subsequent creation of national security directive NSC-68 would lead to not 
only shifts in America’s relations with the world at large (specifically Europe), 
but also draw a new course for America’s relations with China, for the first time 
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deviating considerably from the established pattern of economic engagement 
and support for China’s territorial and sovereign integrity. 
After 1945, when it became clear that the Soviet Union was emerging as 
America’s new adversary, and continuing throughout the Cold War, Roosevelt’s 
liberal internationalist cause became “inextricably bound” to the policy of 
“containing” Soviet-directed, expansionist communism.98 The US did not, at 
first, actively seek to spread peace and democracy around the globe, but instead 
adhered to a goal of preventing the spread of authoritarianism.  
China, “a tangle the United States could never unravel during World War 
II”, posed even greater challenges for Truman. Rising anti-communist 
sentiment, and with the Soviets actively supporting the Chinese Communists, 
meant the US had little choice but to back the Nationalists (a regime they had 
not much respected during World War II). Truman dispatched General Marshall 
to help broker a compromise, naïvely assuming the Nationalist government 
would reform itself. Despite some initial encouraging signs, this ultimately 
proved fruitless. The Nationalists squandered their advantages, and the Chinese 
Communists capitalized on their failures. Truman rebuffed recommendations to 
send troops to support the Nationalists, as China still remained a secondary 
theatre of concern. Unfortunately, because of strong support from Henry Luce’s 
influential Time-Life media empire, and ill-informed congressional Republican 
support for Chiang, Truman “recognised that... to abandon China in an election 
year would give the opposition a whip to flog him with.”99 Truman’s half-
hearted and incomplete support for Chiang’s cause would have severe 
consequences both at home and abroad. When Communism finally triumphed 
in China, Truman suffered domestic political attacks over the question of “Who 
lost China?”, as it was seen as a further triumph for communism. Truman 
despised the Chinese Communists and made no conciliatory gestures towards 
the new Beijing regime – albeit the US domestic political scene would not have 
allowed for any reconciliation anyway.100 
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Following his re-election, and in the face of growing support for Senator 
Joseph McCarthy’s anti-Communist crusade, Truman needed to prove that he 
(and, by extension, the Democratic Party) were not soft on communism. To this 
end, on January 30th 1950, he authorised a complete review of American foreign 
policy. The result was ‘NSC-68’, the nation’s first formal statement of national 
security policy, which defined the Soviet challenge as global, equating 
communist interests everywhere with those of the Soviet Union. NSC-68 
advocated the globalisation and militarisation of the containment strategy. 
Coming in the wake of Mao’s communist victory in China, McCarthy’s “Who lost 
China?” accusations, and Russian advances in nuclear weaponry, the document 
“pictured the Soviet Union as aspiring to world hegemony, refused to rule out 
the possibility of war, and recommended a much broader, more energetic and 
expensive effort to counter this threat.”101 In essence, it was a “practical 
expansion of the Truman Doctrine”, which had been worldwide in implication 
but limited to Europe and financial means in application.102 
To gather Congressional support for implementing the suggestions put 
forth in NSC-68, Truman needed to prove expanding the scope of the 
containment policy as essential. Truman had only been able to appropriate 
funds, from a reluctant Congress, for containment in Europe “with the help of 
the crises in Greece and Czechoslovakia.”103 Therefore, the president believed 
he required another crisis to acquire the necessary support for implementing 
his new program. By June 1950, the international situation had grown more 
uncertain: 
“Chiang could not hold on to Formosa nor Rhee to South Korea 
without an American commitment; the U.S. Air Force and Navy 
needed a justification to retain their bases in Japan; the Democrats 
had to prove to the McCarthyites that they could stand up to the 
Communists in Asia as well as in Europe.”104 
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On June 25th 1950, North Korean troops crossed the 38th Parallel in force, 
and Truman’s needs were met. In other words, the policy envisioned in NSC 68 
“could be wrapped up and tied with a ribbon by an Asian crisis.”105 
Alongside containment, fear of the ‘domino effect’ – that communist 
successes in one country would lead to a wave of communist revolutions – 
troubled American strategists’ during the Cold War and influenced their policy 
proposals. American leaders feared that “if the United States suffered a series of 
reverses in mostly symbolic contests with the Soviets, Soviet power would seem 
unstoppable”, which would result in weak non-aligned nations, as well as some 
American allies, bandwagoning with the Soviet Union, “while remaining non-
communist or anti-communist internally... for fear of being on the losing side in 
geopolitics.”106 The domino effect was a particular concern in the Asian theatre, 
where evidence suggested it might be valid: 
“Common borders permitted Stalin to help Mao gain power in 1949, 
allowed Russia and China to help Kim Il Sung win and keep power in 
North Korea, and helped North Vietnam survive and eventually 
conquer South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.”107 
China’s participation and intervention in the Korean Peninsula put an end 
to American assumptions that there were “significant differences between 
varieties of communism”, and from that point on, “the prevailing view was that 
communism in Asia, as in Europe… was a monolith” which led the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff to pronounce in 1952 that “each Communist gain directly involves a loss to 
the Western world.”108 Korean Communists had indeed received support from 
both the Soviets and Chinese Communists, but only the Chinese committed to 
war – Stalin would renege on his promise of air support. As the conflict 
continued, Truman organised a series of talks and negotiations to bring the war 
to an end, but the conflict would continue into Eisenhower’s administration.109 
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Truman inherited a nation eager to return to America’s traditional policy 
of non-involvement, traditional civil-military relations, and anxious to return to 
peacetime pursuits. As a result of the containment policy, when Truman left the 
White House in 1952, “his legacy was an American presence on every continent, 
an unprecedented number of alliance commitments, and an enormously 
expanded armament industry.”110 Truman turned America decisively away 
from the 1930s policy of unilateral disarmament and neutrality, favouring an 
arms build-up and collective security.111 The measure of his success is that his 
successors would all stick with his policies. 
The real commitment to containing communism globally, and the 
revolution in American foreign policy, occurred when the Truman Doctrine was 
supplemented by the more panoramic NSC-68, when “dominant opinion in 
Washington no longer held that the policies of 1947 – economic aid without 
military involvement – would suffice to contain Soviet expansion”.112 
 
When he came into office, the most pressing foreign policy matter on 
Eisenhower’s agenda was how to address the stalemate in Korea. He directed 
his defence team to devise contingency plans for tactical nuclear strikes against 
Chinese forces along the Yalu River, should armistice negotiations fail. After 
Stalin’s death, however, the new USSR leadership encouraged China to 
negotiate and make concessions to expedite a return to regional stability.113 
That China had held its own against the United States granted it “instant great-
power status”. Mao’s continued dependence on Soviet support would cement 
their alliance in the short term, but differences over the conduct of the Korean 
War laid the foundations for fissures in the relationship to open.114 
Eisenhower’s policy in East Asia was to bolster US allies “against China, 
the Soviet Union, and local Communist parties” through military aid and the 
1954-5 creation of SEATO. The president’s greatest challenge in East Asia came 
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over Taiwan and Indochina. With regards to Taiwan, “Eisenhower entered 
office committed to the more aggressive support of Chiang Kai-shek’s 
Nationalist government.” The president withdrew the Seventh Fleet from the 
Taiwan Straits, with the implication that Chiang could then begin working to 
roll back Communism on the mainland. In reality, despite a lingering desire to 
protect Taiwan, Eisenhower had no interest in involving America in retaking 
the mainland or stumbling into the middle of a continuing Chinese civil war. 
This policy is not unlike previous US approaches to China, from 1850-1920. Mao 
would test Eisenhower’s commitment to Taiwan when he initiated “a series of 
crises” by shelling Nationalist positions on Quemoy and Matsu, but Mao’s 
actions actually led to a formal defence pact between the US and Taiwan, 
promising help to resist mainland aggression.115 
The administration’s uncompromising support for Taiwan held both 
domestic and international benefits. It was “especially popular among Old 
Guard Republicans and the congressional China Lobby”, who Eisenhower 
required for domestic policy support. At the same time, it was part of a 
“deliberate strategy to force a diplomatic wedge between Moscow and Beijing.” 
Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles “understood that 
Communist China was no Soviet puppet, and that the possibility existed of even 
greater Sino-Soviet discord.” To encourage that discord, the US took a very hard 
line against Beijing, which forced it to make demands of Moscow that they 
“could not accept without the unwanted risk of general war” – this included full 
support against the United States over Taiwan. Mao’s attacks on Taiwan 
succeeded in driving the wedge home, but it was a risky strategy for the US to 
pursue: it alienated US allies and created considerable Sino-American tensions 
that increased the likelihood of conflict.116 
“Whether any other strategy would have promoted U.S. interests 
much more effectively is an open question; evidence suggests that 
Mao was in fact profoundly hostile toward the United States during 
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the 1950s and would probably have been hostile regardless of 
specific changes in American policy.”117 
 
The domino theory played a crucial role in American involvement in Vietnam 
during the 1960s, and saw the policy of containment taken to its limits. 
Presidents Kennedy and Johnson escalated troop deployments in Vietnam in the 
hope that, with the South Vietnamese army, they could defeat the North 
Vietnamese leader, Ho Chi Minh and the Vietcong, “thus preventing a 
communist takeover not only of South Vietnam but all of Southeast Asia.”118 
The inept implementation of policy, and misguided application of 
American military power proved an eye-opening experience for a nation 
described as “cocky [and] overconfident”.119 In the 1970s, as a result of the 
spiralling costs of the Vietnam War, a strong opposition to containment 
developed in American public opinion: “in Vietnam the American people had 
been forced to face up to the true cost of containment”.120 
As a presidential candidate, John F Kennedy had criticised Eisenhower’s 
New Look strategy, with its “more bang for your buck” preference for more and 
larger bombs. Kennedy wanted to respond to communist aggression on every 
level. To Kennedy, Vietnam offered the perfect theatre for the United States to 
halt communist expansion. As Ambrose writes, “There he could show his 
interest in the Third World, demonstrate conclusively that America lived up to 
her commitments... and play the exciting new game of counterinsurgency”.121 
In order to provide help to the Vietnamese, under the 1954 SEATO 
agreements, South Vietnam had to be under threat from outside forces, which in 
the 1960s it was not; the strife came from within Diem’s government, and was 
not comprised solely of communist forces. The bulk of the Viet Cong were, 
moreover, recruited from within South Vietnam. After writing the SEATO 
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Treaty, John Foster Dulles had promised that, while the agreement extended 
protection over the region of South Vietnam, “under no circumstances would 
the United States be required to put down an internal uprising or get involved 
in a civil war.” This was, however, before the Cold War, containment, and 
growing fear of the domino effect. Kennedy’s Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, 
expressed these fears: “if the United States allowed the Viet Cong to win in 
South Vietnam, the Chinese would quickly gobble up the rest of Asia”, 
considering as he did that Hanoi was a pawn of Communist China.122 As a result, 
Kennedy would “never seriously consider changes in the U.S. policy of 
containing and isolating China.”123 
In the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the United States and the 
Soviet Union appeared to be moving towards a more stable relationship. By the 
early 1960s, China had supplanted the Soviet Union as America’s most feared 
adversary; “of the two communist giants, it appeared far the more militant, 
hostile, and belligerent.” Robert McMahon argued that, the underlying reasons 
behind the fateful decision to militarily intervene in Vietnam, “however 
misguided they might appear in retrospect” lie “almost entirely within the 
realm of Cold War fears.” In the broadest sense, therefore, American 
intervention derived from an American desire to contain China and “prove 
simultaneously, for the sake both of allies and adversaries, the credibility of 
American power and the sanctity of American commitments.”124  
 
NORMALIZATION TO TIANANMEN (1972-1989) 
The feared domino effect did not result in the emergence of a unified 
communist bloc. Unlike the post-war ties between democratic nations, the ties 
binding Asian communist nations would prove fragile and tenuous: 
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“China split with the Soviet Union in the 1960s and fought border 
skirmishes with it, and in 1979 China fought a brief war with 
Vietnam, by then a Soviet satellite.”125 
Richard M. Nixon won the presidency at a time of great discontent with 
domestic, as well as foreign, affairs. It fell to Nixon to conduct foreign policy in 
an environment in which both realists and idealists were hostile to the war in 
Vietnam: Realists insisted that American principles were still valid in Vietnam, 
but offered two stark, extreme proposals for continued involvement: “if the war 
in [Vietnam] was worth fighting, it had to be won and, if it was not to be won, it 
had to be abandoned”; Wilsonians, on the other hand, appeared to believe that 
American idealism had suffered from a basic moral flaw, and once they decided 
the promotion of freedom and liberty was no longer an obtainable goal, they 
abandoned the effort.126  
This increased opposition to existing policies led Nixon to offer his own 
doctrine, intended to reduce the burden of America’s overseas commitments, 
transferring much of the responsibility onto others involved. In Vietnam (and 
other theatres), Nixon’s doctrine “did not represent a major shift in U.S. foreign 
policy”; based on the key principle that the US would “call on its allies and 
friends to supply their own manpower to ‘defend’ themselves against 
‘Communist aggression’, while America provided only advice, aid, and arms.”127 
This process was called “Vietnamisation”, which came to stand for two different 
processes with regards to Vietnam: “American withdrawals and – in order to 
counterbalance these withdrawals – the accelerated training, equipping, and 
enlarging of the South Vietnamese army.”128 
Other components of President Nixon’s plan for Vietnam (created with the 
help of Henry Kissinger), were the use of negotiations with the Vietnamese 
communists; escalated ground and air operations; and also Nixon’s “madman 
theory”, which was the threat of excessive force. The emphasis placed on each 
of these components fluctuated depending on the situation in Vietnam, as well 
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as America domestic politics.129 During his administration, Nixon dispatched 
Kissinger to negotiate peace with the North Vietnamese in Paris, but as the 
fighting continued and negotiations dragged on for years, there was widespread 
domestic opposition to American involvement in Vietnam. Eventually, in 1973, a 
peace agreement was signed that allowed US troops to withdraw, but the war 
itself did not end until two years later with the fall of Saigon and the Northern 
victory. 
The American experience in Vietnam had a lasting effect on the 
prosecution of American foreign policy goals in all the administrations that 
followed. The “Vietnam Syndrome” manifested as a reluctance to commit US 
troops in large numbers to hot spots around the globe in efforts to avoid 
quagmires, and the belief that America “should never again engage in military 
conflict far from home without clear, viable, political objectives, public support 
and an exit strategy for the military.”130 
Nixon and Kissinger recognised that the world had changed dramatically 
since 1945. There were still two superpowers that dominated militarily. 
However, there were now at least five major centres of economic power, with 
Western Europe, Japan, and China joining the United States and the USSR. 
Moreover, “from a geopolitical as opposed to ideological perspective, the USSR 
and China were each other’s enemies rather than socialist brethren,” which 
meant new diplomatic opportunities were open to America. By approaching 
China through a power political perspective, unlike an ideological perspective, 
“allowed for the pursuit of hard-nosed negotiation with hostile 
powers in limited areas of mutual advantage even alongside 
continued competition with such powers. It also encouraged a desire 
to limit America’s material commitments in locations of peripheral 
interest.”131 
Paradoxically, therefore, a foreign policy based on straightforward power 
politics offered a greater chance to avoid further Vietnam-type entanglements, 
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while also allowing for more constructive relations with America’s Cold War 
adversaries. 
“If China and the USSR were thought of primarily as great powers 
rather than simply ideological enemies of the United States, then 
there was considerable room for diplomacy with Moscow and 
Beijing.”132 
Nixon eased trade and travel restrictions with the Chinese and also 
removed the Seventh Fleet from the Taiwan Straits; all to indicate his interest in 
improving US-China relations. Because of domestic obstacles, however, Nixon 
“feared a severe backlash from conservatives and anti-Communists should he 
reach out to China or abandon Taiwan.” As a result, initial diplomatic overtures 
to China were “careful, limited, secretive, and vague on both sides.”133 
Nixon’s success with China was ultimately a bi-product of his early foreign 
policy successes and the calmer international environment they helped bring 
about. In 1969, when he entered office, the US was embroiled in and 
preoccupied by a costly stalemate in Vietnam, one that had “shattered America’s 
cold war consensus” and encouraged violent social domestic conflict. During his 
years in office, however, Nixon and Kissinger 
“extricated the United States from Vietnam, thus reducing a source of 
severe domestic controversy, while improving American relations 
with China and the USSR. This in turn allowed them to balance Soviet 
power, retrench strategically, and maintain an internationalist 
foreign policy without undue expense, a policy maintained under 
Ford.”134 
Gerald Ford, who replaced Nixon after his impeachment and resignation, 
would continue the normalisation process with China, but it would not be 
finalised until the following presidency, of Jimmy Carter.135 The contrast 
between the Carter and Reagan years owed “more to contrasts in what the two 
presidents and their respective entourages said than to any vast differences in 
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what the two administrations actually did.”136 If one looks at the basic substance 
of the major foreign policies, it is difficult to see more than a marginal 
difference. These policies included: 
“continuance of support for NATO; continuance of a wary 
cultivation of China; continuance of support for Israel, along 
with as much or as little cultivation of moderate Arab 
governments as is compatible with the Israeli connection; a 
continuing consciousness that the security importance of Japan 
outweighs any economic rivalries; continuing orientation to the 
Association of South East Asian Nations and of the Pacific, 
including ANZUS pact countries Australia and New Zealand; 
[and] a continuing restraint of the basic hostility to Vietnam 
and Iran.”137 
Reagan’s policy toward China, in fact, appeared simply to allow the 
normalisation process to continue unhindered by presidential involvement or 
attention, save occasional, ill-advised rhetorical insults directed at the Chinese. 
President Reagan, long a fervent anti-communist, had never approved of 
détente with the Soviet Union (or China) – during previous Republican 
administrations of Nixon and Ford, or during Carter’s. When Reagan was 
elected, he knew America was not prepared to challenge Soviet power. The US 
had the potential advantage in both economic and military terms, but it still 
“languished in a political malaise inflicted by Vietnam and stagflation”.138 The 
American reluctance to use its military power abroad following Vietnam had led 
to the assumption that there was little that could be accomplished with United 
States’ military power. Reagan showed awareness of this in his dealings with 
Poland, Afghanistan, Central America and his withdrawal of troops from 
Lebanon.139 It was Reagan’s opinion that the United States should never again 
be in the position where it lacked the military and/or economic resources to 
help prevent the expansion of communism and Soviet influence.140 
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GEORGE H.W. BUSH (1989-1993) 
As a former envoy to China and the UN, as well as director of the CIA, George 
H.W. Bush came to office with an “excellent pedigree” in foreign affairs. Despite 
his considerable experience, however, President Bush did not find it easy to 
articulate what role the United States should play in the post-Cold War world. 
“The sudden end of the Cold War overturned the political truths of the post-war 
world – truths by which the experts had interpreted and understood the 
world.”141 New concerns on the global agenda included political instability 
caused by ethnic and religious tensions, economic pressures, and budding 
conflicts over dwindling resources.  
The year Bush took office was marked by “unprecedented, unpredictable, 
and unimaginable events” in China, the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, South 
Africa, and Central America and more changes were seen to the basic structure 
of the international system than had been since summer 1945. Unusually, and 
perhaps remarkably, the United States played almost no role in these 
worldwide events.142 By the end of that year, the Soviet Union had withdrawn 
inside its shrinking borders, and the Cold War was at an end in Europe.143 
Nonetheless, it was felt at the time that, providing global order was 
America’s “inescapable lot”. Given the nation’s considerable stake in the proper 
functioning of the global economy, not to mention potential spill-over effects of 
regional instabilities on US national security, it was considered not only a 
matter of duty but also of vital interest for the US to shoulder the burden of 
engaged leadership.144 
Bush inherited a range of policies from the Reagan administration, 
including: support for the Contras, Strategic Defence Initiative, a strong NATO, a 
peace process in the Middle East, liberalisation in South Africa, trade 
adjustments with Japan, improve relations with China, and a continuation of 
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détente with the Soviet Union.145 However, the issues that would come to 
dominate his presidency were mostly new. The familiar guideposts of American 
foreign policy disappeared with the end of the Cold War,146 which meant there 
was a need to re-examine the extent to which the national interest should direct 
the nation’s foreign policy, and the role of the US military in achieving those 
goals. Bush gave every indication that the national interest would remain at the 
heart of American foreign policy-making. 
The primary order of business of the first two years of Bush’s presidency 
was to shepherd the Cold War to a peaceful conclusion. Through careful 
diplomacy, and in the face of considerable domestic criticism, Bush did just that: 
In December 1989, President Bush met with Russian President Gorbachev to 
discuss the future of Germany. Zbigniew Brzezinski identifies this meeting as 
“Bush’s finest hour,” as the meeting effectively formalised Soviet acquiescence 
to the political changes in Eastern Europe, and set in motion  a series of 
consultations that resulted, within the year, in a reunified Germany.147 Despite 
calls from the political right to take a harsh line towards Russia, by 1990 “Bush 
had forged a fairly satisfying personal relationship with Gorbachev”, which 
allowed the two leaders to achieve a number of historic developments (with 
minimal bloodshed) between 1990-1992: the reunification of Germany, 
independence for the Baltic states, Soviet troops removed from satellite nations 
in Eastern Europe, sovereignty for Soviet republics, Gorbachev’s fall from power 
and replacement by Boris Yeltsin. Bush and Gorbachev also negotiated a series 
of arms control agreements, specifically SALT I and SALT II, which would see 
the removal of tactical nuclear weapons from overseas and also the reduction in 
their nuclear arsenals from approximately 13,000 in 1990 to between 3,000 
and 3,500 warheads by 1995.148 
In 1989, concern for the situation in the communist world was not limited 
to the former Soviet Union and its satellites. China also appeared to be on the 
brink of chaos, as social unrest surfaced: 
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“With the boundaries between political control and socioeconomic 
liberalisation blurring, an unprecedented outburst of massive 
student demands for democracy made it look for a moment as if the 
Chinese communist regime might explode.”149 
Brzezinski says the events of late May and early June 1989 that 
culminated in the Tiananmen Square massacre, “provided an important clue to 
the strategy eventually pursued by the Bush administration toward the general 
crisis of communism.”150 It was clear that American public and congressional 
sympathies lay with the Chinese students, and at first Bush threatened to 
toughen trade policies involving China, unless it released dissidents and 
embraced a more moderate policy to deal with such events.151 
When it came to China, Bush’s vision was closer to Nixon and Kissinger’s 
than Reagan and Schultz’s; the new president favoured economic engagement 
and strategic opportunity over perceived and actual ideological differences. A 
number of issues occupied the US-China relationship during Bush’s presidency, 
including Chinese sale of weapons technology to Iran, Syria and Libya and the 
fact that Beijing would lie about doing so. China was quickly replacing Japan as 
the largest holder of US debt, and still maintained trade barriers to US products 
and investment.152  
Bush claimed to deplore the events in Tiananmen Square, but insisted on 
placing it within the wider context of US interests. At the time, the Cold War was 
not yet over, so the president still adhered to a set of strategic guidelines for 
China – even if the need was reduced, it was still considered a vital balance to 
Soviet influence in the region. Bush’s hesitance to punish China resulted in 
“prolonged, legislative trench warfare” as protectionists and human rights 
advocates forged a strong anti-China lobby, against which Bush wielded his 
presidential veto as a way to prevent the deterioration of US-China relations.153 
In the post-Cold War world, however, the strategic rationale for ignoring 
China’s poor human rights record disappeared. There can be no doubt that 
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America’s impression of China was forever altered by the events of Tiananmen 
Square, and these events have come to define much of the Sino-American 
relationship.154 
President Bush was unwilling to let public opinion jeopardise the 
continuing strategic relationship with China that resulted from the 1979 
normalisation of relations. Bush’s strategy involved “caution, secret diplomacy, 
reassurance and continuity, while avoiding any self-identification with the 
cause of the demonstrators,” in order to reassure Beijing that its official position 
toward China was not the same as towards Poland and other nations seeking to 
throw off communist rule.155 Bush’s position on this issue would later cause him 
problems during the 1992 presidential election. 
After June 1989, the annual renewal of China’s Most Favoured Nation 
(MFN) trade status would become a favourite tool to punish China, and would 
define the Congressional China debate for the remainder of Bush’s time in office. 
That said, by the end of 1990, China was “clawing its way back to international 
respectability.” The greatest asset it had to offer the international community 
was the potential for profit resulting from its rapid modernisation. Businessmen 
in America “chafed at the prospect of being denied billions of dollars” in 
potential profit because leaders in Washington were troubled by Beijing’s 
handling of China’s internal affairs. In other words, “Issues of human rights did 
not loom large on many corporate balance sheets.”156 
The business community, and eventually the Executive, took up the 
argument that denying China MFN would harm not only US economic interests, 
but also China’s hopes for liberalisation and democratisation. The values-based 
Congressional opposition to China and also public opinion was of considerable 
concern for Bush, who wished to keep relations on a stable footing – open and 
free trade and strategic support in the UN (which China would give in regards to 
Iraq).157 
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Despite his successes in navigating the Cold War to a peaceful close, 
Bush’s presidency would primarily be defined by two international crises, 
which occurred within less than a year of Bush’s declaration of the Cold War’s 
end. These crises erupted in the Persian Gulf and in Yugoslavia, and gave 
President Bush an opportunity to establish a new direction in US foreign policy, 
and beyond that, the “new world order” of international cooperation expressed 
in his speech following the Helsinki Summit in September 1990.158 However, 
the president’s responses to Iraqi and Serbian aggression were “starkly 
different – massive intervention in the first case, studied indifference in the 
second.”159 
Bush and his foreign policy team were well aware of the precedent its 
handling of Iraq would set: “resisting aggression, limiting goals, showing the 
United Nations’ utility as a problem-solving institution, and working with 
allies.”160 With these in mind, President Bush dispatched the largest 
expeditionary force – more than 600,000 troops – since the Vietnam War, and 
organised an “impressively wide coalition” for the Middle East operation.161 
In contrast to Iraq, the American response to brewing violence in 
Yugoslavia was very different. Despite the spectacular victory in the Gulf War 
that clearly demonstrated US military dominance, Bush was reluctant to 
become involved in the Balkans. In fact, the response to the Yugoslavian civil 
war would be more precedent-setting than the Gulf War,162 and hark back to 
pre-World War foreign policy traditions. Cameron and James Patterson propose 
that, because 1992 was an election year and Bush was already under attack by 
Bill Clinton, his Democratic rival, for spending “too much time on foreign 
policy”, Bush was unwilling to commit American troops into such a precarious 
situation.163 Without being able to make a direct appeal on national security 
grounds, the United States was unable to muster the will or desire to get 
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involved. As Secretary of State Baker remarked with characteristic pungency 
“We don’t have a dog in this fight.”164 
After a campaign in which he was frequently “pilloried for caring more 
about the outside world than Americans’ fortunes at home”, Bush left office with 
one final call for global engagement, “tapping into a sense of compassion and 
responsibility.” This came in the form of one last intervention, in November 
1992. As part of a UN humanitarian operation, Bush ordered 25,000 American 
troops to Somalia, an “overwhelming use of military power in a place that few 
Americans could find on a map.”165 This, however, might suggest that Bush was 
able to put aside his antipathy towards humanitarian intervention when 
political considerations were not a factor, as they potentially had been in the 
case of Yugoslavia. Somalia would become a “major factor” in the development 
of America’s post-Cold War foreign policy, and with the deployment of troops to 
Somalia, President Bush had “presented a poisoned chalice” to his successor.166 
 
WILLIAM J. CLINTON (1993-2000) 
Bill Clinton inherited a number of unfinished foreign adventures and concerns 
from the outgoing Bush administration. Having run on a domestic, “it’s the 
economy, stupid” election platform, and with no foreign policy experience of his 
own, there was much interest in how the new president would deal with these 
pressing international issues. To begin with, the Clinton administration was 
unable to formulate a coherent approach to a number of issues – those he 
inherited from Bush and those that arose during his administration. Clinton’s 
foreign policy would fluctuate depending on the situation that confronted him 
and equally often it would be influenced by the domestic political climate. 
Writing in 1996, Richard N. Haass referred to the Clinton approach to foreign 
policy as “case-by-case-ism”.167 Clinton’s lack of confidence and focus on foreign 
                                                          
164
 Cited in: Brzezinski (2007), p.116 
165
 Chollet & Goldgeier (2008), p.53 
166
 Cameron (2002), p.18 
167
 Haass (1996), cited in: Bacevich & Kaplan (Sep.30
th
 1996), p.16 
Stefan Fergus Chapter III: A Brief History of US-China Policy 
115 
 
affairs was evident also in the number of differing, fleeting ‘doctrines’ put 
forward by his staff.168 
Clinton’s election saw a president and public “less interested in 
international affairs than at any time in the previous six decades combined.”169 
This apathy was in large part due to the end of the Cold War and a belief that 
America could take advantage of a ‘Peace Dividend’ that would allow for 
reduced defence spending, and the opportunity to return focus to addressing 
domestic problems. However, the new era of peace and harmony was not to be. 
Rather than the peaceful pursuit of domestic policies, the Clinton 
administration was presented with a series of unanticipated international 
challenges to which it was obliged to respond. For a president who “loathed the 
military” in his youth, Clinton would employ the US military “more often, for 
more varied purposes, and in a wider variety of circumstances than any 
commander-in-chief since Franklin Roosevelt”170  
Decisions to intervene during the Cold War had been simpler, because 
presidents always knew why, if not when, to use force: “to combat the Soviet 
Union, its allies, and its clients, and thus defend American interests.” The 
arguments for intervention during the Cold War were not always persuasive, 
but they were always plausible. According to one of Clinton’s campaign foreign 
policy advisers, Michael Mandelbaum, the cause for intervention in Bosnia, 
Somalia, and Haiti “was not... plausible.”171 
Stephen Walt, who has taken a favourable view of Clinton’s foreign policy 
record, identified four goals that dominated Clinton administration foreign 
policy. By remaining militarily engaged, the administration has sought to 
“dampen security competition and reduce the risk of major war in Europe, East 
Asia, and the Middle East”; the administration has “worked to reduce the threat 
of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)”; it has tried to “foster a more open and 
productive world economy”; and the administration has tried to “build a world 
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order compatible with basic American values by encouraging the growth of 
democracy and by using military force against human rights abuses.”172 
After the Cold War, it was felt that ideological struggles might be a thing of 
the past. It seemed as if the entire world was adopting variations of American 
economic and political systems. Competition between states was primarily over 
achieving this goal. The Asian financial crisis of 1997 gave an additional impetus 
to Western triumphalism. American foreign policy became increasingly driven 
by domestic politics: “When pressure on foreign countries appears free of risk, 
there is increasing scope for legislating American domestic preferences as 
objectives of foreign policy.”173 Clinton’s foreign policy, more so than his 
predecessor’s, would be conducted with a keen eye on the domestic political 
environment, which at times would limit his ability for manoeuvre. 
The most significant events of Clinton’s foreign policy were a series of 
interventions. At the beginning, Clinton’s presidency was marred by a couple 
that were unsuccessful. These interventions, in Haiti and Somalia, shared 
several features: “Each involved small, poor, weak countries far from the crucial 
centres that had dominated American foreign policy during the Cold War.”174 It 
is perhaps partly because of American unfamiliarity with these regions that the 
resultant outcomes were unsatisfactory. 
In Africa, Clinton was faced with escalating violence in Somalia, the 
‘poisoned chalice’ bequeathed to him by Bush. The debacle in Somalia “accounts 
for much, but not all, of the administration’s hypersensitivity to casualties,”175 
on display when Clinton would later get involved in Bosnia and Kosovo. By 
undermining public support for humanitarian interventions, the debacle in 
Somalia paved the way for the tragic failure to involve the US in Rwanda.176  
American intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo, as well as the peace 
negotiations, were arguably successes for the Clinton administration, and 
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offered a considerably different international approach than that displayed by 
George H.W. Bush’s administration.  
The second Balkan intervention had an unfortunate side effect. First, the 
intervention was not approved by China, which adhered to its traditional stance 
of non-intervention and belief in the sanctity of a nation’s sovereignty. Secondly, 
when US bombers accidentally destroyed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, 
relations turned sour. Beijing rejected American assurances that it was 
accidental, and anti-American agitation spread through some Chinese cities. It 
was an unfortunate chapter in the US-China relationship which had appeared to 
be improving.177 
Clinton entered office when US-China relations were at a low ebb. The end 
of the Cold War had removed the anti-Soviet rationale that had sustained the 
relationship, and tensions remained from the Tiananmen crackdown. During his 
presidency, Clinton was never able to decide how much of a priority to make 
China. He travelled there only once, six years into his presidency. Criticism of 
Clinton’s China policy usually focuses on its lack of cohesion, and the president’s 
inability to decide which issues mattered to him most. This resulted in a policy 
that “wander[ed] among human rights, trade, Taiwan, and Korea” and had no 
clear path “to blend carrots and sticks in his attempts at engagement.” China 
thus “oscillated from being portrayed as a human-rights outcast to a would-be 
strategic partner.”178 
Stephen Walt, however, argues that Clinton’s China policy was “an 
effective combination of engagement and deterrence.” Even though the 
administration took office committed to pressing China on its human rights 
record, it soon learned that a confrontational approach did little for human 
rights, but instead threatened the entire US-Chinese relationship. Clinton 
therefore sought to keep China’s emergence as a major power from 
undermining key American interests, while also avoiding any 
counterproductive confrontations by renewing China’s “most-favoured nation” 
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trading status as well as supporting China’s entry into the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO).179 
After rejecting any possible military actions against North Korea,180 the 
administration put together in 1994 what amounted to a “standstill agreement” 
with the government in Pyongyang. The accord was flawed, with no way of 
determining if spent fuel was being diverted to bomb-making. Mandelbaum 
proposed a multilateral coalition (including Japan and China), to exert pressure 
to end Pyongyang’s nuclear program. This would have involved extensive 
consultation with Tokyo and Beijing, which Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher never undertook, and would have drawn attention and resources 
away from Asian goals developed in response to domestic constituencies – 
specifically, human rights violations in China, and the more immediate issue of 
the trade imbalance with Japan,181 and opportunities in China. Hard-liners 
criticised Clinton for rewarding North Korea’s defiance of proliferation, but at 
the time, none had offered an alternate policy that would have achieved as 
much with as little cost. Both South Korea and Japan opposed the use of force, 
so the situation called for restraint and flexibility, both of which the 
administration displayed.182 
A desire to safeguard both American economic interests and ideals proved 
difficult when taken in conjunction with the goal of not angering China. For 
Clinton, this goal was never more difficult to reconcile than when Taiwan came 
to the fore of US-China relations. Taiwan’s situation appealed to idealist foreign 
policy minds as a democracy under the shadow of a potentially hostile 
communist neighbour. At the same time, commercial interests in both Taiwan 
and China created the need to tread softly on any issue involving Taiwan’s 
status. Taiwan was another area that Congress felt confident enough to 
encroach on Executive prerogative. 
In 1995, Congress wanted to grant Lee Teng-hui a visa to give a speech at 
his alma mater, Cornell. As a fledgling democracy, Taiwan had considerable 
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bipartisan support throughout American government. Unanimous motions in 
both houses of Congress put Clinton in a tough spot: the issue appealed to his 
liberal ideals as well as the commercial imperatives of his economically 
focussed domestic and foreign agenda. He could not afford to alienate either 
pro-democracy forces or the Chinese, who had a tendency to react harshly to 
any support for Taiwan – either by imposing sanctions on US commerce, or 
threatening the fragile stability across the Taiwan Straits. Clinton chose to 
favour his domestic audience. Naturally, Beijing reacted negatively, and the 
Chinese ambassador to the US was withdrawn, the newly-appointed US 
ambassador to Beijing was not recognised, the cross-strait dialogue was 
suspended, and the PLA conducted provocative military exercises in the Straits. 
To defuse the situation, Clinton publicly reasserted American support for the 
One-China policy.183 In the aftermath of the crisis, the two nations “agreed to 
disagree on issues of human rights and missile sales”, preferring instead to 
focus on stable commercial relations and strategic help with North Korea.184 
Clinton’s decision was not without opposition. The administration’s 
decision to sell sensitive satellite technology to China led many domestic critics 
to accuse the administration of “putting corporate interests... ahead of what 
many analysts believed to be the national interest in minimising assistance to 
the PLA.”185 
International trade was an area of foreign policy that was of particular 
interest to Clinton. It is also an area of policy where he had the most success, 
and where the influence of domestic forces is most apparent. With the 
expansion of free-market liberalism as a “post-Cold War purpose of American 
foreign policy,”186 the president seemed to be resurrecting Calvin Coolidge’s 
famous dictum that “the business of America is business”. Clinton’s specific 
achievements included the passage of the North American Free Trade 
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Agreement (NAFTA), the completion of the Uruguay Round of trade talks, and a 
host of bilateral trade agreements.187  
Economic engagement for the promotion of liberal economic policies, 
including an intense effort to lower trade barriers, was a key feature of the 
administration’s foreign policy, and they played a large part in decisions to 
grant normal trading status to China, provide economic assistance to Russia, 
and offer diplomatic recognition to Vietnam.188 
Despite initial fears that China policy would be dictated by men 
determined to punish Beijing for its human rights transgressions, images of 
Tiananmen Square were already fading from political (though not public) 
memory, and with them wide opposition to economic engagement with China – 
though determined pockets of anti-China sentiment survived, and do so today. 
Calm voices in the White House prevailed, and both economic and domestic 
political advisers reminded Clinton of his campaign pledge to revive the 
economy. Precipitating a trade war with China, they warned, would seriously 
harm his stated agenda, China and also the United States. There were now 
“enormous opportunities to make money in China” and “American businessmen 
did not intend to be left behind”. When Clinton rejected MFN renewal with 
conditions, he was effectively giving away America’s final weapon in changing 
Chinese behaviour. Therefore, with the acquiescence of the president, the 
Commerce Department, the NEC and NSC staffers sympathetic to commercial 
interests, shouldered aside the State Department on China related issues. 
“Perceiving little if any threat” to US security, those charged with determining 
China policy “stressed the importance of trade and investment, the value of 
good relations with China for the American economy.”189 
In mentioning China, though, one should point out that domestic politics – 
specifically, fear of congressional opposition – initially made Clinton reject 
China’s entry into the WTO in April 1999, before later reconsidering and 
accepting the offer in November of the same year. Domestic forces would again 
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hurt Clinton’s economic hopes when, in December 1999, at the ill-fated WTO 
summit in Seattle, the President sought to appease a variety of domestic lobbies 
by calling for stronger labour standards and the possibility of trade restrictions, 
a position that clearly departed from the president’s commitment to trade 
liberalisation.190 
Many of Clinton’s foreign policy decisions, other than economic ones, were 
the result of domestic political calculations. This was especially true following 
the Republican landslide victory in the 1994 midterm elections, in which “a 
Congress whose disdain for foreign affairs was almost gleeful” was elected.191 
The fear of domestic political backlash was a key factor in the “ignominious” 
withdrawal from Somalia and the refusal to commit ground troops in Kosovo or 
any military forces whatsoever in Rwanda. In the case of Haiti, the harsh 
economic sanctions introduced were “partly to assuage prominent African-
American critics” of US policy, and troops were finally sent in when sanctions 
contributed to an unpopular and massive influx of refugees into Florida.192 
Domestic distractions would hurt Clinton’s ability to focus properly on 
foreign policy, when the Lewinski scandal dominated American political news, 
debate and discourse. Foreign policy was effectively neglected. In some 
instances, this was beneficial, as anti-China sentiment diminished as the 
Republican-controlled Congress focused all its attention on presidential 
indiscretions. After the scandal abated, however, business as normal resumed. 
Clinton came to office at a time of diminished interest in foreign affairs, 
which increased the relative weight of domestic interest groups when it came to 
informing foreign policy. Without the presence of a strong, single focus for 
national security and foreign affairs, the voices of these groups – particularly 
labour and industry lobbies – were easier to hear, and more difficult to ignore. 
As we have seen, it is not just in economic foreign policy that Clinton was 
influenced by domestic forces. Clinton had to deal with an increasingly 
isolationist (though, in truth, anti-Clinton) Republican Congress. By focussing 
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on the domestic political landscape, Richard Haass writes, Clinton “gave the 
American people the foreign policy that polls suggested they wanted”, rather 
than leading them “toward the foreign policy they needed”.193 That said, this 
was hardly unusual from a historical viewpoint, as promoting domestic 
interests (particularly commercial) has a long tradition in US foreign policy.194  
The problems presented to the Clinton administration in Somalia, Haiti 
and Bosnia, were all variations on a theme: “How could a great power exert 
itself as a force for good in the world?” At the end of Clinton’s presidency, there 
was no consensus in America of its purpose in the world, or how it should be 
pursued. In the strictest sense, none of these areas posed a direct threat to 
American security. The conservative response to the question of how to 
approach foreign policy was simple and traditional, if cold: a narrow definition 
of US national interests, and “leave [other] countries to their fate.”195 In 2000, 
the incoming administration of George W. Bush, with its emphasis on a more 
national-interests-focussed foreign policy, gave all indications that this would 
be the case going forward. 
 
GEORGE W. BUSH (2001-2009) 
George W. Bush ran for the presidency in the wake of President Clinton’s 
assertive multilateralism and penchant for intervention, promising a “humble” 
foreign policy. Initially, this appeared to rely on a return to traditional 
management of great power relations and pursuit of the national interest, as 
outlined by National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, in an article for Foreign 
Affairs: “American foreign policy in a Republican administration should refocus 
the United States on the national interest in pursuit of key priorities,” which 
included ensuring “America’s military can deter war, project power, and fight… 
if deterrence fails”, “to promote economic growth and political openness”, 
“renew strong and intimate relations with allies who share American values”, 
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“to focus U.S. energies on comprehensive relationships with the big powers, 
particularly Russia and China, that can and will mould the character of the 
international political system”, and “deal decisively with the threat of rogue 
regimes and hostile powers”.196 These goals would largely direct the 
administration’s policies during the first eight months of his first term. 
George W. Bush’s choice of top advisers and appointees implied continuity 
with the realism that had characterised his father’s foreign policy. It was a 
seasoned team with far more experience and seniority than Bush himself. 
Initially, the foreign policy team focussed on George H.W. Bush’s unfinished 
business: great-power relationships, missile defence, and military 
transformation.197 
Dubbed the “Vulcans”, the foreign policy team initially believed the 
collapse of the Soviet Union had ushered in a “strategic pause”, which could last 
several decades. Therefore, much as Rice had suggested they would, the 
Vulcans’ perception of international politics as great-power struggle led them to 
focus on China. This perception went back to the presidential campaign of 2000, 
when Bush would often mention China in his few foreign policy speeches. Bush 
would speak of China as a “strategic competitor”, thereby distancing himself 
from Clinton’s policy of engaging Beijing. Bush also described a preference for 
transforming the US military to exploit technological advantages to discourage 
China’s PLA from “accelerating an arms race it could not hope to win.”198 Bush 
and his team criticised the outgoing administration for “appeasing” China and 
“indulging” a corrupt Russia, and would mock Clinton for his “inconsistency and 
wishful thinking” toward China.199 During the campaign, Bush took a leaf out of 
Clinton’s own playbook, and referred to “the butchers of Beijing”,200 much as 
Clinton had when running against George H.W. Bush. During his presidency, 
however, President Bush was more measured in his approach to China, even if 
not in his rhetoric. A large part of this was due to the administration’s 
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preoccupation with China, and China’s provision of support for certain anti-
terrorism initiatives. 
There were two basic beliefs that formed the core of President Bush’s 
foreign policy at the start of his administration: The first was that the best way 
to ensure America’s security in an ever-dangerous world was to shed the 
constraints imposed by allies and international institutions. The second belief 
was America, unbound by entanglements, should use its strength to change the 
global status quo. In other words, the philosophy behind Bush’s foreign policy 
“turned John Quincy Adams on his head” and argued that America should 
“aggressively go abroad in search of monsters to destroy.” This was the logic 
behind the Iraq War, and it animated the administration’s efforts to deal with 
other rogue states such as North Korea and Iran.201 
As previously mentioned, US-China relations played a significant role in 
Bush’s pre-9/11 foreign policy agenda, and they unfolded in a “somewhat rocky 
fashion”. This was certainly the case after a US EP-3 spy-plane collided with a 
Chinese fighter in April 2001, damaging the US aircraft but killing the Chinese 
pilot. The American crew was briefly detained while the two governments 
attempted to defuse the situation.202 Neither President Bush nor Rice was able 
to fashion a decisive policy. Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld “agitated for 
a muscular response”, but in the end Bush turned to Secretary of State Colin 
Powell to provide a diplomatic solution,203 which resulted in the release of the 
US crew, and a “one-sided apology” to China.204 While conservatives were not 
happy at the outcome, the crisis was rationally contained and tension quickly 
abated. 
The events of September 11, 2001 were the first attacks on American soil 
not just by foreign terrorists, but by any foreign power since Pearl Harbour.205 
The 9/11 attacks have been attributed with ‘changing everything’ for US foreign 
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policy.206 It’s debateable whether this is true in the grand scheme of US foreign 
policy, but it certainly changed everything for the Bush administration. After the 
invasion of Iraq, the top-level “obsession” with Iraq would overshadow every 
other foreign policy issue America faced for the next three years.207 The 
consequences of this obsession have not been trivial, nor have they necessarily 
been wholly negative. The foreign policies that aroused the greatest opposition 
were mostly those of Bush’s first term (the invasion of Iraq, the embrace of 
unilateral action). In Bush’s second term, many of the unpopular policies were 
“modified, abandoned, or reversed.”208 There were a number of areas where 
Bush pursued relatively successful policies, and other areas the administration 
could simply not avoid. Specifically, and as an outgrowth of his administration’s 
focus on weapons of mass destruction, Bush found himself having to deal 
increasingly with issues of nuclear proliferation. In Bush’s second term, his 
foreign policy acknowledged that the US, powerful yet not omnipotent, still 
needs to work closely with other nations if it is to solve key foreign policy 
challenges.209 
One of Bush’s most controversial foreign policy successes involved the US-
India nuclear deal, ratified by the Senate on October 2nd 2008. The deal was 
intended to improve ties and bilateral relations, which had been strained by 
India’s nuclear program.210 The deal exempted India from the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty’s restrictions, permits it to keep and produce nuclear weapons, and also 
commits the US to provide India with a source from which to buy sensitive 
nuclear technology. In other words, “India has now been granted all the 
privileges of a recognised nuclear-weapons state but with none of the 
responsibilities.”211 
The decision to forge such an agreement, Brzezinski suggests, had to be 
“especially troubling” for China, which had maintained a posture of minimum 
strategic deterrence with regards to India. Any significant increase in India’s 
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nuclear arsenal could only increase pressure on Beijing to “abandon its strategic 
self-restraint.” Also, in making this deal, Beijing’s inclination to do America’s 
bidding with regard to North Korea and Iran was no doubt reduced.212 The 
India deal, therefore, posed an unnecessary threat to stable great power 
relations in the region. 
After the rocky start to US-China relations, Bush – like his father and 
Clinton before him – was unable to solve the puzzle of China’s rise.213 The 
administration’s combination of engagement and hedging is essentially a 
continuation of Clinton’s policy. During his campaign, George W. Bush 
proclaimed that, if he was president, 
“China will know that America’s values are always part of America’s 
agenda. Our advocacy of human freedom is not a formality of 
diplomacy, it is a fundamental commitment of our country.”214 
However, as with Clinton before him, Bush’s rhetoric and approach to 
China softened, clearly moving towards the established consensus on China as 
perhaps not a ‘strategic partner’, but certainly a ‘business partner’. As in the 
past, US-China relations would be based on stable commercial ties, allowed to 
self-regulate while the administration was distracted by more immediate 
concerns in the Middle East (just as it had during the World Wars and America 
was distracted by events in Europe). 
On North Korea, Bush initially used South Korean President Kim Dae 
Jung’s visit to “publicly quash” the assumption that he would seek to finalise the 
deals partly negotiated under Clinton. Given administration rhetoric post-9/11, 
Bush effectively closed the door, at least for the time being, to further 
discussions with Pyongyang over its nuclear program.215 The Agreed 
Framework negotiated by the Clinton administration was formally cancelled on 
October 20th 2002.216 
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As time passed, and America became entangled by the situation in Iraq, 
the Bush administration took a different, multilateral approach to North Korea. 
With neither China nor Russia prepared to support a severe international 
ostracism of North Korea, it became clear to the administration that only a 
regional, multilateral effort could encourage North Korean self-restraint or 
stand any chance of achieving an acceptable outcome. In 2004, Bush helped 
commence the Six-Party Talks, which involved the US,  China, Japan, Russia, 
South Korea and North Korea. These talks were a clear acknowledgment that 
East Asian security required some form of international architecture.217 
Through these talks, the United States was able to secure a commitment from 
North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program. In October 2006, when 
North Korea broke its agreement and conducted a nuclear test, the UN Security 
Council passed a Chapter VII resolution. China put economic pressure on the 
rogue state to bring it back to the negotiating table. In February 2007, North 
Korea agreed to halt plutonium production at its Yongbyon site, later 
dismantling the key facilities. In June 2008, in its clearest gesture of compliance 
with its agreements, North Korea blew up its cooling tower at Yongbyon.218 
In the wider Asian region, administration policy has not always been 
successful or inspired, and there have been some “significant wobbles”, but this 
is the part of the world where Bush’s foreign policy record is probably 
strongest.219 Jay Nordlinger points out that, “it’s hard for any president to say 
that he and America have good relations with Japan, South Korea, and China at 
the same time – but [George W. Bush] can say that.”220 
In Asia, the Bush administration has: 
“successfully strengthened U.S.-Japan ties without causing a crisis 
with China; it has stepped up cooperation on a number of fronts with 
both India and Pakistan; it has continued to support the emergence 
of democracy in Indonesia, the country with the world’s largest 
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Muslim population; and it has prevented Taiwan from derailing our 
increasingly smooth relationship with Beijing.”221 
The new strategies employed by the administration called for “regime 
change, pre-emption, and victory.”222 This over-emphasis of neoconservative 
ideology alienated allies and left America’s reputation in the world diminished. 
Both Russia and China, on issues like North Korea, Iran, the Middle East, and 
Central Asia, found that their interests had become more compatible. Both 
regimes viewed America’s militant promotion of democracy with considerable 
distaste, and saw in it an obvious threat to regional political stability.223 
The administration’s obsession with the Middle East allowed rivals and 
competitors to advance and progress without fear of American reprimand or 
interference. Oil producers in the Persian Gulf region and also Africa, may 
increasingly gravitate toward China in the search for more reliable, less 
judgemental customers. In Africa, Sudan in particular has begun to do so. Unlike 
George W. Bush’s America, “China emphasises political stability over democracy 
and can be a reliable source of reassurance.”224 
 
CONCLUSION 
Economics plays a key role in helping one understand America’s policies 
towards China and the world at large. From the Opium Wars until the onset of 
World War II, and again after the end of the Cold War, the protection of 
American business interests was usually the main concern. However, until the 
end of World War II, the United States did not feel in a position strong enough to 
fully protect these interests through force or otherwise. This explains American 
complicity in the Western Powers Conference in China, and also its 
unwillingness to involve itself in China’s internal struggles. Equally, the long-
lasting policy of non-entanglement held stubborn hold of American 
policymakers for much of this time. 
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With the onset of the Cold War, American foreign policy saw a number of 
revolutions. Not only did the ideological policy of containment – attached, as 
always, to the realist notion of protecting America’s national interests – become 
almost the raison d’etre of US foreign policy, but relations with China entered an 
aberrant period. Ideological opposition towards China’s communist 
government became a key feature of US-China relations. No longer was China a 
‘secondary theatre’ to wider (i.e. European/Western) global concerns. This 
would have a lasting impact on US-China relations, as despite economic reality 
resuming its importance following normalisation, US policymakers and 
Congressional representatives would be, and remain, unable to separate 
ideological opposition to China from general relations. In some respects, this is 
a result of the media’s focus on negative events from China’s history in its 
reporting (see Chapters Four and Five). 
One clear trend in US-China relations is the role of China as a pawn in the 
power politics of the West. First, this was in terms of economic standing, as the 
relatively young United States attempted to make a name for itself and expand 
its commercial empire into Asia, coming up against resistance from entrenched, 
more powerful European interests. During the Cold War, China again became a 
pawn in a wider realpolitik struggle, as part of the US-USSR conflict and struggle 
for influence. 
“Since the end of World War II, statesmen had been grappling with the 
tensions and trade-offs between American interests and ideals.”225 Over the 
course of three presidential administrations, American foreign policy has swung 
between privileging interests and ideals. It has yet to find a happy medium 
between the two. Given that George H.W. Bush’s preference for realism led to 
condemnation for its selfish outlook, and Bill Clinton’s overly cautious 
engagement and intervention in the world, it should not have been surprising 
that, when neither doctrine presented adequate responses to the terrorist 
attacks of September 11th 2001, George W. Bush would go in search of a new 
one with which to confront the growing challenges of the world. By merging – 
or at least, claiming to merge – America’s interests and ideals, Bush brought the 
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United States one step closer to realising a sustainable grand strategy for the 
post-Cold War world. 
Without the ideological Cold War struggle, one might have expected a 
return to a wholly traditional foreign policy. This has not been the case. 
Emerging as the most powerful nation appears to have implanted a penchant 
for indulging American power. George H.W. Bush, for the most part, was able to 
keep these urges in check – thanks, perhaps, to his experiences during his 
formative military and government years. In the end, however, he supported a 
humanitarian campaign in Somalia. Equally, one should reiterate that the US 
remains heavily reliant on the rest of the world – in terms of trade, markets, and 
also sources of raw materials – so a policy of isolation is out of the question. 
Clinton and George W. Bush, on the other hand, appear to have struggled 
with a return to a purely traditional foreign policy, which would have favoured 
the national interest at the expense of more liberal indulgences. Whether 
humanitarian intervention or a sweeping democratising crusade, both 
presidents succumbed to the idea of America as the indispensible nation, no 
longer content to be a shining beacon acting as an example. Instead, they 
wished to instruct others. 
Perhaps peculiarly, however, policy towards China has maintained a 
consistency – as always, with caveats for crises or unexpected events – that is 
encouraging and also helpful. Commerce and great power politics remain key 
determinants of the relationship. If you look at all the instances when realism, 
or the protection of commercial opportunities, was not central to foreign policy 
– Vietnam, Somalia, the second Iraq war – each time, the policy has resulted in 
shambles. Without the guiding principles of national interest, policy is 
rudderless and prone to failure. This might explain why policy has a tendency to 
revert to normalcy, as with China. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE MEDIA, FOREIGN POLICY, & CHINA 
 
Having outlined the broad history of American foreign policy, it is time to 
narrow our focus to the policymaking process, with particular regard to one 
country: China. As has been argued in the preceding chapters, US foreign policy 
is made through a variety of actors exerting a measure of influence over state 
officials and constituencies. Realist theory argues that foreign policy is the 
realm of elites and government only, and that the populace has no business in it. 
Pluralism, as argued in Chapter 2, argues that multiple inputs influence foreign 
policy, and that realism is too narrow a theory to fully explain US China-policy 
on its own.  
In this chapter, I shall look in more detail at the influence of domestic 
media on foreign policy and China-policy in the United States. This chapter 
examines the ambiguous-yet-integral role media plays in foreign policy 
formulation, reinforcing a more complex impression of China that requires 
more than just a simple realist or liberal approach. It will also show how 
publications exhibit both security concerns and economic hopes, with little-if-
no concern for conflicting conclusions. 
The end of the Cold War and the Tiananmen Square incident in June 1989 
fundamentally changed the nature of the US-China relationship. China was no 
longer needed or seen as a strategic balance to the Soviet Union, thereby 
leading to a policy vacuum. The images of tanks rolling into Tiananmen Square 
to put down peaceful, pro-democracy student protest also created, on the part 
of the American public, an enduring, negative impression of the Communist 
regime in Beijing. Indeed, the footage and images captured in June 1989 are so 
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memorable, that they are still used repeatedly in most, if not all, documentaries, 
articles and reports about China. It also significantly raised the profile of China 
in the media: “China received just 64 minutes of airtime the year before (1988), 
while in 1989, the year of Tiananmen, news on China totalled 881 minutes.”1 
This display of government force directed at a civilian population was at odds 
with the media’s largely positive portrayals of China during the Cold War 
leading up to and after Nixon’s visit in 1972 and détente. 
Since the early 1970s, and especially after the end of the Cold War, the 
foreign policy-making process has evolved from a relatively closed system 
dominated by the president and his advisers into one that is much more open, 
frequently contentious, and pluralistic. The president remains the most 
powerful actor (the buck, as Truman believed, still stops at the President’s 
desk), but he must now contend with a more active Congress, while overseeing 
a complex executive bureaucracy, and respond to pressures and ideas 
generated by the mainstream press (including 24-hour news channels and 
certain political internet sites), a multitude of think tanks, the business-
corporate establishment, and also public opinion. In this respect, the increase in 
the number of non-governmental actors influencing the policy-making process 
has meant foreign policy increasingly has come to resemble domestic policy, 
which remains an open, multi-actor process dominated by interest groups and 
frequently swayed by the media.2 In this context, the media plays an important 
role in framing public opinion and so directing governmental attention to a 
wide range of issues, frequently through a domestic lens. This is not a new 
phenomenon. Already in the 1970s, Henry Kissinger lamented how difficult it 
was becoming to conduct diplomacy in an era of fragmenting democracy and 
open media. 
In cases where relations between two nations are primarily strategic in 
character, realist theory assumes the primacy of diplomatic actors in the policy-
making process. However, because strategic concerns form only a part of the 
complex relations between China and the United States, a realist approach to 
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the bilateral relationship is not entirely appropriate. The construction of US-
China relations is increasingly focussed on what are now frequently called 
‘intermestic’ issues – i.e. those issues with both an international and domestic 
impact. These include China’s status as a trading partner, China’s exports 
quality control, intellectual property rights, human rights, religious freedom, 
environmental concerns, and also (for the conservative wing of American 
politics) values issues in China such as abortion. These issues are “very different 
from the kinds of issues that predominate in a national interest/realpolitik 
relationship, and thus call into being a very different institutional and political 
set of actors and relationships.”3 The increased importance of intermestic issues 
is not unique to US-China relations, however: Since the end of the Cold War, the 
foreign policy-making process has undergone some considerable changes, 
decentralising and devolving into a series of diverse and often unconnected 
issues. This has resulted in what has been described as a “schizophrenic”4 policy 
towards China, as its main focus has a tendency to switch and change 
depending on a number of factors, including public opinion, media attention, 
and special interests.  
In this chapter, we will start by looking first at the role of the media in the 
policy-making process for US foreign policy as a whole.  
The mainstream media is the most likely influence in the gradual 
development of an individual’s foreign policy preferences and knowledge. This 
is because the media – specifically newspapers and to a greater extent 
television – are the primary conduit between the public and policymakers. Also, 
the media are the principal means by which the majority of the public will 
receive their information about foreign affairs, an issue for which personal 
experience is unlikely to dictate their preferences or decisions.5 Therefore, the 
media necessarily plays a significant role in determining the public’s attention 
to and knowledge of foreign affairs.6 
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Following the general discussion, we look more closely at how the United 
States mainstream media portrays foreign policy towards China, and how the 
media (and those who operate in its boundaries) can affect the organisation and 
conduct of China policy. As we shall see, the media portrays American policy 
towards China in terms of threat-versus-advantage, or engagement-versus-
containment cycles. This is typical of the US’s majority foreign policy tradition 
of pragmatism, but also notes a minority tradition of liberalism and idealism. As 
the media acts as an intermediary between both government and public 
institutions, and between pragmatism and idealism, it is essential to understand 
its function in determining the threat-advantage cycle on China.  
 
EXISTING RESEARCH ON THE MEDIA AND FOREIGN POLICY  
The complex relationship between the media and the foreign policy-making 
process can be categorized in four ways. They are: “watchdog journalism”, 
when the media evaluate and criticise government policy; the “CNN Effect” 
(discussed at greater length, below), when the media are considered to drive 
policy; the “manufacturing consent” theory and the “news management” 
function, initially promoted by Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, when 
the media fully support and serve government policy.7 Finally, there is also the 
“mutual exploitation” model, which suggests “policymaking cannot be done 
without the media, nor can the media cover international affairs without 
government cooperation”, meaning that they work together “sometimes for 
mutual benefit, sometimes for mutual injury, often both at the same time.”8 
Whichever approach is used, research into the effect of the media appears 
to reach contradictory conclusions.9 In a brief survey conducted by George C. 
Edwards III and B. Dan Wood of Texas A&M University, they found that some 
researchers have come to the conclusion either that the US media’s agenda 
appears to “have direct, sometimes strong, influence upon the policy agenda of 
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elite decision makers”;10 that the media “has an especially important role in 
agenda setting”, influencing the president’s foreign and domestic agendas;11 
that examples of media importance and influence are “fairly rare” with little 
independent effect on a government’s agenda;12 or that, while some papers on 
the subject identify the media as the least important of influences on decision 
making, it is more likely that “for the White House staffs, the media is not a 
source of new ideas; it is at best a bridge to the political environment.”13 In 
other words, the general consensus as to the media’s place in the foreign policy-
making process is that it takes the role of a ‘framer’ or ‘shaper’ of stories and 
policies, rather than a maker of foreign policy.14 However, even though 
academic research takes this position, there is, as we shall see, some evidence to 
suggest that how the media might portray a specific foreign policy choice is 
sometimes taken into account by officials when formulating policy. 
Much of the research mentioned above concerns the broadcast media in 
the United States but, as will be discussed below, the preferred format of the 
broadcast media is not conducive to long-lasting intellectual debate or even 
lasting impressions. Therefore, much of the analysis in the second half of this 
chapter will look at the print media, which has the luxury of space and time to 
outline a cogent argument or position in full, without the constraints of 
incessant advertising breaks or such a pronounced need for sensation and 
sound bites. 
While the goal of journalists in the United States may be to tell objectively 
a story of importance to large numbers of people, independent of government 
influences and concerns, the US mass media nevertheless provides a forum in 
which domestic politics and power contenders “wage their battles” for influence 
and control of specific issues. Through “selective, distorted leaks” and “scripted, 
contrived events”, the US media have become the vehicle by which “policy 
agendas are formed and articulated, coalitions are built, and power struggles 
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are waged.”15 This is true for all actors in US foreign policy: Congressmen use 
the media to raise their profiles and also to raise awareness of pet issues and 
projects; Interest groups use it to enhance the visibility of their messages and 
issues; Academics and specialists can use the media to boost their income but 
also to sometimes promote new books they have authored or to help the 
agendas of their employers (think tanks, foundations, businesses or 
consultancies). 
The primary requirement of round-the-clock media (particularly the 
television outlets, talk radio, the networks, but also print publications), which 
has large blocks of time and space to fill, is to provide the “constant stream of 
catchy notions and fresh faces” needed to attract the public’s attention, build 
ratings, increase their market share, and attract and accumulate ever-more 
advertising dollars. In combination, these factors “produce a distorted public 
discourse in which the nature and implications of important policy decisions 
are obscured.”16 Because of this, interest in the issues and policy run a distant 
second. 
One of the most important factors in determining the public’s knowledge 
of foreign affairs is, of course, how much news media they are exposed to and 
consume. For those who don’t pay attention to foreign news, the way the media 
portrays any given issue is obviously immaterial. For those who do regularly 
consume news, however, the American public’s familiarity with political issues 
is closely related to the amount and type of attention these affairs receive in the 
media. The way the media portrays an issue can also have a strong influence on 
whether or not the public views it as important. By covering an issue 
consistently and frequently, the media increases the importance of these issues 
and also helps to shape the public’s assessment of it and political figures’ 
responses and actions.17 If an issue is not covered by the news, then it stands to 
reason that its importance in the public’s eyes will be minimal. Therefore, it can 
be suggested that the media plays a role in agenda-setting, “determining what 
issues get focused on and which do not… there would be many other issues that 
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would get much less policy attention if it were not for major media coverage.”18 
As Bruce Jentleson put it, “If a tree falls in the woods and television didn’t cover 
it, did it really fall?”19 
The mass media “serve to mobilise support for the special interests that 
dominate the state and private activity, and that their choices, emphases, and 
omissions can often be understood best, and sometimes with striking clarity 
and insight, by analysing them in such terms.”20 The media works within a 
“guided market system”, with “guidance provided by the government, the 
leaders of the corporate community, the top media owners and executives, and 
the assorted individuals and groups who are assigned and allowed to take 
constructive initiatives.”21 This, as we shall see in the second part of this 
chapter, can certainly be seen with regards to the Wall Street Journal’s reporting 
on China. 
However, this is not always the case, as even after considerable media 
coverage, some international issues still receive minimal policy attention. Most 
recently, for example, we have the genocide in Darfur, Sudan; but it is also 
evident in the George H.W. Bush administration’s lack of interest in Yugoslavia, 
and also President Clinton’s inaction over the 1994 Rwandan genocide. It is 
possible that the media’s attention is simply attracted by sensational images or 
a requirement for human-interest-stories, while not presenting or even calling 
for government action. Also, the slow speed with which events develop can 
afford policymakers the opportunity to pre-empt media attention and pressure 
by outlining reasons for inaction. Equally, there are some important foreign 
policy issues that, despite their importance, don’t receive much media coverage 
and therefore don’t get on the agenda – to continue Jentleson’s analogy, “whole 
‘forests’ may fall down with no television cameras in sight.”22 
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THE “CNN EFFECT” & ELITE RESPONSES/PERSPECTIVES 
This leads us on to the phenomenon referred to as ‘The CNN Effect’. According 
to Strobel, this is the “nexus of media power and foreign policy, where 
television’s instantly transmitted images fire public opinion, demanding instant 
responses from government officials, shaping and reshaping foreign policy at 
the whim of electrons.”23 The reporting of the Tiananmen Square massacre by 
the Western media in June 1989 is considered to be the birth of this new 
phenomenon in policy-making, resulting in a dramatic increase in live television 
reporting of international crises and events.24 
James F. Hoge, the editor of Foreign Affairs, wrote in 1994 that the new 
“capabilities of modern media to be immediate, sensational and pervasive are 
unsettling the conduct of foreign affairs.” In addition, in the “shapeless 
aftermath” of the post-Cold War world, lacking the superpower rivalry that 
worked as a focal point for foreign policy consensus, “the impact of media’s 
immediacy is magnified”.25 Others, however, believe “the focus on news 
management and the CNN effect, like most binaries, has obscured the widely 
varied subtleties around and between these poles of analysis,” diverting 
attention away from several effects of domestic and international actors and 
factors.26 
There has been a considerable amount of research done into the validity 
of the CNN Effect; whether or not it exists or, if it does, just how influential it 
really is. As with the influence of media as a whole, there is little consensus. 
Warren Strobel, writing in American Journalism Review, argues that “the closer 
one looks at those incidents that supposedly prove the CNN Effect, where 
dramatic and/or real-time images appear to have forced policy makers into 
making sudden changes, the more the Effect shrinks.”27 While this may very 
well be the case, virtually all of the officials Strobel interviewed for his article 
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agreed that, if nothing else, CNN has “radically altered the way U.S. foreign 
policy is conducted.”28 
This effect has best been explained by Nicholas Burns, a former 
Secretary of State’s spokesperson serving under Warren Christopher. Burns 
explained that the spokesperson must increasingly take into account not only 
the politics of any given situation, but also the media environment: “I have since 
learned that understanding what makes the journalists seated in front of me 
tick is just as important as being able to defend our position on the ABM 
treaty.”29 Burns continued, saying “Of all the various media… television is the 
one that has the greatest daily effect on how we can tell the story of U.S. foreign 
policy”, largely because television is “the medium that most Americans now use 
for their daily news and understanding of what their government is up to 
around the world.”30 
Addressing the myth that television news, particularly CNN, dictates what 
is on the foreign policy agenda, Warren Strobel points to how the US 
intervention in Somalia is used as an example to ‘prove this’. After all, there was 
equal suffering in southern Sudan in 1992, “but the administration was forced 
to pay attention to Somalia because the TV cameras were there.” A former 
assistant secretary of state for African affairs told Strobel, “It started with 
government manipulating the press… and then changed to press manipulating 
the government.”31 
George F. Kennan wrote that there could be no question that the reason 
for US intervention in Somalia lies primarily with the exposure it received in the 
American media, particularly television. In his diary, excerpted in the New York 
Times on September 30, 1993, he warned that if U.S. policy, “particularly policy 
involving the uses of our armed forces abroad, is to be controlled by popular 
emotional impulses, and particularly ones provoked by the commercial 
television industry… then there is no place… for what have traditionally been 
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regarded as the responsible deliberative organs of our government.”32 Kennan’s 
words sparked a short back-and-forth in the media about their influence on the 
policy process. CBS newsman Dan Rather, for example, wrote a response to the 
New York Times, arguing that “to give television credit for so powerful an 
influence is to flatter us who toil there – but it’s wrong.” Some reporters “may 
wish for the power to direct public opinion and to guide American policy – but 
they don’t have it.”33  According to Marvin Kalb, this is because “Image in and of 
itself does not drive policy”, rather “Image heightens existing factors” already 
taken into consideration by policy-makers.34 
When looking at the world today, however, we are forced to rethink this – 
after all, there are plenty of journalists writing and reporting on the situation in 
Tibet, Darfur and so forth, yet US intervention is noticeably absent. This is most 
likely the result of reasons beyond media control and/or influence, such as the 
importance of China in geopolitics, and also business.35 Equally, as already 
mentioned, the images of the brutal killing of people in Rwanda did not move 
governments to intervene militarily, even though there was supposedly more 
news coverage of Rwanda than Somalia (until US troops were sent to 
Somalia).36 
In the case of Yugoslavia, unlike Somalia, the press did not exert sufficient 
influence over the Bush administration’s decision-making. Warren 
Zimmermann, the last U.S. ambassador to Yugoslavia, told Strobel that “It 
wouldn’t have mattered if television was going 24 hours around the clock with 
Serb atrocities”. The president wasn’t going to get involved in the civil war: 
“Through all the time that we were there… we had largely made a 
decision we were not going to get militarily involved. And nothing, 
including those stories, pushed us into it… this was a policy that 
wasn’t going to get changed no matter what the press said.”37 
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While “image-provoked bursts of public compassion or anger can induce 
government paralysis or overreaction”, it is important to remember that media 
images usually have a short shelf-life. Whatever immediate impact such images 
may have, a well-explained policy position can offset the passions invoked. 
Hoge has suggested that Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton 
experienced policy failures because of a lack of clearly defined interests. In 
these situations, without the guidance of a solid government position or policy, 
the press can (and frequently does) raise humanitarianism above more 
concrete national interests as a justification for intervention and action.38 
From another perspective, however, the ability of the media to promote 
humanitarianism as a governing principle is seen positively: Broadcast images 
of strife and suffering abroad, displayed on CNN and other networks, can also 
help foreign policy officials explain the need for U.S. intervention, in an example 
of the mutual exploitation model. Quoting Richard Boucher, then State 
Department spokesman for Secretary James Baker, the press “makes the case of 
the need to be involved sometimes more than we can.”39 
 
THE RISE OF “SOFT NEWS” 
In recent years, there has been a rise in the number of ‘soft news’ media outlets 
operating in America. Matthew Baum (author of Soft News Goes to War) 
characterises ‘soft news’ as media channels, outlets and programs more 
interested in sensation and human interest than hard news. Since the 1990s, 
there has been a “dramatic expansion in the number and diversity of 
entertainment-oriented, quasi-news media outlets”,40 and as their numbers 
have grown, so too has their popularity – audiences for soft news programs are 
often larger than for hard news channels. 
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Whether skewed by bias, submerged in humour, or otherwise delivered, 
the popularity of soft news media has had an important effect on foreign policy 
reporting: 
“By altering the cost-benefit calculus for typical individuals, the rise 
of the soft news media has, without necessarily increasing the 
public’s overall appetite for political news, nonetheless increased the 
likelihood that typical individuals will attend to select high-profile 
issues, primarily those possessing characteristics – such as violence, 
heroism, scandal, a readily-identified villain, and the like – amenable 
to framing as dramatic human interest stories.”41 
 Baum argues that, by making political and foreign policy news stories 
more entertaining, and by including such content in soft news settings, these 
programs have the “perhaps unintended” benefit of actually helping a larger 
portion of the general public to understand foreign policy, by increasing 
uninterested viewers’ exposure to ‘hard’ news stories.42 
“By transforming mundane political coverage into entertainment, the 
soft news media have successfully employed piggybacking and cheap 
framing strategies in order to capture a substantial segment, or niche, 
of the television audience.”43 
As some Americans only become aware of foreign policy issues when 
these issues appear on soft news  programs, this is both beneficial (because 
they notice the issue in the first place) and potentially harmful (there is no way 
of controlling the quality of the information they receive). When foreign policy 
issues cross over into soft news, Baum dubs them “water-cooler events”, and 
they will likely be discussed afterwards at length by people who might not 
always do so. The rise of this “new class of entertainment-oriented, quasi-news 
and information programs” has had the unintended consequence of increasing 
the likelihood that foreign policy crises will become water-cooler events.44 
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The impact of soft news should not be overestimated, however. The 
popularity of these ‘soft’ news channels and programs “demonstrates only that 
such programs have potential to influence public opinion regarding foreign 
policy, not that they actually do so.”45 Also, on the apparent association between 
levels of soft news consumption and acceptance of isolationist policies and 
positions, or suspicions of multilateral and proactive US foreign policies “does 
not affect all Americans equally... the strongest effects of soft news consumption 
appear mostly limited to the less educated and politically attentive segments of 
the population, who are also the primary consumers of soft news programs.”46 
This conforms with Neuman, Just, and Crigler’s findings, that television “can 
break the attention barrier for issues of low salience”, while “Newspapers and 
magazines are better sources for new information when the audience is already 
motivated to pay attention.”47 (This is the reason for separate analyses of 
broadcast and print portrayals of China in the second part of this chapter.) 
The rise of soft news programs has also had an impact on the practices of 
hard news media in America. “Hungry for sensation”, news programs feed off 
“simplified ideas, expressed without nuance or qualification and often pitted 
against other simplifications in a ‘point-counterpoint’ format.”48 The reputation 
and standing of broadcast news has therefore been tarnished amongst content-
based news outlets due to the decrease in the coverage of ‘hard news’ (e.g. 
politics and foreign affairs), the increase in ‘soft’ news pieces (i.e. human 
interest stories) and utilisation of social networking sites as sources of content. 
Burns made the following observation in 1996: 
“In my view, television networks, CNN excluded, are by far the least 
serious of all media. The proud American networks, which educated 
my generation through the space launches, race riots, wars and 
scandals of the turbulent 1960s and 70s, now restrict themselves to a 
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sorry minimum of foreign affairs coverage, reflecting current 
prevailing public attitudes.”49 
Centrist, neutral, or ‘objective’ news has been “radically challenged”, 
Matthew Baum has argued, by what is often called “opinion journalism” – the 
focus on ‘celebrity’ opinion-makers and commentators who draw large 
audiences. Opinion journalism “operates more on the fringes than in the middle, 
more with emotion and innuendo than with facts or investigation” – the most 
popular examples of biased television news sources are Fox (conservative) and 
MSNBC (liberal).50 
This view, an increasingly widespread opinion, is due to the ever-
shrinking length of the average sound-bite for US broadcasts, compared with 
the almost four-times longer BBC standard, and CNN’s tendency to air entire 
interviews.51 However, in today’s media environment, there can be little doubt 
that CNN’s standards have also slipped, thereby diminishing its impact on 
policy-making (domestic and foreign) – a result of their increased acceptance of 
Twitter and Facebook as legitimate sources of quotes, comments and even 
news. In a way, this is a modern development and evolution of popular-if-
worthless ‘vox populi’ quotations in the news media. While some might argue 
that they can offer credible commentary, when you consider the Twitter feeds 
or Facebook profiles of politicians, CNN is not actually referring to these. The 
new tendency is to refer to obscure viewers and ‘Tweeters’, and has led satirical 
news outlets, such as The Daily Show and The Onion, to frequently ridicule both 
CNN and other broadcasters for referring to, or relying on, these sources.52 
The increase in importance and acceptance of soft news media is also 
demonstrated by the greater attention paid to presidential politics in these 
media. Prior to 2000, presidential politics was not much covered in the soft 
news media. However, because candidates came to recognise the wider (and, 
most importantly, younger) audience they could connect with through soft 
media, and because of their newfound willingness to appear on these programs 
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(in interviews, or even ‘skits’ on Saturday Night Live), presidential politics has 
become a frequent topic. Shows like The Daily Show and The Colbert Report will 
devote entire weeks to presidential, congressional and senatorial campaigns.53 
The Daily Show in particular, has had great success bringing candidates onto its 
show since 2000, and President Obama has been particularly accommodating of 
interview requests from a number of soft news programs (both in office and 
before while campaigning). It is becoming increasingly apparent that soft media 
are influential actors in the media-politics arena (by either helping to ‘get out 
the vote’ or, more likely, mobilising a party’s ‘base’) – and this has only become 
more apparent since Baum’s book was published. However, as with print media 
and the opinion journalism of MSNBC and Fox, soft news programs are not 
apolitical, and frequently push either liberal or conservative positions in 
interviews and segments. 
Given the narrowing of content, whereby someone with a conservative 
bias knows exactly where to look for conservative news and reporting (e.g., Fox 
News on television, or National Review and The Weekly Standard in print), one 
must wonder just how influential the media really can be.54 By clearly 
displaying or exhibiting an ideological bias, your audience is unlikely to share a 
different set of ideals or opinions; you will effectively be preaching to the 
converted. “Too many Americans are consuming one-sided, opinionated vitriol 
rather than actual news.”55 In Baum’s words: 
“the shady art of fulmination has influenced television news 
profoundly and even affected print journalism to the point that news 
sometimes seems to have been trumped by views.”56 
 The changing nature of news content is also noticeable in how guest experts 
comport themselves and articulate their expertise on air. Academics are frequently 
called upon to contribute to the media – either in the form of a guest pundit on a 
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news programme, or by contributing op-ed pieces in the print media. Although 
these appearances and articles can help to add understanding and credibility to 
an issue, they are not universally welcomed. For example, in 1993, the New York 
Times’ Walter Goodman wrote of “a thriving television tradition of know-it-alls 
expatiating at the summons of the evening news on why a catastrophe they 
never predicted could now easily be foreseen,” of which the “most 
accomplished of the breed are the foreign-policy pontificators.”57 These 
television experts, sometimes referred to as ‘talking heads’, are often brought in 
by television studios to help add gravitas, credibility and a scholarly face to a 
particular position or agenda the programme is trying to get across to its 
audience. As already discussed above, the formats available to these guests is 
not conducive to proper intellectual discourse. A few appearances on a popular 
news show can help enhance the reputation of the scholar in question. With 
university research increasingly going down a more theoretical road, a good 
performance on a new programme, according to Goodman, “may bring a book 
contract, a lecture tour, an invitation to be a senior something-or-other at a 
think tank, a partnership in a consulting operation, an invitation to contribute 
to op-ed pages.” Goodman’s rather cynical contention is that “The new line for 
academic careerists: perform or perish.”58 According to Halper and Clarke, “We 
have nearly reached the point where experts devote more time to packaging 
their ideas in a media-friendly way than to the rigor or implications of their 
analysis.”59 They are particularly critical that “distinguished former Secretaries 
of State Madeleine Albright and Lawrence Eagleburger should lend dignity and 
credibility to confrontational talk shows”, because their “truncated, rapid-fire 
format effectively excludes expertise from the debate.”60  
This also applies beyond television news. Matt Frei (2008) has written 
about how scholars at think tanks construct theories and proposals without 
fully thinking them through.61 When they prove false, these scholars can simply 
switch their attention to their next big idea. Equally, both Baker and Powell 
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have written about the importance of media in making considerations about 
foreign policy and how decisions/policies might “play” in the media. 
The level of respect afforded to news broadcasts is mixed. While there are 
clearly many experts and scholars who take advantage of invitations to appear 
on these news shows, Will Hutton points out that, “Opinion has become more 
important than fact, so that many facts that do not fit the a priori thesis are 
simply not broadcast.”62 The guest experts, in these instances, peddle a “mix of 
unexceptional observations and pop formulations”,63 because when learned and 
experienced specialists and officials do take part in a news show on television, 
they “quickly learn that sound bites and repartee, not analysis, are the keys to 
being invited back.”64 The importance of sound-bites is also responsible for the 
rise of non-expert pundits, who have no specific expertise for being called on to 
comment. An example of this type of ‘expert’ is conservative mega-selling 
author and commentator Ann Coulter, whose statements are frequently 
hyperbolic – simultaneously offensive to the political left, and performing a 
disservice to the right. It is becoming increasingly clear that ideological purity 
and political theatre are now considered more important than actual expertise. 
 
In 1966, Senator William Fulbright observed in Senate Hearings on Government 
and the Media, that even the most prominent newspapers (e.g. New York Times 
and Washington Post), on foreign policy issues, “have become almost agents or 
adjuncts of the government, that they do not contest or even raise questions 
about government policy.”65 While the Watergate scandal in June 1972 
heightened the media’s distrust of government, and led to a mini-boom in 
investigative reporting, the current journalism climate is much changed. The 
mass media in America has been drawn into a “symbiotic relationship” with 
powerful sources of information through “economic necessity and reciprocity of 
interest”.66 As certain newspapers – specifically, the Washington Post, New York 
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Times, and Wall Street Journal – are far more widely read among policymakers 
and political elites, the closeness of this relationship is heightened, giving the 
papers a level of influence greater than their circulation might suggest. The 
media, therefore, could be argued to write or broadcast for the political elite, 
and the political elite in return could be seen to be performing for the media. 
One can infer from this an in-built reinforcement of views and policy 
preferences. 
In American society, media interests “are peculiar corporate creatures 
without wholly altruistic aims.”67 Therefore, given the US media’s corporate 
nature, there have been increased “market-driven efforts by television 
broadcasters (and, to a lesser extent, other media outlets) to make certain types 
of news appealing to viewers who are uninterested in politics.”68 The media 
cannot afford to keep reporters and camera crews stationed in every area 
where a news story may break. Therefore, through a lack of resources available 
to the struggling industry, the media must rely on fewer sources (usually 
official, governmental and corporate sources of information) to meet their daily 
news demands and strict news schedules, and this is especially true for foreign 
affairs stories.69 “Economics dictates that they concentrate their resources 
where significant news often occurs, where important rumours and leaks 
abound, and where regular press conferences are held”; for example, the White 
House, the State and Defence Departments, city halls, police departments, and 
with access to Washington’s ever-growing population of lobbyists. Business 
corporations are also considered important, valuable sources of news and 
stories. All of these sources are considered valuable because they are also believed to 
be reliable, recognisable and credible.70 
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THE US MEDIA & CHINA 
THE MEDIA AND CHINA SINCE TIANANMEN 
“To a great extent, the stage for current U.S. policy difficulties was set 
by the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown, from which China has 
never been rehabilitated in the eyes of most Americans.”71 
The collapse of the Soviet Union, and the resultant disappearance of China’s 
strategic importance as a counterweight to Soviet power, may have resulted in 
an eventual reassessment of U.S. China policy over the course of the 1990s or, at 
the latest, the 2000s. But any potential trajectory for the US-China relationship 
was ultimately diverted as the government crackdown in Tiananmen Square 
ultimately ruptured the American policy consensus on China, and suggested to 
many in the United States that the emerging political liberalisation assumed to 
be accompanying China’s program of economic reform had come to an abrupt, 
violent end.72 Of course, we know now that China’s economic liberalisation has 
not ended, rather it has continued at an impressive, oft-double-digit growth rate 
– even following the economic crisis, China continues to grow, even if at a 
reduced rate. Beijing does, however, show few signs of loosening its grip on 
China’s political environment, and certainly there has been no move to open up 
and liberalise Chinese politics. 
The June 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre and the May 1999 violent 
anti-American demonstrations across China (in the wake of the accidental 
bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade) are just two instances that have 
made or reinforced the American public’s more negative views of China, 
deeming it a “serious threat”.73 This is perhaps the result of media depictions of 
the violence, and no doubt the political spin put on it by those China-critics who 
would usually be excluded from punditry on China when the relationship is 
more or less stable and amicable. 
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President George H.W. Bush’s press secretary, Marlin Fitzwater, 
identified the media’s impact following Tiananmen when he said, while the US 
government was the first to respond to the events in China, “it was based 
almost entirely on what we were seeing on television. We were getting 
reporting cables from Beijing, but they did not have the sting, the demand for a 
government response that the television pictures had.”74 
The television images of students peacefully demanding free expression, 
of the now-famous, lone protester facing down a row of tanks, followed by 
reports of violent repression through the night and after the television cameras 
were expelled from the area, “drastically altered U.S. opinion starting at the top” 
of government and on down to those in the public who sat riveted to CNN.75 The 
lasting impact of these images has meant that, ever since they aired, US media 
has devoted considerable attention to Beijing’s policies and practices that are 
easily portrayed in a negative light and shown to be against the principles and 
values that the United States espouses and hopes to represent. “Such coverage 
was viewed by an American public that held ambivalent views about the 
Chinese authorities and seemed prepared to consider negative issues raised by 
U.S. media.”76 The general public’s lack of understanding of China has left the 
media with a lower burden of proof, which results in a shallow understanding 
of China. This is most notably exemplified by the evolution of rhetoric and 
policy towards China. As mentioned in the previous chapter, both Presidents 
Clinton and George W. Bush entered office with a negative impression of China. 
However, despite the media’s negative bias, they both mellowed as they became 
more informed of the actual situation, and a realisation of the mutually 
beneficial aspects of the US-China relationship allowed for a realist dominance 
once more. So it can be seen that the first President Bush still sent his National 
Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft to China, despite considerable opposition in 
the media, President Clinton still moderated his tone (dropping his references 
to the “butchers of Beijing”), and President George W. Bush also eventually 
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moved back towards the engagement position when China offered its support in 
the War on Terror. 
James Mann identifies an additional contrasting trend in media coverage 
of China, which leans not only negative, but also towards the cliché in an 
attempt to “exoticise China, making it seem strange, distant, and difficult to 
comprehend”. This characterisation harbours the subtext that “China is 
fundamentally different from the rest of the world, that a visitor to China should 
suspend his or her ordinary judgements, [and] that the reactions that would be 
evoked elsewhere in the world have no place in China.”77 This theory can help 
explain many positive stories about China, as reporters (or the new 
organisations to which they belong) might hope to portray China’s actions in a 
positive light for a variety of economic and/or political reasons. 
According to David Lampton, American motivations with respect to 
China have always been a strong combination of “economic enticement” and 
“spiritual and economic salvation”. What he means by this is simply that 
“Americans tend to rationalise economic intercourse with China with 
improvement (as they see it) of the spiritual and political lives of the Chinese 
people.”78 While this may very well be the case, and it is relatively easy to see 
this approach taken by a number of academics, special interests and many in 
the media, the image and portrayal of China can rise and fall depending on 
circumstances and events. 
In a short survey of US newspaper coverage of China, Liss found that it 
was clearly much more negative than positive, and the same can be said for 
television reports. As a result, assuming the reader (or viewer) does not have a 
particularly deep understanding or interest in wider international relations or 
US-China relations, “we can see that they will probably imagine China as a land 
of political repression, crime, and Soviet-style mistreatment of its citizens.” The 
government in Beijing, meanwhile, when it is not “imprisoning its own citizens, 
[it] is exhorting its populace and training its military for the eventual goal of 
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extending its geopolitical influence throughout Asia, taking the US on head-to-
head in the process.”79 
As I shall show below, this portrayal of China as a potential aggressor is 
certainly the impression presented by the Weekly Standard, which is far more 
aggressively and unambiguously critical of China than the major papers and 
other news weeklies. The major papers (the Washington Post, New York Times, 
and the Wall Street Journal) appear, from my own research, more likely to 
present neutral news stories – though frequently containing allusions or 
references to darker, less acceptable events or practices in China’s recent past – 
while negativity is far more common in their commentary and op-ed pages. 
Given the ideologically wide array of commentators these papers are able to 
draw from, it is difficult to identify a specific publication-position on China. The 
news weeklies and other non-dailies, on the other hand, frequently provide an 
ideological bias in their news stories as well as opinion pieces. These 
publications draw from the same pool of issues to report and discuss less 
savoury aspects of China’s rise and domestic environment, including: 
environmental degradation, human rights, economic “cheating”, China’s military 
build-up and lack of transparency. It is also common to find China specifically 
referred to as “Communist China” or “Red China”, in a clear attempt to paint the 
PRC as the world’s “socialist other” and a potential foe, indicating a potential 
desire to classify China in terminology reminiscent of the Cold War – i.e. 
‘democratic vs, authoritarian’, ‘capitalist vs. communist’, and so forth. 
 
From my own research, there is considerable evidence that the US media as a 
whole perpetuates two conflicting images of China, one negative and one 
positive. The first is of a benign and constructive nation, while the other is of a 
malevolent and threatening potential enemy.80 It is true that some publications 
– usually those with an overt ideological bias – portray China as just one or the 
other, with the majority leaning towards a more negative portrayal. This may 
very well be the result of US media journalists not having a deep understanding 
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of China, and retaining a certain level of Cold War-esque thinking, not to 
mention a media format that favours brevity over substance. 
Radha Sinha lays much of the blame for the lack of objectivity of 
reporting on China at the feet of conservative journalists, who he describes as 
having “disproportionate influence”. While it is difficult to actually measure any 
given media faction’s influence,81 Sinha does qualify his observation: “One of the 
manifestations of this trend is the glowing reporting on economic achievements 
of post-reform China (the period after 1978) because the changes seem to 
conform to American views of a market-economy; pre-reform China almost 
always receives bleak appraisal.”82 This does not, however, match observations 
by other scholars and also my own research into US media portrayals of China. 
It is true that the Wall Street Journal – as a business paper – focuses most on the 
business and trade aspects of the US-China relationship, often praising China’s 
economic reformation, but most other print magazines and newspapers 
(particularly in opinion-pieces or editorials), hold largely critical views of China. 
Their criticisms focus on human rights, currency, repression, and so forth. The 
conservative Weekly Standard, for example, rarely (if ever) has a good word to 
say about China, and openly revels in their opposition to the PRC’s regime, trade 
and domestic policies.83 
The dual-view of China is comprised of a number of elements and 
influences. The American public’s positive image of China is influenced by such 
things as “Marco Polo, China’s ancient greatness, civilisation, art, hoary 
wisdom”,84 and modern images of its considerable economic progress and 
development. Hollywood’s frequent depiction of China’s history as romantic 
and civilised, not to mention China’s own movie industry’s exports, have helped 
to foster this impression.85 The negative image of China is far more widespread, 
and perhaps more ingrained – possibly a result of the preference for sensational 
pieces discussed earlier in this chapter. Writing in 1972, Isaacs presented the 
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following list of negative images: “cruelty, barbarism, inhumanity; a faceless, 
impenetrable, overwhelming mass, irresistible if once loosed… the devious and 
difficult heathen, the killers of girl infants… the torturers of a thousand cuts… 
the nerveless indifference to pain, death, or to human disaster, the whole set of 
lurid, strange, and fearful images clustered around the notion of the awakening 
giant”,86 and many if not all of these impressions remain today. Today, there are 
a number of other negative stories and angles popular with the media; these 
include outsourcing jobs, China’s actions and policies in and towards Tibet, 
China’s disregard for intellectual property rights, dangerous manufactures, and 
ever-growing human rights infractions. Taiwan and its formal status is another 
issue that can come front-and-centre in the media’s discussion of China, but 
usually only when a crisis (for example, in 1996) or an important event (such as 
an election) takes place. 
 
BROADCAST MEDIA 
American broadcast media is largely event-driven and subject to sensation, and 
tends to be the medium that creates and presents the most enduring and potent 
images of China. As we have seen above, the media has become increasingly 
controlled and dependent on short sound bites, which has led David Lampton to 
comment: “This accounts for a constant refrain among both the Chinese and 
China experts that news coverage of the PRC tends to be superficial, simplistic, 
and to ignore many central subjects.” Lampton argued that this results in 
difficulty in finding good coverage of a “trend story (such as the gradual 
transformation of China)” because of the “event-driven medium, and in a 
medium in which the length of the average sound bite has dropped from about 
twenty seconds to seven or eight seconds in the last twenty years.”87 It is for 
this reason that the print media, less reliant on short sound-bites, offers a 
broader understanding and portrait of China’s contemporary modernisation. 
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The US mass media do not simply report facts, but also play a role in 
defending the core values of their constituents, as they see them. As such, it is 
not immune to the pressures that affect other branches in the policy-making 
process. The influence of these lobbyists and interest groups can often be seen 
in the nature of reporting on China. For example, NBC’s lead expert 
commentator during the 2008 Beijing Olympics was Joshua Cooper Ramo. 
Ramo’s coverage of the games, and of the Chinese government, was 
“relentlessly upbeat” according to Silverstein, who also insinuated that the 
positive reporting was due to Ramo’s other job as the managing director of 
Kissinger Associates, which has “extremely close ties to the Chinese leadership 
and whose business involves opening doors for Western companies seeking to 
do business in China”,88 and therefore cannot be seen to be critical for fear of 
jeopardizing the group’s future business.89 Undisclosed conflicts of interest 
such as this are not uncommon: News Corp outlets have been ordered, on 
occasion, to downplay any story that might paint China in a poor light, in the 
hopes of not jeopardizing Murdoch’s plans for expanding into the Chinese 
market. 
The media provide fora in which politicians and opinion leaders compete 
for popular attention and political support. “The media are therefore not simply 
observers of the U.S.-China relationship; they are active players in it.”90 Quite 
often, this can manifest itself through the media becoming the story, focusing on 
China’s media and internet censorship (or censorship of services like Google), 
and the lack of free-speech when reporting in or on China. 
According to a study published in 1998 jointly by the National 
Committee on U.S.-China Relations, the Kennedy School of Government, and 
American University, media pieces and programmes on China in general had 
received small viewing figures from those who said they followed the stories 
“very closely”. Examples given are Clinton’s visit to China in 1998 (14%), the 
1996 Taiwan Straits tensions (19%). While some might consider these to be 
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newsworthy and important stories, audiences were limited. “The one exception 
was in 1989, when nearly half of the American public closely followed the 
events in Tiananmen Square.”91 The impact of the Tiananmen images (as 
already discussed) on American passions and opinions endures today, and is 
well illustrated in the following example: April 8th 2008, on CNN’s Situation 
Room, Wolf Blitzer explained that the pro-China lobby argues that China is a 
different country to the one of decades ago, when (among other things) 
Tiananmen was fresh in people’s mind. Jack Cafferty, another of CNN’s 
extremely popular and influential hosts, responded that the government in 
Beijing isn’t that much different, but it is the bilateral relationship that has 
changed. Illustrating the enduring negative impression of China, he explained 
his position thus, touching upon many of the negative contemporary issues: 
“We’re in hock to the Chinese up to our eyeballs… They’re holding 
hundreds of billions of dollars of our paper. We are also running 
hundreds of billions of dollars worth of trade deficits with them, as 
we continue to import their junk with the lead paint on them [sic] 
and the poisoned pet food, and export jobs to places where you can 
pay workers a dollar a month to turn out the stuff we’re buying 
from Wal-Mart.… [But] I think they’re basically the same bunch of 
goons and thugs they’ve been for the last fifty years.”92 
Compared to his CNN colleagues, Cafferty holds a particularly negative 
opinion of China, which he conveys forcefully to his viewers, as well as the 
millions of readers of his website and books. Like many in the media, the issues 
he awards the most importance are economics and human rights. Cafferty 
appears to have the impression that China is a particularly malign actor in the 
realm of economics. China’s purchase of huge amounts of US debt, he believes, 
bestows “enormous leverage”93 over political and economic policy towards 
China. Flavia Colgan (an MSNBC Political Analyst) agrees, describing the 
bilateral relationship as “we have a gun to our head by a country called China 
                                                     
91
 Cited in: Lampton (2001), p.265 
92
 Cafferty (2009), p.59 – This statement caused an absolute storm for CNN, who came under fire not only from 
the Chinese Foreign Ministry (verbally and by making CNN visa applications difficult), but also from Chinese 
Americans. 
93
 Cafferty (2009), pp.61-62 
Stefan Fergus Chapter IV: Media, Foreign Policy & China 
157 
 
[sic]”.94 That the US has allowed this state of affairs to evolve to America’s 
detriment is unfortunate as, “China’s global ascendancy aside, the flow of 
defective or deadly products shipped here has been steady.”95 The discovery of 
defective and dangerous Chinese-made products in America caused a 
considerable amount of backlash and increased negativity against China: 
MSNBC warned consumers about “poisoned” and “tainted” baby formula made 
in China, adding Chinese-made milk to a “long list” of banned or dangerous 
Chinese products.96 Lou Dobbs, on his recently-cancelled CNN show, Lou Dobbs 
Tonight, devoted a significant amount of time to a “fight against the export of 
American jobs.” Dobbs’s claim is that “four or five hundred thousand jobs a year 
are lost to outsourcing and relocation of production” and the host likes to name 
the “guilty” corporations and state governments who send these jobs abroad.97 
This is also clear in his book, Exporting America (2004). The export of jobs is an 
issue the media likes to run with because of its human interest angle, and, 
because of this, politicians need to address these concerns. Thus the media act 
as story and agenda framers in the debate. 
Within the media, any issue can remain on its radar through the self-
regenerating nature of news reporting, and this is certainly the case with 
human rights in China. Contrary to the claims of China apologists in the United 
States, unfavourable press attention to China is not primarily the result of 
groups ‘picking on’ the country. China’s human rights abuses – whether it’s 
Tibet, Falun Gong, Xianjiang, or religious and political repression – get coverage, 
even when they are less severe than abuses in other countries, because “the 
PRC is a globally significant state in a way that Nigeria or Burma is not.”98 
However, despite this, the current economic crisis has meant that economic 
relations between the two countries dominate any coverage of China, relegating 
most other issues outside the public eye, with only a couple of exceptions.99 
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China’s conduct on the global stage at large is frequently criticised on US 
TV forums. Beijing’s relations with the Sudanese government, for example, 
plays into the frame that China is a selfish, cold nation with a disregard for 
general human rights. In a segment about Darfur and the UN’s inaction, Ed 
Royce explains that Security Council efforts are being thwarted principally by 
China because it is not only the main customer for Sudan’s oil, it is also a major 
supplier of weapons to the Sudanese government; when Chris Matthews asks 
whether or not this is because China just doesn’t care, Royce explains that it is 
because “They haven’t felt enough pressure yet” from the global community.100 
The impression that China ‘doesn’t care’ about issues like these is not strictly 
speaking true. The media often asks questions like these, without 
understanding that China’s foreign policy is based considerably on national 
interest calculations, which can sometimes result in a cold impression in the 
West (not unlike the global impression of George H.W. Bush’s policy towards 
Yugoslavia). 
Although academics and TV pundits frequently hold negative 
impressions of China, they can sometimes provide a moderating influence on 
hosts who frame their questions in highly critical ways. For example, in the 
case of China’s relations with North Korea, Norah O’Donnell, an MSNBC host, 
criticised China for providing so much aid and support to the regime in 
Pyongyang, but failing to use that leverage effectively. The guests on the show 
provided the wider political context of the relationship (concerns over stability, 
mainly).101 This is important as, because of the influence some news presenters 
enjoy over their audiences, an ‘expert’ who offers a more moderated opinion 
can potentially help moderate both public and official perceptions of China. 
 
PRINT MEDIA 
The difficulty experienced by the broadcast media in dealing with China, limited 
by the stringent space- and time constraints, is not shared by the print media. 
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When it comes to reporting on China, there are a number of recurring themes in 
the US print media. While there are, without doubt, articles that adhere to a 
given China agenda, there are many articles (a considerable majority) that 
would fall into a category of ‘straight reporting’, in which journalists merely 
report the facts or events as they happen, without an evident bias one way or 
another. There are those journalists and articles that take a more negative tone, 
which might focus on potential (or sometimes ‘inevitable’) conflict between the 
United States and China,102 or between the PRC and Taiwan; China’s human 
rights abuses and the PRC’s repressive political system; China’s internal 
instability, unrest and potential breakdown within Chinese social order;103 
backwardness and corruption within the political system.104 One National 
Review editorial, for example, outlined a general shopping-list of grievances 
about China: 
“Whether developing ballistic missiles, threatening Taiwan with 
truculent language, shrugging at North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, or 
permitting the piracy of intellectual property, China’s rulers do little 
to inspire confidence”105 
On the opposite side of the spectrum, there are the slightly-less-common 
positive tone articles about China, which look at the promise and potential of 
the Chinese market, China’s impressive and sustained economic growth and 
reform of its outdated command economy, cultural change, and, more recently, 
diplomatic cooperation in the Global War on Terrorism.106 Since President 
Obama took office, the theme of climate cooperation and also Chinese currency 
manipulation have risen in prominence and frequency. Commentary on the 
former has been mostly positive, and Thomas Friedman has been particularly 
vocal in his disappointment with the US lagging behind China on green energy 
production and investment, dedicating a number of his New York Times 
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columns to the issue.107 The issue of China’s monetary policy, on the other hand, 
has continued to be quite negative in the press.108 
In those areas where China’s actions and interests are perceived to be 
more in concert with America’s – the economic promise of China’s growing 
internal market, any reform of China’s government and economy, increased 
diplomatic cooperation, and cultural exchanges109 – coverage is usually more 
balanced. Recently, especially in the run up to the Olympic Games in 2008, 
media coverage of China also looked at the potential benefits the Games might 
bring to China (including some follow-up after the event). Most recently of all, 
the print media has discussed China’s role in the aftermath of the 2008-9 
economic crisis, sometimes quite favourably. 
One thing is clear, however: any cursory survey of the American print 
media’s China coverage will show a deep-rooted, though not overwhelming, 
bias towards negative news coverage.110 This is true across the political 
ideological spectrum. For example, the liberal newsweekly The Nation tends to 
focus on China’s negative impact on the environment and the US job market; the 
conservative Weekly Standard, on the other hand, tends to look unfavourably on 
China’s role in the global energy market and is also highly suspicious of China’s 
defence policies and military build-up.111 “The school of thought that perceives 
China as a threat to the US holds considerable sway over America’s major 
newspapers” and a number of major news-weeklies. “In balance to this, though, 
are those who believe that China should be engaged, not contained.”112 
 
ISSUE AREAS IN US MEDIA REPORTING ON CHINA 
There is no shortage of articles outlining the negative impact of China’s rise, 
especially in the economic and human rights spheres. To get a wider 
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understanding of the nature of China coverage in the print media, I shall now 
look at the specific, key issues and illustrate how they are portrayed and 
reported. These issues can broadly be collected into the following four 
categories: economics, human rights, military, and environmental. There is 
frequent overlap between the categories. For example, despite official claims 
that economic liberalization and development in China will ultimately lead to 
political liberalization, some describing this as an “iron law” of international 
relations,113 “Beijing remains as brutal as ever”. Therefore, “the arguments 
made over the years by advocates for constructive engagement have proved 
largely fallacious”.114 China is guilty of such abuses as “extrajudicial killings, 
torture and coerced confessions of prisoners, and the use of forced labour, 
including prison labour,” and has offered “unflagging support” to some of the 
most tyrannical regimes abroad.115 
 
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
Economics receives a considerable amount of attention from the print media, 
from all sides of the political spectrum. Depending on their stance on other 
issues (e.g. human rights), a publication will look at the US-Chinese economic 
relationship through different prisms. For example, publications of all stripes 
have been critical of what TIME magazine identified as the “almost puppy-like 
devotion to the Middle Kingdom voiced by Western CEOs”.116 The Weekly 
Standard, in particular, has berated the US business (specifically Republican) 
establishment for “subordinating both strategic concerns and American 
principles to business interests,”117 while The Nation argues that the China 
market is so attractive to business that human rights violations are simply 
ignored, and no official is comfortable addressing them in public.118 
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The Weekly Standard frequently publishes articles about the 
subordination of principles (once pointing out how a Pizza Hut now stands on 
the former site of the Democracy Wall), arguing that “For America as an idea, 
business as usual with a totalitarian state is always too expensive.”119 The 
Weekly Standard is not blind to the benefits of economic relations with China, 
but it doesn’t pass up many opportunities to shine a light on the darker side of 
trade with China: “It gets to use the hard currency it derives from [trade with 
the US] to… ahem, sustain the sadistic regime it imposes on its citizens, 
modernise its gigantic army, and expand its malign influence throughout Asia.” 
With pernicious business-oriented special interests “whispering in his ear” on 
US-China policy, a president is unlikely to do anything but maintain his 
silence.120 
The Nation, a liberal magazine ideologically distinct from the Weekly 
Standard, is equally critical of China trade, which it focuses on above all other 
US-China issues. However its writers approach the issue from a different (not to 
mention simplistic) direction; specifically, the impact of outsourcing and its 
harmful effects on US wages,121 China’s repression of trade unions,122 and its 
manipulation of the Yuan.123 Like the Weekly Standard, The Nation is critical of 
the influence of the business community, accusing the government of being 
“more aligned with Wal-Mart” than with US manufacturers.124 This position is 
shared by journalists writing for The American Prospect, a liberal monthly 
publication which includes articles denouncing “the alliance of slave-labour 
factories in China and U.S. retailers like Wal Mart” that is dragging down US 
wages.125 Writers at the Nation are careful to warn against extreme legislative 
reactions to the imbalances in the bilateral relationship, as, even though the 
“economy is held hostage by Himalayas of external debt, much of it in the hands 
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of a strategic rival, China”,126 such knee-jerk impulses do “nothing to address 
our underlying industrial weakness or the American penchant for living beyond 
our means,”127 and therefore some of the blame remains at home. However, that 
China’s dollar holdings are an issue is clear when you consider that it is 
consistently mentioned in every article mentioning China between 2005 and 
2008, and prominently so during the presidential election of 2008.128 
Interestingly, but in a sign of ideological honesty, articles covering the value of 
the yuan and the decline of the manufacturing sector in the US are on the whole 
balanced, refusing to join other “China-bashers”. The Nation’s editorial board 
has also been critical of standard liberal tropes, distancing themselves from 
‘liberal’ attack ads that ridicule corporate tax cuts “for creating jobs and 
businesses – in China.”129 Instead, they have argued that “Manufacturing jobs 
have been in steady decline… for decades in the United States, as in other 
advanced countries. Using fewer people to produce more goods is what 
economic growth is all about.”130 Still, for liberal publications like The Nation, 
outsourcing is still an important, negative issue. Even President Obama’s 
stimulus plan has been criticized, because it “might restart factories in China 
while leaving US unemployment painfully high.”131 
When it comes to China, the Wall Street Journal, has a specific place 
within the general print media. When Rupert Murdoch purchased the Journal, it 
was believed that the paper’s coverage of China would become subordinated to 
News Corp.’s other interests in China. Some journalists argue that this has not 
really come about,132 but this might be more the result of the Journal’s main 
function as a business paper, which means it will tend to focus on the business 
potential of the China market and what its reforms and modernization mean for 
foreign corporations conducting business in China.133 As a whole, articles 
discussing China have been neutral or attempted to put a positive spin on any 
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potentially-negative issues. According to one Fortune article, the “overt 
patriotism” exhibited by Murdoch’s various American properties doesn’t stop 
News Corp from “pandering to China’s repressive regime to get his 
programming into that vast market”, going so far as to block publication 
through HarperCollins of former Governor of Hong Kong, Christopher Patten’s 
book that was critical of China, and dropping BBC’s World Service for reporting 
stories that were critical of China and its government. Murdoch has also been 
accused of pandering to the Chinese by referring to the Dalai Lama as “a very 
political old monk shuffling around in Gucci shoes.”134 It would be possible to 
use the Journal as support for Radha Sinha’s thesis that corporate-ownership 
dictates the opinions and reporting standards of the media outlets they own.135 
The Journal’s overtly pro-China position has not leaked into all of the Journal’s 
coverage, as it does consistently describe China’s economic policies as 
“mercantilist”, and has described China’s calls for a new global currency as 
“disingenuous”.136 
 
THE HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA 
CNN’s coverage of the Tiananmen Square incident didn’t just usher in a new 
media environment characterized by round-the-clock news; the images of tanks 
bearing down on peaceful protesters also sparked intense scrutiny and 
criticism of China’s human rights policies. David Tell, writing in the Weekly 
Standard, summed up a general media impression thus: “China remains a 
horrible place, as every CIA and Amnesty International report makes clear.”137 
China’s reputation as a human rights abuser has been especially difficult 
to shake in the wake of criticism from the print media. Again, as with economics 
and trade, the conservative and liberal publications both find fault, but in 
different aspects. Conservative papers and magazines focus on a broad 
spectrum: the repression and frequent incarceration of members of the Falun 
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Gong sect as a general attack on all religions (China is, of course, still officially 
atheist), as well as noting the occasional “oppression” of Chinese Christians;138 
conservative commentators also view China’s one-child policy as state-
sponsored abortion. 
China’s abortion policies receive a great deal of criticism from the right.139 
What is interesting is the use of China’s abortion record to try to influence the 
domestic US debate on the same issue. Despite the very different situations in 
China and America, this is done by disingenuously referring to any legislation 
opposed to The Weekly Standard’s position as similar to “China’s murderous 
family planning policies” for which there is “irrefutable evidence of infanticide, 
forced abortions, and starvation of children in orphanages”.140 David Frum, a 
popular Republican commentator also argued that “American abortion law 
must rank somewhere near China’s as the most permissive on earth.”141 China’s 
record on abortion is frequently used to make the nation appear inhumane, cold 
and brutal, the opposite of what America is. Jonah Goldberg, a popular and 
respected conservative commentator, has drawn a particularly dark portrayal: 
In China, Goldberg explains, girls “are being exterminated simply because they 
are girls, not because women can’t ‘afford’ a child or because it would interfere 
with their careers.” The writer argues that this is simply because the Chinese 
“don’t think girls are worthy of life, or at least not as worthy as boys.”142 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s proposal to reduce the importance of 
human rights in the US-China dialogue on her 2009 visit to China received a 
large amount of criticism in the press. In “The Administration Kowtows”, Ethan 
Gutman vilified the fact that Clinton announced that while Tibet, human rights, 
and Taiwan would “be on the agenda”, “We pretty much know what they are 
going to say”, which Gutman took to suggest that these issues will receive a 
token nod at best, without much effort to make progress. Gutman goes on to 
point out the downside of this weary approach: 
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“Even if Clinton was tired of Chinese human rights (in the old-
fashioned definition, where people are tortured to death and so on), 
the act of unilaterally agreeing to ignore an actual source of tension 
between our two societies represents a notable change in U.S. policy. 
The repercussions will extend far into Taiwan, China, and 
America.”143 
According to conservative writers, the Obama administration’s position on 
China is too cold, lacking a focus on the ideals that make America. Matthew 
Rees, especially, takes objection to the diminished importance of human rights: 
“Human rights in China. Democracy in China. These are things the Obama 
administration wants nothing to do with. Are the Chinese people on their 
own?”144 
The liberal press in America finds much to be critical of China, though it 
does not get involved in many of the traditional ‘values’ issues popular with the 
political right. For the left, China’s lack of progress on social rights, such as 
access to an unrestricted internet, a fair justice system, the fact that workers’ 
unions are illegal in China, and China’s heavy-handed repression of activists and 
their lawyers are key issues.145 As with magazines such as The Weekly Standard, 
the liberal press also uses China-related issues to colour their debate on 
domestic issues. 
For example, a popular issue is China’s regulation of the internet. The 
Nation negatively reports on Beijing’s policies of removing or blocking online 
content that challenges the Communist Party’s authority. The authors of these 
articles, however, are equally (if not more) critical of U.S. companies – e.g., 
Google, Yahoo!, Microsoft and Cisco – who help China in their efforts to censor 
the internet or persecute ‘netizens’ who distribute or post material that breaks 
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China’s restrictions; “We shouldn’t allow US firms to act in ways that contradict 
fundamental American values.”146 
The 2008 Beijing Olympics provided a great opportunity to write about 
China’s progress and modernization. While it did result in many positive 
reports on China’s modern cities and industrial prowess, the Olympics were 
also seen as an excuse to report on China’s failure to improve on its human 
rights record (a condition for receiving the right to host the Olympics),147 and 
its policies towards Tibet and Sudan. The Sudan issue in particular excites the 
wrath of left-wing publications. Fatin Abbas, writing in The American Prospect, 
argues that China’s involvement in and policies toward the Sudan are 
exacerbating and prolonging the situation on the ground: “Part of Khartoum’s 
defiance reflects its favoured status with China, which imports almost half of 
Sudan’s oil production”148 Articles critical of China’s role as financier of the 
genocidal regime in Khartoum grew in the lead-up to the Beijing Olympics, and 
in response to then-President Bush’s decision to attend the opening 
ceremonies, a New York Times editorial called for Bush to speak out against 
China’s human rights record, and to urge China to cease their weapons 
shipments to Sudan.149 Nicholas Kristof, a popular columnist at the Times, wrote 
that China is doing itself no favours on the world stage by “abetting genocide in 
Darfur and in effect undermining the U.N. military deployment there”. Kristof 
also explains that “in exchange for access to Sudanese oil, Beijing is financing, 
diplomatically protecting and supplying the arms for the first genocide of the 
21st century”, while the “basic reality is that China continues to side with Sudan” 
even after a string of deliberate attacks on UN forces.150 This, however, is 
consistent with China’s history of pursuing its national interest in foreign policy. 
Because the coverage of the Olympics was so varied in tone and content, it is 
difficult to assess how any single or selection of articles may or may not have 
influenced any government policies at the time. That being said, the opening 
spectacle of the Beijing Olympics was attended by President George W. Bush, 
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and American government rhetoric and press releases were positive or neutral 
in tone. 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 
China’s industrial expansion and modernisation, and what this means at a 
macro level for  climate change, is not as widely reported as one might think, 
and when these issues do appear, reporting tends to be mostly balanced, with 
any ‘blame’ being shared by China and the industrialised nations who consume 
too much. There are, however, still a number of magazines and newspapers 
who report on environmental degradation caused by China’s lax regulatory 
system, the impact of chemicals washing unchecked into rivers and seas,151 and 
the quality of the air in China’s cities (especially in the lead-up to the 2008 
Olympics, when there was considerable concern from athletes that they would 
do serious damage to their health by competing in such a polluted 
environment).152 
Much is made in the US press about the considerable growth in carbon 
emissions from China’s continued and growing reliance on coal-fired power 
stations. Paul Krugman, Nobel Prize-winner and columnist for the New York 
Times, has expressed concern that the rate of omissions is only destined to grow 
as China announces plans to continue its reliance on coal as its primary energy 
source, and will increase coal production by a further 30 percent by 2015. This 
decision alone, Krugman reports, will “swamp any emission reductions 
elsewhere,”153 which has naturally led to considerable concern among 
industrialised nations trying to push through universal emissions regulations.  
The likely surge in carbon emissions from coal-sector growth in China will 
only add to the effect of Chinese pollution felt around the world and critical 
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reporting in the US media. Bradford Plumer, reporting for The New Republic, has 
written about how “China’s pollution problems aren’t just taking a devastating 
toll on China,” but affecting other nations, too.154 
Another common angle for environmental stories is the impact of 
environmental degradation on China’s growing economy, and also the inability 
of the government in Beijing to enforce regulations. According to both Bradford 
Plumer, and Andrew Moravcsik (writing for Newsweek), the Chinese 
government is acutely aware of environmental damage and what this means for 
the Chinese economy,155 and have been keen to gain any advantage from 
investment in green technologies – be it actually energy production, or the 
creation of jobs for its ever-growing workforce.156 
Overall, while pointing out the shortcomings of China’s contradictory 
policies of attempting to reduce pollution while, at the same time, increasing 
production of coal-fired energy plants, the US media pays more attention to the 
progress China is making – be it the considerable success the government had in 
reducing the pollution haze over Beijing in time for the Olympics (while also 
largely ignoring the unsustainable lengths the Chinese government went to in 
order to achieve this), or praising China’s increased investment in alternative 
energy sources (including wind-farms and solar energy),157 putting it way 
ahead of the United States’ own efforts at curbing emissions and environmental 
degradation. In this respect, environmental reporting on China can often be 
more positive than reporting on other issues. 
 
CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL AMBITIONS AND ROLE 
Reporting on the security relationship between the United States and China is 
an area prone to political bias and not a little hyperbole. The tendency among 
reporters appears to be to toe the line of the political party that reflects the 
editorial ideology of the publication. Reporting by conservative/Republican 
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publications, therefore, is greatly influenced by the “China threat” theories, 
while overtly liberal publications feature far fewer articles on military and 
security issues, unless topical (for example, due to a confrontation between 
China and the US) or while discussing the historical context of the US-China 
relationship.158 A common theme in the conservative press is that China has 
pursued a policy since “the early 1990s, aimed at achieving unchallenged 
Chinese domination over all of East Asia”.159 
It could be argued that Charles Krauthammer’s 1995 TIME article, “Why 
We Must Contain China” has had a lasting effect on the press’s view of China, 
and by extension also government officials. The article identified China as a 
“ruthless dictatorship”, arguing that “Containing China is not enough… 
undermining its aggressively dictatorial regime” is also necessary, by 
supporting dissidents and keeping pressure on human rights issues.160 Echoes 
of these sentiments can be found throughout the US print media. This, along 
with a generally negative opinion of “the ominous rise of China”,161 has largely 
framed subsequent US-China security-related stories in the US print media. 
The National Review, in particular, features many articles about China’s 
growing military power and what this might mean for the US. Despite the 
general unease about China’s growing strength emanating from the pens of 
National Review contributors, the editors retain a sense of realism that calls for 
restraint over important issues. For example, on the issue of Taiwan’s status (a 
popular topic among conservative journalists), one editorial stated that it is 
“deplorable” that Taiwan must fear Beijing’s reaction whenever it proclaims its 
nationhood, but, at the same time, because “We are at war, and cannot be too 
fastidious in our dealings”, the government must be more discerning in the 
fights it picks.162 Despite this editorial sense of restraint, however, other writers 
for the magazine believe differently. Given the influence of the National Review 
among Republican officials and powerbrokers (its founder, William F. Buckley, 
Jr., was a stalwart of the conservative movement when it first emerged as a 
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force in politics), it is significant when a columnist, such as Richard Lowry, 
proclaims that “We want to check China”,163 and recommends strengthening 
Japan’s position in Asia and its defence forces to “counterbalance China”.164 
The Taiwan issue features prominently in many, but not all, publications – 
however, this is usually limited to times when particular crises or important 
events take place (such as Taiwanese democratic elections). The New York 
Times’ Drew Thompson and Nikolas Gvosdev draw readers’ attention to what 
can only be described as China’s unreasonable and bellicose policies toward 
Taiwan: along with a growing arms build-up along the coast facing Taiwan, 
China’s new anti-secession law “explicitly gives [Beijing] the authority to 
‘employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures’ should Taiwan 
unilaterally declare its independence.”165 
The portrayal of China as a potential enemy or rival of the United States is 
usually presented in great-power, or traditional terms: the relative levels of 
influence and hard power, realpolitik. The argument seems to be that increased 
defence spending and military hardware will deter China from mounting a 
viable challenge to America’s position as the world’s only superpower. 
However, there are a growing number of reporters who are writing about 
China’s newfound expertise in ‘cyber-warfare’ and ‘cyber-spying’. The Wall 
Street Journal has published a number of articles that suggest China is pursuing 
a number of possible methods of asymmetric warfare. Bret Stephens has 
outlined, in grim prose, scenarios in which “thousands of people die” as the 
result of attacks on America’s technological infrastructure, through the Chinese 
doctrine of “shashoujian” (or “assassin’s mace”), which is an outgrowth of their 
study of the Gulf Wars and the realisation of how heavily dependent the US 
military is on technology.166 The image created by articles like these is one of a 
China that is targeting the United States specifically through anti-satellite 
weapons and weapons that can threaten American aircraft carrier groups.167 
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In recent years, members of the US press have encouraged closer 
economic ties with China and an enlarged US military in an attempt to make 
“Chinese aggression prohibitively expensive”.168 The focus on stories that 
appeal to realist conceptions of international affairs can have the effect of 
influencing policymakers, as they potentially increase the acceptance of realist 
threat-vs.-opportunity calculations. This is especially true when these articles 
are published in ‘opinion-maker’ daily newspapers like the Washington Post, 
New York Times and Wall Street Journal, or in ideologically-biased 
newsmagazines. 
It is not just the Chinese government’s actions and policies abroad that 
receive a wary or negative appraisal in the press. Nicholas Kristof has written 
about “China’s prickly nationalism”, which, when coupled with the fact that 
China still approaches the world through the prism of “guochi, or national 
humiliation”, can sometimes lead to a sense of cockiness and hostility when 
confronted with foreigners.169 TIME magazine’s Simon Elegant has written 
about how this prickly nationalism makes China appear prone to nationalistic 
anger that can lead to violence, such as that which emerged during the difficult 
Olympic torch relay in France, which was beset by pro-Tibet protestors: “The 
ferocity with which [Chinese] protestors turn on anybody who disagrees with 
them reminds some older Chinese of the dark days of Mao Zedong’s Cultural 
Revolution, which convulsed China from 1966-76.” The author believes the 
anger to be the result of “years of indoctrination in a highly nationalistic – some 
would say xenophobic – credo that imagines a hostile and perfidious world 
determined to undermine China.”170  
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has examined different facets of media as well as the media’s 
treatment of key issues that make up the US-China debate, and their influence 
on policy-makers. It was my belief, coming at this research, that the media can 
help to steer the discussion and frame the debate with their coverage of China-
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related issues, and this chapter supports that view. That said, it remains hard to 
quantify the actual level of influence on policy itself that the media exerts. 
There are two conclusions that can be drawn regarding the media’s role in 
US foreign policy-making. First, the media acts as an intermediary between the 
American public and the federal government. In this role, the media offers 
issue-framing in which government officials can advance their stated agendas 
with regards to China and China policy, as well as platforms from which they 
can push policy proposals and attempt to sway public opinion to their position. 
Secondly, in terms of the trends and traditions of American foreign policy, 
the media help reinforce the beliefs at the core of America’s historical and 
contemporary grand strategy. Regardless of the political biases of a publication 
or television news program (stated or otherwise), the American preference for 
economic expansion is clearly accepted and even promoted by many media 
outlets. In terms of threat-versus-advantage, the level of threat presented by 
China is recognised, but is not as widespread as the economic advantage the 
country’s rapid modernisation offers to the globalised American economy. The 
apparent negativity of American media’s portrayal of China – ranging from 
admonishing China for its poor environmental record (while frequently 
ignoring America’s own questionable record), to seeing threat in China’s rise – 
is articulated most commonly within the framework of traditional power 
politics and zero-sum terminology, where China’s gain is America’s loss.  
The liberal-moralist media approaches China critically – even those 
concentrating on the economic-advantages of the relationship often espouse 
moral outrage at some of China’s domestic and foreign policies. The liberal 
values that American politicians profess to hold so dear are frequently tested by 
revelations of Chinese internal practices (such as forced abortions and 
sterilisations, or religious and ethnic repression) and external policies as well 
(such as currency manipulation, and sabre-rattling and encroachments into 
America’s sphere of influence). 
Most importantly, while media may not influence actual policy, it can 
create a tone for policy debate. In this respect, it can influence the conduct of 
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policy-making. A president or other official who ignores angry media opposition 
to a specific policy will likely come to political harm; whereas a politician who is 
able to articulate a policy position within a framework provided by the media 
can reap considerable benefits. 
The relative influence of printed articles on the policymaking actors is 
highly dependent on both the circulation of the publication it is in, and also 
more importantly who reads the publication. It is likely that newspapers such as 
the Washington Post and New York Times, with relatively small (and shrinking) 
circulations, reach more of the American political elite than does, for example, 
The Nation. Given the tendency to present unbiased, or at least neutral, articles 
in these newspapers, it is unlikely they serve as particularly strong sources of 
policy prescriptions. Broadcast outlets, with much wider audiences, have the 
potential to influence the electorate and officialdom more widely. However, as 
has been discussed in this chapter, the format stories are presented in is a 
considerable limiter on how much information a presenter can provide, leaving 
segments prone to hyperbole or shallow depictions of any issue. Given the 
complexity of the US-China relationship, this will mean a very limited 
understanding of the politics involved. 
There are times when the media will act as a valuable resource to 
government officials – specifically, during times of crisis, when the presence of 
reporters can sometimes provide on-site information quicker than official 
agencies. However, as time goes on and governmental attention turns to the 
event, the information-gathering resources available to the White House, State 
Department and Congress, dwarf the efforts of the media and therefore 
supersede it as a source of information. At this point, the media become less 
important, and the roles reverse, as the government turns the media into a tool 
for mobilising public opinion to achieve their goals, and Executive attention 
turns to prominent newspaper and broadcast editors who have the ability to 
shift or influence public perceptions.171 In the next chapter, I shall look at the 
role of special interest groups and lobbies on the policy-making process, and 
how they have a greater impact on the direction of policy. 
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CHAPTER IV.II 
MEDIA CASE STUDY: TIANANMEN SQUARE 
“To a great extent, the stage for current U.S. policy difficulties was set 
by the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown, from which China has 
never been rehabilitated in the eyes of most Americans.”1 
The above quotation, from 2001, remains relevant today. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, the Chinese government’s crackdown on student and citizen 
protesters in Beijing would be a turning point in the conduct of US-China 
relations, particularly in the eyes of the American media. This chapter addresses 
the role of the media as a social institution working within the pluralised 
American foreign policy system. By addressing the media’s portrayal of 
Tiananmen as a case study, we are able to better understand the role the media 
plays as part of the pluralist American foreign policy-making system. In 
addition, it highlights the need for a balanced approach that includes the 
conventional concern for executive-level decision-making and an appreciation 
of the role and influence of the media. The reporting on Tiananmen Square has 
left an indelible mark on the American debate on China, and has embedded the 
media’s portrayal of China into the decision-making process. As will be shown, 
although the media has not usurped the centrality of the Executive Branch in 
policy-making, it has, however, acquired a central role in framing the discussion 
and setting the agenda. 
This chapter examines the presentation of the Tiananmen Square 
crackdown of June 1989 in a selection of key American printed media, from 
across the political ideological spectrum. New York Times and Washington Post 
are the two cornerstone political newspapers in America, with the widest 
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political readership. The evidence and reporting for this chapter are 
predominantly drawn from these two newspapers, USA Today and some 
reporting by other news publications including: The Nation (despite its smaller 
circulation, it is a platform from which liberal news personalities and politicians 
often present their views); The New Republic; National Review, Weekly Standard, 
and The Washington Times (influential conservative publications, which print 
features and editorials by Republican officials, former officials, and advisors).2 
The Tiananmen crackdown came in the wake of 15 years of increasingly 
positive media impressions of China. Following the Nixon administration’s 
opening to Mao and the People’s Republic, the American media had rallied to 
the idea of China as an ally, and that America’s alliance with China was in the 
US’s interest – the positive image of “China’s ancient greatness, civilisation, art, 
hoary wisdom”,3 was coupled with China’s new position as a Cold War ally. 
Negative impressions persisted, but there’s no doubt Nixon’s opening to Mao 
was a turning point in America’s understanding and opinion of China. Indeed, 
reporting on China often had a positive spin. June 1989, however, would change 
that, seriously shattering the positive (or at least neutral) impression many 
Americans had come to hold of China. 
It is clear that few things will draw the attention of the Western, and 
particularly American, media more than stories that tap into Western liberal 
ideals of democracy, equality, freedom of expression, and freedom of the press. 
All of these ideals were raised by the events in and around Tiananmen Square, 
and also in its legacy. There are four distinct ‘periods’ of reporting related to the 
Tiananmen Square crackdown – Build Up, the Crackdown, Aftermath, and 
Legacy – and these will inform the structure of the chapter going forward. 
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BUILD UP TO CRACKDOWN (MAY & JUNE 1ST-3RD 1989) 
Student protesters had begun shortly after the April 15th death of the popular 
former Communist Party leader, Hu Yaobang. The movement gained 
momentum during a hunger strike by 3,000 students, which began in May 1989. 
“More than a million Beijing residents took to the streets to support the hunger 
strikers in their demands for a more democratic government, and 
demonstrations were reported all over China.”4 The protesters had a broad 
agenda – democracy was only one of the items, and possibly not the most 
important to the students. Far more immediate was the students’ concern over 
corruption and income inequality (Hu Yaobang was popular, because he was 
believed to be honest and non-corrupt). The student protests also started in 
advance of a state visit by Mikhail Gorbachev. By the middle of May, 
approximately half a million Chinese university students, teachers, reporters 
and their supporters were rallied in the heart of Beijing, as the wave of peaceful 
student demonstrations swelled.5 The immediate causes of public 
dissatisfaction were “relate[d] not only to vague yearnings for democracy but, 
more importantly, to profound economic frustrations and disgust over social 
inequities and corruption.”6 
The international press corps in China for Gorbachev’s visit were 
enamoured of the student movement, seeing in it the seeds of China potentially 
moving towards Western-style democracy and values. Michael Dobbs, writing 
in May for the Washington Post with unintended premonition, compared what 
he saw in Beijing to what he had seen in Soviet Georgia, a month earlier: 
“The most striking parallels are with the demonstration in Tbilisi... 
that was brutally broken up by Soviet troops in the early morning 
hours of April 9. What ended as a blood bath began as a peaceful 
hunger strike by hundreds of young Georgians camped outside 
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government buildings surrounded by thousands of sympathetic 
onlookers.”7 
It is possible that American journalists over-optimistically saw the 
blossoming of a liberalising China, one that would fulfill its promise as they saw 
it. In an article written before the incident (but dated after), Hendrik Hertzberg 
predicted the success of the democracy movement: 
“Now it seems equally inevitable that it will end in some sort of 
victory – at a minimum, the fall of Prime Minister Li Peng, who, by 
declaring martial law and calling out the army just as the students 
were about to end their hunger strikes, galvanized the opposition 
anew, split the ruling elites, and delegitimized himself beyond 
repair.”8 
Hertzberg was not wrong about the factional splits among the Chinese 
leadership, but unfortunately his positive prediction would ultimately prove 
very wrong. Hertzberg continued, arguing that what was being witnessed in 
China was part of the inevitable march of democracy across the globe. 
“The tide rolling out of China should sweep away what remains of the 
notion that ordinary people in poor countries with limited 
democratic traditions do not care about civil liberties. This idea has 
proved false almost everywhere it has been tested. The laboratories 
include societies as diverse as India, South Korea, Spain, Portugal, 
and, in recent months, Panama, the Soviet Union, and now China.”9 
As Beijing made moves to forcefully bring an end to the protests, Western 
journalists’ optimism about the potential end results of the movement was 
shattered, and likely planted the seed for what has been, to this day, a continued 
distrust and wariness about China. This perhaps explains why Western 
journalists are so zealous in keeping the memory alive. 
                                                          
7
 Dobbs (May 15
th
 1989), p.A25 
8
 Hertzberg (Jun.12
th
 1989) 
9
 Hertzberg (Jun.12
th
 1989) 
Stefan Fergus Chapter 4.2: US Media & Tiananmen Square 
179 
 
As mentioned above, the attention of the American media can often be 
captured by stories that appeal to American values of freedom of expression 
and freedom of the press. There is certainly a sense one gets from reading May 
1989 features that much of the Western media’s interest in the demonstrations 
sprang from professional kinship with Chinese reporters who had started to 
join the students’ movement. As the protests coincided with a visit from 
Gorbachev, there were, according to Dobbs, an estimated 1,500 journalists there 
to cover the summit.10 Many were convinced that this veritable army of 
international reporters, “helped restrain hard-liners in the government who 
wanted to use the police to restore order”, as they saw the Chinese leadership 
facing the same situation that confronted Filipino President Ferdinand Marcos 
in 1986, and the Shah of Iran in 1979, “when their armies fragmented rather 
than beat and shoot demonstrators in living color before international 
audiences.”11 Many of the protesters were convinced the authorities would 
move on the protests after the journalists disappeared.12 In an article titled 
“Blanket TV Coverage Gives Chinese Demonstrators a Security Blanket”, Jim 
Hoagland of the Washington Post, argued that the communications network set 
up to cover Gorbachev was “more important as protective covering for the 
students than was the presence of the Soviet leader itself.” The US media’s 
reporting on the protestors highlighted its belief in the Western ideals of 
freedom and power of the press, which would sadly prove lacking in China.13  
“The government doesn’t dare to use force against the students, because 
they know that if they did, workers and citizens would take to the streets in 
protest against it,” one unnamed reporter for the Chinese Guangming Daily told 
a Washington Post reporter. A key demand of the students’ had been freedom of 
the press, and this has “stirred much sympathy among the capital’s journalists, 
hundreds of whom have taken part in the protest rally despite their 
publications’ affiliation with the party.”14 Many reporters and editors from the 
                                                          
10
 Dobbs (May 15
th
 1989), p.A25 
11
 Hoagland (May 18
th
 1989), p.A35 
12
 Dobbs (May 15
th
 1989), p.A25 
13
 Hoagland (May 18
th
 1989), p.A35 
14
 Southerland (May 17
th
 1989), p.A1 
Stefan Fergus Chapter 4.2: US Media & Tiananmen Square 
180 
 
People’s Daily (the “mouthpiece” of the CCP)15 had also joined protestors, 
“loudly” demanding democracy, freedom of the press and expression, and the 
lifting of press censorship.16 The journalists demonstrating “represented all the 
leading Chinese newspapers and news agencies”, who were protesting the 
‘muzzling’ of the press following the imposition of martial law and two weeks of 
favourable coverage of the students’ movement in the Chinese press. Before 
martial law was imposed, Dobbs reports, Chinese news media had been 
reflecting Zhao Ziyang’s sympathetic attitude towards the students.17 
As this chapter will illustrate, below, one of the characteristics of 
American media coverage of Tiananmen Square and China would become early 
dissatisfaction of American official responses. Even before events escalated to 
violence, some reporters were disappointed with American official response: 
“Many of our democratic statesmen, instead of being touched by the Chinese 
people's ardent plea for democracy, seem mostly worried at the idea that a 
billion people might be cast adrift, free from the rigid safety of their totalitarian 
fetters.”18 
The demonstrations and leadership gridlock “underscored the fragile and 
volatile nature of the situation in Beijing”, even though the turmoil seemed to be 
subsiding.19 The party leadership in China were believed to be “especially 
concerned” about the potential for dissent to grow outside the student 
movement, particularly among factory workers. The fear, rooted in historical 
precedent, was that worker participation in the protests “could bring on broad 
social disruption.”20 The peaceful demonstrations were starkly different from 
previous popular movements that had shaken China – for example, the 1960s 
Red Guards movement, the 1979 Democracy Wall demonstrations, and 
scattered student protests in 1987.21  
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In the final days of May, the numbers of demonstrators had dwindled, as 
popular support for the movement started to lose steam, “in large part because 
of fears of a government crackdown.” Almost twice as many troops (200,000) as 
demonstrators were deployed around Beijing, suggesting the government was 
considering action, and PLA troops were reportedly scrutinising visas at 
Beijing’s train station, in attempts to prevent the numbers at Tiananmen Square 
from swelling further.22 In the pre-dawn hours, along Changan Avenue, the 
main east-west thoroughfare near Tiananmen, between 500 and 1,000 local 
residents confronted and prevented troops from passing. Nicholas Kristoff, in 
the New York Times, took a more sensationalist approach, reporting that 
“citizens flung themselves in front of army trucks and tanks, stopping and often 
reversing the long convoys.”23 The citizen roadblocks appeared to work, as the 
troops did not appear to be authorised to use force, and “once they got near it, 
they showed little willingness to try to break through the crowds.”24 
The soldiers, reported Kristoff, appeared “distinctly unenthusiastic about 
their mission.” Most seemed to be from distant regions, and seemed surprised 
when their movements were blocked by local residents. One said they had not 
been told why they were sent to the Tiananmen area.”25 An army engineer 
angrily told Kristoff that, “Our government is too harsh to the students... The 
People’s Liberation Army belongs to the people, and it is time for every Chinese 
to speak out.”26  
The demonstrations, therefore, provoked a political crisis, with splits 
forming not only within the military and government, but between them. After 
the party leader, Zhao Ziyang, with the support of other like-minded officials, 
urged a conciliatory approach, it precipitated a power struggle that resulted in 
the dismissal of Zhao,27 who would live the rest of his life under effective house 
arrest. 
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On June 3rd, there was an accident, in which a speeding police van veered 
out of control and crashed into a group of four cyclists, killing two people at the 
scene and seriously injuring the others. The perception in the first days of June 
1989, was that in one night the Government had killed four bicyclists and tried 
to use military force to seize the students in Tiananmen Square. A construction 
worker told Kristoff that a “massive demonstration” would be staged in 
response to the accident. “We’ll probably go on strike, too. We can’t let the 
troops attack the patriotic student movement.”28 The Chinese leadership, as it 
turned out, wouldn’t allow them the opportunity. 
 
THE CRACKDOWN & IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH (JUNE 3RD-6TH 1989) 
“Bloody Sunday in Tiananmen Square will be remembered by 
Chinese at home and abroad as one of the darkest days in China’s 
history, one which is likely to blacken the names of several Chinese 
leaders for decades to come.”29 
Some reports filed on June 4th and 5th were amongst the most graphic articles 
ever written about China up until that point. Some reporters showed a measure 
of journalistic restraint when describing the military crackdown, while others 
filed disturbing accounts of brutality. After an article that had attempted to find 
a balanced view of who or what was at fault for causing the demonstrations in 
the first place, Nicholas Kristoff’s article in the wake of the crackdown was more 
stark: 
“Tens of thousands of Chinese troops retook the center of the capital 
early this morning from pro-democracy protesters, killing scores of 
students and workers and wounding hundreds more as they fired 
submachine guns at crowds of people who tried to resist – sometimes 
firing in the air and sometimes firing directly at crowds of men and 
women who refused to move out of the way.”30 
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Daniel Southerland of the Washington Post filed an even more graphic and 
powerful account of the “bloody massacre” and “carnage”: 
“25-ton tanks of the People’s Liberation Army were the main 
weapons of terror. Converging from east and west, they lined the 
northern side of the square, flattened the statue students had erected 
to honor democracy, and then ripped into the students’ tent city 
encampment... Tanks pursued student victims with machine guns, ran 
over some and smashed others like insects against walls... Behind the 
tanks came soldiers and riot police, who beat students with 
truncheons and fired on them with automatic weapons... One tank 
crushed several students against the wall of the concert hall... Anyone 
holding a banner became a target... A soldier shot a worker who was 
helping the students by using his three-wheeled pedicab as a 
makeshift ambulance. Soldiers shot a man driving an ambulance 
loaded with the bodies of students.”31 
Los Angeles Times reporters filed many grim features. Of the crackdown 
itself, Mann and Holley wrote: 
“At times, the firing was indiscriminate. At about 5:30 a.m. today, for 
example, a military convoy of about 100 vehicles – including tanks, 
armoured personnel carriers, trucks and jeeps – swept past the 
Beijing Hotel toward Tiananmen Square, firing at bystanders. After 
they reached the square, at about 5:45 a.m., heavy automatic rifle fire 
could be heard from the area, which had already been subjected to 
several other lengthy volleys earlier in the morning... Every hour or 
so through this morning, troops fired volleys of gunfire in an 
apparent attempt to intimidate the crowds.”32 
The day after the main crackdown, the American media still in China 
reported a tense and fearful atmosphere, characterised by “continued 
bloodshed”, conducted with “cold-blooded... randomness”, making the shootings 
“seem to be acts of pure terror.”33 Beijing citizens remained nervous, the city 
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still under martial law. “When tanks passed, the crowds fell back, aware the 
troops in control would not hesitate to crush them.”34 During periodic 
skirmishes near Tiananmen Square, Chinese troops continued to fire on 
unarmed residents. According to hospital and witness reports, “scores more” 
people were killed.35 
The remaining protesters battling against their oppressors were framed in 
an almost dystopian setting, as additional tanks and armoured personnel 
carriers were sent to Tiananmen, “Beijing residents lying in ambush hurled half 
a dozen firebombs at them near the intersection of Changan Avenue and 
Dongdan Street.” There was “sporadic firing during the night around Beijing”, 
where citizens had set up crude little barricades, but to no avail. “As the death 
toll mounted, individual citizens continued to display extraordinary physical 
bravery in acts of defiance.”36 Nevertheless, Beijing hospitals became “so full of 
casualties that they scarcely had time for those who were not severely 
wounded,” their floors “covered with blood”,37 mirroring the “blood stained... 
pavement stones.”38 
George Will, a conservative commentator, evoked an image of China as 
Orwellian dictatorship, a country with “a boot in [its] face – forever”, arguing 
that Orwell’s “nightmare is the totalitarians’ dream, the terrifying promise of 
permanence.” The world “marvelled at the bravery, politeness and good will of 
the protesters”. But the foreign audiences did not appreciate the protestors’ 
challenge to the totalitarian regime. “The regime understood,”39 and reacted as 
totalitarian states do: with violence. This violence “ended a period of 
remarkable restraint by both sides, and seemed certain to arouse new 
bitterness and antagonism among both ordinary people and Communist Party 
officials”40 
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OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT STATEMENTS: “THE CYNICAL LIES OF BEIJING’S TOTTERING 
DICTATORS”41 
The official government statements issued before and after the crackdown 
became a topic of discussion in the US press, as it offered a starkly different (or, 
at least, selective) account of the events. According to George Will, what made 
Tiananmen Square “terrifying to the totalitarians” was the fact that the protest 
movement had “no leaders” and was comprised of “just unconscripted spirits.”42 
Will was quite correct, as in China most (if not all) changes in regime and 
reform have come on the backs of popular revolt – the same, in fact, is true of 
the CCP itself. 
For China, the Tiananmen crackdown, “was a fundamental turning point.” 
The Communist Party leadership, as reported by some in the US media, made 
the decision that “no matter how high the costs to its image at home or abroad”, 
it had to use overwhelming force against the demonstrators who posed a 
powerful challenge to their power and legitimacy.43 Nicholas Kristoff tried to 
put the CCP leadership’s decision into context: “the party [had] suffered a 
prolonged erosion of its moral authority – and its ability to intimidate”, and the 
people’s feelings for the CCP have evolved from “awe and love” alongside fear 
into little more than “disdain or even contempt”. Kristoff points out that, while 
dissidents and student demonstrators had received most of the attention from 
the foreign press, “among ordinary Chinese the practice of ignoring or defying 
the party ha[d] become nearly universal.”44 
Kristoff’s article, which looked into the roots of the protests, has a strange 
sense about it, perhaps as an attempt to offer journalistic objectivity. He 
criticised protestors who were disappointed in China’s economic situation and 
also belittled the concerns over rampant corruption in the CCP. The author put 
some of the blame on “the pessimism of smart young Chinese, their obvious lack 
of appreciation for the regime that in the last decade has so palpably increased 
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their opportunities and material comforts”, and perceptions in China that the 
country was suffering from an economic crisis. China’s annual inflation rate at 
the time had passed 25% per year, and there had been previously unfamiliar 
problems such as “bank runs and cash shortages”. Kristoff then addressed 
corruption: “Bribes and abuse of power are no longer peripheral to the 
economy; they are the fuel that makes it run”. But, writes Kristoff, “all countries 
have graft and economic problems”, as if the degree of corruption was the same 
everywhere, and ignoring China’s long history of endemic corruption. A sense of 
economic frustration had arisen in China due to inflation and corruption, and it 
allowed people to “convince themselves that they are becoming worse and 
worse off financially”, despite growth rates of 11% per year.45 
Kristoff reported on the CCP’s official news programs, which were quick to 
provide their own accounts of the events, stating that “the People’s Liberation 
Army had crushed a ‘counter-revolutionary rebellion’ in the capital”, claiming 
“more than 1,000 police and troops had been injured and some killed”, 
alongside ‘some’ civilian casualties.46 China’s “hard-line” leaders, “oblivious to 
world reaction” and also the images and reports filed by the foreign media, 
declared on camera that there were “no civilian casualties, only soldiers 
‘murdered’ by counterrevolutionaries.”47 
From another official news broadcast the night before the crackdown:  
“A handful of ruffians are wantonly making rumors to instigate the 
masses to openly insult, denounce, beat and kidnap soldiers in the 
People’s Liberation Army, to seize arms, surround and block 
Zhongnanhai, attack the Great Hall of the People, and attempt to 
gather together various forces. More serious riots can occur at any 
time.”48 
The Beijing Martial Law Headquarters claimed that “thugs in a frenzy” had 
attacked PLA troops, “seizing weapons, erecting barricades, beating soldiers 
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and officers in an attempt to overthrow the government”.49 Official Chinese 
reports described these ‘thugs’ and their hostile actions: 
“Students and workers tried to resist the crackdown, and destroyed 
at least 16 trucks and 2 armored personnel carriers. Scores of 
students and workers ran alongside the personnel carriers, hurling 
concrete blocks and wooden staves into the treads until they ground 
to a halt. They then threw firebombs at one until it caught fire, and set 
the other alight after first covering it with blankets soaked in 
gasoline.”50 
These reports were starkly different to the image of “soldiers with 
automatic weapons, tanks, and armored vehicles attack[ing] unarmed civilians” 
that was a frequent image presented in the American press, alongside “bloody 
ground, prostrate bodies, wild-eyed young soldiers firing in all directions”.51 
What the Chinese students and their worker allies had wanted was 
accountability. The economic opening-up of Chinese society brought with it 
inequality and corruption. The protesters were demanding “not an end to the 
market experiment but a rudimentary political counterweight to its abuses”. It 
would have been easy to satisfy them with respectful attention and a loosening 
of press controls.52 A “sympathetic attitude toward these mild and legitimate 
demands” from the government might have averted the “subsequent 
bloodbath”, but the government adopted a no-compromise approach.53 As 
Hertzberg explained, instead of diplomacy and leadership, “the gerontocracy 
chose darkness and death.”54 
Journalists from the Los Angeles Times continued to report on the 
aftermath of the crackdown, and painted a picture of growing tension among 
the army units deployed in Beijing – even reporting witness statements of army 
personnel engaging in fire fights with each other. The authors proposed – 
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without evidence, unfortunately, but not unsurprisingly – that they were rival 
factions loyal to the hard-line and more liberal factions within the ruling CCP. 
“Troops and armored vehicles were reported moving toward Beijing from the 
east. They were described as opposed to the forces that killed hundreds of 
citizens over the weekend.”55 
This was the first time in its history that the CCP used the PLA to carry out 
its policy of repression. While Mao had “killed millions during his numerous 
political campaigns”, he always used the masses and police to achieve his goals 
(during the Cultural Revolution, Mao’s agenda was carried out by the Red 
Guards and Revolutionaries).56 The crackdown appeared “unnecessarily 
vicious”57 to foreign observers, many of whom highlighted the “overpowering... 
contrast” between the peaceful demonstration and “carnage”58 wrought by the 
Chinese government. Sending in the military was “a bloody ending” to the long-
running face-off between the Chinese regime and the pro-democracy 
demonstrators. It was “a battle that the leadership found it could not win 
without use of lethal force”,59 and “exploded once and for all the fiction that was 
summarized in the very name ‘People’s Republic’ of China”60 
 
THE MEDIA, THE TIANANMEN AFTERMATH, & THE GEORGE H.W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION 
In the months after the Tiananmen crackdown, the Chinese leadership “worked 
hard to project an air of normality”, by imposing “silence on its own people by 
intimidation”, and putting a stop to “meaningful foreign television coverage”; 
tactics that had some success. “The world’s attention span is never very long, 
and people’s concerns have drifted away from China.”61 
“the brutality that we saw on our screens in June has not stopped. 
The shooting of peaceful demonstrators for democracy has been 
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succeeded by the systematic arrest, beating and torture of those who 
have expressed doubts about the perfect wisdom of the Chinese 
Communist Party and its leaders.”62 
In an article about the CCP’s attempts to whitewash the events of 
Tiananmen, David Sanger described Beijing as a “city seemingly trapped in a 
fearful silence”, forced to swallow the Party’s propaganda and twisted version 
of events that took place during the “counterrevolutionary rebellion”.63 In 
another article, Southerland explains that, “despite the apparent calm here, 
Beijing remains a bitter city”, respect for the regime at an all-time low. Chinese 
authorities have declared that “everything has returned to normal in Beijing”, 
but justified the continuance of martial law because they must continue to 
“guard against ‘bad elements’”.64 
The government expanded its oppression into the coastal provinces, 
revoking the token democratic reforms that had been made there, removing 
leaders and attacking private enterprises and even shutting them down.65 China 
has seen an “intense campaign” to dispel Western assertions that “a thousand 
civilians were killed”, and that over 10,000 were arrested in the months 
afterwards.66 A State Department human rights report stated that abuses in 
China were not only rampant, but got worse after Tiananmen,67 in particular, 
continued arrests and persecution of large numbers of dissidents.68 Although 
China described the protests as a “rebellion, quashed by a heroic but restrained 
army that took few lives”,69 in fact, the country became a “harsh and sullen 
place” ruled by an “aging, discredited leadership... actively repressing precisely 
those elements of the population on which it counts most to modernize the 
country.” Deng Xiaoping remained “unapologetic about the sequence in which 
his fearful and insecure regime saw in the demonstrators a mortal threat to its 
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survival and sent in the tanks.”70 Almost a year later, “the bitter old men” were 
still showing their fear.71 
Some reporters put the Tiananmen crackdown into a historical context, 
further damning the CCP with its past record. Anthony Lewis, for example, 
characterised “the shattering of hopes” as “no new phenomenon for the 
People’s Republic”, describing a government that has frequently “presided over 
turmoil and repression”. Lewis offers Mao Zedong’s “lunatic” Great Leap 
Forward, which set the China back for years, and cost more than 25 million 
lives. In another example, Lewis explains that the Cultural Revolution, which 
followed the Great Leap Forward, “wasted” a generation. Deng Xiaoping had 
seemed to offer rational politics and economic reform, rather than the “Maoist 
cult of personality”. Instead, by “opting decisively for the totalitarian model”, 
Deng “destroyed the lingering legitimacy of the system.”72  
Bette Bao Lord (wife of Winston Lord, Ambassador to China at the time of 
the crackdown) wrote that, because of Tiananmen, the Chinese “no longer... 
entrust their futures to idols with feet of clay and blood on their hands.”73 
Writing two years after the event, she painted a grim picture of how dissenters 
from 1989 have been treated: 
“I am thinking of that young man who defied a convoy of tanks. What 
has become of him? Like all too many of the brave and hopeful and 
young, has he been executed? Secretly tried and arbitrarily 
sentenced? Sent off to a labor camp or internal exile? Released from 
incarceration but without a means to live? Or is he still detained 
without charge in a crowded cell?”74 
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MEDIA CRITICISM OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S RESPONSE TO TIANANMEN 
The George H.W. Bush administration’s focus on pursuing a realist foreign 
policy, dealing with nation-states as they were (rather than making any 
attempts to reform them), came under considerable criticism in the American 
press. Despite the ability of the press to sway members of the Legislative 
Branch of government, President Bush exerted considerable control over actual 
policy. In the wake of Tiananmen Square, “there are few places where the 
administration’s approach makes less moral, strategic, or practical sense than 
China.”75 In particular, disappointment and anger at President Bush’s measured 
and careful response to the crackdown – and how out-of-step it is with 
American public opinion – quickly came to define much American reporting on 
China for the next few years.76 In a printed debate in USA Today, readers were 
informed that, 
“The images won’t fade quickly from our minds... The blood and 
brutality in Tiananmen Square. Brave students demonstrating 
for democratic reforms ruthlessly crushed by Chinese 
authorities... But President Bush apparently has put those 
unsettling images aside.”77 
Even more damning, the paper argues that the Bush administration has 
not only brushed aside the events in and around Tiananmen Square, the 
president has “bowed to the wishes of Chinese leaders” by vetoing the Chinese 
Student Visa Bill, by entertaining new sales of satellite communications 
technology to China, and by sending Scowcroft and Eagleburger to China in 
order to “chat with those who ordered the protesters crushed.”78 Writing in 
1991, The New Republic editors looked back on Bush’s record, and characterised 
his China policy as “morally noxious and politically unwise”, because he 
“deferred unerringly to the Chinese dictatorship”. In addition, after the 
massacre, the president “both lied to the American public about his activities” 
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and privately reassured the “Chinese Stalinists of unruffled relations”, or as 
Brent Scowcroft put it to the Chinese directly, “Friends forever.”79 
The administration was accused of “muster[ing] only the weakest of 
responses”,80 and being “strikingly reluctant to criticize the Chinese 
Government”, silent on Beijing’s campaign of dissident arrests, and the 
president was accused of having a double-standard (the arrest and torture of 
Soviet dissidents, one journalist argued, would have elicited a much more 
forceful response).81 The administration’s justification for its policies is that 
“America needs a stable China”, a position unaccepted by many in the press, 
because “this China, the China savaged by elderly tyrants, is not going to be 
stable.”82 
The president’s reluctance to criticise China was not shared by all of the 
administration’s officials, and many in the American press offered opposing 
administration opinions whenever possible. State Department spokeswoman 
Margaret Tutwiler, in particular, was often quoted during the Tiananmen 
aftermath, criticising the Chinese leadership and appealing to US values. In one 
statement widely disseminated through the press: 
“The whole world has seen what happened in Tiananmen 
Square. Large numbers of peaceful protesters were killed by 
army units... We condemn the use of live fire against unarmed 
citizens, which is what happened in Tiananmen Square. The 
demonstrators were seeking basic human rights such as 
freedom of association, of the press and of expression... 
Labeling such people as ‘counter-revolutionaries’ and 
‘hooligans’ will do nothing to alter the reality of what happened 
in Tiananmen Square.”83 
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A.M Rosenthal was particularly hostile to the Bush administration’s policy 
approach towards China, referring to “fawning toasts” and “promises 
abandoned”. In one particular article for the New York Times, he excoriated the 
president for ‘brow-beating’ Republican senators into voting to prevent an 
override of the President’s veto of a Congressional bill guaranteeing Chinese 
students the right to remain in the US. Rosenthal characterised the Bush policy 
as “dumping the democracy movement in China to go along with the Communist 
Government that gave us Tiananmen Square”; a policy that “certainly made the 
butchers of Beijing happier”. The journalist explained the realist calculations 
involved in Bush’s policy, writing that the Chinese now “owe him”, and should 
offer up a couple of political favours.84 
The Tiananmen crackdown “left most Americans repelled by the regime’s 
brutality and wondering whether a solid basis remained for the relationship the 
United States has been building with China for two decades.” The Bush 
administration, however, was slow to perceive this sentiment, and has been 
following an “unwise and unfeeling China policy”.85 One anonymous official said 
that the “prevailing view” in the Bush White House was that the American 
media presented only a “selective, unrepresentative portrait” of events in China 
in June 1989. The secret trip to Beijing by Brent Scowcroft and Lawrence 
Eagleburger to apologize for being “slightly critical” of the Tiananmen 
crackdown, “less than six months after the massacre” was “the wrong response 
at the wrong time”.86 Jim Hoagland would later characterise the trip as 
“obsequious secret diplomacy”.87 
Only under pressure did it offer some “catch-up gestures”, suspending 
certain military ties and withdrawing diplomatic contacts – all, of course, while 
trying to minimize the damage to the important geopolitical and diplomatic 
interests shared by the two countries.88 These gestures notwithstanding, “the 
pro-Beijing crowd in the U.S. coos with pleasure when the Chinese Communists 
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disdainfully toss Washington a morsel – like ‘lifting’ martial law imposed at the 
time of Tiananmen”, but because of Bush’s policies, “more Chinese will go to the 
horror camps, more will die”,89 and democracy will take longer to arrive in 
China. “Blood is not flowing in Beijing these days, but the people who spoke out 
for freedom there remain in distress.”90 
A year after the “bitter old men who run China crushed the ‘Statue of 
Liberty’ in a night of bloody terror, along with countless flesh-and-blood 
students who dared seek freedom for their nation”, the Bush administration 
continued to be criticised in the US press. “Astoundingly,” wrote one 
commentator, “the government of the nation whose ideals inspired the Chinese 
dream... remains woefully silent”. In the same article, President Bush’s desire to 
avoid alienating China is characterised as “no way to achieve democracy”, 
rather “a dodge”: “the facts are clear. China’s leaders massacred their own 
citizens. They crushed freedom. They rejected human rights.”91 The implication, 
of course, is that Bush is out of step with the American people and the nation’s 
(even the world’s) ideals. 
Therefore, the impression of a “sorry” administration record on China 
policy quickly emerges from even a cursory review of the articles published in 
the wake of June 1989. In the eyes of the American press, the Bush 
administration had shown itself “ready to pay in major diplomatic and 
economic coin” for Chinese political support “for which Washington should not 
have paid at all” – for example, China’s accommodation of American policy in 
Iraq.92  
Chinese dissident representatives were also interviewed for comment on 
the Bush administration’s China policy: “We feel like we’ve been abandoned... 
This sends a very wrong message to the Chinese government that their 
suppression of human rights can go on unimpeded.”93 
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One policy area that allowed for press criticism of the Bush 
administration’s handling of China after Tiananmen was that of China’s Most 
Favoured Nation trade status.94 American legislators took to the media to make 
their case against renewal of China’s MFN trade status and other elements of 
the Bush administration’s China policy. In particular, Congressional Democrats 
announced that the US should not reward China with MFN until it improved its 
“atrocious” human rights record.95 Senator George Mitchell (D-Maine) aired a 
long list of criticisms of China through the Washington Post’s opinion pages: 
“If American ideals are not violated by the massacre in Tiananmen 
Square, by the imprisonment and execution of persons for peaceful 
dissident, by forced political indoctrination of students and the 
arbitrary refusal of emigration rights, then how are those ideals 
defined?... By no reasonable standard does the Chinese government’s 
treatment of its own people or the people of Tibet reflect even the 
most minimal respect for basic human rights.”96 
Mitchell also highlighted China’s tendency to not honour its weapons 
proliferation commitments, and especially its unfair trade practices, painting a 
picture of an irresponsible stakeholder on the international stage – one the 
Bush administration was not calling to task: “The Chinese government has paid 
no price whatever for its brutal massacre of peaceful dissidents in Tiananmen 
Square. It has paid no price for its continued disregard of world arms control 
efforts. It has paid no price for its repression in Tibet.”97 
President Bush’s “unwillingness to criticize China” has been blamed for 
crystallizing the MFN debates into what would become an annual fight in 
Congress. According to Congressman Lee Hamilton (D-Indiana), “The president 
has made this a much more difficult issue because of his unwillingness to 
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criticize China... It’s built a lot of steam in Congress... [which] seems to be 
moving toward conditions that are impossible to achieve.”98 
 “Tiananmen Square... is now a metaphor for repression.”99 The Bush 
administration’s policy of engagement and avoiding alienation made it appear 
to be on the side of the repressors. 
Reports from the American media criticizing Beijing’s long-term handling 
of the Tiananmen protestors, and also China’s “political-legal system” added 
further cause for dissatisfaction with the Bush administration. In an Op-Ed for 
the Washington Post, the author criticized Beijing labeling the incident as 
“counter-revolutionary rebellion”, which is “Chinaspeak for the exercise of basic 
rights of speech and assembly” – in other words, a way to attack the ideals that 
America holds so dear. Nonetheless, the editorial recognized that the Chinese 
regime had been releasing more dissidents than normal in 1990-1 (“using the 
general preoccupation with Iraq to dispose of the cases”), as if “some 
combination of leniency and toughness... the authorities hope to close the books 
on Tiananmen Square.” But, the editorial states, “It can’t be done.” The 
government reaction to the protest movement was “savage” and “grievous”.100 
During the immediate years afterwards, many anti-Communist and anti-
Soviet movements – for example, in Germany101 – would be compared with the 
situation that lead to and resulted from the events in Tiananmen Square. Of 
particular interest to many US journalists was the stark contrast between what 
happened in China and the rest of the communist world. For example, 
Southerland wrote that, by the first anniversary of the massacre, while “other 
communist countries... witnessed extraordinary political reforms”, China had 
not gone the same way as the crumbling Soviet empire. Instead, “with seeming 
ease, through arrests and detentions, political indoctrination sessions and 
endless investigations of suspected dissidents”, the regime in Beijing managed 
to silence the calls for democratic change. Despite Beijing’s “carefully 
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constructed façade of strength and party unity”, one year after the protests, and 
despite apparent “extreme nervousness” on the part of China’s leaders, nothing 
had been done to solve the issues that sparked the protest in the first place.102 
 
The continued repression of free and foreign press in China remained on 
the American media’s agenda. Directives for “additional security”103 resulted in 
“increased censorship of the domestic and foreign media”, including severe 
restrictions on satellite broadcasting from the country. In addition, multiple 
reports were published of Chinese police and security personnel ‘roughing up’ 
and unlawfully detaining foreign reporters and their companions.104 
Few moderate Chinese commentators were interviewed in the years 
immediately following the massacre, and reporters often featured negative 
remarks from Chinese dissidents and US government officials: One Chinese 
student referred to the Chinese leadership as “Wild and savage autocrats [who] 
have inherited power in China for thousands of years of our history.”105 
Many sub-national politicians were less restrained in their criticism of 
China. For example, New York Mayor Edward I. Koch told Chinese Consul 
General Weng Fupei that, “speaking on behalf of most Americans, and certainly 
most New Yorkers... what your Government has done in violating the human 
rights of its own citizens is shocking and unacceptable and must be changed.”106 
Despite the wide-reaching criticism, Beijing has refused to reconsider its verdict 
of characterising the 1989 demonstrations as a ‘counter-revolutionary’ 
movement that “had to be crushed for the sake of China's stability and 
development”.107 Beijing has “not been impressed” by President Bush’s 
concessions and measured approach to China policy. The American media has 
been even less impressed with Beijing’s position: “They haven’t apologised. 
They called the USA’s expressions of outrage criminal interference” in their 
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internal matters, “and they continued their reign of terror against the 
demonstrators.”108 Not only demonstrators, but also relatives of the victims of 
the 1989 crackdown: “Working with exiled dissidents against the interests of 
the Communist Party is often declared a major crime.”109 
Despite Beijing’s continued control over dissidents, the CCP continues to 
experience its own problems. Factional conflict within the CCP remained in the 
media spotlight, painting a picture of a regime struggling internally, that could 
potentially destroy itself: “Once [Deng Xiaoping] dies, there’s no way that they 
can maintain stability”, wrote Southerland. A “semblance of stability” has been 
imposed, but “disillusionment with the party leadership has grown rather than 
diminished”, with opposition to Premier Li Peng’s “repressive policies” quietly 
voiced by a growing number of Chinese officials. Tensions within the police and 
the armed forces also came to light, as some officers “display reluctance to deal 
sternly with student activists”, and younger members exhibit more liberal 
preferences.110 
By the end of George H.W. Bush’s presidency, American press coverage of 
China retained a strong negative bias. China’s leadership, in particular, are 
alternatively characterised as “hard-line Chinese who think they can get away 
with murder”,111 “wicked men who ordered the tanks in”,112 “unrepentant” 
tyrants,113 and “bitter old men”.114 Focus was also turned ever-more on China’s 
human rights record in general, and not just Tiananmen Square. Jack Healey, 
Amnesty International’s US executive director at the time: 
“Are there any changes in human rights conditions? A big, big, big 
‘no’... When you think that China represents one-fifth of the world’s 
population, you realize the volume of pain is immense. It really 
shakes the soul.”115 
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LEGACY & ANNIVERSARIES (CLINTON & BEYOND) 
After the MFN debate was closed, there was a noticeable reduction in the 
frequency with which reporting on China mentioned Tiananmen Square, as 
more pressing international and domestic news grew in salience. Anniversaries, 
however, presented good opportunities for renewed attention on the events of 
1989. The themes that arose from Tiananmen Square – particularly China’s 
human rights record – remain at the centre of the American printed media’s 
portrayal of China. In recent years, this has focused on Beijing’s various other 
crackdowns; from the persecution of the Falun Gong religious sect, to Beijing’s 
policy of “cultural genocide” in Xinjiang and Tibet.116 
The anniversaries of the 1989 crackdown see at least one article from the 
main newspapers (only the ‘big’ anniversaries receive much attention in the 
main magazines, if at all). These articles reiterate the events of June 1989, often 
highlighting the brutality of the massacre, the Chinese government’s continued 
resistance to reviewing its policy at the time, and also the continued 
persecution and difficulties of dissidents and family members of those who lost 
their lives in 1989. It is not uncommon for articles to detail new arrests carried 
out by Chinese law enforcement, “as it does every year”,117 of relatives and 
dissidents. 
As the fifth anniversary of Tiananmen grew near, the Chinese leadership 
remained nervous, and “hundreds of police as well as office workers were 
mobilized to prevent even the smallest protest in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square 
or the sensitive university district.”118 In addition, midnight raids on homes 
were conducted to apprehend actual and potential dissidents.119 “Anything that 
hints of organised opposition is swiftly crushed”, and “bigger, more severe 
crackdowns than before” are taking place.120 For years, Mainland Chinese faced 
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the “possibility of arrest for public gestures of mourning or for criticizing the 
government’s use of force” in 1989.121 
A decade after the massacre, Tiananmen continued to plague the US-China 
relationship, one that “can never be as smooth” as Beijing wants it to be as long 
as CNN’s “searing images of tracer bullets in the night and tanks in the 
streets”122 persist in public consciousness, along with Beijing “slaughtering 
hundreds of its own citizens... crushing everything in its path”.123 These images 
are “etched on the American psyche”, and “the stigma of Tiananmen” 
remains.124 Also, by 1999, more information had become available, creating an 
even-more damning picture of what had happened. For example, Wiseman 
reported that, while many of the demonstrators were indeed students, most of 
those killed were actually “workers and ordinary people” who had attempted to 
stop the “military onslaught”: “It was the ordinary citizens of Beijing who paid 
the price in blood overwhelmingly that night.”125 
On the twentieth anniversary of the tragedy, dissent remained quickly 
crushed, and the American press reported on Beijing’s continued repression 
and paranoia. Hundreds of extra security officers (“uniformed and plain-
clothes”) were deployed around Beijing; access to online message boards and 
social-networking sites, including Twitter, was blocked by Chinese censors to 
stop dissidents from organizing protests: Chinese officials have learned the 
lesson of Tiananmen, to quash dissent as early as possible. As Minxin Pei 
described the lesson, “you have to be very tough at the beginning, to nip things 
in the bud. It is much better to have overkill than underkill.”126 
An editor of The Nation reminded readers of how the “June 4 massacre 
turned Beijing streets into urban killing fields”. Jeffrey Wasserstrom, outlined 
many of the themes that have come to characterise reporting on China and 
Tiananmen: Beijing’s refusal to admit what actually happened (the CCP “insists 
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there were no peaceful protests and no ‘massacre’, just ‘counter-revolutionary 
riots’... pacified by soldiers who showed great restraint”); the tight control of 
information (“tries to keep young Chinese ignorant of what happened”); the 
distance China has come since 1989, and how China’s society and economy have 
“changed enormously”. Wasserstrom bemoans the decline in interest in 
Tiananmen, and states that “China specialists need to resist the temptation to 
put 1989 behind us”, as Chinese leaders have encouraged.127 The National 
Review, in its weekly round-up, recalled Claudia Rosett’s Wall Street Journal 
article, quoting “If China’s democratic uprising has achieved nothing else, it has 
at least flushed into view the naked shape of China’s Communist Party.” The 
article finishes in agreement, stating that the events of Tiananmen are still 
indicative of the CCP’s character, calling on readers and America to 
“Remember.”128 As a response to the CCP’s refusal to provide a proper 
accounting of June 1989, a website, “MassacreMap”, has been created, solely 
aimed at marking the events of the Tiananmen Massacre run by Ellen Bork 
(sometimes contributor to The Weekly Standard and Fox News), Tian Jian, and 
Philip Chalk.129 
The press appears, therefore, to be a principle proponent of keeping the 
memory of the 1989 crackdown alive in American discourse, as the moment 
when the Chinese leadership “snuffed democracy’s flame”,130 when Tiananmen 
Square “became a killing field, when the communist leadership sent tanks to 
crush a pro-democracy demonstration.” The “Big Brother moves” and “strong-
arm tactics” may have worked so far, but even CCP journals suggest leaders in 
Beijing are “losing political control as people gain more economic freedom”..131 
While comparisons with George Orwell’s 1984 were popular and obvious, 
Beijing’s tactics – particularly when it came to propaganda before and after the 
crackdown – had also been compared to the tactics of the Nazis and Hitler’s 
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propagandist Goebbels, specifically his dictum “if you repeat a lie a thousand 
times, then it becomes a truth”.132 
The press continues to be muzzled in China, and as a result remains a 
focus in American reporting on the anniversaries of Tiananmen and other 
articles about China’s human rights policies. For example, a couple of days 
before the fifth anniversary, there was “an official Chinese order telling Beijing 
hotels to switch off CNN news broadcasts during the anniversary”. Mike 
Jendrzejczyk of Human Rights Watch Asia and frequent critic of China, 
commenting on the CCP-enforced blackout of CNN: “Obviously the Chinese are 
paranoid... that news from outside the country would stimulate domestic 
protests.”133 On the tenth anniversary, the authorities “pulled the plug” on the 
network once again, ordering hotels, apartments, and offices to stop receiving 
CNN until the day after the anniversary. The reason was because CNN had been 
broadcasting pieces about the protests and the military response. The NGO 
Reporters Without Borders also reported that the CCP had suspended several 
publications and halted issuance of new press credentials and licences.134 For 
the twentieth anniversary, Tiananmen Square was ‘swarmed’ with police and 
foreign TV reports (from CNN and BBC World, for example) recalling the 
crackdown were blacked out.135 
Suppression of information has extended beyond the press, however. 
Chinese dissidents have adopted new technologies like the Internet and text-
messaging, but the regime has “also proved adept at using these media to 
discourage protests, disseminat[ing] its own interpretations of events” and 
mobilising its own supporters.136 The media crackdown over the twentieth 
anniversary was even more wide-reaching: 
“Twitter and other Internet services that people could have used to 
coordinate gatherings were blocked, as were news Web sites such as 
CNN and the BBC. Foreign newspapers and magazines that had been 
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covering commemorative protests in Hong Kong were delivered with 
pages ripped out. Writers, activists and even mothers of victims were 
put under surveillance or house arrest.”137 
In advance of the Beijing Olympics in 2008, some attempts were made to 
juxtapose the stark truths of 1989 with contemporary China. The New Republic 
argued that human rights in China had actually got worse in the run-up to the 
Games.138 Mike Lopresti, writing for USA Today, recounts Jeff Widener’s 
recollections of June 1989, how events moved so quickly from optimism and 
community (“at one point the soldiers were singing with the protesters on the 
square”). The lone man standing before a tank, the iconic photo taken by 
Widener, was “the face of then in China, when the tanks rolled in, leaving 
Tiananmen Square filled with blood, ghosts and the unanswered fate of a man 
who’s famous yet anonymous.” This bleak image is in stark contrast with the 
Beijing and Tiananmen Square of 2008, which is a place of “thousands of 
tourists” and Chinese interested in the upcoming Olympics and tourists’ opinion 
of China, and “surveillance cameras on every light post and... filled with flowers 
and visitors.”139 
 
AMERICAN MEDIA, CHINA’S ECONOMY & CHINESE ‘APATHY’ 
A frequent element of Tiananmen reporting by the US media is the fact that the 
Chinese government “has labored to put the June 4, 1989, massacre behind it, 
suppressing public discussion of the event while highlighting the rapid 
economic growth China has achieved in the years since.” Philip P. Pan has 
pointed out that the memory of Tiananmen “continues to mar China’s 
reputation abroad” and remains a “powerful symbol” at home for those 
dissatisfied with the Communist Party’s monopoly on power.140 Despite this, 
however, interest in and knowledge of the crackdown in China has diminished – 
drastically among younger Chinese. Just three years after the crackdown, long-
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time China reporter for The New York Times Kristoff wrote of the already-fading 
memories of the event: 
“The shift in public mood confounds widespread predictions at the 
time that the Communists would not be able to rewrite history this 
time, that a prolonged bitterness and antagonism would immensely 
complicate party rule in China. In fact, Communist hard-liners came 
the closest to calling it right: that the rage would dissipate and that 
some people would even change their views.”141 
In more recent years, much US press attention has also been distracted 
from China’s human rights record, focussing more on the “astounding” 
economic growth and China’s newfound prosperity.142 This has had some 
impact on the place of Tiananmen Square in the media’s China framework. In 
some cases, it is used to illustrate how far China has come. For example, 
Hoagland wrote: 
“Beijing has become an urban Godzilla since then: Concave, convex 
and cantilevered skyscrapers march erratically across the ridges of 
an unending, perpetually smog-filled skyline. These canyons of steel 
and glass corporate fortresses visually testify that money and 
material ambition have totally eclipsed the demands for democracy – 
and honesty in government – that filled the streets in one of the 20th 
century’s great moments of peaceful public protest.”143 
In other cases, American reporters write articles that bemoan the seeming 
disappearance of Tiananmen from the consciousness of the Chinese people, 
highlighting the Chinese government’s success in censoring information and 
keeping the Chinese people, particularly younger generations, “virtually 
oblivious to the real story of Tiananmen.” A Chinese professor supported this 
impression, when he told Calum MacLeod that the CCP has been “very 
successful at controlling information”.144 Beyond this ignorance of the details of 
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the crackdown, “the masses seem either apathetic or tranquilized by the fruits 
of economic growth; the restive intellectuals seem cowed by repression”145 
To refer again to Kristoff’s article from 1992, it is clear that the steady 
decline in interest in Tiananmen started very soon, and was in no small part the 
result of the Chinese government’s own policies. “One reason why the outrage 
over the killings has subsided is simply repression: many Chinese believe that 
talking about the Tiananmen crackdown will accomplish nothing and will 
simply risk punishment,” in its way validating the CCP’s justification for the 
brutal suppression of the demonstrations in order to preserve its own 
legitimacy. “Another reason is the Government's skilful propaganda.”146 
Textbooks in China do not mention Tiananmen; teachers don’t teach it; and the 
state media “go out of their way to ignore it”; mainland online chat rooms are 
quickly scrubbed of references to the killings; Chinese internet search engines 
block Tiananmen articles; and censors are quick to delete the number ‘64’, 
which is code for referring to the events of June 4.147 Discussion, therefore, is 
“banned to the point that many young people know nothing of what 
happened.”148 
Government suppression has only got more successful and easier as 
distance and economic success has diluted the salience of some, though not all, 
of the issues the student movement had been protesting. “Ignorance of 1989 is 
contributing to the perception of a freer society among the youngest – and most 
volatile – elements of the population. They have known nothing but prosperity 
and take it for granted.”149 
The political ferment of the1980s, therefore, gave way to an “obsessive 
popular concern with money” and spreading free markets, which has not run its 
course. The CCP’s one-party power monopoly is based ever more on providing 
annual economic growth rates that bring a “highly visible flow of consumer 
                                                          
145
 Lane (Nov.24
th
 1997), p.45 
146
 Kristoff (Jun.5
th
 1992), p.A4 
147
 Chang (Jun.8
th
 2009), p.13 
148
 Cha & Ng (Jun.5
th
 2009), p.A6 
149
 Chang (Jun.8
th
 2009), p.13 
Stefan Fergus Chapter 4.2: US Media & Tiananmen Square 
206 
 
goods and other material benefits to the country's urban population.”150 For 
China’s growing middle class, getting rich has become a “ubiquitous 
preoccupation.” The job for the government, therefore, is to sustain the 
economic boom.151 
China’s economic development is not only distracting the Chinese public. 
According to many China critics in the American press, diminished interest and 
attention being paid to China’s past is partly in the name of business 
opportunities. For example, long-time China critic Jim Hoagland characterised 
the European Union’s consideration of lifting the arms embargo on China, in 
place since 1989, as “Europe... set to prove the wrong guys right about the 
world’s willingness to put aside outrage over human rights atrocities when 
business beckons.”152 
Beijing has informed the international community that the crackdown was 
“necessary to ensure social stability”, a “precondition for the market-driven 
changes that have since transformed China into the world's third-largest 
economy.”153 When this argument is met with [disbelief], Chinese officials ask, 
“What right does the U.S. government have to... flagrantly interfere in China’s 
internal affairs?”154 
Part of the media’s continued interest in 1989, beyond the sensational, 
newsworthy nature of a government-sanctioned massacre, also stems from 
their total failure to predict what it would mean for China in either the short or 
long term, and also China’s continued refusal to reform in line with Western 
values and ideals: 
“It is humbling to realize how often post-Tiananmen events have 
defied our predictions. More than a few observers assumed two 
decades ago that the Chinese Communist Party would soon go the 
way of its counterpart in Poland, where Solidarity won a major 
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election on the very day of the massacre. Later, some of us were sure 
that to survive, the party would either pull back from engaging with 
the world or reverse the verdict on 1989.”155 
As America and the West waited for China to resume its “inevitable 
course” toward liberal democratic modernity, “the Chinese Communist Party 
leadership set about shoring up its dominance in the nation.” Despite frequent 
and repeated predictions in the West of “an imminent political opening”, the 
trend in China has been “toward consolidation of the Chinese autocracy rather 
than reform... the Chinese leadership ha[s] no intention of reforming itself out of 
power.” Western observers hoped that to keep China on a path of economic 
growth and to manage the myriad internal problems that growth brings, China 
would be forced to reform itself. This, too, now seems unlikely. Most economists 
now believe China’s remarkable growth could be sustainable for some time to 
come, without the need for political or social reform. 
“Keen observers of the Chinese political system see a sufficient 
combination of competence and ruthlessness on the part of the 
Chinese leadership to handle problems as they arise, and a 
population prepared to accept autocratic government so long as 
economic growth continues.”156 
 
CONCLUSIONS & THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 
Overall, the key themes and impression that have emerged and been 
maintained throughout coverage of Tiananmen Square and China as a whole, is 
that of a government that will brutally crush dissent, one with an illiberal and 
unchangeable approach to human rights, and one that will go to considerable 
lengths to restrict honest information about its past from reaching the younger 
generations. Despite America’s faults in reality, these critical images of China 
run counter to its own perceived ideals, and as a result it cannot but have an 
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impact on the American public and government officials’ impressions of the 
People’s Republic (which, in itself, is considered an oxymoronic name). 
Tiananmen cast an unwelcome shadow over the new Obama 
administration very early on when it appointed Charles ‘Chas’ Freeman as 
Chairman of the National Intelligence Council. The reaction highlighted the 
importance of the 1989 crackdown in the formulation of American perceptions 
of China. Gabriel Schoenfeld, writing for the Wall Street Journal, claimed that 
Freeman “unabashedly sides with the Chinese government” on Tiananmen, “a 
remarkable position for an appointee of an administration that has pledged to 
advance the cause of human rights”.157 Michael Goldfarb, of The Weekly 
Standard, offered the full text of Freeman’s surprising 2006 opinion of the 
Tiananmen crackdown. In it, Freeman claims the CCP’s account of events is 
“very plausible”, that the “truly unforgivable mistake of the Chinese authorities 
was the failure to intervene on a timely basis to nip the demonstrations in the 
bud”. Freeman described the Chinese response to the “mob scene” as a 
“monument to overly cautious behaviour” and “ill-conceived restraint” on the 
part of Zhao Ziyang. He went further, explaining that protestors who take over 
central areas of cities, like Tiananmen Square, “should expect to be displaced 
with despatch from the ground they occupy.” Freeman finished his statement 
saying he hopes – as does the “majority in China” – that the Chinese leadership 
will never “repeat the mistakes of Zhao Ziyang’s dilatory tactics of appeasement 
in dealing with domestic protesters in China.”158 Freeman’s appointment, his 
opinions on Tiananmen, and also Secretary Hillary Clinton’s comments about 
further delinking human rights concerns from the US-China dialogue (“the 
debate with China over human rights, Taiwan and Tibet cannot be allowed to 
interfere with attempts to reach consensus on other broader issues”), were 
harshly criticised by the US press. To Goldfarb, it suggested that “the Obama 
administration will be giving the Chinese a free hand to deal with dissent 
however they see fit.”159 
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It’s worth taking a look at a recent article by James Fallows for The 
Atlantic, which looks at the state of dissent in China today. The Arab Spring 
protests and revolutions in 2011 presented a new opportunity to reminisce 
about Tiananmen Square. Just after the demonstrations in Tunisia and Egypt 
erupted, China saw its own series of “Jasmine” protests. Beijing has learned 
from the experience of Tiananmen, not to mention the international reaction, 
and methods have been “subtler... and more insidious”. As a result of these 
Jasmine protests, China has seen “the most serious and widespread wave of 
repression since the Tiananmen Square crackdowns.” Fallows, a long-time 
China reporter for The Atlantic, was also careful to qualify that “worst since 
Tiananmen Square” does not mean “as bad as Tiananmen Square.” The 
government has taken pains to ensure that there have been no coordinated 
nationwide protests, and PLA troops have not been employed as the major force 
in containing dissent, as they were in 1989. In 2011, enforcement has been left 
mainly to regular police, the “much-feared” ‘urban management’ patrols, large 
reserve armies of plainclothesmen, and “many other less visible parts of the 
state’s internal-security apparatus”, which Fallows writes “now has a larger 
budget than China’s regular military.” However, Fallows also addresses a couple 
of the possible causes for the reduction in interest in China’s human rights 
record and Tiananmen. Firstly, life in China can be “simultaneously so wide-
open and so tightly controlled”. Secondly, reporting on Chinese oppression of 
human rights activists and their lawyers (illegal detention and “enforced 
disappearances”) can become “tedious”, suggesting an element of subject-
fatigue as no noticeable improvement is reported. Fallows attributes much of 
Beijing’s actions possibly down to “reflex and paranoia”.160 
Writing in 1998, Dana Milbank described President Clinton’s trip to China 
as unique, serving the purpose of not only promoting the administration’s China 
policy to America, but also put Clinton “in the peculiar role of cheerleader for 
the new China”. At this point in US-China history, “China [had] been demonised 
by both the right and left as a hostile and aggressive power, oppressor of its 
own people, and the United States’ next great enemy.” This was, in part, an 
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element of Clinton’s engagement policy but also his focus on economics and 
trade – China was certainly by this point becoming an ever-more important 
trading partner. One National Security Council staffer described Clinton’s trip as 
a “vast education experience” for the American press.161 As the next two 
chapters will show, while the human rights debate continues in the press, it has 
been subordinated by economic and occasional strategic interests. Perhaps the 
American media learned from Clinton’s lesson. 
Critics of China’s human rights policies were galvanised by the events of 
1989, and have frequently referred to the Tiananmen massacre when making 
their case before Congress and the American people (through the media). There 
can be little doubt that the reporting of Tiananmen Square has had a lasting 
impression on American impressions of China, and as a result has influenced 
the conduct and rhetoric of US-China policy. Tiananmen Square has become 
useful shorthand for all of China’s human rights failings. 
In a scathing 2008 editorial, the editors of The New Republic excoriated 
the simple pattern adhered to by recent presidents and presidential candidates: 
that of talking tough on China during the campaign, but mellowing upon 
entering the White House (none more so than Bill Clinton). The predictable 
pattern, the editorial argues, gives the Chinese government no cause to reform 
their human rights policies. The editorial is a good example of certain sectors of 
the American press maintaining the standard of pushing for reform in China. 
Without doing so, editorials argue, it signals to the Chinese people that 
America’s “ultimate solidarity lies... with their odious government”. The clear 
disappointment in the American media has been the tendency to relegate 
human rights and exposure of China’s repressive policies to the backburner, to 
abandon “the billion, long-suffering men and women of the world’s largest 
dictatorship”.162 
Many of the articles referred to in this chapter (especially those published 
in the five years after the event) were accompanied by photos from June 3rd and 
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4th 1989 – bloodied protesters,163 Chinese police or military forces attacking 
and apprehending students, visiting US officials accosted by Chinese police (for 
example, Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi),164 and other powerful images. While 
images of tanks and bloody streets may have dimmed somewhat, the repression 
of free speech, press and society remain key characteristics of Americans’ 
perception of China. As a result, it is perhaps unsurprising that officials frame 
their rhetoric and pronouncements accordingly, to fit within the media-created 
frame. As we will see, and have seen, this does not necessarily translate into 
negative or prescriptive policy towards China – certainly, the negativity of China 
reporting had only a minimal impact on the George H.W. Bush administration’s 
policy preferences and decisions. Congress certainly appeared more affected by 
the negativity, but largely because Representatives and Senators felt the shock, 
disappointment and revulsion that reporters had. From the graphic reports 
mentioned and quoted earlier in this chapter, this should not come as a 
surprise. This tells us that, while the American foreign policy system is highly 
pluralised, the Executive Branch retains and wields considerable power over 
eventual policy, able to tamp down on popular passions when necessary. That 
said, however, the media has the ability to steer the discussion, forcing 
government officials to address or justify their actions – acting as watchdogs, if 
you will. The Tiananmen Square crackdown was such a break from the 
improving image of China that successive administrations and the media had 
been cultivating since Nixon’s opening in 1972, that it irrevocably damaged 
China’s image in the eyes of the American public. 
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CHAPTER V 
SPECIAL INTERESTS & FOREIGN POLICY 
 
In the post-Cold War world, security concerns and the unifying opposition to 
Soviet expansion no longer drives American foreign policy. Now economic 
interest, democratisation abroad, and concerns about human rights have 
greater prominence. As the foreign policy focus dissipated, various pressure 
groups and other institutions with particular interests in a broad range of 
foreign policy issues acquired enhanced (though still limited) influence on 
policymaking. As the foreign policy-making process in the United States has 
become more pluralistic, therefore, so too has the need for a more flexible 
approach to policy-making.1 
The political space occupied by special interests and corporations is 
contentious. As with the media, opinions are varied and contradictory when it 
comes to how influential special interests are. The main question that needs to 
be asked is whether or not US politics can be viewed as a competition between 
different interest groups. Unfortunately for the purposes of this chapter, a lot of 
the literature leans towards conspiracies and reflects a highly anti-corporate 
bias, making it difficult to ascertain the true extent of influence and input of 
special interests, lobbies, and corporations in the foreign policy-making 
process. 
Lobbies come from a wide range of sectors – from business to defence, 
human rights and labour groups to pro-Free Trade groups, local state interests 
to foreign governments – and therefore pursue separate and often competing 
agendas. A not-infrequent argument to be found in the literature is that 
corporations effectively run or own the United States government, having 
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bought their way into the corridors of power with considerable campaign 
contributions.2 It is certainly true that corporate- and special interests’ 
donations to political campaigns remain significant, but the extent to which 
these contributions translate into foreign policy influence is difficult to 
ascertain. 
C. Wright Mills, author of The Power Elite (1956), has characterised the 
American political landscape as being ruled by “an intricate set of overlapping 
cliques” that occupy the upper strata of the economic, military, and political 
institutions in the United States.3 John Judis has suggested that there is clear 
evidence that “Elites, interest groups, and political parties have moved the 
country, and made history, through their influence over what government 
does.” However, he continues, the degree of influence they enjoy over 
government and the political process has depended on what Americans believe 
the role of government to be at any given time.4 
The widespread acceptance of corporate government control is well 
illustrated by Robert Reich, in his book Supercapitalism. As outlined by Reich, 
public opinion surveys about the role of special interests and government have 
shown a growth in distrust of government intentions: in 1964, only 36% of 
Americans felt “public officials don’t care much what people like me think”, but 
by 2000, that sentiment was shared by more than 60% of respondents. In 1964, 
almost two-thirds of Americans believed the government was run for the 
benefit of all Americans, and only 29% believed it was “run by a few big 
interests looking out only for themselves”. By 2000, the ratio was practically 
reversed, with 35% believing government was run for the general benefit of all, 
and more than 60% arguing that the US government was run by a select few big 
interests.5 
David C. Korten, has explained how “it is not a matter of a small elite group 
meeting in secret to craft a master plan for taking over the world.” Instead, the 
truth is that the intersection between business and government works much 
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“like any networking or shared culture building process out of which alliances 
among individuals and groups emerge and evolve.” However, due to the highly 
interlinked and interrelated world of business and government, outward 
appearances can lend themselves to accusations of conspiracy: “There is no 
conspiracy, though in practical terms, the consequences are much if they 
were.”6 
What makes China an important nation to study with regards to US 
lobbies with interests/stakes in foreign policy, is that it excites all sides of the 
policy debates. In some ways, this might explain the occasional lack of 
(rhetorical) coherence. US-China policy is an all-encompassing policy area, with 
representatives of most corporate and industrial sectors, ideological, religious, 
and foreign national interests all taking part in the debate in Washington. 
Stephen Teles has identified three general types of interest groups operating in 
the US-China policy-making sphere: those with interests that are “primarily 
strategic or military… primarily economics and trade… [and] those with human 
rights concerns”.7 This chapter will look at the way in which special interests 
and lobbies work in the American political system, both historically and 
contemporarily; it will identify the different types of special interest operating 
in the United States; before focusing on special interests in US-China foreign 
policy, and drawing conclusions with regards to the trends and traditions of US 
foreign policy. 
 
SPECIAL INTERESTS – WHAT THEY ARE & HOW THEY OPERATE 
When discussing special interests, it is important to first identify what they are. 
For the purposes of this chapter, special interests are identified as: business 
lobbies, such as the US Chamber of Commerce, hoping to influence foreign 
economic policies; ethnic lobbies, such as AIPAC and the less-cohesive China 
Lobby, with goals of improving their position within the United States and for 
their home-country; and think tanks and ideological groups, such as the Council 
on Foreign Relations (CFR) and the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), hoping 
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to disseminate their policies and ideologies (be they political, moral or 
religious), and bring government policy into alignment with their own views. 
Before focusing on foreign policy, it is important to understand how 
special interests fit into American politics as a whole. Throughout American 
political history, John Judis writes, “interest groups and lobbies have exerted an 
enormous influence over American politics.” Judis argues that “[e]very piece of 
tax and regulatory legislation, every government expenditure, and every 
government initiative in international trade bears their imprint,” offering the 
1947 Taft-Hartley Act as one drafted by lobbyists.8 As mentioned in Chapter 
Two, at the birth of the United States, these lobbies and special interests were 
referred to as ‘factions’ by James Madison and Alexander Hamilton. 
Pluralist writers like E.E. Schattschneider argue that much political 
conflict finds its origins in that existing between special interest lobbies. There’s 
plenty of evidence to support the claim that lobbying groups have considerable 
impact on domestic politics. For example, the Business Groups vs. Consumer 
Protection Agency in 1977, and the AFL-CIO’s success in making even 
Republicans, historically opposed to this idea, vote for a minimum wage hike in 
1996. There is, conversely, little – if any – evidence of this being the case in 
foreign policy. This does not mean pluralists are wrong per se, as they could still 
argue that most political conflicts begin between interest groups, before 
government officials work on formulating policies that support their own 
agendas. Through public relations and campaign finance, special interests also 
attempt to exert influence over the electoral arena, by framing issues in ways 
that benefit their causes. However, the extent to which they can manipulate 
political discourse is limited, as Schattschneider acknowledges, because the 
electoral arena is a realm of politics distinct from actual governance, and what 
works during a political campaign may not necessarily result in policy action.9 
In other words, lobbyist success is subject to factors that are beyond their 
control. 
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Due to the open nature of Congress, and the fact that members frequently 
put their opinions and views on the record, it is easier for interest groups to 
target them as potentially amenable contacts to push their positions and 
cause(s). On the other hand, “Organised interest groups generally have a harder 
time trying to influence the executive branch”. This is because, once decisions 
are made at the cabinet level, the more closed nature of bureaucracy in the 
executive branch makes officials less sensitive to pressures from extra-
governmental groups.10 Furthermore, an open Congress with Constitutional 
control over trade policy, and elected officials’ electoral needs, means the 
opportunities for lobbying are near-limitless for business interests.11 While the 
“direct quid pro quo is never easy to establish” between business and 
politicians, “politicians hoping to continue receiving... business largesse have to 
safeguard the interests of their benefactors during their tenure of office.”12 This 
symbiotic relationship is understandably difficult to change. The lack of any 
progress on campaign finance reform, and the continued influence of business 
interests, according to Greg Palast, means that “the financial poisoning of our 
body politic continues”.13 
The character of the American electorate can also have an impact. The 
United States has a poor record of voter turnout and “Americans are not very 
political beyond their local sphere.” Due to this perceived political apathy, 
Lawrence Davidson has argued that the United States is “a democracy of 
competing interest groups or lobbies”, or to use his terminology, a 
“factocracy”.14 If most Americans are disinterested in foreign affairs, and if 
foreign policy has no necessary connection to popular concerns or preferences, 
then the question becomes, “whose concerns and preferences does foreign 
policy reflect?”15 
In realist theory, because a nation’s population is eternally fickle, public 
influence on foreign policy would “permit the emotional to govern the 
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rational”.16 If a population is largely disinterested in foreign affairs, then one 
would assume that political elites remain the dominant actors in foreign policy, 
as many realists assert. At this point, a pluralist would accept the neoliberal 
view that executive and legislative officials with foreign policy authority bargain 
with domestic interest groups who can use “members’ votes, campaign 
contributions, threatened or actual capital flight, labour strikes, and other tools” 
to influence elite decision-making.17  
Davidson finds the notion that political elites would be more likely to 
approach policy decisions rationally rather than emotionally “highly dubious”, 
arguing that they must (like ‘civilians’) be affected by their own groupthink and 
environments. It might therefore be argued that, due to the openness of the 
American political system, special interests and lobbies take the place of 
‘citizens’ as domestic actors in foreign policy, as the general population 
effectively abdicates its influence of policy formulation to whatever lobby or 
interest group does care about foreign affairs.18 Whether or not these actors 
play a part in policy is not in doubt; what remains unclear is the extent they are 
able to influence US foreign policy-making and traditions. 
The First Amendment of the US Constitution (guaranteeing freedom of 
speech and expression), arguably opened the door for lobbying of the US 
government. The Amendment holds that Congress is prohibited from making 
any law that abridges “the right of the people… to petition the government for a 
redress of grievances.”19 While a literal reading of the amendment does not 
directly refer to lobbying factions, by stretching the terminology, it is possible to 
see how lobbying could be justified as citizens seeking redress of grievances. 
There are certainly issues with this reading of the Constitution. If, as mentioned 
above, citizens have abdicated their involvement in foreign policy (and politics 
as a whole), then lobbying groups should not be considered ‘citizens voicing 
their grievances’. When it comes to foreign governments’ lobbying operations in 
the US, this rationalization is even more tenuous. 
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As the US government itself began to intervene extensively in economic 
affairs – regulating currency, tackling monopolies, encouraging conservation, 
policing food and meat products, and levying taxes on income and profits – 
businesses and other affected groups organized lobbies to protect their 
interests.20 In other words, “if there is government intervention in the corporate 
economy, so is there corporate intervention in the governmental process.” With 
interlocking military, political and economic structures, this level of 
intervention (in both directions) has the potential to increase.21 
While citizen involvement in political activity outside Washington has 
mostly atrophied (the increase in grassroots activism during the 2008 
presidential election is starting to look like a temporary uptick in participation), 
activity on or around Washington’s K Street has spread and is expanding. 
According to the Center for Responsive Politics, the number of registered 
lobbyists working in Washington, D.C., has grown by 39% between 1998 and 
2008 (from 10,641 to 14,808 registered lobbyists), with a considerable, 
temporary increase in 2007 (15,131). In 2008, lobbyists spent $3.3billion 
lobbying government agencies – or $222,853 for each registered lobbyist.  
Some might be tempted to see this increase in lobbying activity as a 
positive development, because it might suggest that there is greater public 
involvement in politics. However, given the nature of these groups (who 
increasingly represent corporate and some foreign interests), the truth is 
frequently the opposite: “Far from deepening citizen involvement in politics, the 
proliferation of these Washington organizations discourages it by making 
politics the exclusive province of paid hacks and single-issue fanatics.” Judis 
argues that political parties and politicians have become more “subordinate to 
political consultants, media experts, pollsters, and public relations flacks, none 
of whom are accountable to voters”, meaning the system has become captured 
by large contributors who “hold the balance of power in elections and popular 
referenda.”22 Campaign contributions, and the vast sums corporations and 
special interests are able to ‘bundle’ for favoured politicians, are frequently 
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looked upon as a cause of the weakening control government officials hold over 
politics, and the growing influence of corporations and special interest groups, 
as they feel beholden to their financial backers: with elections increasingly 
expensive, partly because of the cost of television advertising, “candidates have 
found it increasingly difficult to defy their funders.”23 The perception, therefore, 
is that you need substantial financial resources in order to have any influence 
within the Washington Beltway. 
According to Davidson, who takes an overall dim view of how easily 
politicians are ‘bought’ by campaign contributors, this difficulty in bucking the 
desires of their financial backers means “when factional interests prevail, most 
politicians will be politically incapable of resisting influential lobby group 
demands” as they attempt to protect their revenue stream. Correspondingly, 
they become incapable of acting in a rational way, or in a way that resists 
interests “adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and 
aggregated interests of the community”.24 
In much the same way as the media, interest groups have a role in framing 
issues. They hope to package issues in a way that “attracts media and executive 
branch attention, places the issue on the agenda, and puts the administration 
and foreign governments on the defensive.” In other words, they “react to 
opportunities created by changing international and domestic political 
circumstances.”25 In order to frame the debate, lobbyists and interest groups 
will frequently rely on the media to get their message across to the general 
public and, if direct access isn’t available for pushing their agenda, to 
government employees. 
Using the media can help amplify special interests’ messages, as 
“favourable media coverage can build broad support and increase the amount 
of funds and other resources available to the interest groups.” However, broad 
media coverage is not always the most effective way to achieve a stated goal. 
When dealing with particularly sensitive topics, some interest groups would 
rather avoid the media spotlight, because their goals “could reflect badly in the 
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public eye on their efforts to seek particular actions in American foreign 
policy.”26 Therefore, according to Robert Sutter, lobbies are less likely to be 
influential on “highly visible issues that engage widespread, contrary public 
passions or media coverage and on issues in which there are strong, competing 
ideological, partisan or constituency pressures.” In other words, for issues that 
“neither undergo active public or media scrutiny nor conflict with legislators’ or 
other policymakers’ convictions, partisan leanings, or constituency needs”, 
special interest influence is more likely.27 In the case of foreign policy, a lobby’s 
effectiveness is aided by the “normal indifference the public shows toward 
events abroad.”28 Where there is media attention to an issue, “a successful 
faction or lobby… will present its demands in terms that complement the 
prevailing thought collective.”29 
That being said, when studying the impact of interest groups and non-
governmental actors, Dietrich cautions against some common assumptions: 
“although activity and access both are necessary for interest group influence, 
neither alone is sufficient for, nor should either be equated with, actual 
influence.”30 Therefore, given the increase in their numbers and their greater 
rate of activity, it is possible to argue that they have increased policy influence, 
but it is difficult to state definitively that they do. The amount of coverage given 
to the situation in Darfur, for example, is a useful exemplar of this fact: A lot of 
media attention has been paid to the region and the ongoing genocide 
(particularly in soft news media – a result of celebrity activism on the issue), 
however little has happened with regards to governmental policy to help ease 
or end the conflict. 
In order to be a successful lobby, an interest group must have “excellent 
organization both in the nation’s capital and at the grassroots level, a steady 
source of revenue, and leadership that is thoroughly versed in the ins and outs 
of lobbying Congress, the executive branch, and the political parties.” In 
conjunction with these attributes, for the exceptionally successful lobbies, a 
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group must have a staying power that can last for decades and even 
generations. Davidson says that “Such unique lobbies can truly subvert any 
notion of national interest so as to make it conform to their parochial 
interests.”31 These lobbies’ successes and longevity are often the sources for 
various conspiracy theories about outside influence in government policy (for 
example, AIPAC, the Farm Lobby, and defence industry lobbies). 
It should be pointed out that special interests, particularly think tanks, can 
affect or influence the policy-making process in other ways. For example, some 
can assist Congress in policy oversight, by “monitoring executive behaviour” to 
ensure it conforms to congressional goals and is “responding properly to 
international events.” Additionally, interest groups help by producing policy 
analysis and reports that are important to their constituents, and also time-
consuming, which can help save the government money and time.32 
 
FOREIGN NATIONAL LOBBIES 
There are three ‘lobbies’ established specifically for foreign relations 
(beyond business lobbies). The first is the Cuba Lobby. Highly visible and firmly 
established in states such as Florida, but narrowly focussed, the members of 
this lobby are able to wield a good deal of influence over issues related to Cuba, 
and are little interested in any other foreign policy issue. 
The second prominent (some would say ‘infamous’) foreign policy lobby is 
the Israel Lobby. Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer published an article and 
book about the influence the Israel Lobby wields over American foreign policy, 
bestowing upon it a level of influence that is altogether higher than most others 
will accept.33 In reference to AIPAC’s methods and hyper-activity, Davidson 
concedes that there is “nothing illegal” about any of it; rather, this is just the 
way the American political system works. However, when an influential 
organization “most often takes its cue from a foreign state rather than from the 
democratically debated and decided desires of a community of American 
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citizens it claims to represent, then the right-to-petition argument becomes 
highly questionable.”34 A less strident branch of the lobby has recently 
increased in prestige and visibility, advocating a more balanced approach to 
Israel-related foreign policy issues. Going by the informal name ‘J Street’, the 
lobby has become known as a moderating force on AIPAC. 
Another accepted large lobby is the China Lobby. There are, however, a 
number of differences between this ‘lobby’ and other ethnic-interest groups. In 
many ways, the China lobby is not a ‘super-lobby’, as it is made up of too many 
unconnected factions, with varied motivations. The term ‘China Lobby’ is, 
instead, a shorthand name for a collection of lobbies concentrating on China-
related issues. It has rarely been able to come together cohesively to force an 
issue, or exert much influence (depending on the faction within the lobby that 
one is considering). This ‘lobby’ will be looked at in much greater detail in the 
second half of this chapter. 
 
WHO ARE THEY & HOW DID WE/THEY GET HERE? 
The relationship between ‘big business’ or corporate interests and US foreign 
policy is one fraught with controversy and misunderstandings. This section will 
provide a timeline for the development of US political lobbying culture. 
As mentioned in Chapter Three, throughout American history, commercial 
interests have played a central role in foreign policy, reflecting an “obsession” 
with open markets for American business. There are even numerous instances 
from American history when it appears as if foreign policy has been made or 
executed by individual corporations; or the government has acted on behalf of 
corporations. One famous example is US policies in Latin America, which at one 
time was seen to be synonymous with United Fruit’s corporate interests in the 
region. More recently, Detroit’s ‘Big Three’ auto companies pushed the first 
Clinton administration to “the brink of a trade war with Japan”35 when Japan’s 
automakers (specifically, Toyota) surpassed the quality and reliability of 
American brands. In today’s economic environment, the tensions have clearly 
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shifted focus towards China. Complaints revolving around the valuation of 
China’s renminbi, China’s considerable US debt holdings, and other mercantilist 
practices have risen to prominence during President George W. Bush’s 
administration, and persist in the Obama administration. 
Some neoliberal analysts of international relations and foreign policy 
identify business corporations and associations as exerting particularly strong 
influence on American foreign policy. This is because of their wide-reaching 
effects on the economy and their capacity to direct or influence voters to punish 
either a single politician or even a political party that has proposed or 
supported a measure opposed to their own agenda.36 While this has a sinister 
air to it – and there’s little doubt that, under certain conditions and at certain 
times, corporations have managed to affect policy decisions – the relationship 
between business and government has frequently been beneficial to the US. 
While this may not be the case today, in the past government has helped 
stimulate industry and business for the good of the nation (for example, FDR’s 
New Deal). 
The first interest groups formed in the United States were focused on 
industry and business interests. They included the American Bankers’ 
Association (1877), the American Federation of Labor (1886), the National 
Association of Manufacturers (1894), the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (1912), 
and the American Farm Bureau (1920).37 The 1920s saw the number of 
organized interests expand, and again during World War II and the New Deal 
years. By 1949, according to a U.S. Department of Commerce estimate, there 
were approximately “4,000 trade, professional, civic and other [national] 
associations” operating in the United States.38 In the 1980s, the lobbying 
community attained its still-common collective name of ‘K Street’, from the fact 
that many lobbying firms concentrated their offices in this area of Washington, 
D.C. As the number of lobbies increased, their relative power as a whole 
increased also: 
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“The development of K Street… was spurred initially by the 
success of progressives, populists, and business leaders in 
weakening the political parties. Interest groups filled the vacuum 
left by the declining power of the political parties.”39 
In order to offset potential risks, American companies often have to turn 
to the government for help – as they did during much of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries in China. That help can sometimes come from the 
Department of Commerce, which can act as an “unofficial global lobby group for 
American businesses abroad.” Companies also use industry groups like the 
Chamber of Commerce and various trade associations to pressure Congress and 
the White House to pass legislation or enact regulations that could create 
favourable conditions for their global commercial interests.40 
“The hallmark of involvement with big emerging markets is that 
American business depends upon Washington’s help to liberalise 
trade, protect intellectual property, remove regulatory barriers, and 
encourage continued economic reform.”41 
Therefore, corporations need government help “to win major contracts in 
the many countries whose governments award the deals and where French, 
German, or Japanese firms are getting help from their governments.”42 This has 
long been the case with regards to China (as outlined in Chapter 3), and remains 
the case because the government in Beijing still plays a large role in China’s 
business sector, which means there remains a perception that governmental 
intervention is needed to help pave the way for American corporations hoping 
to locate part of their operations (predominantly manufacturing) in mainland 
China. This, however, is only part of the whole story: as we shall see later, the 
work and efforts of a select few American corporations actually helped lay the 
groundwork for China’s opening and development. 
Foreign policy reportage is subject to manipulation by government and 
organizations that take an interest in global affairs, and have the ability to 
influence the media in one direction or another. In terms of special interest 
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influence over the media, this is mainly through corporate ownership of media 
outlets. Big business’ influence on the American political process has been 
considerably strengthened as a result of corporate takeovers of media 
corporations, and also by an increase in cross-ownership of large media 
conglomerates. Today’s global media landscape is dominated by just a handful 
of multinational corporations: Time Warner, Disney, Bertelsmann, Viacom, 
News Corporation, TCI, Sony, and Comcast.43 For this reason, Edward S. Herman 
argues that journalists and reporters are not the controlling media elite. Rather, 
it is the owners of these media-owning corporations that are the guiding 
voices.44 Rupert Murdoch, CEO and Chairman of News Corp., for example, enjoys 
considerable influence over the news outlets he controls and the content they 
provide (as mentioned in Chapter 5). 
 
CORPORATE & OTHER INTEREST GROUP INFLUENCE IN US FOREIGN POLICY 
The groups or lobbies in ascendancy can make all the difference in what kind of 
goals government can achieve during any particular period. For example, 
business lobbies “virtually reign[ed] supreme” in the 1920s and 1980s, when 
the political party in power (the Republican Party, in both instances) helped 
create an environment more amenable to their wishes.45 
The overlap between business and government is nothing new, and it 
would be wrong to assume it was a Republican or Bush-era creation (even 
though the Bush administration did raise it to a level not seen since the 
Harding-Coolidge era). The employment of business figures in key government 
positions has been common practice, with “Corporate leaders, lawyers, and 
investment bankers... able to move in and out of the highest levels of 
government”46 since the Founding of the nation. 
Reaching back into American history, for example, Condy Ragnet was 
President John Quincy Adams’s charge d’affairs in Brazil at the same time as 
being president of the Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce. In the Jackson 
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administration, Charles Biddle was the government’s agent in Central America, 
and also a business agent for Atlantic & Pacific Transportation Corporation 
(exploring the possibility of an isthmus canal in the same region Jackson had 
assigned him).47 Other names from American history include Elihu Root, Joseph 
P. Kennedy, Dean Acheson, and Robert McNamara. Robert Rubin and Hank 
Paulson are two more recent examples of Wall Street figures making the move 
to high-level government service (Secretary of the Treasury, and both formerly 
of Goldman Sachs), while former Vice-President Dick Cheney was CEO of 
Halliburton before joining the Bush administration. The aim of this section is to 
illustrate the evolution of corporate-government ties; to show how the role of 
corporate figures in government has increased in importance and significance 
as the nation progressed and grew in global influence and power. 
Walter Russell Mead has written that, because foreign policy and domestic 
policy have been inextricably interlinked throughout American history, it means 
that “special interests have always been at play in foreign affairs.”48 Lobbying 
was frequently important to get things done at the beginning of the Republic; 
and some policies, put in place as a result of considerable lobbying, were far 
from negative. Indeed, the U.S. Navy was the result of intense lobbying on the 
part of Massachusetts merchants, who wanted the US government to provide 
protections for their vessels.49 
An early example of corporate and special interest involvement in foreign 
policy is the mid-nineteenth century case of Hawaii, which has a good climate 
for sugar cultivation. Following quick on the heels of this realisation, 
businessmen and missionaries “teamed up to take over Hawaii in the name of 
God, civilisation, and profit.” Davidson identifies the annexation of Hawaii as a 
“tale of two lobbies”: the first comprised American sugar-growers of Hawaii, led 
by Sanford Dole; the second lobby was made up of Louisiana and Georgia sugar 
growers, who wanted to protect their market position and maintain high tariffs 
on imported sugar. Sugar interests would again become involved in Cuba and 
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the Philippines, as well as groups representing the tobacco, mining and the 
carrying trades.50 
One particularly important ‘lobby’, operating in the final decade of the 
Nineteenth Century and the turn of the Twentieth Century, was comprised of a 
power-house of political and corporate elites, which pushed a ‘large policy’ that 
“reflected America’s alleged destiny to be a great imperial power”. This lobby’s 
agenda could be identified as the beginning of the American penchant for ‘grand 
strategies’. The lobby included J.P. Morgan and associates, future presidents 
William McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, John 
Olney (Secretary of State 1895-7, also a J.P. Morgan associate), and John Hay 
(Secretary of State 1898).51 Other organisations that emerged at this time 
include the National Civic Federation (1900) and the National Association of 
Manufacturers (NAM), which was founded in 1895 and would wield 
considerable influence on a number of domestic and foreign policy issues (it 
was even said that NAM was “known for keeping Senators on retainer”, so close 
were its ties to government).52 Like the elites who founded and served in them, 
these groups “aspired to be above class, party, and interest. They saw their role 
as conciliatory, as bringing classes and interests together rather than siding 
with one against the other.”53 
The Spanish-American War (April-August 1898) enhanced a US strategy of 
“intervention and subversion” in Central and South America. This policy was 
“intimately tied to the needs of specific American businesses that... successfully 
lobbied the U.S. government for direct assistance when needed... [and] also 
integrated key American politicians and policymakers into their 
entrepreneurial structure.” The most famous example of this, and the central 
player in a number of conspiracy theories concerning corporate dominance in 
US foreign policy, is the United Fruit Company, which had a propensity for 
taking over local economies, governments, and militaries who got in their way. 
Effectively, Davidson states, “U.S. foreign policy in Central America had long ago 
been privatised by the economically oriented special interests” that represented 
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businesses such as United Fruit and their subsidiary, Chiquita Brands. These 
companies and their “parochial interests... had come to define the U.S. national 
interest in this part of the world.”54 There is, however, a problem with this 
statement. Davidson does not provide any ‘evidence’ to support the claim that 
United Fruit was controlling or unduly influencing US foreign policy. Indeed, 
Davidson actually points to Congressional hearings during which Chiquita 
Brands admitted to funding, by itself, Colombian right-wing-paramilitary groups 
as evidence, even though it is clear that they were acting in their own interest, 
irrespective of the US government’s South American policies.  
American business emerged from the Second World War stronger than 
ever. Many, if not all, Americans “recognised that the efforts of the nation’s 
industry – highlighted by the rapid conversion of the auto industry to war 
production – had been instrumental in the allied victory.” This popular support 
led corporations to expand their operations in Washington, gravitating towards 
K Street.55 
In the 1940s and 1950s, “the politics of the Truman and Eisenhower years 
was characterised by the preponderance of powerful interest groups and of 
elites.” Judis explains domestic politics during these decades using the “umpire 
theory” (James Landis) or “referee theory” (Earl Latham) of government, which 
states that “government act[s] not as a guarantor of democratic pluralism but 
merely as an arbitrator among interest groups.” Foreign policy, however, 
remained the purview of political elites. Officials and policymakers such as Dean 
Acheson, Paul Nitze, George Marshall, and others who helped shape post-World 
War II foreign policy did not see themselves responding to pressure from 
interest groups. Instead, these leaders set the policy agenda, promoted specific 
policies, and then tried to convince major interest groups and the public of their 
wisdom. In other words, interest groups were tools the government could 
periodically use to motivate and mobilise support, in much the same way as the 
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media, and government officials believed they defined the national interest for 
both the American public and also interest groups.56 
In the decades following World War II, many businessmen and -women 
steered clear of politics. For those that did participate, organisations like the 
Chamber of Commerce were the preferred forums. This changed in the 1970s, 
when “many of these corporate leaders and bankers abandoned their 
commitment to disinterested public service and to a politics that transcended 
class.”57 This change could be attributed to a single proposed law, which 
surfaced in 1971. The Burke-Hartke Bill “thoroughly alarmed business leaders”. 
A product of the AFL-CIO, the bill was commissioned because certain interests 
wanted a law that would restrict the operations of multinational corporations. 
The law did this by removing the tax breaks for companies that invested abroad 
– which entitled them to pay taxes on only repatriated profits; the President 
was also given the authority to restrict the export of capital if it was seen to be 
contrary to the national interest or threaten American jobs; quotas were to be 
put on imported goods that would compete with US-made products. In 
response, businesses poured money into the Emergency Committee for 
American Trade (ECAT), which was established in 1967 to protect and defend 
the interests of multinationals.58 
Considerable Democratic victories in the 1974 mid-term elections (a gain 
of 49 seats in the House) set the stage for a “final conflict that would help define 
American politics and democracy” for the rest of the century. With a two-to-one 
majority in the House of Representatives, a thirteen-seat majority in the Senate, 
and Jimmy Carter in the White House, business and conservative interests were 
faced with a solidly liberal government. The political field, according to Judis, 
became split in two. On one side (the left) was “what remained of the old liberal 
movement, led now by an increasingly desperate AFL-CIO.” Opposing this 
liberal faction were “the lobbies, think tanks, and policy groups created by 
business and their conservative allies in the early 1970s. The battleground was 
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the U.S. Congress.”59 While Carter’s administration represented a rare 
opportunity for liberal interests to potentially usurp corporate interests’ 
influence, this was not to be the case. 
The debt crisis of 1982 provided an opportunity to address the threat of 
prospective newly industrialised countries (NICs), and in response, the “full 
political resources of corporate America were mobilised to regain corporate 
control of the political agenda and the court system.” Domestic reforms 
intended to improve the global competitiveness of the United States by getting 
government “off the back” of business were especially high on the agenda.60 
This is a common trope in corporate political interests. In the 2008 Presidential 
election, Republican candidate for Vice-President, Sarah Palin, would frequently 
speak of the need to get government ‘out of the way’ of business, because 
corporations know how to do it better than government (a position that wilfully 
ignores the huge bailouts needed in 2008 following the wake of the financial 
crisis). 
With Ronald Reagan’s landslide victories in 1980 and 1984, the scales 
tipped further in favour of the business lobbies and affiliated think tanks. One of 
President Reagan’s first acts was to create a business advisory group that 
included forty CEOs and chairmen from many Fortune 500 corporations and 
leading banks, this led many business leaders to lend their support to Reagan, 
believing they would get much of what they wanted from his administration. 
This use of business leaders would be repeated by the George W. Bush 
administration’s energy advisory board, run by Vice President Dick Cheney and 
comprised of representatives from energy industry leaders. In the 1980s, 
Washington, D.C., and New York abounded with ‘foundations’, ‘institutes’, 
‘centres’, ‘committees’, and ‘councils’. Many of these organisations were the 
intellectual arms of business lobbies or political factions. The Washington 
establishment no longer behaved, or functioned, as elites should: “They were 
interested, rather than disinterested participants; what they said often meshed 
subtly or crassly with the interests of business clients or political patrons.”61 
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President Reagan had presented himself during the 1980 and 1984 elections as 
the worthy successor of Andrew Jackson and the ‘coonskin populists’, but by the 
time he left the White House, “the public had become wise to this ruse”. As a 
result of lobbying and banking scandals, most Americans realised that “what the 
Reagan revolution really promised was not self-rule, but rule by K Street special 
interests”.62 
The latter half of the 20th Century saw the creation and proliferation of 
ideologically-based lobbies that “demonstrated equal, if not greater, power” 
over the foreign policy process as business interests.63 These lobbies 
represented very diverse interests, and just as the ‘business lobby’ is not always 
as cohesive as one might be led to believe from the literature documenting it, 
those lobbies built on ideological foundations are equally broad. For example, 
the aforementioned ‘China Lobby’ is a catch-all term for a diverse selection of 
interests, including human rights lobbies, religious organisations, defence 
lobbies, student groups, and also trade and business groups. The diversity of 
these lobbies, in some ways, can help explain why government still retains a lot 
of control over foreign policy, and why special interests do not have a clearer or 
more obvious impact on foreign policy – one could argue that the proliferation 
of competing agendas means they effectively cancel each other out. 
The defence industry has maintained consistent influence over the 
political process and governmental appropriations. With the onset of the Cold 
War, and despite President Eisenhower’s warnings against a powerful military-
industrial complex, Congressmen, Senators and Presidents have frequently 
appeared subservient to the political benefits that come with defence 
appropriations. A notorious example would be Senator Henry ‘Scoop’ Jackson, 
the “hawkish Democrat in thrall to the Boeing Company”, the large aerospace 
contractor based in Washington, his home state. The alliance between threat-
inflating ideologues and the needs of a military-industrial-complex that requires 
an enemy in order to secure ever larger contracts was a constant feature of the 
Cold War Years, and remains a feature of American politics today. Robert 
Scheer, a critic of the politics of military appropriations, has said that the 
                                                 
62
 Judis (2000), p.218 
63
 Davidson (2009), p.53 
Stefan Fergus Chapter V: Special Interests & Foreign Policy 
233 
 
“gyrations of lobbyists and politicians eliciting billions” for weapons systems in 
the name of fighting the enemy of the day, is really “a lap dance designed to hide 
the fact that all you are getting out of it is the opportunity to fork over ever 
larger amounts of your money.”64 The real purpose of bloated military budgets 
has become profits and jobs,65 as well as electoral politics, almost more than 
about national defence. 
Newt Gingrich and the Republican Party would attempt the same 
business-oriented approach to government in the 1990s. The key to the 
Republican strategy was building powerful lobbying coalitions that would help 
enact the Republicans’ (and K Street’s) agenda, and “Gingrich invited business 
lobbies to help him eliminate any government regulations that got in their 
way.”66 After winning control of Congress in November 1994, conservative 
Republicans faced the task of developing policies that would address the 
national interest. Instead, they “fell back upon representing their most vocal 
constituents and interest groups”. Their economic policies reflected the 
interests of the wealthy and their K Street lobbyists; social policy conformed to 
the wishes and goals of the religious right; and foreign policy was the “narrow 
isolationism of the small town provincial that had dominated the party earlier 
in the century, but had largely disappeared during the Cold War.”67 Using this 
simplistic formulation, one can see how the influence of interest groups and 
electoral political considerations created problems for the Republican Party. 
Their economic and foreign policies were somewhat inconsistent: economics 
today is about globalisation and moving beyond US borders, which conflicted 
with the isolationist wing of the party. 
With the Cold War over, Jeffrey E. Garten argued that commercial 
considerations would play an ever greater role in American foreign policy, from 
the second Clinton administration into the next century. “Much of our foreign 
policy could look more like it did during the nineteenth century and up until 
Pearl Harbor, when, for the most part, commercial goals were paramount.”68 
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Garten, writing in 1997, had no way of predicting the events of 2001, but for the 
most part he appeared correct. 
To place the blame of corporate influence solely on the Republican Party 
would be inaccurate. President Clinton pursued an economic strategy bound to 
please corporate interests – from his strong belief in the benefits of free trade 
and his support of trade deals such as NAFTA, Clinton was furthering the 
interests of many leading American businesses and manufacturers. David 
Korten has argued that Clinton’s position on free trade was little more than a 
sop to contributors, pursued because Clinton was “lacking other viable ideas”. 
Therefore, because he was “anxious to please” corporate interests, he 
“embraced economic globalisation as both his jobs program and his foreign 
policy.”69 
The George W. Bush administration, like the Reagan administration, was 
another boon for corporate interests and, to a lesser extent, ideological 
interests. Greg Palast argues that the administration promoted the corporate-
government revolving door to another level. According to former Texas 
Agriculture Commissioner Jim Hightower, “They’ve eliminated the middleman. 
The corporations don’t have to lobby the government anymore. They are the 
government”, as former executives were appointed to head those government 
institutions that regulated their previous employers.70 
As mentioned above, the defence industry has maintained a keen hold on 
some politicians ever since the end of World War II. The politics of defence 
budgets in the United States has taken on a much broader definition and 
purpose in recent decades. No longer is it solely created for the benefit of the 
Pentagon and the US armed forces. Electoral politics now play a large role in 
defence appropriations. For example, the letter President Bush presented to 
Congress requesting $20 billion in emergency defence allocation in the wake of 
9/11, Robert Scheer writes, 
“managed to fulfil the twin purposes of the national security budget – 
such a misnomer – by both rewarding his financial supporters in the 
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defence industry and politically exploiting the concerns of a 
frightened nation.”71 
George W. Bush’s transformation in the wake of 9/11 – from an 
internationally unambitious president primarily focused on domestic issues to a 
hawkish Commander in Chief – represented “an end to the menace of fiscal 
restraint and an enormous windfall of new money from the government in 
Washington.”72 Naturally, this new money needed to be allocated accordingly, 
for which the big defence corporations employ armies of lobbyists. 
 
THINK TANKS 
Public policy research and analysis organisations, more commonly known as 
‘think tanks’, play an important role in the American foreign policy-making 
process. According to Richard Haass, the current president of the Council on 
Foreign Relations (CFR), they “fill a critical void between the academic world… 
and the realm of government.” They do this in a number of ways: Think tanks 
can, through their usually extensive roster of experts and academics, propose 
original options and ideas to help administrations (and opponents) generate 
policies to further their political goals – be it domestic or foreign policy; their 
rosters can also provide a ready pool of experts from which an administration 
can fill government posts; and they also help an administration with mediation 
and attempts to find solutions to pressing issues;73 they also provide forums for 
experts and policymakers (including members of the press, universities, 
embassies, foreign policy bureaucracy, and business and financial communities) 
to meet and conduct detailed study and discussion on pressing matters of 
foreign policy and the national interest.74 
Many are not aware of the role think tanks play in policy formulation, as 
they conduct much of their work below the radar of the media spotlight, 
attracting less attention than other influences on US foreign policy – such as 
exposure-hungry members of Congress, rival government departments who 
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jockey for more influence and wider purviews, and also the interest groups and 
lobbies who frequently use the media to disseminate their messages. However, 
it must be noted that think tank scholars frequently utilise the media (be it 
television or op-ed pages in newspapers and newsweeklies) to help present 
their case and influence policy-makers. 
There are over 1,200 think tanks operating in the United States today, and 
these organizations have been a force in American politics for nearly 100 years. 
Unavoidable in the arena of American politics, think tanks frequently “add a 
bias provided by their founders and funders” to their policy papers.75 It is clear 
that certain think tanks cater to the conservative spectrum of American politics 
(for example, the Heritage Foundation and the AEI), while others follow a more 
liberal ideology (for example, the Centre for American Progress – described as 
the “granddaddy of the new [liberal] vanguard”),76 and some take no official 
position on foreign policy issues (such as the Council on Foreign Relations). An 
example of a particularly influential conservative think tank is the Cato 
Institute, which, funded partly by brokerage firms, financed polls that claimed 
to show – through leading questions – that the public favoured Social Security 
privatization, a favourite issue among conservatives. 
The level of influence enjoyed by think tanks is largely dependent on their 
connections with leaders in the White House, the State, Defence and 
Treasury Departments, and also Congress and the Senate. As with the business 
community, there is a ‘revolving door’ for policy experts. Think tanks can also 
offer a place for former government officials to share their insights from 
government service in an institutional setting, and remain engaged in the 
foreign policy-making process.77 This creates an atmosphere where academics 
and policy intellectuals who “brought a spirit of scientific objectivity and 
disinterest to political deliberations” will lend their names and expertise to 
institutions “dedicated to promoting the narrowest interests of business 
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contributors.”78 Think tanks can, therefore, often be identified as key voices 
heard by policy-makers. 
With shared conceptions of the national interest, a think tank with strong 
connections to a given administration – for example, the Project for a New 
American Century and the George W. Bush administration (until it disbanded in 
2006),79 and also the Centre for American Progress and the Obama 
administration80 – a think tank’s policy prescriptions can be considered 
influential only in that they are, to use Parmar’s phrase, “pushing against an 
open door”, as there was no question of having to overcome a resistant 
officialdom. Therefore, when a think tank’s or other special interest 
group’s behaviour or attempts at intervention appear to alter the direction of  
Executive policy, it is most likely the case that the prescriptions offered by the 
lobby or think tank adhered closely to the position already held by Executive 
officials.81 The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) has “long been recognised as 
one of the most influential of modern American institutions”, and was explicitly 
set up as a tool meant to aid the US government in conceptualising the national 
interest and foreign policy. For some scholars and commentators, the 
relationship between the CFR and the federal government has been “a troubling 
one”, because the CFR is an exclusive, private group, it is funded by donations 
from large corporations and foundations, it is highly secretive about its 
operations, and its members are frequently “ensconced in the centres of state 
power”.82 
During the George W. Bush years, many left-leaning groups had little 
chance of exerting influence or promoting action on their issues. Part of the 
reason for their ineffectiveness stemmed from Newt Gingrich and Tom DeLay’s 
skill at convincing lobbying firms that the Republican majority in both the 
House and Senate, following their electoral victories in 1994, was here to stay. It 
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was under this misperception that an unofficial policy emerged – Republicans 
(i.e. the Majority) would only deal with Republican-affiliated lobbyists, or firms 
who employed Republican-affiliated lobbyists, effectively shutting Democratic 
and left-leaning advocacy groups out of the process, until the House and Senate 
changed hands and they found a more amenable audience in the Nancy Pelosi-
led Democratic Congress. Now, left-leaning institutes and think tanks find “their 
ideas and positions... at the centre of the Washington debate.”83 
Presidential campaigns offer think tanks the opportunity to help re-shape 
establishment thinking, especially on foreign policy. Presidential candidates 
frequently solicit advice from a large range of think tank experts when creating 
their election platform before testing their policies on the campaign trail. There 
are a couple of clear examples of presidential candidates – and later, presidents 
– taking on board think tank-produced ideas and policies. These include 
President Reagan’s adoption of the prescriptions in the Heritage Foundation’s 
“Mandate for Change” publication; and President Bill Clinton’s creation of a 
National Economic Council, following a 1992 joint IIE and Carnegie Endowment 
proposal;84 and the seemingly never-ending proposals published by almost all 
intellectual organisations on the future of the War in Iraq and the Global War on 
Terror. With President Obama’s election in November 2008, it is widely 
accepted that liberal think tanks are experiencing a rise in influence, while 
conservative think tanks do not enjoy the influence they did during the George 
W. Bush administration.85 
 
From this analysis of lobbies in American politics, we are starting to get a 
glimpse of how special interests might reinforce the realist and liberal 
traditions in US foreign policy. Economic and defence interests naturally 
promote realist policies, while ideological interests promote more liberal 
policies. This chapter will now turn its attention to look at how lobbies operate 
with regards to China policy, how China policy may differ from other foreign 
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policy issues, and how their influence might further reinforce the trends and 
traditions of US foreign policy. 
 
SPECIAL INTERESTS & CHINA 
In the 1990s, the proliferation of issues on the US-China agenda has facilitated 
the rapid growth of organised lobbies operating in the US-China policy 
process.86 For the five years after the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident, the 
central China issue in the United States was whether or not to renew China’s 
Most Favoured Nation (MFN) trade status. This will form the basis of a case 
study later in this chapter, as it is also indicative of the role special interests 
play in American politics. 
Over the course of its relations with China, the United States has 
“threatened and blustered but in the end taken very little real action”; there are, 
according to Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro, many reasons for this inaction, 
but one of the most important is the effectiveness of what he calls the New 
China Lobby, “a multifaceted, loosely correlated network actively encouraged 
and manipulated by China mainly by promising or withholding money.”87 
Munro has identified four “special characteristics” to Chinese lobbying and 
public relations campaigns in the US that, “taken together, make it different 
from these efforts by other countries.” These characteristics include China’s 
changing position on the global stage – frequently looked at unfavourably by 
‘hawks’ in the US government; China’s own reactions to American policies and 
actions, the “ferocity” and the “tone of virulent aggrievement” with which they 
respond; the large and influential groups of former officials who have come to 
dominate the debate about China; and also Beijing’s use of the “threat of 
economic warfare” to enlist “one of the broadest business efforts to influence 
national policy in all of American history.”88 His grand rhetoric aside, Munro has 
identified the key extra-governmental elements that help shape US policy 
toward China. 
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There are two broad camps that form around China issues. One faction is 
comprised of business and trade interests, typically favouring positive relations 
and increased contact and engagement (for example, the Business Coalition for 
U.S.-China Trade). For issues relating to China, perhaps more than other foreign 
policy issues, ideological and ‘moral’ interests are equally active. Such groups 
include human rights groups (e.g., Amnesty International), labour unions, and 
religious groups (e.g., the Moral Majority). Other groups involved in the China 
policy debate include military procurement lobbies. 
Following the Tiananmen Square incident, “America’s policy on China was 
radically and indelibly transformed.” In the three years that followed, “a series 
of policy disputes called into question the assumptions that had been guiding 
U.S. policy.” These disputes brought with them a host of new actors into the 
decision-making process, and helped establish policy coalitions that remain 
active today.89 For example, human rights, religious, and labour groups remain 
active opponents of unfettered trade with China because of their ‘deplorable’ 
human rights record, frequently proposing sanctions or outright opposition to 
contacts with China. The coalition of business groups, however, has changed 
slightly, as some lobbies were created solely with the goal of making MFN 
permanent. Since that has occurred, and China has joined the WTO, these 
groups have been dissolved or altered their approach. Equally, groups involved 
in Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) are very active in China-trade debates. IPR 
groups are perhaps one of the few groups able to point to concrete success at 
pushing their agenda, as “computer hardware and software industries have 
successfully hardened the American attitude toward Chinese piracy of 
intellectual property rights.”90 
 
CONGRESS & CHINA 
Before going into detail about how these interest groups operate in China-
related policy debates, it is worthwhile to outline Congress’s role in the debates. 
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As discussed previously, greater access makes congressional members and 
their staff the most effective targets of lobbying.91 According to Tao Xie, Congress 
has been “unusually active” throughout American history in the development of 
the important US-China relationship. Examples of Congressional action include: 
1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, 1948 China Aid Act, 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, 
and the already-mentioned Annual MFN debate and Permanent Normal Trade 
Relations.92 
After 1989, James Mann argues, “Congress’s involvement in China policy 
was far more pervasive” in nearly every aspect of the relationship, investigating 
any example of Chinese malfeasance (real or imagined), and always willing to 
entertain sanctions: “decisions about Chinese students, grain sales, human 
rights, arms-control policies, business contracts and transfers of technology 
were not only influenced but, in some cases, initiated by Congress.”93 Therefore, 
“from the Chinese perspective, Congress’s China policy has almost always been 
one of antagonism and punitive actions.” Prior to Tiananmen, there was never a 
problem in renewing MFN, but afterwards “Congress attempted to revoke MFN 
or to add various conditions to its renewal” every year.94 
Despite Congress’s activism, there remain some considerable obstacles for 
it to overcome: 
“Congressional committees, bicameralism and presidential veto 
make it virtually impossible for Congress to legislate on China, 
despite its intense preferences, and therefore Congress often turns to 
informal – but no less effective – means to exert influence on China 
policy, such as framing public opinion and generating situations that 
result in anticipated reactions by the executive branch or Beijing.”95 
For the most part, therefore, Congress and other non-Administration 
sources are excluded from China Policy dialogue and discourse. Given the 
nature of the American foreign policy-making process, when voices in Congress 
are heard over the course of Sino-American relations, Xie says, “they usually 
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come out supporting the actions and decisions taken by the White House.”96 
This is only half true, as there are factions in Congress and the Senate that are 
equally vocal about their opposition to US-China policy. 
This being said, there is a noticeable decline in anti-China measures 
coming from Congress. As the number of American small- and medium-sized 
businesses that source materials and parts from China grows, representatives of 
districts in which they operate are becoming more positively disposed to China. 
John Pomfret states that “there is an undeniable evolution... taking place”, and 
members of Congress and their staff “are now far more likely to water down 
measures opposed to Beijing.”97 
 
INTEREST GROUPS 
Over the years since US-China relations were normalised, scholars, media 
commentators, and other observers have “ascribed various degrees of influence 
to different lobby or interest groups at different times”.98 Few observers would 
argue that lobbies or organised groups were the sole, or dominant, forces 
behind China-policy decisions. Instead, their influence at particular times has 
been dependent on “fluctuating circumstances, including changes in elite and 
public opinion, international pressures and opportunities”, among other factors. 
Therefore, “Measuring the influence of individual interest or lobby groups on 
U.S. China policy remains a subjective exercise.”99 
Interest groups do not always work together in common purpose. For 
example, the business community and human rights lobbies have come into 
conflict frequently during China policy debates. At these times, a standard 
scenario can be glibly summarised as: “business groups attacking the human 
rights community as extremists totally lacking in reason, and the human rights 
community accusing business of cozying up to a brutal Chinese dictatorship.”100 
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This rivalry can partly be explained by media influence. By reporting on 
human rights issues, the media is able to “force human rights concerns onto the 
agenda” with the result for the government being that “purely interest-based 
justifications” for policy become “difficult if not impossible to make.” For 
business interests and corporations, this has added a new facet to their 
strategies, as “In order to be successful, business groups now have to fight the 
human rights groups on their own rhetorical turf.”101 Therefore, it is interesting 
to note that interest groups, whether or not they exert influence on the 
government, are able to exert pressure on each other, and are sometimes able 
to reshape the debate to suit their own agendas. 
 
CHINA, HUMAN RIGHTS & SPECIAL INTERESTS 
As with many facets of the US-China relationship, the subject of Chinese human 
rights abuses has been a salient issue for the public since Tiananmen Square. 
This “drives journalists to cover the issue, for editors to give it priority, and for 
human rights groups to be seen speaking up on it.”102 With the media, any issue 
can remain on its radar through the self-regenerating nature of news reporting. 
When an issue like human rights becomes salient through a specific event, 
“human rights groups get access to the media as a result, they can then get 
additional attention for their information, which increases public interest, 
which spurs more press coverage, and so on.”103  
Mike Jendrzejczyk, late Human Rights Watch-Asia director, said in 1996 
that access to policymakers and any level of influence in the policymaking 
process “is to a large extent conditioned by how visible we are in the press, and 
to what extent Congress is echoing and picking up our concerns.” An Amnesty 
International official agreed: “If it is a hot topic, we can sway Congress. There is 
less pressure when there is no media event.”104 
This means that “disproportionate press attention to China is not the 
result of groups ‘picking on China’, as her advocates in the United States 
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accuse.” Rather, it is groups exploiting news coverage for their own ends. Also, 
China’s abuses get coverage, even when they are less severe than in other 
countries, because China is a “globally significant state”. The success of human 
rights groups keeping China’s abuses on the agenda is, according to Teles, due 
to the combination of “the real situation in the PRC, a sympathetic press, the 
rhetorical skills of the human rights advocates, and the effect of public 
opinion.”105 
If there exists a “generally hostile public opinion toward China”, then the 
public environment will give strength and access to human rights groups that 
they would otherwise lack. “When human rights abuses are in the news, the 
ability of human rights groups to get a hearing jumps substantially.”106 
However, this is likely just an issue of framing the debate, as there is no 
guarantee that news coverage of human rights will translate into government 
action or legislation. Most recently, this can be witnessed in the policy-silence 
on issues such as Darfur (Khartoum is highly connected to Beijing), issues 
surrounding persecution of the Falun Gong sect in China, and also the status of 
Tibet. A persistent, though hard-to-prove, theory is that public opposition to 
Beijing’s poor human rights record cost George H.W. Bush’s re-election. 
President Bush “strongly resisted” interest group attempts to push China policy 
in directions he opposed. “He preserved his China policy but lost the election of 
1992, in part because of the way he dealt with the PRC.”107 
In recent years, with the growth of religious-influence in Washington, D.C., 
the Christian Right has become a vocal advocate for the human rights of 
Christians persecuted in other parts of the world, “most notably in China”. For 
example, the Christian Coalition joined other human rights-oriented groups 
including Amnesty International in lobbying Congress to cut trade with 
countries that permit attacks against religious believers and groups.108 
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CHINA, BUSINESS & SPECIAL INTERESTS 
Zachary Karabell argues that US-China policy over the past 20 years has been 
“clouded by a messy mix of realism, idealism, and capitalism.”109 The focus on 
capitalism, market access and business has, considering Beijing’s strong control 
over the Chinese economy, given the Chinese government a good deal of 
influence over American businesses and government. The Chinese are well 
aware of this influence, and are quite open about their reasons when ‘punishing’ 
Washington and American corporations. For example, in 1996, China bought 
$1.5billion worth of Airbus airplanes, rather than Boeing products. Prime 
Minister Li Peng, in the aftermath of the deal, praised European leaders because 
“they do not attach political strings to cooperation with China, unlike the 
Americans who arbitrarily resort to the threat of sanctions or the use of 
sanctions” – despite China’s use of economic sticks and carrots, and the threat of 
punishment amounting to much the same thing.110 Peng’s statement was an 
angry reaction to America’s ‘interference’ in the Taiwan Strait, after Clinton 
dispatched two carrier groups to the area. 
A China-Trade lobby has existed for much of America’s history. While 
today it focuses on trade quotas, market access, intellectual property 
infringement, and so forth, in the 1840s it pushed for the acquisition of 
California for the Union – ports in Los Angeles and San Francisco were 
particularly attractive given that they would considerably shorten travel time to 
the Orient, and therefore be good for boosting international commerce. Later, in 
1853, Commodore Perry’s mission to Japan was ostensibly because the US 
wished to use Japan as a coaling station for merchant vessels (and was again 
pushed for by the Oriental trade lobby).111 
There was little precedent for early business forays into China. However, 
in the late 1980s and more aggressively in the 1990s, “Western companies 
started to probe the China market.” With faltering steps, and considerable 
obstacles along the way, they were able to establish a foothold and, over time, 
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began to see results and returns from their efforts and investments.112 Because 
of the nature of China’s economy during these decades, global trade agreements 
frequently didn’t cover what Western companies faced upon their arrival in 
China. While this resulted in “an exciting, discombobulating, [and] often 
frustrating” experience, it was also “sometimes highly lucrative” for those 
corporations willing to take the risk.113 The lucrative returns have not gone 
away, which is perhaps the strongest reason for American businesses fighting 
so hard to keep trade open with China, and free from protectionist or morally-
imposed barriers. 
China’s impressive economic transformation is often seen as an internal 
development that U.S. and multinational companies have been able to exploit, 
and which the Communist leadership under Deng Xiaoping and then Jiang 
Zemin encouraged. This misses the deeper story. “The activities of those U.S. 
companies and multinationals in China itself were an integral part of China’ 
transformation, and the capital they invested was essential to the changes that 
took place.”114 This is especially true of the first corporations to make inroads 
into China. Kentucky Fried Chicken, Avon, and especially FedEx were able to 
make considerable, early progress into China because they altered their 
business models to suit the local markets. FedEx was also helpful to the Chinese 
as, in order for their own business to function and flourish, they spent billions of 
dollars on infrastructure improvements that, in turn, benefited the rest of 
China’s economic modernisation and expansion.115 In the past, to protect its 
weak textile industry, America had “imposed restrictions on the import of 
Chinese textiles, denying to the Chinese the sales necessary to buy the building 
blocks for their industrial infrastructure”.116 When US corporations like FedEx 
offered to help provide and build much of the infrastructure the Chinese 
needed, it is no wonder the Chinese government was accommodating. 
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Western companies that went to China went for a number of reasons. For 
many companies, “going global in the second half of the twentieth century was 
simultaneously fraught with danger and busting with opportunity.”117 Because 
companies have been the most obvious beneficiaries of the opening of China’s 
markets, reaping extraordinary profits in some cases, “it has been easy to 
portray this emerging system as simply one more example of the way that 
capitalism and corporations satisfy the interests of the few and fail to enrich the 
many.”118 However, given the nature of both the global and also the American 
domestic economy, some corporations went to China “simply out of desperation 
or last hope, both before the challenge of the New Economy and because of it.” 
Companies with connections to Hong Kong and Taiwan were also able to 
expand further into China, as these two countries were starting to explore 
opportunities on the mainland, also. Other businesses went to China either 
because they were multinational and expanded into any market they could, or 
because “they had reached the limits of their business model in the other 
markets that they were in... [and] they saw few other options”119 for expansion 
and growth. 
While many businessmen and CEOs thought China’s entry into the WTO 
and closer ties in general were a good idea,120 this was not the case for 
everyone. In the US, any deal that was considered to signal acceptance of 
Communist China, its autocratic government and questionable record on human 
rights, as well as its lax enforcement of intellectual property rights and 
contracts, was frowned upon. It would be seen as immoral, misguided, and not 
in American interests by many – commentators, special interests and also 
members of Congress, from both sides of the political spectrum. Those on the 
left “interpreted the strong support of the business community... as a naked play 
for more profit at the expense of the American worker and even at the expense 
of economic security.” Opponents on the right clung to the rigid Cold War 
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ideology that “declared any Communist regime anathema and demanded a 
rejection of China until democracy trumped Communist dictatorship.”121 
 Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the resultant change in 
paradigm, a different constituency was drawn into the debate: that of the 
business community. As American businesses started to trade and invest more 
in China, they came under an increased amount of criticism and attention. They 
were “beset by questions about why they were doing business with such a 
repressive regime, one that had so recently ordered tanks to fire at unarmed 
citizens.”122 In order to confront these charges, businesses have “been forced to 
come up with an argument that admits the importance of human rights 
concerns, and deplores Chinese behaviour, but states that commercial links are 
the best way to change the human rights situation in China.” In other words, the 
strategy of business groups is to “take the sting out of the human rights groups’ 
revelations by admitting everything that they accuse China of, but then shifting 
the debate to what can actually change the behaviour of the regime.”123 
The need to protect their investment, as well as a political desire to report 
economic growth and show that American companies are strong and 
succeeding in the world economy, allows for close ties between business and 
the American government. An unnamed Republican source told Dumbaugh that 
“multinational corporations have too much influence in the China debate.” 
According to this source, “There has been an unholy alliance between big 
business, the Clinton administration, and certain Republicans who have 
adopted the trade-at-any-price approach.”124 Despite the fact that President 
Clinton and Vice-President Gore “genuflected to the need for more worker 
protections embedded in global trade agreements”, unions and labour groups 
couldn’t exert enough influence over an Executive that was pro-business. This 
resulted, perhaps, in the “scant reference to labor rights, workplace conditions, 
or environmental issues”125 in deals made with China and also in NAFTA. 
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In the US, trade is becoming more politicised and more dominated by one-
sided concerns intent on maximising their immediate strategic advantages. Of 
particular and increasing importance is the issue of outsourcing – namely, the 
process by which jobs (manufacturing, administrative, and others) are exported 
to nations with lower labour costs. By supporting certain business interests 
wishing to label China a menace, and prevent further outsourcing, “American 
law-makers are doing no more than following United States public opinion.” 
Will Hutton has pointed to a recent survey, in which 84% of those polled want 
the US’s top foreign policy objective to be protecting American jobs from 
overseas competition. It is unsurprising, then, that “in this atmosphere, China’s 
cheap labour is seen not as a natural advantage from which both sides benefit, 
but as an unfair excuse to dump goods in the United States.”126 That the 
exporting of jobs is still a big issue, prevalent in the media, just goes to show 
that some labour groups, with the help of the media, do have a degree of 
influence: politicians need to address these concerns, even when reports are 
available that suggest jobs are not being exported to China and elsewhere. 
 “For their own reasons,” James Mann writes, “the U.S. government and 
American... corporations have been eager to conduct as much business as 
possible with China. In order to do this, they have sought to minimise the core 
issues of repression of dissent and China’s one-party political system”.127 Today, 
issues also include currency manipulation, China’s dollar reserves, and religious 
persecution. The business community can use the media to reach their goals by 
employing members of lobbying firms to portray a positive and upbeat image of 
China (for example, Joshua Cooper Ramo from Kissinger Associates, and 
Kenneth Lieberthal of Stonebridge International).128 
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SHORT BUSINESS CASE STUDIES 
General Motors129 
General Motors is an American company that fights against restrictions on US-
China trade, because China’s growing auto-market might help save GM’s 
struggling US operations. While it is possibly “the lowest moment in history” for 
one of America’s iconic industrial companies, China provides GM with a 
“parallel universe”: it is a market where business couldn’t be much better for 
the venerable automaker. While global sales for the auto industry were forecast 
to fall nearly 9% in 2009, according to market-research firm CSM Worldwide, 
Chinese auto-sales were expected to rise 8%.130 General Motors in the United 
States may be “saddled with gas-guzzling car models nobody wants while it 
loses customers to rivals,” but in China, ten years after the first GM cars rolled 
off Chinese assembly lines, the company is “neck and neck” with Volkswagen for 
the lead in market-share.131 
With the new restructuring plans for GM, due to its difficult financial 
situation, government and bank plans for recovery likely to spark some future 
controversy, or at least conflict between necessary corporate strategy and 
political priorities.  
Following the April 2009 announcement that the US government would 
own a 50% stake in the company, and the United Auto Workers union (UAW) a 
further 40%, GM’s board faced a “confounding choice”: Should GM shore up its 
competitiveness by exporting more cars from China to the US and other 
markets, despite the inevitable loss of more UAW jobs this would entail? While 
that might make sense as a corporate strategy, the UAW and its supporters 
argued that “a China-centric manufacturing strategy would defeat the very 
reason GM is being rescued in the first place: to preserve some of America’s 
shrinking industrial base while propping up the economy.”132 It is not clear how 
exactly General Motors would have preserved America’s shrinking industrial 
base, considering their plan stated “employment reductions” as a means for 
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moving forward,133 and did not address outsourcing policies or concerns 
regarding China. 
Ralph Nader, an opponent of job outsourcing and one-time presidential 
candidate, lobbied Senator Chris Dodd and Representative Barney Frank 
(chairmen of the Senate and House committees involved in discussions on the 
Auto Industry Bailout), voicing the concern of many that General Motors’ 
bailout would not return jobs to the United States: 
“... although the company has stated after negative publicity that it 
will not export from China, there is no evidence that it is abandoning 
the business model of outsourcing production for the U.S. market, 
and questions remain about how binding is the recent commitment 
not to export to the United States from China.”134 
General Motors was predicted to post a profit in 2010, as it started to pay 
back some of the $52 billion US government loan. This increase in revenue was, 
in part, a result of increased sales in China. 
 
Cisco Systems & Huawei 
In 2003, Cisco Systems – an American high-end consumer electronics 
manufacturer – found itself in competition with up-and-coming Chinese rival, 
Huawei. Whereas the GM case is one of China benefiting an American 
corporation, the case of Cisco and Huawei is the opposite: an example of a 
Chinese upstart threatening an established American brand, and one that has 
echoes in other US-China cases. 
Huawei was able to provide similar products to those produced by Cisco, 
at a fraction of the price. Part of the reason is the lower wages in China: its 
thousands of engineers, highly educated and trained, are paid top dollar by 
Chinese standards; its salespeople also earn high wages by local standards. In 
both cases, wages are nowhere near that of Western counterparts. “Huawei 
could, in short, make similar products, sell them for less money, and generate 
immense profits, which it then plowed back into research and development.” In 
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2001, Huawei’s sales were $250 million but, by 2004, had grown to $2.5 billion. 
This impressive growth and success, coupled with Huawei’s secretive CEO, the 
corporation’s shadowy connections to China’s PLA, and also Huawei’s proposed 
2003 joint-venture with Cisco’s American rival, 3Com Corporation, made Cisco 
nervous. 
In testimony before the US Senate, Ted C. Fishman (author of China, Inc.) 
reported that “Huawei... basically built itself into a multi-billion-dollar company 
by copying virtually everything in the Cisco catalog, including the catalog.”135 
During the Huawei-3Com joint venture negotiations, Cisco filed suit in the US 
against Huawei, claiming that its products were not low-priced substitutes, but 
low-priced copies made from “illegally pirated software and a host of other 
infringements on Cisco’s intellectual property.”136 Specifically, the suit claimed 
that Huawei was involved in “systematic and wholesale infringement of Cisco’s 
intellectual property”, and that the “extent of [Huawei]’s copying and 
misappropriation of Cisco’s intellectual property is staggering”, including 
source codes, “verbatim” copies of Cisco manuals, and their proprietary user 
interface design.137 The suit Cisco brought was settled out of court. “We do not 
know the terms of the settlement,” says Fishman. “[I]t will be very interesting to 
know whether part of the terms of that settlement was access to the Chinese 
market by Cisco, but there was no redress on the piracy itself.”138 
Accusations of intellectual property theft are common in US-China 
relations. There is clear precedent for this paranoia, of course. In 2003, 
Shanghai Jiaotong University Professor Chen Jin led a team to develop China’s 
first home-grown semiconductor chip industry (a high priority among China’s 
leadership). It was revealed in 2006 that the chips Hanxin produced were just 
Motorola chips, on which migrant workers had simply scratched away the name 
‘Motorola’ from a chip and replaced it with ‘Hanxin’.139 In the case of Cisco and 
Huawei, Karabell argues that it is probably more accurate to say that Huawei 
engineers reverse-engineered Cisco’s products – they “disassembled them, 
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studied them, and then figured out a way to create similar products on their 
own.”140 
The timing of the suit, not to mention the quiet settlement (as Fishman 
said, believed to have included greater access to the Chinese market), raised 
questions about Cisco’s true motives. Whether Cisco was, in fact, worried about 
its intellectual property, or whether the company was more concerned about 
the prospect of the Huawei-3Com alliance competing with Cisco in the US and 
Europe, “undercutting its market share with lower-cost products that worked 
just as well.”141 
Huawei did not escape these events unscathed, and it is becoming clear 
that the corporation has been irreparably damaged by their dispute with Cisco, 
in the eyes of American politicians. After the joint venture with 3Com collapsed, 
Huawei, now a global player in telecoms, “went out and bought the Qualcomm 
patent portfolio”, which gave it access to 30,000 legitimate patents. Fishman 
characterised deals like the Qualcomm purchase as threatening to US interests: 
“... these intellectual piracy regimes in a way become like the Mafia buying the 
liquor store. They can legitimate themselves once they grow to scale. That is 
quite a threat.”142 
Two separate incidents are indicative of the national security argument 
that has come to define American legislator’s concerns about Huawei. First, and 
related to the Cisco case, was Huawei’s 2007 attempt to buy a minority stake in 
3Com, a move that received considerable opposition among American 
legislators, and an eventual Congressional block to the deal. Championed by 
Florida Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (and co-sponsored by seven other 
Representatives), House of Representatives bill (H.R. 730) highlighted the links 
between Huawei and the People’s Liberation Army, voiced concern over 
Huawei’s “opaque” corporate structure considered to be “one of the least 
transparent” companies in China, and suggested that “the merger be blocked 
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due to national security concerns, the export of sensitive technologies.”143 The 
bill passed. 
In 2010, Huawei’s attempts to expand their operations in the United States 
came under attack – again due to national security concerns. Despite Texas 
Governor Perry’s attempts to persuade Huawei to expand their operations in 
his state, the US intelligence community pressed Sprint, a US telecoms company 
who wanted to build a national 4G network, to not use Huawei components, 
“fearing the company’s close ties to the People’s Liberation Army would 
effectively give the Chinese government a listening post in every cell tower of 
the new wireless network.”144 The same members of the Senate145 lobbied 
President Obama directly, informing the president in a letter that any Huawei 
contribution to the 4G network project could “undermine U.S. national 
security”. The Senators pointed also to “China’s well documented focus on 
developing cyber warfare capabilities”, which would supposedly be advanced 
by Huawei involvement in the construction of the American 4G network.146 
 
CASE STUDY: PRESIDENT CLINTON & THE MFN DEBATE 
There were two broad camps involved in the Most Favoured Nation debate. 
Opposed to renewal, or at least favouring conditionality, were human rights 
groups, labour unions, religious groups, and Chinese student groups. On the 
other side, favouring the renewal of MFN, were business and farm lobbies (e.g. 
the Business Coalition for U.S.-China Trade). While these groups “did have an 
impact on the early stages of the policy process”, broader domestic political 
goals and international pressures ultimately shaped the policy choices made by 
the Clinton administration. “Thus, while interest groups’ actions can no longer 
be ignored by policy analysis, their policy influence remains only minor.”147 
At each stage of the yearly MFN debates, organised interest groups 
capitalised on widening policy differences to maximise their own influence. 
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With each successive year, as Congressmen searched for ever-more targeted 
policy prescriptions and rationales, either to thwart or support MFN, the 
possible alternatives grew, and “the search for appropriate policy approaches... 
opened the door for NGOs and other interest groups to become more influential 
in advancing ideas and alternatives.”148 
President Clinton’s first two years in office had seen a considerable push 
to bring human rights to the forefront of US foreign policy. China, therefore, 
“was squarely in the sights of the human rights lobby.”149 It was believed that 
the Clinton administration would be more amenable to working with special 
interests, certainly more so than George H.W. Bush’s administration, which had 
maintained “cool” relations with human rights lobbyists. According to Sutter, 
presidential “vacillation and uncertainty put the administration in a passive 
position, responding to a tug-of-war between competing U.S. groups” during 
Clinton’s time in office.150 However, despite the pressure exerted on the 
administration by human rights lobbies, President Clinton made a controversial 
decision in the spring of 1994 to delink China’s most-favoured-nation (MFN) 
trade-status from its poor human rights record. The debate and policy process 
of this decision makes for a good case study of the impact special interests have 
on US foreign policy. 
Under Clinton, human rights lobbyists not only had key allies within the 
administration, but Clinton’s appointees actively requested information from 
these groups. John Shattuck, the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights 
and Humanitarian Affairs, had “regular biweekly meetings with interest group 
officials.” While human rights groups enjoyed direct access to key and high-level 
government officials, the business lobbies also remained highly active. Three 
dozen business, agricultural and consumer associations formed the Business 
Coalition for U.S.-China Trade, and directly lobbied the president (though were 
unable to meet in person with Clinton), with the help of an active group of 
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congressional moderates led by Congressman Lee Hamilton (D-IN), who was 
Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.151 
After Tiananmen, American policy-makers had been “torn between the 
desire to open China to Western and American business interests on the one 
hand and to take a strong stand against the autocratic Chinese government on 
the other.”152 President Clinton’s initial ambiguity over China policy – needing 
to balance his campaign promise of making China’s MFN status conditional, and 
his wish to improve economic and general relations with China – meant interest 
groups continued major lobbying efforts to influence administration 
decisions.153 Indeed, in 1994, with the termination of China’s MFN status a real 
possibility for the first time (due to internal splits in the administration and 
Congress), Dietrich states that the business community, wishing to leave 
nothing to chance, “organised one of the most extensive lobbying efforts ever 
made on a foreign policy issue”, spearheaded by the US-China Business Council, 
the Emergency Committee for American Trade, and a selection of other 
business and agricultural lobbies.154 
Delinking China’s MFN status from human rights considerations is 
considered a “watershed” moment in the bilateral relationship, because it “gave 
the green light” for businesses to go to China, and allowed companies that 
already had a presence there to accelerate their plans.155 The rush of American 
businesses into China, as a result of “uncoupling morality from business”,  
“set back the agenda of those who wanted to use economic ties as a 
carrot to induce the Chinese government to change the nature of the 
political and legal system in China.”156 
The tactic of using MFN in a carrot-and-stick approach to China was 
widely popular among many groups who attempted to influence the debate. 
Mike Jendrzejczyk, representing first Asia Watch and later Amnesty 
International USA, referred to MFN as a “blunt tool”, yet one to which there was 
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no “alternative that represents the same kind of power and leverage”.157 
According to Jendrzejczyk, it is “simply impossible” to separate China’s 
behaviour as a reliable trading partner from its unwillingness to comply with 
human rights norms: “A government that routinely violates its own laws to 
crack down on dissidents is equally willing and able to cheat on an IPR 
agreement, not honour a contract with a foreign investor, or to restrict 
information from business services or the Internet coming into China from 
outside the country.”158 
Jendrzejczyk was one of the most vocal opponents to MFN renewal and 
the Clinton administration’s policy of delinkage. His was a position supported 
by others, however, including: the National Council on Chinese Affairs;159 the 
Puebla Institute (a human rights group), who cautioned the administration to 
“not be satisfied with cosmetic gestures and isolated promises” from the 
Chinese government.160 Religious groups – from those representing the 
interests of persecuted Christians in China,161 and especially Tibetan groups 
(International Campaign for Tibet in particular)162 were equally active and 
vocal about their preference for using MFN as a ‘stick’ to urge or force 
improvements in China’s approach to and respect for human rights. 
One of the main reasons for this move away from a ‘moral’ approach to the 
US-China relationship had to do with the changing nature of US-China bilateral 
trade. In 1990, when the MFN issue first emerged, US-China trade was small and 
limited to a few specific sectors. By 1994, American imports from China had 
more than doubled to approximately $38 billion annually (exports to China had 
still grown, though not nearly as fast).163 Clear prospects of major infrastructure 
improvements in China (partly a result of investments by US corporations such 
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as FedEx), made considerable future market growth possible, giving the 
administration and American businesses a new appreciation of China’s future 
potential. William Warwick told Secretary of State Warren Christopher, “Either 
we establish a major presence in the Chinese market, or we forget about being a 
global player.”164 A executive of the McDonnell Douglas Corporation (appearing 
also as a representative of the Emergency Committee on American Trade), K.R. 
Williams stated that China is a “market for huge potential for U.S. firms and 
workers”, particularly in airplane industry, and withdrawal of MFN would only 
hurt American businesses and jobs and benefit foreign competitors who would 
be able to reap the rewards of China’s ever-growing market.165 The sentiment 
was also voiced by Robert A. Kapp, representing the US-China Business Council, 
saying that revoking MFN would be a “catastrophe” that would cut America “off 
from the very dynamic region that President Clinton has proclaimed to be the 
key ingredient in our economic survival in the future.”166 
The potential for market growth, according to Dietrich, led business 
interests away from the controversial argument that increased economic ties 
would lead to greater liberalisation in China. Now, the argument was that 
maintaining China’s MFN status would help the US economy and jobs, thereby 
appealing more to the US’s strategic economic interests rather than ideological 
interests.167 The growing support for human-rights-conditionality to MFN, and 
the resultant threat to growing trade relations (not to mention US investments 
already made in China’s economy), brought new interest groups into the policy 
debate to counter these idealistic groups. For example, “Business and farm 
groups argued that sharp tariff increases would hurt importers and consumers, 
while potential Chinese retaliatory tariffs would hurt exporters.”168 Therefore, 
MFN renewal received considerable support from such groups as the American 
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Association of Exporters & Importers,169 the National Retail Federation,170 the 
Toy Manufacturers of America,171 the textiles industry was widely 
represented,172 the U.S. Chamber of Commerce,173 the American Electronics 
Association (which submitted a letter signed by 144 business leaders urging 
renewal),174 and others. On top of this, the threat of revocation spurred further 
involvement from several Fortune 500 companies, and some of the most 
powerful businessmen in America (for example, Bill Gates).175 To refer back to 
the textiles industry, however, this was an industry that was not unified behind 
the renewal of MFN. Exporters and importers saw MFN renewal favourably, 
however the American Textile Manufacturers Institute considered MFN a 
privilege that China had not earned, and that Chinese imports competed 
unfairly with American-produced products.176 
There is another factor to take into consideration. Ross Munro (a staunch 
China-critic) has accused China of “turning their burgeoning economic power 
into a political and diplomatic weapon” during the MFN debate. To help shore 
up support from the business community, the Chinese “dangled billions of 
dollars’ worth of trade and investment” opportunities in front of American 
corporations. Many of these deals were concluded well before the June deadline, 
and Beijing “made it clear that these deals would collapse if the Clinton 
administration carried out its threat to suspend MFN”.177 The lack a “coherent 
multilateral approach for promoting human rights and the rule of law in China”, 
allowed lobbying and manipulation from special interests and China itself, as 
“Beijing play[ed] off one major trading partner against another”, wielding its 
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“economic clout” to undercut any moves to sanction China on human rights 
grounds.178 
While much of the attention during the MFN debate was focussed on the 
efforts of business groups, other interest groups were actively involved with 
different concerns. The labour movement got involved for an entirely different 
set of reasons to the human rights lobby. For example, the AFL-CIO was in 
favour of revoking China’s MFN status, and its perceived motivations were an 
“amalgam of legitimate human rights concerns” about the use of forced labour 
in China, and “trade protectionism.”179 Richard L. Trumka, Secretary-Treasurer 
of the AFL-CIO at the time, explained the group’s opposition to MFN: “China’s 
continued denial of basic worker and human rights”, “non-reciprocal, unfair 
trading relationship that is harmful to U.S. workers”, and the fact that “there is 
nothing today that suggests that China is willing to act in accordance with 
international trading rules of basic democratic principles.” Trumka also decried 
“the unwillingness of the United States” to address these issues. The AFL-CIO 
representative laid much of the blame at the feet of US business interests, one of 
the “major forces” behind the pro-MFN extension debate: “much of the passion 
in this discussion is a result of corporate decisions to use China as a low-cost 
production location”, and any action on the part of the US government could 
jeopardize existing or planned investment, which had been estimated at the 
time to be as high as $25 billion. “We have reached the point where the most 
ardent defenders of Chinese communism are U.S. capitalists.”180 The labour 
movement opposed China’s MFN status for much the same reasons that it 
opposed NAFTA, “in particular its interest in avoiding additional foreign 
competition.” The focus on prison labour in China, Teles asserts, “while 
certainly legitimate on human rights grounds, is tailor-made for keeping certain 
goods out of U.S. markets, and out of competition with U.S. workers.”181 
The debate over China’s MFN status is perhaps one of the few in which 
influence can be ascertained clearly. However, this does come with a caveat: 
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lobby influence was balanced by Clinton’s own political needs at the time. At the 
signing of the executive order, a number of special interests’ representatives 
were present, however this “may have been more symbolic than substantive”, 
but it also made clear that interest groups participated in the debate, fulfilling a 
number of functions. Most importantly, they helped shape the debate: human 
rights organisations, labour and Chinese student groups were “very successful 
in highlighting China’s abuses”, business groups “helped shift attention to the 
commercial benefits”, and many groups provided much-needed information to 
members of Congress and the administration.182 
As the debate developed over the years, it is possible to witness the 
evolution of the debate and the rhetorical framework in which it was 
conducted. The vast majority of witnesses at Congressional hearings over 
renewal of China’s MFN status, throughout the Clinton administration, 
condemned and recognised China’s poor human rights record, and even the 
most ardent opponents to renewal recognised that there are business 
opportunities to be exploited for the benefit of the United States. As the debate 
drew on, the support for delinking also grew – even human rights groups and 
dissident groups came to accept that MFN was a separate issue to human rights, 
and therefore ought to be dealt with separately by the US government.183 This 
reality, therefore, created the following general impression: ‘Revoke MFN, and 
we’ll see either no change or a decline in China’s human rights, and be 
weakened economically in vital industries. Renew and/or delink MFN from 
human rights, and America will benefit economically and there may be 
improvements in human rights.’184 Given President Clinton’s and his 
administration’s clear economic priorities, it is little wonder MFN was 
eventually delinked entirely from human rights issues – the prospect for 
‘crippling’ American businesses, and costing American jobs185 would have been 
too costly politically. 
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Ultimately, Clinton did not decide on the terms of the executive order 
because of the concerns and needs of special interests. Instead, he chose the 
terms to “balance the domestic political needs of upholding his campaign pledge 
and avoiding a clash with his own party in Congress”, and also a wider foreign 
policy goal of “not having unreachable conditions that would guarantee a clash 
with China.”186 
 
ACADEMIA & CHINA 
Believed to be objective observers of American politics, academic institutions 
and think tanks can still be influenced by the agendas of their financial backers, 
and therefore a ‘special interest’. James Mann considers Washington think tanks 
as “those peculiar institutions” where ideas are sometimes formulated and then 
“ignored when they don’t serve the hidden financial or other interests that help 
determine the work of think tanks.”187 Halper and Clarke have written that 
activist and outside funding can influence think tanks to sponsor specific 
positions on important contemporary issues. While there is plenty of 
disagreement among members of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) on 
‘conservative’ issues, they nevertheless “proceed largely from a common 
ideological basis that keeps these disagreements within well-defined 
bounds.”188 
In the realm of US-China relations, there are clear examples of when think 
tanks or other institutions have pursued specific policy proposals to please 
financial supporters. This is an inherent element of the think tank system and 
culture: a think tank is unlikely to attract funding from a source that is of 
opposing ideological leanings. For example, the Heritage Foundation and AEI 
receive financial support from the Korean Foundation and Samsung, who 
“support an agenda-driven discourse on issues such as Taiwanese 
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independence, North Korean non-proliferation, and Chinese human rights 
abuses,”189 all of which come through in Heritage and AEI publications. 
The Brookings Institute is perhaps the most ideologically broad think tank 
in America, with fellows espousing a multitude of conflicting positions: “in the 
summer of 2005, [its fellows] included supporters of the Iraq War and 
opponents of it, advocates of a realist engagement with Chinese economic 
expansion and advocates of a sustained trade embargo on grounds of human 
rights abuses.”190 The Brookings Institute is, however, a near-oddity among the 
growing ranks of think tanks and policy shops, many of which – like lobbies – 
are formed to push certain agendas. 
Despite the influence of money in political research on US-China relations, 
it is a special case. There appears to be “a strong reluctance to challenge the 
status quo” on China, and also “a willingness to ignore or explain away China’s 
continuing repression.” This is because there are growing incentives for 
prominent Americans to support this status quo; that is, a commitment to open 
markets and economic engagement with China. James Mann, a vocal critic of 
academics’ approaches to US-China relations, also found, “not infrequently, a 
strong sympathy with China’s leaders and their problems, despite the 
authoritarian nature of the system.”191 Mann refers to this as the “Embattled 
Elites Equivalence and Commiseration School”,192 but could also be described as 
a type of Political Stockholm Syndrome. 
Whenever there is an important US-China summit, meeting, or official 
visit, or a major international event involving China, “one can count on 
America’s leading China scholars rushing to publish newspaper op-ed pieces 
explaining the extraordinary difficulties Chinese leaders face.” Whenever the 
Chinese leadership carries out a new campaign of arresting dissidents or closing 
down newspapers, the opposite is true, and “the China specialists seem to 
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vanish from public view.”193 This could be seen as an example of symbiosis of 
the various non-governmental influences on US foreign policy. 
As mentioned earlier, many former officials who used to provide 
dispassionate guidance on foreign and domestic policy issues have become 
lobbyists and consultants for American and foreign businesses: “Former 
Secretaries of State make provocative public statements defending China while 
not revealing their own financial stake in the current Chinese government.”194 
James Mann has pointed out that there are “huge and growing financial 
incentives” for prominent, former-government officials to support the status 
quo in China.195 
Business organisations continue to depend upon the intellectual prestige 
of those who are respected in the international relations field, but “there is a 
sense that they are less influential than they once were.” An unnamed business 
organisation representative explained to Teles in 1996, that it is good to “get a 
Scowcroft or an Eagleburger to make a big statement or do some huge op-ed... 
that’s supposed to affect the process.” The source did admit that there was only 
limited support or benefit from such a tactic, as it happens quite often.196 
Any perceived decline in influence that former notables may have in the 
China debate is unlikely to affect one former Secretary of State: Henry Kissinger. 
Throughout the research for this chapter, Kissinger’s consultancy, Kissinger 
Associates, is mentioned as being an enormous influence on the US-China 
debate. This is understandable, given Kissinger’s long-time interest in China, his 
role in normalisation, and also his general international prestige. Kissinger 
enjoys “extremely close ties to the Chinese leadership” and much of the 
business for his consultancy “involves opening doors for Western companies 
seeking to do business in China.”197 His consultancy (or “strategic advisory 
firm”), has been criticised for being too overtly pro-China. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, Joshua Cooper Ramo’s coverage of the 2008 Beijing Olympics, 
was criticised for its uncritical representation of China; according to Silverstein, 
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he “couldn’t find enough wonderful things to say about China”,198 the 
implication being that Ramo’s (and therefore Kissinger Associate’s) positive 
reporting on China is the result of future-business calculations. 
James Mann believes those with personal interests in keeping relations 
with China open and free of conflict have created a “Soothing Scenario”, which 
“holds that China’s economic development will lead inexorably to an opening of 
China’s political system.” This is merely one of the possible outcomes for China’s 
future, but “it is certainly the mainstream view of China in America today.” The 
purveyors of the Soothing Scenario include: “leading academic experts on China, 
business executives who are eager to trade and invest in China, and the think 
tanks and other elite organisations that depend on corporate contributions for 
their funding.”199 
Many think tanks in America get sizeable donations from business 
executives and companies who are doing business in China. The donors “seek to 
foster policies that will protect or augment their financial interests.” Some think 
tanks, in turn, swayed by these donations, might “issue a flurry of studies and 
reports supporting trade with China and other policies that favour the 
American business community.”200 There is, therefore, a “palpable worry in 
Washington that the US is tangled in a Faustian bargain that may not end 
well.”201  
This “deluge of money” has had a considerable impact. Mann argues that 
the effect has been to “skew American discussions about China toward an 
upbeat, pro-business viewpoint.” While not every China specialist thinks alike 
(there are still plenty of dissenters and more cautious scholars), one 
nevertheless finds “recurrent ideas, themes, and attitudes” evident in much 
scholarship and think tank output on China. “The underlying tone is one of 
defensiveness about China’s one-party state and an instinctive reluctance, 
particularly in public, to criticise or even call attention to repression of 
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dissent.”202 Mann criticises the overly-funded pro-business stance 
predominantly because it obscures or ignores human rights abuses in China. He 
does not, however, write much on what his opinion of China’s economic impact 
on the US really is, or whether it’s something that should be of concern.  
There is a potentially nefarious impact of outside influence on think tanks 
and academics. If academics feel pressured to conform to certain principles, or 
to water-down discussion about China, then their work is compromised – 
especially if they believe their positions at these institutions to be at stake. 
According to The Weekly Standard, Ross Munro was fired from his post as 
Director of the Asia program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI), 
after his book The Coming Conflict With China (referenced in this chapter) was 
published. According to the article, this was “because FPRI was pressured by 
what [Munro’s] book calls ‘the New China Lobby’.” The article goes on to 
suggest that former Secretary of State Alexander Haig (identified in the book as 
being a member of this new lobby) “hated the book… And the next thing anyone 
knows, Munro is suddenly fired.”203 While it is not possible to confirm the 
allegations made against Haig, if it were true, this would set a dangerous 
precedent for future China scholarship at outside-funded institutions. 
In 1998, Teles described experts as “the dog that has not bitten in the 
China debate so far,” as a result of a lack of consensus on China. While most 
China experts agree that it is in America’s interest to integrate China into an 
international rule-based economic and political system, which should exert 
pressure on the regime to give the rule of law and conformance with 
international standards higher priority, “there is not yet consensus-level 
agreement that a primarily economic, conflict-averse relationship is the way to 
get there.” This lack of consensus means there is no disciplining force for public 
and policy-maker opinion: 
“Without such a discipline, of the kind that only experts can provide, 
and presidential leadership can cement, policy toward China is likely 
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to sway with the relative power of interest groups, shifts in public 
opinion, and the salience of various domestic public policy issues.”204 
While Mann and others identify an overtly positive or neutral position 
toward China among academics, there is a significant group who actively seek 
to promote the opposite position. Specifically, ‘neoconservative’ academics have 
been particularly negative about China and its relationship with the US. 
According to Robert Scheer, “the neocons so desperately need the Chinese 
Communists” in order to justify their imperialistic goals and closeness to the US 
defence industry. The neoconservative portrayal of the Chinese is as 
“the Chicoms of old, the ‘yellow horde’ as once described in racist 
terms, that threatens us with wile and ingenuity, given to sneaky 
spying ways, the masters of the most enormously expensive and 
destructive gadgets in the arsenal of the devil.”205 
The perceived Chinese threat was a neocon preoccupation before 9/11. 
Scheer argues that, “In their eagerness to build an empire based on an immense 
U.S. military, they require a formidable nation-state enemy. China is the best 
candidate to fill that vacancy.”206 While neoconservatives have received a 
critical blow to their reputation and influence in Washington, in the aftermath 
of the Bush administration and the perceived debacle in Iraq, some of their 
ideas and goals remain. China is still a popular ‘threat’ offered by Congressmen, 
Pentagon officials, and others who wish to generate support for increased 
defence-spending or specific funding for expensive new weapons systems. 
 
CHINA’S LOBBYING 
While many major foreign governments continue to work predominantly 
through their embassies in Washington, “nearly one hundred countries rely on 
lobbyists to protect and promote their interests.”207 One of the most significant 
developments in recent years has been the growth in China’s efforts at lobbying 
the US Congress.  
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“For years, the lobby that promoted Taiwanese interests, known simply as 
the China lobby, was the superpower of lobbies representing foreign causes in 
the United States.” After Madame Chiang-kai Shek addressed a joint session of 
Congress in February 1943, until the 1970s, “no U.S. president challenged the 
so-called China lobby, which opposed all contacts with mainland China.” 
Newhouse argues that China chose not to emulate Taiwan’s lobbying efforts 
because of a strong Westphalian/realist belief that “players on the world scene 
should not interfere in one another’s internal affairs”, and the concept struck 
Beijing as “morally tainted”. Instead of lobbying, they focused their attention on 
cultivating close relationships with important figures in US politics – such as 
former Secretaries of State Kissinger and Brzezinski,208 and lobbying by proxy 
(through business interests). After China’s ascension to the WTO, however, 
some business groups started to lose their enthusiasm to lobby for a growing 
competitor. 
Two instances changed Beijing’s position on lobbying. First, the severe 
reactions from all sectors in the US following the crackdown in Tiananmen 
Square, and again in 1995 when the Clinton administration granted Taiwanese 
President Lee Teng-hui a visa. China’s considerable purchases of US Treasury 
Bonds, and that the US is a major destination for Chinese exports, were two 
further incentives to increase lobbying efforts.209 John Pomfret notes that 
China’s lobbying efforts have become “increasingly sophisticated” recently, and 
have resulted in an effective “congressional about-face” in tone.210 
Beijing has sought the services of a number of respected lobbying firms in 
Washington. For example, to help deal with textile tariffs and quotas when they 
were high on the political agenda, Hogan & Hartson (“one of Washington’s 
largest law firms”) and McDermott Will & Emery were retained by Beijing to 
lobby on China’s behalf. Patton Boggs was later hired as well, and reportedly 
had meetings with 13 of the 18 members of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee.211 
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Another relatively early foray into lobbying was when China attempted to 
buy Unocal in June 2005, through the 71% government-owned CNOOC and with 
the help of respected lobbying firm Akin Gump. They were confronted with a 
much stronger and larger lobbying effort on behalf of Chevron. “Lobbyists 
working for Chevron wrapped their argument in nationalism, portraying 
CNOOC as a predatory arm of China’s leadership looking to acquire a high-value 
U.S. asset”,212 and were ultimately able to stop the sale. 
China’s efforts have not just focused on the spectre of economic or 
political repercussion for those who criticise China. Zhou Wenzhong, China’s 
ambassador to the US, personally met about 100 Congressmen and Senators in 
their own districts during his four years in the capital, a charm offensive that 
has reaped a good deal of success. Now, troublesome politicians are charmed, 
rather than denounced on the front pages of the People’s Daily. Senators Chuck 
Schumer (D-NY) and Lindsay Graham (R-SC), for example, were invited to visit 
China after proposing a bill that would slap a severe 27.5% tariff on Chinese 
goods unless the yuan was revalued, and upon their return they moderated 
their approach, having clearly been charmed by officials in Beijing.213 
 
CONCLUSION 
There is no doubt that lobbying efforts in Washington have expanded 
considerably over the last decade. The world and Washington are “abuzz with 
thousands of nongovernmental organizations”. Considering this cacophony of 
voices shouting to be heard on any given issue, it is difficult for any one voice to 
dominate the debate. Therefore, the dominant framework in policy-making 
remains the nation-state, “defined by its borders, its bureaucracies, its armies, 
central banks, and individual currencies.”214 
Despite frequent left-wing conspiracy-laden theories to the contrary, and 
hundreds of volumes that supposedly support them, “The big secret of 
Washington is that there is no single elite able to plot world domination from 
the dusty reading rooms of the city’s luncheon clubs.” Halper and Clarke 
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reported one government official describing the policy-making process as an 
almost futile cry for attention: “You wake up in the morning, spend your whole 
day fighting to be heard, go to bed and start all over the next day.”215 
Lawrence Davidson has argued that, because fundamental campaign 
finance reform is not on the horizon, interest group politics will continue to 
define how American political business is conducted. As a result, the only 
available option is to reinforce the lobbying culture: 
“For those... disappointed with the consequences of this system, the 
only present answer is to organise new interest groups to challenge 
those groups you dislike. For, in the American system of politics, qui 
tacet consentire videtur, ‘the one who is silent is seen to consent’.”216 
When it comes to US-China policy, given the importance of the 
relationship and its predominantly economic nature, “it is difficult to tell 
whether the groups themselves have contributed to the policy divergences over 
China in the past decade or have merely exploited already existing 
differences.”217 The United States relies on a free and open market system, 
which the work of lobbyists can help to promote, thereby benefiting and 
conforming to the national interest. The role of foreign national interests is also 
important and cannot be discounted, because they are able to tap into specific, 
existing biases of government officials – either by promoting good relations as a 
source of trade and opportunity, or by creating alliances against shared enemies 
and/or threats. However, given the difficulty in measuring influence, the 
findings of this chapter would suggest that lobbies, think tanks and other non-
governmental interests are, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, are “pushing 
against an open door”,218 and therefore able to find receptive audiences. 
The “already existing differences” in American foreign policy dialogues 
are, effectively, manifestations of US foreign policy traditions. Just as certain 
media outlets focus on threat, advantage, or values, so too do special interests in 
American politics. In the case of China, we can see how the bilateral relationship 
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is used to justify both realist and liberal foreign policy prescriptions. Economic 
and business interests promote specific and usually narrow policies that suit 
America’s traditional mercantile realism (some, like the US Business Council, do 
promote more general interests). Equally, as the only credible, potential large-
scale threat to US security, defence industry lobbies and Congressional ‘hawks’ 
are able to push their own agendas as well, appealing to the more nationalist 
realist tradition. Perceived as a continued, unapologetic abuser of human rights, 
China offers a target for lobbies that push liberal-moralist prescriptions and 
allows them to paint China as inimical to America’s traditional values. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH & CHINA POLICY 
 
There remains one important question: can the relevant agencies in the U.S. 
federal government plan, coordinate, and execute grand strategy with sufficient 
competence to secure the nation and defend its vital interests? This thesis has 
already looked at the media and special interests and how they try to exert 
influence on the foreign policy-making process. They have their own concepts, 
inputs, processes and outputs towards their understanding and portrayal of, 
and approach to, China. However, these sectors of the foreign policy-making 
system do not ‘do’ grand strategy as outlined in the first chapter of this thesis. 
The only sector of foreign policy actors that can do this is the (collective) 
Executive Branch. 
In the United States, the significant influences on the foreign policy-
making process are “continually shifting, rendering consistent tracking of the 
process more difficult and increasing uncertainty about how and why decisions 
are actually made.”1 Just as Congressmen and Senators must contend with the 
political realities of Washington, the Executive Branch operatives are also 
subject to many of the same considerations, not to mention having to deal with 
members of Congress who try to impose their views on overall government 
policy. This is nothing new. Some may argue that the rise of K Street and the 
diversification of foreign policy actors have necessitated that a keen eye be kept 
on domestic politics. The truth, however, is that to fully understand American 
foreign policy, one must recognise that the “daily requirements for political 
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survival and the priority of domestic agendas” have always “been central 
foreign policy drivers” in Washington.2 
Due to the pluralist nature of American politics, it is important to 
understand the people involved in policy-making, as their prejudices and beliefs 
can help ascertain how or why they make certain decisions: 
“Foreign policy and national security decisions are multiple-value 
choices and are rarely reached on the basis of a single, overriding 
view of any single problem that excludes all other considerations. 
Domestic political considerations and personal interests are an 
inescapable part of the decision-making process, especially at the 
White House level.”3 
Therefore, one can acquire a “predictive handle” from knowing something 
of an official’s professional background.4 Perceptions of foreign policy issues, 
for all participants, are also “heavily shaded by their particular concerns,” and 
where individuals sit in the process can determine the “stakes that they see 
involved and hence the stand they take.”5 For example, what is for one 
participant primarily a budget concern could be an issue of foreign relations or 
congressional relations to another. Departments and organisations have 
different compositions and responsibilities.6 Officials at the OMB are likely to 
view most issues (from defence procurement to foreign aid) as predominantly 
budgeting concerns; while the State Department will view these issues in more 
amorphous terms such as  global communication and influence, and diplomatic 
perception. As the biggest spender of all, Pentagon officials will naturally 
perceive their yearly budget as extremely important, as they face procurement 
decisions, not to mention logistical costs and budgets for ongoing conflicts. In 
addition to these groups, White House staffers, presidential and congressional 
advisers have their own sets of interests; specifically, domestic politics and 
electoral concerns. White House advisers, “particularly those without any 
regular and routine responsibility for national security matters, often come to 
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see foreign policy issues largely in terms of domestic politics and the 
possibilities of their own involvement.”7 
Emerging from the Cold War, the US public had many things on their 
minds, but foreign policy was a lesser concern, unless there was some perceived 
linkage between a domestic and an international issue,8 or when American 
values or interests appeared threatened. This allows politicians to make 
connections between domestic and international affairs, which in turn can 
inflate their public importance. Regarding China, “political cycles have 
enormous impact”,9 as domestic issues (normative, security, and economic) 
often rise to the fore. 
 
COLLECTIVE EXECUTIVE: WHITE HOUSE, AGENCIES & FOREIGN POLICY 
As with domestic politics, foreign policy authority in the United States is divided 
among a number of institutions. How well they interact has a considerable 
impact on policy-making and policy–execution. Constitutionally, the President is 
Commander-in-Chief, but, without congressional support or acquiescence, he 
would find it hard to sustain protracted military or diplomatic engagements 
abroad. The Executive Branch implements trade law, but the Congress sets tariff 
levels. While the President negotiates treaties, the Senate must ratify them 
before they can take effect. The Executive Branch is charged with implementing 
policy, but the legislative branch has the responsibility to investigate 
implementation in a diverse range of areas – from alleged, illegal Chinese 
campaign contributions (1996), or sensitive technology transfers to China 
(1998-9). Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there are few Executive 
foreign policy principals who can escape the necessity of Senate confirmation – 
the key exceptions to this are the President’s White House staff – including the 
National Security Adviser.10 This latter point is important, as 
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“the modern trend, especially since the United States emerged from 
World War II as a global power, has been to expand the White House 
staff and institutions like the National Security Council (NSC) 
precisely to enable more centralised control, or at least better 
centralised coordination, over an expanding policy community.”11 
This expanding foreign policy community includes the departments of State, 
Defense, Treasury, Justice and (since 2001) Homeland Security, as well as the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 
National Security Agency (NSA), the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), the 
Military, and, growing in importance, trade and foreign aid departments. 
Presidential efforts to strengthen control over this expanding foreign policy 
community will only stimulate countertrends, including powerful “centrifugal 
forces” in Congress, the media, and other areas of the Executive Branch itself.12 
Law and custom dictate that the Cabinet officers involved in foreign policy will 
almost always include the Secretaries of State, Defence and Treasury, the 
National Security Adviser, and also various White House economic advisers and 
sometimes the US Trade Representatives. On military concerns (budget and 
deployment), the Joint Chiefs of Staff are consulted. The Director of National 
Intelligence is consulted when information about foreign governments or 
groups, particularly hostile ones, is important.13 
 
Each new administration brings an influx of new staffers and appointees, and 
new members of any department will come up against career officials who are 
set in their ways and often overly protective of their ‘turf’. Interdepartmental 
friction can depend on which department houses the strongest personalities, or 
has the closest ties to the president. A recurring problem, therefore, has been 
the balance “between coherence and discipline in presidential policy on the one 
hand, and bureaucratic collegiality on the other”14 
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Within the US government, there is a strong “socialisation process”, in 
which individuals who enter service with doubts about, or ignorance of, 
particular aspects of a set of shared bureaucratic images will “frequently find 
themselves quickly coming to support them.”15 In addition, both career and 
‘political’ professionals in a department “often develop more of a loyalty to their 
cabinet secretary... than to a president who is a more remote figure across 
town.” To a remarkable degree, a president can come to be viewed by the 
professionals as “an interloper in policies that their departments are immersed 
in on a daily basis,”16 which can result in increased resistance to new 
presidential initiatives. 
The socialisation process and strong departmental attachments can have a 
long-term impact on both career officials and political appointees. For example, 
Warren Christopher, who served as Deputy Secretary of State and Secretary of 
State (under Carter and Clinton, respectively), developed a strong respect for 
Foreign Service Officials; while Dick Cheney, who served as George H.W. Bush’s 
Secretary of Defence, would exhibit a strong bias for Department of Defence 
preferences and agendas. For the main, this is because career officials, including 
those who rise to the top of their organisations, “often develop their position 
largely by calculating the national interest in terms of the organisational 
interests of the career service to which they belong.” Halperin explains that 
even “in-and-outers” – political appointees or short-term officials – are also 
sometimes “captured” by the organisations that bring them into government, 
influencing their future positions to varying degrees.17 The downside to this 
socialisation is that “even seasoned veterans of the Washington scene usually 
know only the trade secrets of life in the branch in which they serve.” It does 
not appear common for an official to have served in multiple departments, 
which means “Mutual ignorance of one another’s world is often embarrassingly 
obvious when an executive branch witness testifies before Congress.”18 
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Some policy elites do circulate, displacing others “not just from one 
presidential administration to another, but also within a given presidency.” The 
impact this can have on US foreign policy was most evident in George W. Bush’s 
administration, after the ‘neo-cons’ were rotated out, and replaced by more 
realist advisors and officials. Robert Gates’ move to the Defence Department, 
Stephen Hadley’s appointment as National Security Adviser, and Condoleezza 
Rice’s move to the State Department all affected foreign relations, which had the 
knock-on effect of moderating Bush’s foreign policy, and making him more open 
to engagement and diplomacy. 
Halperin, Clapp and Kanter explain the basic function of State and the 
Foreign Service as: 
“as reporting on the activities of foreign governments that have 
relevance to the United States, general representation of American 
interests abroad, and negotiation of specific issues when directed by 
the government.”19 
The State Department is organised in a way that suits it to the leadership 
role in national security – it has a bureau of political-military affairs, and also a 
bureau devoted to economic and business issues, which provide it with broad 
expertise.20 However, even as long ago as the 1940s, President Harry Truman 
“often found himself railing at the indiscipline of the State Department,”21 a 
frustration shared by his presidential successors.  
Despite efforts to lessen its elitist self-image, and expand its officers 
involvement beyond diplomacy and reporting into more direct operations, as 
Halperin explains, Foreign Service officers still “view their enterprise as an elite 
organisation composed of generalists”, which means they frequently “resist the 
introduction into the department of novel functions and of experts who might 
be needed to perform those functions.”22 Equally, career diplomats in State and 
abroad will “tend to be more patient and have a higher tolerance for ambiguity 
than others, muddling on as need be through the most complex of 
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circumstances.” They may also be more resistant to major policy changes, shifts, 
and initiatives that substantially alter the status quo (such as Nixon’s opening 
up to China)23 meaning that “established modalities usually hold sway” and, as 
with most political issues, “changes in foreign policy tend to be incremental, not 
sweeping”.24 It is difficult for the status quo to be moved by presidents, and 
even less by those in positions of lesser authority,25 but not impossible – 
presidents and officials in whom they entrust the most power can, when 
conditions are right and given enough political will, have a considerable impact 
on foreign policy. New administrations can bring changes, but continuity is the 
norm. New thinking can, occasionally, result in substantial policy change: 
Richard Nixon dramatically departed from the norm by starting the 
normalisation process with China, and altered the long-standing and politically 
popular ties with Taiwan. Nixon’s success is an anomaly, however, and it is far 
more common that major departures in foreign policy will only occur when 
“external shocks force rethinking and policymakers coalesce on a new course of 
action”,26 such as the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
This tendency towards institutional inertia and the status quo has resulted 
in a gradual erosion in the State Department’s leadership position as other 
departments have strengthened their own international roles. Despite making 
provisions for the expanding importance of economics in foreign affairs, and 
improved links with the military establishment, other departments have been 
“less and less willing to submit to State’s direction” on foreign policy.27 The 
State Department is now routinely ignored in the development and articulation 
of foreign policy, as well as in the conduct of private and public diplomacy, and 
transfer of foreign assistance.28 For example, with their trade-promotion 
missions, the Commerce and Agriculture Departments have often opposed State 
Department initiatives29 that would impose sanctions on trade partners.  
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Between 1960 and 1998, the State Department grew from five ‘regional’ 
or ‘geographical’ bureaus and ten ‘functional’ bureaus (for example, the Bureau 
of International Organization Affairs and the Bureau of Economic Affairs, and so 
forth) to nineteen functional bureaus and one extra geographic bureau. This 
expansion came with a corresponding increase in personnel: in 1960, there 
were fifteen assistant secretaries and eighteen deputy assistant secretaries, but 
by 1998 these numbers had exploded to 25 assistant secretaries and 78 deputy 
assistant secretaries.30 This increase in functional bureaus and staffers, in 
addition to diminishing the relative power of geographical bureaus,31 has led to 
a proliferation of “complex competing interests at the working level.”32 For 
example, in the early 1990s, the State Department’s Bureau of Human Rights 
and East Asia-Pacific Bureau disagreed over linking China’s MFN renewal to 
human rights progress.33 The trends of enlargement and specialisation seen in 
the evolution of the State Department have been “broadly replicated” in other 
cabinet-level agencies with stakes in China-policy, including the Departments of 
Treasury and Defence, and also in the intelligence community.34 According to 
David Lampton, the result of this widespread “organisational constipation and 
growth” has been “that power flowed toward the White House”,35 with its more 
streamlined decision-making process, involving fewer actors with input in 
decisions. 
Over the post-war decades, there have been strong Secretaries of State – 
including Dean Acheson, John Foster Dulles, and Henry Kissinger – who were 
able to reassert some State dominance over America’s international relations. 
Unfortunately for the department, “this seems mainly to have been a function of 
personalities at the top – of the intellectual and physical energy of the cabinet 
secretary and the support of the president for this arrangement.” At other times, 
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State officials have been outperformed by the NSC staff, civilian appointees at 
the Pentagon, or other cabinet departments.36 
Defence policy is different to foreign policy, and the structure of the US 
government and policy-making apparatus means “there is no way for the 
President to bypass the Department of Defense on military operations”, and no 
way for an alternative mechanism to be created for determining defence 
budgets and programs.37 Each military service will naturally support foreign 
policies that “justify maintaining the forces that it believes are necessary to 
maintain the essence of the service” and will “favour strategies that presume 
that precisely those forces will be used in the event of hostilities.” The military 
will usually also support proposals that increase the chances of new equipment 
procurement.38 That being said, the military’s attitude toward overseas 
commitments and use of force is usually opposition (which “is surprising to 
observers who expect a bellicose approach”), and have generally “been opposed 
to or neutral on post-war American interventions.”39 
The foreign policy role of the president and his staff in the White House is 
profound. While the United States is believed to “have a government of laws and 
institutions rather than individuals”, in reality “who occupies the nation’s 
highest office can have profound repercussions.”40 It is in the global arena that 
the power of the presidency manifests in its “purest form”. During the Cold War, 
when the threat of mutually-assured nuclear destruction concentrated the 
minds of foreign policy actors, the president’s latitude for independent action 
was limited. However, in the post-Cold War world, it is much greater.41 
The president’s role in, and influence on, American foreign policy-making 
is “qualitatively different from those of any other participant.” With any 
important foreign policy issue, the president will likely be the principal 
decision-maker determining the general direction of actions.42 For this reason, 
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many participants in foreign policy-making will look to the president for their 
cues. Where career members of the government bureaucracy will look to the 
traditions of their organisations to draw clues of the national interest, “others, 
particularly in-and-outers at high levels, detect clues in their conception of 
presidential interests.”43 The president, therefore, serves as “the surrogate for 
the national interest.” The president’s perception and judgement of what is in 
the national interest (assuming he is able to articulate these interests) will be 
paramount. A strong president with a clear sense of direction and leadership 
can profoundly influence the shared perceptions of the bureaucrats, Congress, 
and the public.44 The president enjoys “extraordinary authority” in foreign 
policy, where in domestic policy “members of the legislative branch are more 
prone to guard their prerogatives from executive encroachments.”45  
There are, however, exigent factors that potentially impede a president’s 
decision-making, and sway the perceptions of other foreign policy actors. At 
times, public and congressional opposition to a president’s policy goals will 
become entrenched as a result of a particular media or legal event from which 
the president cannot easily disconnect his policy. Examples of this include 
George H.W. Bush’s need to respond to Tiananmen Square; Clinton’s 
impeachment; and the WMD revelations during George W. Bush’s 
administration. These exigent factors may be of secondary concern for 
presidents and their close associates, who frequently decide on what policies to 
favour “largely in relation to... maintaining power and getting re-elected.”46 
Unlike in Congress, where 435 Congressmen and a hundred Senators 
clamour for attention and agenda-setting rights, “in the White House... only one 
man’s vote is decisive.”47 That being said, the president is not just a single actor 
with multiple agents who merely follow his directions: the president is the 
focus of a “complex web” of advisers, with “common and conflicting goals”, in 
which a multitude of decisions are made on the whole range of domestic and 
foreign policy issues. A president must “select a team that possesses a diverse 
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range of skills... to suit his tastes, strengths and weaknesses, and sense of 
priorities.”48 In some administrations, this will result in a strong foreign policy 
team to either supplement a president who is engaged in foreign policy (e.g., 
George H.W. Bush), or to support a president with little interest or engagement 
in foreign policy (e.g., Clinton and Reagan).  
Advisors to inexperienced presidents, however, “may actually put their 
own goals ahead of the president,” effectively usurping presidential 
prerogative.49 Advisors can exert a measure of control by helping to shape the 
policy options the president receives, screening the information that crosses his 
desk, advising him on appropriate courses of action, and implementing his 
policies with “greater or lesser vigour”.50 Some advisors have actively 
prevented information from reaching the Oval Office, such as happened in the 
Eisenhower and Nixon Administrations, when Sherman Adams and H.R. 
Halderman (respectively), to varying degrees, controlled access zealously. In 
the Carter administration, which for three years had no chief of staff, Zbigniew 
Brzezinski controlled access to the president on matters of concern to him,51 
and frequently shut out opposing perspectives and proposals (especially with 
regards to China policy). 
The National Security Council (NSC) has become one of the most powerful 
foreign policy institutions in the American system – David Rothkopf has 
referred to it as the committee “Running the World”.52 The NSC is chaired by the 
president (or an appropriate surrogate), and the vice-president, the Secretaries 
of State and Defence and other key senior cabinet members are members. The 
Council was created through the National Security Act of 1947, to 
“advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, 
foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to 
enable the military services and other departments and agencies of 
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the government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving 
the national security.”53 
The creation of the NSC “effectively produce[d] two foreign ministries”, 
but with the White House-based Council’s easier access to the president 
bestowing on it greater influence in strategic and crisis decision making.54 The 
1947 Act bestowed upon the NSC a broad range of responsibilities, many of 
which conflict with those of the State and (to a lesser extent) Defence 
Departments. It is the NSC’s responsibility to “develop strategies to enable the 
United States Government to respond to transnational threats”, “monitor 
implementation of such strategies”, and also to act as an umbrella organisation 
for intergovernmental policy cohesion by “assist[ing] in the resolution of 
operational and policy differences among Federal departments”.55 This 
complicated the tasks of the Secretary of State, who was forced to contend not 
only with foreign governments but also with rival power centres in the 
Executive Branch.56 President Eisenhower would further institutionalise the 
NSC system, by creating the post of special assistant to the president for 
national security affairs,57 which became one of the most powerful, if 
contentious, positions in the foreign policy bureaucracy. Under President 
Kennedy, the NSC became, according to McGeorge Bundy, “essentially a 
presidential instrument”, and it was during Kennedy’s time that the concept of 
the NSC as presidential staff was born.58 
No organisational chart can truly show how an administration works in 
practice. In the American system, “intangibles reign” – global events, 
presidential character, Congressional mood, and public opinion can all affect 
governance.59 However, presidents in turn “come to rely most on individuals 
whose judgement (and loyalty) they have most confidence in.”60 This was 
particularly evident in the relationships between Nixon and Kissinger, and 
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Carter and Brzezinski – two professional relationships that provided a high 
level of policy coherence and success, at the expense of intergovernmental 
harmony. 
A president’s involvement in the policy process can “shape the dominant 
interaction pattern that develops” within the Executive Branch. A decisive 
president can form a focal point for policy-making and, if he becomes involved, 
“mitigate the negative effects of infighting”. An indecisive president involved in 
the process, however, could exacerbate infighting, as advisers compete for 
influence. A president’s indecisiveness, and the increased input, can, therefore, 
lead to policy incoherence.61 The result is an “inescapable necessity for 
presidents to be personally and systematically engaged” in policy-making, lest 
advisors run amok, and “feuds between cabinet agencies fester or bureaucracies 
remain unresponsive to presidential preferences.”62 As different government 
departs approach foreign policy in their own way, and often through the lens of 
different theoretical frameworks, it becomes the president’s responsibility to 
identify the best option, often having to forge a pluralist strategy that serves 
overall American interests. 
 
COLLECTIVE EXECUTIVE & MEDIA/LOBBY RELATIONS 
The relationship between the Executive Branch and the media and special 
interests is a complex one. Chapters Five and Six described the media’s and 
special interests’ methodologies and apparent institutional biases with regards 
to foreign policy and China. This section will look at how the collective 
Executive Branch approaches the media and lobbies. 
While the media controls much of the communications process among and 
between government players, themselves, and the public, government officials 
“do a better job of using journalists for their purposes than vice versa.” This is 
because, in the “overwhelming number of cases”, it is the administration that 
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decides to release a story, and “does so with its own spin.”63 The government’s 
advantage is borne from the nature of contemporary media and journalism 
practices. Leslie Gelb, who has worked on both sides of the fence, puts much of 
the Executive’s advantage down to journalists’ general lack of knowledge, when 
covering foreign, security and economic issues: journalists “are not, as a group, 
overburdened with background and knowledge in these subjects.” This is partly 
because they are not kept on “a beat” long enough to learn the history behind 
and intricacies of the policies they are covering. As a result, reporting on these 
issues can focus more on the “motives, personalities, and politics” involved. The 
media adds to the overall government-advantage by “building their daily 
coverage around daily executive branch briefings” at the White House and 
Departments of State and Defense. “Their reporting thus depends on what the 
government chooses to tell them in these deliberately uninformative briefings.” 
This unfortunate lack of knowledge is part of the reason that exaggerated fears 
of China – among other issues – receive such good coverage (beyond the 
sensation value of crying “China Threat”), as political journalists fail to locate 
given issues within the proper framework, often swallowing whole either 
government talking points or parroting the shrill explanations of television 
‘experts’, who are more interested in ratings and sensation than genuine 
discussion of issues and policy. Gelb places some of the blame at the feet of 
presidents, however: “In a media world of spinning, the White House is spinner 
in chief”, as a president will rarely step in to dispel irrational fears or 
exaggerations. It is only when policies appear to be going wrong, Gelb argues, 
that the media “really begin to exercise political power”,64 as news of policy and 
Executive errors fuels coverage of policies. 
With regards to lobbies, their predominant power lies in their passion for 
their issues. However, this passion is a double-edged sword. At times, lobbies 
can bring public attention to issues that are unimportant to a president In the 
case of Cuba, for example, Washington frequently allows the Cuban-American 
lobby to frame the debate – it is easier for government officials, and Cuba is 
ultimately not that important. Therefore, the Executive branch uses a lobby’s 
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passion and fervour to dictate an issue it has little interest in. American 
corporations and business leaders have effective lobbies to protect their 
interests with and in China. “But if China starts to lob missiles at Taiwan or to 
confront Japan over oil in the East China Sea, those potent lobbies will 
immediately retreat.”65 Ultimately, however, presidents generally give lobbies 
“a wide berth”, but watch closely as the power of lobbies “wax and wane”. When 
lobby power is strong, “presidents fear them” because “Fighting them is too 
costly – unless the White House feels that a vital national interest is at stake. 
When that happens, presidents do fight and win, and the lobbies lose.”66 
Presidents can also blunt opposition from lobbies by inviting them to join in the 
policy-making process (or, at least, giving them a perception of contribution),67 
as Clinton did when negotiating both NAFTA and Chinese MFN.  
Suettinger disagrees with characterisations of the media and special 
interests as particularly influential; and argues instead that (as shown in the 
previous chapter) they provide specific, “effective and important inputs” to the 
foreign policy process, by defining or framing issues for public discussion, and 
also providing factual information to Congress and the Executive, “but they 
exert only minor influence in the actual deliberation and decision process for 
important policy matters.”68 Bureaucratic interests, on the other hand, have far 
more influence and impact, which is why an understanding of these interests is 
important in a study of (China) policy-making. “Pundits, editorialists, and ‘news 
analysts’ figure in the policy process, although not definitively,” Suettinger 
writes.  They are “often strongly partisan” and “they can affect the political 
atmospherics on Capitol Hill by bringing focused opinion to bear on specific 
issues”. In addition, Suettinger argues that television is not as important to 
policy-formulation as print media, as “Policymakers usually get their 
information from written sources, which are more thorough than television 
news programs.”69 Regardless of political affiliation, “most journalistic opinion 
makers are negative about China and critical of any administration that engages 
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with it”, principally due to China’s approach to human rights, religious freedom, 
or non-proliferation.  
 
THE EXECUTIVE, GRAND STRATEGY & CHINA 
Pre-1989, the US-China relationship was founded on a more-or-less shared set 
of realist perceptions about the threat posed by the Soviet Union, and the belief 
that the US and China needed to balance Russia. The strategic underpinnings 
that resulted from Nixon’s 1972 visit to China and the subsequent Shanghai 
Communiqué survived until 1989, when American perceptions of China 
“radically changed”. After the fall of the Soviet Union, justifying a close 
cooperative relationship with a regime widely abhorred in the US became ever-
more difficult – in addition, as the Cold War security rationale disappeared, “all 
the other problems and disagreements in the relationship became far more 
apparent and difficult to manage” and ignore.70 
The massacres of unarmed students and civilians around Tiananmen 
Square in June 1989 “obliterated the good will that had been built up over the 
previous two decades”. Under George H.W. Bush, reconstruction seemed 
possible, but when Bill Clinton was elected, the relationship “swung back and 
forth between confrontation and accommodation” as Clinton tried to fulfil 
political obligations to both human rights and business constituencies.71 Years 
after the event, Tiananmen continues to inform ongoing issues in the bilateral 
relationship – economic sanctions, frequent criticism of China’s human rights 
abuses that trace back to 1989, and also regular commemoration of the 
protests.72 
The period from 1989 to 2008 has seen a constant series of “disputes, 
wrangling, and tension” over the three key issues that have dominated US-China 
relations since 1989: human rights, economics (especially trade reciprocity), 
and security (including espionage, weapons proliferation, and Taiwan). 
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Occasionally, these disputes have been interspersed with brief periods of 
relative amity and optimism, but also instances of high tension or outright 
antagonism. “There was no real norm, no status quo, but a constant effort was 
made to move the relationship into some other status, to ‘normalize’ it”, despite 
a lack of consensus as to what ‘normal’ relations might look like.73 Since 2001, 
the relationship has been mostly stable, as the early years of the Global War on 
Terror distracted the US from many problems in the US-China relationship. 
Once the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan started to drag, other news and economic 
stories rose to the fore again (this is normal in the US-China relationship, as 
shown in the history chapters, when events in other areas of the world 
overshadow or take precedence over US-China relations): 
“China’s strategic importance was less acknowledged, mercantilist 
trade policies less forgivable, repression of human rights and 
democracy less acceptable, proliferation of nuclear materials and 
missiles... less tolerable.”74 
The US-China relationship has reached into “virtually every arena of 
government interaction”, including diplomacy, science, the environment, 
medicine, international finance, agriculture, and military affairs. With every 
department and agency involved in Sino-US relations, “different interests and 
constituencies can easily be magnified by competing policy preferences related 
to China.”75 
Despite considerable political and economic changes in both countries 
(not to mention the considerable changes in the post-Cold War geopolitical 
arena), in neither America nor China has there been a “commensurate change in 
the way U.S.-China relations are considered or in how the other country is 
viewed by their respective governments.”76 It is for this reason that, before 
security and economic relations are considered, the impact of Tiananmen and 
other normative relations and issues must first be discussed. 
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US-CHINA NORMATIVE RELATIONS 
In general, and since 1989 in particular, Congress has been the main driving 
force behind domestic support for a human rights-led, liberal agenda in foreign 
policy, and particularly China relations. It has been the responsibility of the 
presidents to restrain these urgings from having a damaging impact on overall 
relations. 
President Carter embraced the traditional ideal that the US has a special, 
moral mission to perform in the world.77 In his pre-presidential biography, 
Carter wrote: 
“A nation’s domestic and foreign policies should be derived from the 
same standards of ethics, honesty and morality which are 
characteristic of the individual citizens of the nation. The people of 
this country are inherently unselfish, open, honest, decent, 
competent, and compassionate. Our government should be the same, 
in all its actions and attitudes.”78 
Unfortunately, Carter failed to appreciate the connection between power 
and ability in international relations, and by attributing negative motives to the 
opposition of political adversaries, Carter failed to appreciate that these 
adversaries also have interests, and “successful diplomacy must be based on an 
appreciation of the relative power of the contenders and an accommodation of 
competing interests in terms of that power balance.”79 Despite having a 
Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, who was dedicated to Carter’s “more idealistic 
goals”,80 human rights did not dictate Carter administration China policy. 
Continuing Cold War realities meant security considerations still dominated the 
relationship – indeed, Vance believed a focus on normalising relations with 
China could undermine or derail the president’s arms control agenda, and 
argued for an “even-handed approach” that emphasised improved relations 
with both China and the USSR.81 Unfortunately, Vance “found his way blocked 
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by a national security adviser who employed multiple tactics to move Carter in 
an anti-Soviet direction.”82 During Carter’s administration, Zbigniew Brzezinski 
broadened the US-China relationship to include economics, but Carter’s real 
legacy would be an increased (but still not considerable) focus on human rights 
in US foreign policy, and China policy in particular.  
President Ronald Reagan’s “bold meeting” with Russian dissidents during 
a visit to Moscow in 1988, gave rise to an “unspoken expectation” in the US that 
more attention would be paid to human rights and promotion of democracy in 
China and the USSR. Reagan’s symbolic gesture would in part be responsible for 
(then-ambassador to Beijing, and a strong supporter of human rights and 
democracy issues) Winston Lord’s approval for the addition of a Chinese 
dissident’s name on the guest list for a February 28th 1989 gala event on George 
H.W. Bush’s visit to China.83 
GEORGE H.W. BUSH, CHINA, TIANANMEN SQUARE & ITS LEGACY 
George H.W. Bush’s experience in Beijing gave him a strong affinity for China 
policy, and in office he worked to strengthen the Sino-American relationship as 
a counterweight to the Soviet Union (what was, by now, the ‘traditional’ policy 
on China), and encourage China’s economic growth and political progress. 
According to Secretary of State James Baker, with a “committed friend of China” 
now in the Oval Office, there was an expectation that the relationship would 
“attain a new level of maturity and stability.”84 Instead, the Tiananmen Square 
incident and its aftermath “shattered the bipartisan consensus”85 so carefully 
constructed over the course of five administrations, and “challenged the 
realisation of the president’s goals,”86 becoming a consistent obstacle to 
implementing his policy preferences. Tiananmen’s legacy would last well 
beyond Bush’s presidency, and can be seen in almost every area of US-China 
relations. 
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None of the top policymakers at the time had a clear idea of what was 
happening in China in early 1989. “Neither State Department cables, nor 
intelligence reporting, nor the increasing volume of U.S. media reporting on 
China” had provided a clear idea of the socio-political changes or the leadership 
struggles ongoing in China.87 It’s important to remember that Tiananmen took 
place before the CNN Effect described in chapter five had properly come into 
being. 
Washington simply lacked the ability to impose its will on China in the 
wake of the Tiananmen crackdown. Bush contended that there was little any 
president could actively have done for the protestors, no matter how great 
American sympathy for their plight may have been: “The American military was 
simply not capable of coming to the aid of China’s democratic movement, and 
economic or political sanctions were far too slow, if effective at all, to aid in the 
defence of out-gunned activists.”88 
According to Richard Madsen, “Tiananmen... troubled Americans far out of 
proportion to its direct cost in human life and suffering... because it 
contradicted widely cherished American understandings about the meanings of 
their democratic values.”89 Beyond the public’s changing attitude toward China, 
more lasting damage to US-China relations was “probably done in the 
perceptions of that small percentage of Americans for who foreign affairs are of 
consistent interest and importance.” For this group, the “television imagery and 
gruesome stories of what happened after June 4th reinforced what had already 
been growing concerns about the nature and behaviour of China’s government” 
with regard to economic and political reform, and especially Beijing’s failure to 
improve the human rights of its citizens. Tiananmen also acted as a unifying 
event for American politics, creating some bipartisan agreement on China policy 
– even if the anti-China sentiment was born of different concerns (conservatives 
retained their long-standing anti-communism, opposed China’s anti-religious 
policies, and also authoritarian birth control policies).90 The breadth of anti-
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China sentiment was widespread throughout Congress and the Senate, which 
created a difficult working environment for a mostly realist president. 
The domestic outcry that followed the massacre, Baker wrote, “forced a 
tricky juggling act upon our new administration”, which was “challenged to 
defend a policy encompassing geostrategic, commercial, and human rights 
interests that in large measure conflicted.”91 The president and his advisors 
recognised the “imperative” that America “remain engaged internationally”, but 
that even as the last superpower the US could neither prevent, nor solve all the 
traumas in the world. Therefore, the US had to be selective and Bush believed 
foreign policy should be based on “both the requirements of our national 
interest and our principles and values.”92 
The importance of human rights in US foreign policy, explicitly prominent 
since Carter’s administration, had continued to grow, and Bush was determined 
to engage the Chinese on the issue. By US standards, the Chinese performance 
on human rights had been “quite dismal”. Baker saw this firsthand as Treasury 
Secretary. The Treasury Department was involved in “enforcing restrictions 
against the importation of goods manufactured in Chinese slave labour 
camps,”93 and so Baker was able to draw on his experience when constructing a 
response to Tiananmen Square. By pressing the Chinese on human rights, the 
administration was sure they could convince China’s aging leadership that, 
“while they were moving from a Soviet-style economy, they should also 
recognise that political change must keep pace with the aspirations of the 
Chinese people.” It was clear that China needed American help to sustain their 
economic growth, and “We were prepared to use this leverage to encourage 
greater progress toward political reform,” Baker says.94 
To minimise the impact the negative political environment would have on 
China policy, the Bush administration relied on a measure of secrecy – just as 
Kissinger had done during Nixon’s administration, when the domestic political 
environment was not conducive to negotiations with Communists. In 1989, it 
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was not negotiations with ‘communists’, but ‘butchers’ that were considered 
politically radioactive. In order to avoid the plurality of clamouring and angry 
voices in America, Bush sent National Security Advisor Scowcroft on a secret 
trip to China. The purpose of the trip was to signal that Bush was “committed to 
preserving the important strategic relationship” between America and China, 
but that he shared the “shock and outrage” of the American public over the 
events in Tiananmen. “Bush wanted the Chinese to know that he had taken the 
actions he had after Tiananmen because domestic pressure required it and he 
had to fend off harsher sanctions from Congress.”95 The president’s job, in the 
wake of Tiananmen, effectively became balancing the realist and liberal 
traditions of US foreign policy, as he fought to protect a still-important strategic 
relationship while also condemning actions inimical to US values – being who 
he was, however, Bush felt the realist reason was more important, and 
therefore did what he had to do to protect what he saw as the national interest.  
James Baker also met with Chinese officials, in September 1989, and had 
to be careful when discussing previous agreements – a still-secret agreement 
permitting China to launch three US-manufactured commercial satellites on 
Chinese rockets from 1991: “We intend to stand by our agreement,” Baker told 
his Chinese counterparts, “but this is a very sensitive issue in the US, and if it 
became publicized I fear Congress would require us to prohibit it or refuse to go 
ahead. Therefore, we need to be very careful about timing.”96 
In the wake of Tiananmen, Congress became energised and focussed on 
China-related issues, and the most vocal source of anti-China legislation and 
rhetoric. Therefore, the struggle between a Democratic Congress angered by 
human rights abuses in China and a Republican president determined to 
subordinate human rights issues to his perception of American strategic 
interests would define the debate over China policy until the final months of the 
Bush presidency, and continues today.97 
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Nancy Pelosi, a junior congresswoman from California at the time 
(Speaker of the House from 2006-10), led the charge against Bush’s pro-China 
policy position, and his ‘deafness’ to the supposed will of the electorate: 
“Many members of Congress and China experts have called 
repeatedly on the president to send a clear and principled message of 
outrage to the leaders in Beijing. He has missed every opportunity to 
do so. He missed an opportunity by vetoing the bill to protect Chinese 
students; he missed an opportunity by intervening personally on the 
veto override; he missed another opportunity by authorising 
Scowcroft visits and the resumption of U.S. support for World Bank 
lending. And now, the president has renewed most favoured nation 
status to China, missing yet another opportunity to send an 
unequivocal message of U.S. condemnation to the Chinese regime 
who ordered the massacre in Tiananmen Square and the ensuing 
repression.”98 
Baker would give testimony before the House Foreign Relations 
Committee on June 22nd, in order to blunt the impression that Bush’s interest in 
China equated to a coddling or misperception of the events in Tiananmen 
Square. Baker urged Congress to “join with the President in a unified policy 
instead of insisting upon its own short-sighted approach.”99 Four days later, 
Baker would present his case again to the New York Asia Society: 
“The hasty dismantling of a constructive U.S.-Chinese relationship, 
built up so carefully over two decades, would serve neither our 
interests nor those of the Chinese people... Above all, it would not 
help those aspirations for democracy that were so obvious in the 
millions who marched to support the students in Tiananmen 
Square.”100 
In a letter to Deng Xiaoping, Bush “implored Deng to understand that 
American public opinion demanded he take punitive actions and asked him to 
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show ‘clemency’ toward the students.”101 Unfortunately, Beijing was deaf to the 
president’s pleas, and this intransigence and resistance to his requests and 
entreaties for moderation and concessions (symbolic at minimum) frustrated 
Bush, and led him to develop a tougher stance towards China.102 (There are also 
possible domestic political reasons for his change in attitude – as discussed 
further in the Taiwan section, below.) 
Many members of Congress “instinctively distrusted realpolitik 
justifications” for American policy, and “subscribed to a more ‘idealist’ 
perspective” that was “more closely wedded to the American experience” 
guided by the American values of freedom, democracy and human rights.103 
Scowcroft identified Tiananmen as the tipping point that ended White House-
Congress comity on China policy.104 In the wake of Tiananmen, therefore, 
Congress’s liberal-moralist stance was clearly at odds with the administration’s 
realist-pragmatic position; it fell to President Bush to craft a pluralist middle 
course for mutual benefit – ensuring strategic interests were preserved while 
also attempting to give attention to the liberal strain that runs through 
America’s character. On June 6th, the president defended his preliminary steps 
as consistent with “both our long-term interests and recognition of a complex 
internal situation in China.”105 The battle between an administration that 
wanted to maintain the US-China relationship and a Congress intent on 
punishing Beijing lasted into the 1992 election cycle, and accusations of 
“coddling” dictators and “butchers” likely are part of the reason Bush lost the 
election. 
 
When Bill Clinton entered the White House, he evinced “no interest in 
conducting high-level dialogue with the Chinese leadership”, and the new 
administration was more interested in “putting pressure on China over human 
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rights, weapons proliferation, and trade barriers.”106 In contrast to his 
predecessor, Clinton moved China policy “as far away from himself as he could”, 
believing there were “no political gains to be made in this policy area”. Late in 
his second term, Clinton’s attention “turned to his legacy” and China became 
more important. Clinton’s administration was staffed with, effectively, two 
camps – one favouring an economic-focussed foreign policy, and one that 
wanted the priority to be placed on improving human rights in China. 
Initially, Clinton was more interested in pursuing a domestic-oriented 
economic policy, so the responsibility for formulating and executing China 
policy fell to others. One would expect the secretary of state to take the lead 
role, but Warren Christopher “spent little time personally focussed on China 
and never developed close ties to the president”, thereby diminishing any 
influence the State Department could wield on China-related issues.107 This, to 
some extent, explains why the Secretary of State was not able to put his stamp 
on China policy, particularly with regards to human rights. Despite 
Christopher’s clear opposition to delinking human rights from China’s trade 
privileges, Clinton still made him announce official policy at a speech to the Asia 
Society in New York, on May 27th 1994, in which he 
“emphasised that our effort to use economic pressure to improve 
human rights had not proven effective and was at an end. While we 
would continue to press for human rights improvement in China, we 
would no longer use an economic club to force change.”108 
Like many Americans, Christopher was opposed to demoting the 
importance of human rights during Clinton’s presidency: 
“The Chinese ‘internal affairs’ rubric is squarely at odds with the 
U.N.’s Declaration of Human Rights, which binds all of its members. 
That each country has a different culture and different economic 
circumstances absolves none of them from the obligation to comply 
with the Declaration. Torture, arbitrary detention, and sham trials 
cannot be justified by incantations of sovereign rights. Whether a 
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government respects the fundamental rights of its citizens will 
always have a significant influence on whether our bilateral relations 
reach the highest levels.”109 
With a disinterested president and a secretary of state unprepared to 
exert control, China policy was effectively assigned to Assistant Secretary of 
State Winston Lord. Lord, who had broken with the Bush administration over 
its conciliatory approach to China in the wake of Tiananmen, had spent his time 
out of government “active in promoting punitive approaches” to China. In his 
confirmation hearings in March 1993, he told the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee that “We will seek cooperation with China on a range of issues. But 
Americans cannot forget Tiananmen Square.” Lord also identified America’s 
policy challenge “to reconcile our need to deal with this important nation with 
our imperative to promote international values.”110 Lord, working with National 
Security Advisor Anthony Lake’s and Secretary of State Warren Christopher’s 
approval, seems to have enjoyed considerable control over China policy. That 
being said, by pushing policy away from the Oval Office, Clinton signalled its low 
priority, and it soon became clear to others that Lord’s “rank and influence were 
insufficient to command the compliance” of the thirty officials of equivalent or 
higher rank in the State Department, “much less the many other cabinet-level 
officers and their deputies outside the department.”111 
Anthony Lake “believed in a foreign policy based on power and morality”, 
and considered himself a “pragmatic neo-Wilsonian, not naive about the world 
but conscious of the moral requirements of leadership”. Lake believed it was the 
task of governments and leaders to “do all they could to subdue evil, knowing 
that it could never be completely destroyed.”112 In George Bush’s equation (an 
adaptation of Kissinger’s), the massacres at Tiananmen were “an unfortunate 
tragedy that could not be allowed to interfere with the larger balance of power”. 
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For Lake, China’s leaders were “discredited by their slaughter of unarmed 
civilians at Tiananmen.”113 
Clinton’s personal approach to politics may be one clear instance when 
keen presidential involvement did not result in clear progress and results. Like 
George H.W. Bush, Clinton recognised that personal relationships between 
world leaders and diplomats could help overall bilateral relations. When 
dealing with Jiang Zemin, Clinton’s preference for personalising politics was 
hindered at almost every turn by the “stiff formality” that dictated negotiations 
with Chinese delegations and officials.114 In one example, Taylor Branch 
describes Clinton’s memory of a “tough private talk” with Jiang during a summit 
in Seattle, a “long, fruitless encounter”. Clinton and Jiang sat across from each 
other accompanied only by their interpreters: 
“Jiang read a speech to him about the glorious history of China and 
the folly of attempts to influence her internal affairs. It went on so 
long that Clinton said he finally felt obliged to interrupt. Speaking in 
direct sentences, with all the charm he could muster, he invited the 
Chinese leader to get down to business. He told Jiang that he didn’t 
want to change China’s political institutions. Nor did he object to 
prisons. In fact, America had lots of people in prison, and Clinton 
wanted to put away even more. But he did care about basic human 
rights, and, even if he didn’t, he had a Congress that did. To improve 
relations, Jiang needed only to do a few things already permissible 
within Chinese standards and law. Clinton named four, including an 
effective ban on exported goods made by prison labour. When he 
finished, however, Jiang simply resumed his speech.”115 
Clinton’s China policy suffered from his poor relations with Congress. 
Sandy Berger had proclaimed, at the start of the administration, that in Clinton’s 
view the US-China relationship was “going to be an arm’s-length relationship at 
best”.116 This changed during the second term, ironically under the guidance of 
Berger, when China’s Most Favoured Nation status came under attack and 
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Clinton had to balance his human rights and economic priorities, as well as face 
growing concerns of China’s rise as a strategic competitor in Asia. Clinton’s 
problems with Congress began in the wake of the 1994 Republican 
congressional victories. Both houses of Congress shifted leadership from 
Democratic to Republican, “bringing persons who were far more sceptical of 
China into the chairmanships of key congressional committees”, and a more 
hostile majority that seemed intent on limiting Clinton’s space for political 
movement.117 Garrison has reported that, while many right-wing Republicans in 
Congress “genuinely hated China”, they also “really hated Clinton”, and were 
intent on using China issues (as well as Clinton’s personal issues) to “beat him 
up” and hold his China strategy hostage.118 
On the main China issues of his administration, “domestic political 
pressures pulled Clinton in different directions until... international reality 
imposed itself.” Clinton and his advisers came to realise that MFN-status was 
“not going to be the weapon that would transform China’s Communist 
system,”119 and to link MFN with human rights progress was therefore a self-
defeating, politically-motivated dead end. Therefore, when it came to renewal, 
Clinton pragmatically chose economics over human rights, fulfilling his promise 
to put economics at the centre of his foreign policy.120 
Therefore, facing a hostile Congress, Clinton “worked carefully to signal 
multiple win-win themes that included strategic, economic, and progress 
themes that could appeal to a diverse audience,”121 bridging the divide between 
the executive and legislature. By defining China policy success through 
congressional approval, however, “Clinton transferred tremendous initiative 
from the executive branch to Congress and threw China policy into an arena 
dominated by domestic, often parochial, political concerns.”122 
By 1997, the US and China had effectively “agreed to disagree” on human 
rights issues in order to resume a more stable working relationship. To China, 
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this meant preventing American actions that might embolden Taiwan to declare 
independence and retaining access to US markets and technology. In return, 
Beijing offered limited access to their market, intermittent but important 
assistance in coping with a volatile North Korea, and the occasional release of a 
political prisoner. In other words, the US-China relationship became a delicate 
balance of capitalism, realism, and idealism. 
 
US-CHINA SECURITY RELATIONS 
China’s place in Cold War American foreign policy was firmly within the realm 
of security. With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, however, “the strategic 
basis for the U.S.-China relationship – tattered though it was – disappeared 
entirely,”123 and the ability of the US president to deploy Cold War imperatives 
to override pluralistic, foreign policy-oriented domestic interests declined.124 
Contemporary security issues in the US-China relationship are broad and far-
reaching. From the American perspective, there is growing concern about 
China’s military build-up, and the potential threat they may pose to US interests 
in the Asia-Pacific and also Taiwan; Beijing’s support for ‘rogue’ states, 
including Iran, Sudan, Myanmar, Cuba, Zimbabwe, and Venezuela; China’s part 
in WMD proliferation, particularly weapons sales to Pakistan and Iran; 
increasing Chinese trade, investment, and aid (especially military) to resource-
rich and poorly governed African states that undermines Western sanctions and 
other measures designed to apply pressure for reform; and accusations of 
Chinese espionage in the US, most sensationally as revealed by the Cox Report 
in 1999.125 
From President Truman until President Johnson, China was perceived as 
part of the Red/Communist bloc, and therefore a natural ‘enemy’ of America. 
Following Nixon’s visit to Shanghai, which fundamentally changed the status 
quo, each presidential administration until the end of the Cold War saw China as 
a potential counterweight to Soviet Union influence. 
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The State Department was “used to a world in which presidents set broad 
lines of policy and leave it to the State department to implement”. Richard 
Nixon arrived in office having immersed himself in foreign policy, and wanted 
to not only initiate broad policy but to control its execution, to ensure it was 
consistent with his strategic worldview.126 Under Nixon, Henry Kissinger 
succeeded in shifting the terms of the China-debate away from a “discussion of 
bilateral problems emphasised by the State Department to one emphasising the 
opportunities of a triangular focus in light of Sino-Soviet problems.” In order to 
achieve this, Kissinger authored various foreign policy reports –previously the 
responsibility of the State Department – that emphasised themes of the 
opportunities China could represent within a larger strategy for Asia.127 
Excluding Secretary Rogers from meaningful negotiations in Beijing kept the 
White House in “firm control” of the debate over the Shanghai Communiqué. 
The ‘one-China’ policy language was “kept ambiguous” regarding the US-Taiwan 
relationship, at least in part, “to undercut potential domestic opposition.”128 
Secrecy and obfuscation are politically unpopular, but there can be little doubt 
that Nixon’s focus and Kissinger’s tactics produced clear success.  
The normalisation process was completed under President Carter, who 
was “no expert” on China. Carter’s indecisiveness “proved to be a great 
handicap” and “left him... more vulnerable to the manipulation of his advisors 
[Cyrus Vance and, especially, Zbigniew Brzezinski].”129 Vance was determined 
to build a US-Soviet relationship that promoted arms control. Brzezinski, with 
his Polish heritage, was “hostile toward the Soviets and looked for any 
opportunity to thwart them”, which he saw in enhanced US-China relations.130 
Carter’s lack of confidence and expertise allowed Brzezinski to gain control of 
the China policy agenda by playing to the president’s fears about the Soviet 
threat. By cultivating administration allies, such as Defense Secretary Brown, 
and members of Congress who shared his concerns over the Soviets, he was 
further able to solidify his central role in the foreign policy-making hierarchy. 
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By supporting a broader relationship with China to include expanded trade 
(thereby ‘pluralising’ the relationship), Brzezinski built a broad coalition 
supporting normalisation that increasingly isolated Vance’s position (which 
rested almost solely on strategic considerations), and also those in government 
who were more focussed on improving US-Soviet relations.131 A “hard-line Cold 
Warrior at heart”, Brzezinski used his superior access to Carter and his ability 
to “frame issues, control agendas, and find allies” to move Carter in the policy 
direction the national security adviser preferred.132 
George H.W. Bush’s orientation toward China, as mentioned earlier in this 
chapter, was predominantly strategic in origin, and “based on... mutual concern 
about the military intentions and capabilities of the Soviet Union,” an approach 
shared by his National Security Adviser, Brent Scowcroft. Bush also believed 
improved US-China relations, especially growing economic interaction, was 
important for the development of a more open and democratic Chinese system. 
Bush’s “hardheaded and pragmatic” secretary of state, James Baker, “did not 
share his boss’s fondness for China” – Baker saw China issues as “political 
liabilities, even before Tiananmen and far more so afterward”, and knowing that 
China policy would be managed by the White House, Baker “kept aloof” from 
most China issues.133 
In his approach to China, President George H.W. Bush was “strongly 
motivated” by strategic considerations. Bush favoured a realist foreign policy, 
and “subordinated ethical, humanitarian, and ideological considerations to a 
concept of the national interest.” However, in the wake of Tiananmen, he 
quickly realised that it was “impossible... to have... normalised relations”134 in 
this atmosphere. He had to accept that Congress would not accept a purely-
realist China policy Bush had to shift his policy position to what amounted to a 
more pluralist strategy. 
Cooperation remained a factor in US-China relations, however. Pre-
Tiananmen, as part of Bush’s realist strategy, the Chinese had joined the US in 
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arming anti-Soviet guerrillas in Afghanistan, and allowed joint surveillance 
monitoring of Soviet programs from Chinese soil.135 In addition, Saddam’s 
invasion of Kuwait on August 2nd 1990 also offered opportunity for limited 
cooperation. Sanctions were agreed on (trade and arms embargo), but China 
was resistant to the resolution authorizing force, which frustrated Bush – 
especially when Beijing started referring to the US as one of the “two belligerent 
parties”. With the onset of tensions in the Gulf, issues in US-China relations 
were subordinated to more pressing concerns (not unlike the relationship’s 
historical experience). While human rights activists continued to complain 
about China’s trials for Tiananmen prisoners, and US Trade Representatives 
insisted on more open market access and a more level playing field, little 
progress was made.136 
 
Under Clinton, US-China security can be easily identified as centring on Taiwan 
(which will be discussed at length, below) and the bombing of the Chinese 
embassy in Belgrade in May 1999. To understand the progress of events, it’s 
useful to know a bit more about the Clinton administration’s foreign policy 
principles. 
After a short, largely unimpressive tenure, Les Aspin was succeeded by 
William Perry as Secretary of Defence, in February 1994. Despite his expertise 
in defence and arms control, Perry would not play a pivotal role in 
administration policy discussions.137 Perry represented an agenda of 
engagement with China, with the hopes of reinstating military-to-military 
relations that had been suspended after Tiananmen. It was Perry’s belief 
(shared by a number of other Pentagon officials) that close relations with China 
were paramount to solving mutual interests; specifically, North Korea. Warren 
Cohen, the former Republican senator who succeeded Perry in 1997, was 
equally cautious of interference and “would only reinforce” the Pentagon’s 
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position.138 Cohen chose to remain largely uninvolved in China policy-making, 
further solidifying Berger’s importance in the process.139 
Anthony Lake, Clinton’s first National Security Adviser, admitted to being 
an “emotional” policy-maker, and often struggled with his inability to formulate 
strong enough policies that would gain Clinton’s attention. Lake initially 
rejected engaging China in 1993 as “politically unacceptable”, and had 
apparently yet to move beyond the ‘Butchers of Beijing’ characterisation of the 
Chinese leadership.140 Lake’s successor, his former deputy Sandy Berger, 
became a “pivotal figure” in Clinton’s foreign policy system. Berger’s increased 
effectiveness as NSA was due in part to his close friendship with Clinton, with 
whom he enjoyed an excellent working relationship (they met while working on 
McGovern’s 1972 campaign). After his appointment to head of the NSC in 1997, 
Berger prioritized China policy, drew foreign policy control into the White 
House, reduced interdepartmental infighting, and kept the administration on 
message.141 Berger never took it upon himself to become the new Kissinger or 
Brzezinski, but there is little doubt that by replacing Lake, he reasserted the 
prominence of the NSC in the presidential foreign policy decision-making 
system. 
The accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, despite being 
described by Robert Sutter as “the most important incident in U.S.-China 
relations after the Tiananmen crackdown”,142 “barely registered” in America. 
The event continues to be viewed as ‘barbaric’ in China (an article in the 
People’s Daily from May 7th 1999 describes NATO, “headed by the US, brazenly 
us[ing] missiles to attack China’s embassy in Belgrade”).143 However, in the US, 
images of the angry demonstrations in China that followed made it into the US 
news, but the story quickly faded after a couple of days.144 The lack of attention 
was partly due to Clinton’s continuing problems resulting from the Lewinsky 
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Scandal (and the zeal with which the Republicans pursued it), but also because 
it occurred shortly after the Cox Committee’s infamous report in May, which 
“unequivocally declared” that China “had been stealing U.S. nuclear technology 
throughout the 1990s”, which would allow Chins to “develop a sophisticated 
nuclear arsenal more rapidly than had been anticipated.”145 With tensions, 
tempers and passions high, the American and Chinese administrations looked 
again to secret and private discussions, away from the media spotlight. Clinton 
“decided to pursue a lower-profile path and work privately with allies in 
Congress, of which there were many but who had to tread carefully lest they be 
seen as apologists for China or complicit in the scandals engulfing the White 
House.”146 
 
A coherent China policy “proved elusive” amidst contentious American 
domestic debate during the 1990s. The debate was not stilled until the 9/11 
terrorist attacks, which muffled continued American concerns over China “amid 
an overwhelming American concern to deal with the immediate, serious, and 
broad consequences of the global war on terrorism.”147 
Before 9/11, however, George W Bush took a harder line towards China, 
more in line with congressional, media and other American critics.148 denying 
that China was a ‘partner’, and instead labelling it a ‘competitor’. Echoing Cold 
War rhetoric and fears, Bush argued that China was collecting and developing 
technology aimed at weakening the US, it was an ‘intelligence threat’, “an enemy 
of religious freedom and a sponsor of forced abortion,”149 and also a weapons’ 
dealer to some regimes considered truly reprehensible by the American press, 
public and elites (e.g., Khartoum). Following 9/11, “there [was] considerable 
speculation that U.S.-China relations took a fundamental turn for the better... in 
that joint opposition to terrorism became the new strategic underpinning” for 
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Sino-US relations.150 That being said, there remained a stark difference in how 
the term ‘terrorist’ was utilised: where the US targeted groups like Al Qaeda, 
China took aim at Uighurs in Xinjiang, and also took a tougher approach to 
dissidents from Tibet and the Falun Gong sect. 
Like Clinton before him, and in contrast with his father, George W. Bush 
was not particularly engaged or interested in foreign policy. As a result of his 
inattention, and despite a hierarchically organised decision-making system, “the 
lack of White House coordination and presidential involvement left competing 
policy definitions to flourish and two policy channels to emerge.” Bush himself 
began his presidency with a hard-line definition of China as a potential threat 
and strategic competitor. This opinion mellowed after the April 2001 EP-3 Spy 
Plane crisis, when a US surveillance plane collided with a Chinese fighter. 
Despite the President’s success in navigating this incident, “an internal battle 
between two competing strains of thought... vied for dominance” of China and 
East Asia policy.151 Identifying which faction was ascendant at any given time 
can help explain the administration’s foreign policy decisions. The two 
competing definitions of foreign policy are frequently characterised as the 
‘realist’ and ‘neoconservative’, even though the latter is often incorrectly 
attributed to all unpopular decisions and actors in the Bush administration. 
Condoleezza Rice, Bush’s first National Security Adviser, enjoyed a close 
relationship with the President. Having coordinated Soviet policy in George 
H.W. Bush’s NSC, she had been “groomed as a protégé” of Brent Scowcroft.152 
During George W. Bush’s presidential campaign Rice had been a key foreign 
policy adviser, and authored a Foreign Affairs article that stressed the need to 
re-focus US foreign policy on great power diplomacy with Russia and China,153 
echoing the realist sentiments of Bush Senior and Scowcroft. Unfortunately, 
however, “she proved to be unwilling or unable to broker the differences 
between the hard-line and pragmatic factions” at work in the administration.154 
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Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld, who had been one of the more 
liberal and dovish members of the Nixon administration, became one of the 
most hawkish officials after moving to the Defence Department under Ford and 
again under George W. Bush.155 Under Bush, Rumsfeld quickly became 
embroiled in the EP-3 crisis, when he refused to apologise to the Chinese. A 
blunt rhetorical approach to China would be a lasting characteristic of 
Rumsfeld’s relations with the Chinese. Before 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq, 
Rumsfeld went on record accusing China of helping Iraq develop weapons 
systems, and often voiced support for Taiwan. As the wars in Afghanistan and 
Iraq extended and the situation on the ground worsened, Rumsfeld adopted an 
“increasingly pragmatic” approach to China, despite inflammatory comments 
concerning China’s military modernisation on the eve of his 2005 visit to the 
country.156 
The Office of the Vice President (OVP), under the tight control of Dick 
Cheney, became a ‘lightning-rod’ for criticism and bureaucratic strife. Insiders 
complained frequently of the operating procedures of the OVP, how “they make 
a decision, and they make it in secret”, often in ways counter to other 
bureaucratic entities, and then “foist it on the government”, creating confusion 
and resentment,157 much as Kissinger’s and Brzezinski’s secretive control over 
decision-making did in the 1970s. 
Cheney’s OVP would be a key component in Bush’s initial China policy. 
Many OVP staffers were, according to Robert Dreyfuss, “obsessed with what 
they saw as a looming, long-term threat from China.” This was, for I. Lewis 
“Scooter” Libby, Dean McGrath (chief of staff), and Jonathan Burks (Cheney’s 
special assistant), an outgrowth from their involvement in Christopher Cox’s 
“wild-eyed” investigation of alleged Chinese spying in the US. For many in the 
Bush administration, especially among these Cheney aides, but also some 
Defence Department officials such as Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith, China 
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offered a solution to “enemy deprivation syndrome”, which the Pentagon could 
use to justify procurement requests in future budgets.158 
According to Scott McClellan, a former Bush spokesman, when it came to 
foreign policy, “lurking behind it all remained the magic man, Vice President 
Cheney”.159 On China-policy, North Korea, the war in Iraq, pressure for Iranian 
regime change, and issues of detentions, torture, and spying by the NSA, “the 
muscle” of the OVP office “prevailed” in formulating policy and strategy.160 
According to Dean McGrath, the permanent bureaucracy was often “not on 
board, especially on... issues where you’re trying to change things,” which meant 
the OVP saw itself as an institution doing battle with a resistant bureaucracy. 
Aaron Friedberg, China specialist and former OVP director of policy planning, 
agrees that the foreign policy bureaucracy was an obstacle to the 
administration and Cheney’s agenda, supporting Halperin’s thesis of an 
inflexible foreign policy establishment resistant to change: “It’s not an active 
resistance. It’s a passive scepticism about the whole direction of policy.”161 
Cheney and Rumsfeld “prioritised building missile defence to secure 
American security unilaterally” and (like Reagan) argued that US interests in 
East Asia did not depend on improving relations with a “hostile” China, but on 
developing the relationships with major Asian democratic partners.162 Among 
Cheney’s aides were the “anti-China, geopolitical Asia hands” Stephen Yates and 
Samantha Ravich, through whom “the fulcrum of Cheney’s foreign policy... can 
be traced” – which linked energy, China, Iraq, Israel, and oil in the Middle 
East.163 For key Cheney advisers, US-Middle East policy was tied to China, 
through its appetite for oil, which makes it a strategic competitor in the Persian 
Gulf region. Thus, “they regard the control of the Gulf as a zero-sum game.”164 
In contrast to the hard line espoused by Cheney, Wolfowitz, and Rumsfeld, 
Bush’s first Secretary of State, Colin Powell, espoused a pragmatic position, and 
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“recognised that the U.S. shared interests with China and emphasised that a 
multilateral approach to foreign policy provided the best means to secure U.S. 
interests.” The early EP-3 incident and the 9/11 attacks shaped a “fragile 
convergence” around Powell’s pragmatic position; the emphasis was that “a 
positively engaged China was conducive to both stability and security in East 
Asia.” This left room for different bureaucratic factions to manoeuvre for 
dominance, which meant the State Department “could influence the overall tone 
but not necessarily how many aspects of the China policy were 
implemented.”165 As secretary, Powell preferred to defer to the career foreign 
service officers, a fact that, along with his frequently independent views, caused 
other foreign policy actors to “consider him something less than a complete 
team player.”166 
The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the broader War on Terror 
would dominate the focus of the Bush administration, which has led some to 
suggest East Asia was ‘forgotten’ during Bush’s presidency. This has partly been 
reinforced by the literature published on Bush foreign policy, which almost 
exclusively focuses on the Middle East, to the exclusion of China and other key 
strategic and economic issues. Debate had taken on a “sharply partisan cast” 
during the latter half of Clinton’s administration, with Republicans “moving 
away from the views of Henry Kissinger and George H.W. Bush toward a darker 
view of China”, largely to differentiate  themselves from Clinton, who had 
adopted the ‘engagement’ approach similar to that of his predecessors. 
Suettinger believes that, “while this debate moderated as the U.S. fight against 
terrorism dominated the nation’s attention, its return is likely at some point,”167 
and one cannot “discern a sense of permanence about the change.” 
Nevertheless, post-9/11, “there has been an important improvement in the tone 
and content of the official relationship”, which was reflected in the three 
summit meetings between Presidents George W Bush and Jiang Zemin within 
one year of Bush’s re-election.168 In addition, American preoccupation with the 
war on terrorism made it more difficult for interest groups and other activists 
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to gain public or private attention in Congress and elsewhere that they “seemed 
to need in order to pressure for changes in U.S. policies toward China.”169 
The “realities and complexities” of US-China relations “soon limit[ed] the 
influence that any one ideology or personality” could exert over the 
relationship,170 which may explain the personnel changes of 2005. Thanks to “a 
misguided war and a bungled occupation” and a “string of foreign policy failures 
that... alienated U.S. allies and triggered a wave of anti-American feeling around 
the globe,” the numbers and influence of Cheney aides espousing more 
militaristic and ideological strategies – as opposed to the pragmatism of Rice 
and Hadley –declined.171 
In March 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited India to 
negotiate a nuclear deal, which would be ratified in March 2006. The deal “cast 
aside forty years of hostility and suspicion between the two countries”, and 
ended almost a decade of tension over India’s nuclear weapons tests in 1998. 
The deal agreed to commence collaboration over civil nuclear energy and to 
“sweep aside” decades of nuclear-proliferation agreements: “India was being 
made a very special case, in a manner designed to help boost both its economic 
strength and its military capacity. And that exception was being made for a very 
special reason: the rise of China.”172 The discussions had begun during Clinton’s 
administration, but Bush’s predecessor had not been willing to take the final 
step,173 perhaps as a perceived weakness in the wake of White House scandals, 
and a Republican Congress unwilling to hand him a foreign policy victory. India 
was seen as the only country in the region able to balance China, so, where 
Nixon had used China to balance the Soviet Union, Bush would use India to 
balance China. Neither America nor India said explicitly that China is the reason 
for the US-India nuclear deal, but “there cannot really be any other explanation 
for India’s exceptional treatment,” writes Bill Emmott.174 
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With the brief, minor setback caused by the EP-3 collision, therefore, after 
1999, the US-China relationship “assumed a low profile” in both America and 
China. Even when China officially joined the WTO in December 2001, it was “at 
most a two-day story, quickly relegated to the business pages and pushed aside 
for more pressing concerns such as the rumblings about Afghanistan and the 
whereabouts of Osama bin Laden.”175 
TAIWAN 
On issues relating to Taiwan, the norm internalised by American policymakers 
and by members of both Republican and Democratic policy elites has been “to 
use leverage on Beijing officials not to threaten the security of (much less 
invade) Taiwan while, at the same time, keeping Taipei officials from unduly 
provoking their counterparts in Beijing.”176 
Nixon and Kissinger’s efforts to re-open normal relations with China 
fundamentally changed the place of Taiwan in US foreign policy. In order to 
secure an agreement on US-China relations, Kissinger had to pledge to follow a 
One China policy, which stated that Taiwan was part of China, governed by 
Beijing. This process was completed under Carter and his National Security 
Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinksi (who utilised many of the same tactics and 
diplomatic strategies as Kissinger). 
The original China Lobby prevented Washington from having high-level 
contact with mainland China from 1949 until Henry Kissinger’s secret trip to 
Beijing in July 1971. At that point, “Nixon and Kissinger concluded that they 
could manoeuvre China into their diplomacy as a counterweight to the Soviet 
Union”, and that ties with China were of “supreme importance to that goal”. To 
obviate opposition, Kissinger met with the Chinese secretly until the 
administration was ready to present a fait accompli, the establishment of 
contacts and relations with the mainland. With that one stroke, Nixon halved 
the power of the China Lobby. All the lobby could do from then on was to help 
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make it impossible for Washington to abandon Taiwan to China, “something no 
president would have done anyway.”177 
President Reagan’s policy and approach to Taiwan would be indicative of 
future policy. The immediate China issue facing Reagan’s administration was 
arms sale to Taiwan, the inclusion of advanced fighter aircraft in the deal, and 
how the deal would influence negotiations for a new communiqué of 
understanding with China. For conservative Taiwan supporters in the 
administration – such as Allen, Secretary of Defence Caspar Weinberger, and 
several members of the White House staff – the sale was seen as a way to 
highlight America’s continued commitment to the safety of Taiwan in the wake 
of normalisation with China, and also to signal that Taiwan remained more 
important than China to American strategic interests in East Asia. On the other 
hand, Secretary Haig led a group at State who “worked to formulate a policy 
that acknowledged China’s central importance in American strategic foreign 
policy goals vis-a-vis the Soviets.”178 
To shape the new administration’s East Asian policy agenda, Haig had to 
overcome Reagan’s “pre-existing negative beliefs about China”, formed over the 
course of his long, anti-communist career, and to convince the president that 
positive gains from closer ties to China did not mean betraying Taiwan.179 
Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Richard V. Allen 
(there was “no stronger supporter of Taiwan” within Reagan’s camp), also 
helped position the president closer to the centre on China to avoid 
undermining the Nixon-initiated bipartisan consensus. To convince the 
president, Haig resorted to coupling domestic politics with strategic 
considerations. Art Hummel, Reagan’s first Ambassador to Beijing, recalls that 
Haig’s argument was that “we Republicans cannot have, in our first year in 
office, a foreign policy disaster like a rupture with the PRC. This would hurt us 
domestically.”180 Unfortunately, Reagan’s tendency towards policy incoherence 
(be it from a genuine lack of a position, or domestic political calculations) meant 
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he often muddled his position on China, and made many “incendiary” remarks 
that resulted in frequent Chinese “paroxysms of denunciation” – such as 
transforming the unofficial American Institute in Taiwan into an official US-
government-run operation.181 After Carter broke relations with Taiwan in 1979, 
Reagan “dumped Carter’s act on the bonfire of conservative rage over the 
sellout of American friends and allies.” Reagan, who still sympathised with 
leaders in Taipei, believed “American leaders, especially Democratic... had 
neglected or abandoned... the traditional alliances on which American security 
was based,”182 and it was therefore Republicans’ responsibility to show support 
for traditional US allies. Tyler characterised Reagan’s approach to China as one 
based on emotional and ideological argument, rather on intellectual 
argument.183 As we saw regarding Congressional policymaking in the wake of 
Tiananmen, this is wholly American/traditional. 
Haig wanted to militarise the US-China relationship, or “strategic 
association” as it became known (to enter into an “alliance” with a communist 
state was considered unwise domestic politics), in the hope that advanced 
weapons technology sold to the Chinese would be deployed along the 4,150 
mile Sino-Soviet border.184 Haig, like Kissinger, “believed that America’s 
strategic interests lay on the mainland”, but his attempts to bring the president 
around were hampered by Reagan’s tendency to confuse “sentimentalism with 
national interest”, not to mention the Taiwan lobby, which had learned how to 
“push his buttons.”185 
The negotiations over arms-sales to Taiwan were also “hampered by 
Reagan’s inability to avoid gratuitous insults to Chinese sensibilities.”186 The 
Reagan administration very quickly undermined the efforts of Presidents Nixon, 
Ford, and Carter to create a ‘strategic alignment’ with China at America’s side. 
Because of Reagan’s indelicate, “unprogrammed” remarks and rhetoric, China 
chose instead to reposition itself equidistant from the USA and USSR, and 
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“scurrilous attacks on the United States began to appear again in the Chinese 
press.” After the August 7th 1982 new Joint Communiqué, which dealt with the 
US’s insistence on continued arms sales to Taiwan, Reagan made a number of 
unilateral moves that ‘reinterpreted’ the agreement. He “secretly” filed a 
memorandum with the NSC stating that he understood the communiqué’s 
promise to not increase sales, but that it was valid only if the balance of power 
across the Taiwan Straits did not change – this argument would again be 
deployed by George H.W. Bush (see below). If the situation changed, the 
president believed he had the authority to increase weapons-sales to Taiwan to 
further aide its self-defence. Reagan had “no intention of abandoning 
Taiwan”.187 
Events or issues related to Taiwan have become the “most likely to create 
tensions” in Sino-American relations. This is partly a result of the “incongruities 
of the so-called foundations of the relationship,” the three joint 
communiqués.188 Suettinger argues that the key phrases that enabled 
agreement on the 1972 communiqué are no longer true:  
“The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the 
Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a 
part of China. The U.S. government does not challenge that position. It 
reaffirms its interests in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question 
by the Chinese themselves.”189 
The Taiwanese, however, have given plenty of evidence that they are still 
very much intent on being recognised as independent from Mainland China, 
despite increased economic ties to China. Suettinger’s negative opinion of the 
communiqués was shared by Assistant Secretary of Defence James Lilley, who 
argued in 1992 that the first Communiqué was an “anachronism”.190 Where the 
communiqués put Taiwan on the back-burner, thereby reducing the possibility 
of conflict across the Taiwan Straits, the 1979 signing of the Taiwan Relations 
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Act (TRA) inflamed an issue that had effectively been left to run in neutral.191 
Under the TRA, the US is obliged to sell defensive weapons to Taiwan, to the 
chagrin of Beijing. The 1982 Joint Communiqué agreed to a reduction of these 
sales over time, but in 1992 George H.W. Bush agreed to a considerable, 
provocative sale of F-16 fighters to Taiwan. The president argued that the sale 
was in the spirit of the TRA – given China’s recent purchase of Russian-made 
fighters considerably more advanced than Taiwan’s aging air force, the 
president argued the sale met US commitments of aiding Taiwan’s self-
defence.192 At home, Bush’s F-16 deal was well-received by manufacturers in 
Texas, but also seen as a cynical election ploy. The deal came at a difficult point 
in Sino-American relations, at the time of the MFN debate and a US Trade 
Representative poised to sanction China on its tariff- and nontariff-barriers to 
American products. Bush “wavered”, but “domestic political considerations 
ultimately overcame his doubts” about the impact such a deal would have on 
the carefully-managed US-China relationship.193 Despite Bush’s assurances to 
the Chinese that the decision was political, Beijing still overreacted: Chinese 
arms sales to Pakistan resumed, Beijing pledged to provide Iran with a nuclear 
reactor, and stepped up pressure in Washington on every issue that was 
important to them – “no arms sale would go uncontested, no visit unprotected, 
no hint of change in the procedures for U.S.-Taiwan relations unchallenged.” To 
dampen Chinese retaliation, Bush vetoed the 1992 US-China Act, and signed a 
market access agreement “long on promise and short on details”.194 
“Congress has taken a very activist approach to preserving Taiwan’s 
security for a variety of reasons. Taiwan is now a full-fledged ‘values 
issue’, rather than a national security question, owing to the island’s 
transformation into a thriving and colorful democracy.”195 
Beijing’s “typically thin-skinned” reaction to Congressional legislation on 
Taiwan only exacerbates the image of China as a bully, increases tensions and 
bolsters Congressional and public support for a Taiwan seen to be living under 
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the oppressive shadow of hundreds of Chinese missiles pointed directly at 
them.196 
Taiwan was a particular problem during Clinton’s administration. That 
being said, for such a fractured policy-making team, the Taiwan issues offered 
moments of clear policy coherence regarding China, even if domestic political 
considerations were key in helping to create interdepartmental unity. The first 
confrontation over Taiwan was with regards to Lee Teng-hui’s request for a visa 
for Hawaii (which he would be visiting en route to Central America). The 
Clinton State Department, fearful of provoking China, countered with an offer of 
a reception in a transit lounge. Lee, naturally, rejected this gesture and 
instigated “a strikingly successful lobbying effort”. Since the end of the Second 
World War, no country had been more successful at “manipulating the 
American government” than Taiwan, save Israel. Since the TRA, however, there 
have been few Taiwanese victories. Both houses of Congress passed nonbinding 
resolutions insisting that visas be issued to Taiwanese officials – in both this 
instance (which the administration refused) and when Lee requested a visa to 
visit his alma mater, Cornell University.197 All of Clinton’s advisers had 
concurred with the decision to issue Lee a visa in May 1995 for his Cornell 
speech, disregarding warnings from China specialists at State, on the NSC staff, 
and also the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Secretary Christopher, Secretary Perry, and 
Lake joined in recommending to Clinton that the visa be issued, “fearing that 
Congress would work some mischief to the Taiwan Relations Act if we did 
not.”198 Tyler reports that in this instance, Clinton had “dominated” the 
decision-process, as he believed the issue was one of freedom of speech, a value 
held very dearly by the American people. Clinton also saw issuing the visa 
himself as a way to retain Executive control of the issue, and avoid a binding 
resolution from Congress, which would have raised the possibility of a need for 
a presidential veto – “I don’t want my first veto to be in support of... China,” 
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Clinton is reported to have remarked, reflecting the “political terror” of having 
to support a regime he had vilified during his campaign.199 
Taiwan’s lobbyists were successful, but “the key to their success was the 
fact that Taiwan was now a democracy, assuring it support across the political 
spectrum”, including the White House.200 
“Delight in the political evolution of Taiwan, combined with anger at 
the ‘Butchers of Beijing’ prompted American political leaders to 
support Taiwan with full knowledge that their actions were offensive 
to the People’s Republic.”201 
The White House’s decision to issue the visa had unfortunate 
repercussions that same year. Bolstered by what they saw as America 
condoning Taiwanese Democracy and by extension independence, political 
discourse during the lead-up to Taiwan’s first free elections was infused with 
the rhetoric of independence, which Beijing would not abide. In response, the 
PLA stepped up provocative exercises in and around the Taiwan Straits. Clinton 
requested that China cease these operations, but instead Beijing reminded 
Clinton that China now had the power to inflict heavy costs on American forces 
if events escalated.202 Among Clinton’s senior advisers, “there was no doubt” 
that the administration was “reaping the harvest of the abrupt decision” 
regarding Lee’s visa. The issue was not helped by the fact that the Taiwanese 
leader’s speech had been broadcast around the world, and during his speech he 
proclaimed the sovereignty of Taiwan.203 There appeared to be a state of 
“denial” in the White House following the PLA build-up, as if Clinton and his 
foreign policy principals did not believe China would go ahead with exercises.204 
Clinton dispatched the USS Nimitz through the Straits. In February 1996, the 
PLA continued its military build-up along the coast of the Straits; and in March 
1996, Chinese missiles ‘bracketed’ Taiwan, in a clear message that no part of the 
island was safe from potential Chinese attack. In response, the Clinton 
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administration dispatched two carrier groups to the Straits, and this show of 
force defused the situation. The Taiwanese elections were held on schedule, and 
the pro-independence Lee was elected. After Lee’s victory, the PLA packed up 
and the US carrier groups were re-tasked. The Taiwan Crisis of 1995-6 
reminded American leaders that China “could easily become a dangerous 
adversary, that the partnership of the 1970s and 1980s had ended with the 
Tiananmen massacre, [and] that the efforts by both Bush and Clinton to 
accommodate China’s rising power in the world had not been reciprocated by 
the Chinese.”205 
George W. Bush came to office expressing determination that his 
administration would do “whatever it takes” to defend Taiwan, and also 
announced that the use of force would be an option should the PLA choose to 
attack Taiwan. President Bush continued to authorise arms sales to Taiwan, 
including the largest-to-date in 2001 (of destroyers and diesel submarines, but 
not including the controversial Aegis destroyers). The Bush administration also 
reiterated America’s acceptance of and adherence to the One-China policy, 
being careful to curb “potentially destabilising” pro-independence proposals.206  
Taiwan policy during the second Bush presidency moved beyond the 
control of the State Department. The Pentagon’s “clear policy position, its size, 
resources, and central importance to policy implementation” gave it the “ability 
to circumvent State Department initiatives.” The Pentagon’s public focus on 
arms sales to Taiwan, and also on contingency planning, conflicted with the 
State Department’s position, which acknowledged the need for assisting 
Taiwan, but recommended that “relations with Taiwan should be kept low key 
so that the U.S. avoided unnecessary and potentially destabilising political 
confrontations with the PRC.”207 The State Department, therefore, preferred to 
“manage arms sales quietly and limit military relations in order to avoid any 
confrontation with China.” To the benefit of administration pragmatists, 9/11 
and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq helped frame China in a more positive 
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light, “more firmly as an ally in the strategic struggle against terrorism”, 
emphasising mutual interests and potential gains through cooperation.208 
On the controversial subject of visas for Taiwanese officials, George W. 
Bush’s administration allowed President Chen Shui-bian to travel more freely in 
the US.209 Differences between America and China subsided somewhat after the 
2008 election of President Ma Ying-jeou, who has “sharply shifted Taiwan 
toward a more cooperative stance in relations with China.”210 This, in 
conjunction with the War on Terror’s easing of overall US-China relations, has 
meant a concurrent easing of tensions over Taiwan (temporary as they may be). 
 
US-CHINA ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
Idealism in American foreign policy, particularly in regards to relations with 
China, has been a mixed affair. Realism retains a considerable hold over 
American foreign policy and China policy, but it has evolved over time. This is 
also true of the liberal tradition in US foreign policy, which has found room to 
breathe in the post-Cold War era, as security concerns give way to a broader 
field. That being said, the myriad forms realism can take offer some areas of 
overlap (particularly in economics). 
The US-China economic relationship is fraught with little-understood 
issues like currency revaluation, intellectual property rights, and China’s 
internal market structure and ‘rules’. The main, contemporary issues in US-
China economic relations are as follows: concerns over the “massive” trade 
deficit ($256 billion in 2008); Chinese currency policies and practices, despite 
the July 1st 2005  procedural change, which allowed the currency to revalue 
slightly, but not enough to calm the clamouring voices in Congress; American 
dependence on Chinese financing of US government budget deficits, and the 
weakness this overreliance conveys, despite it helping keep the US economy 
somewhat balanced; and China’s underperformance in the enforcement of 
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intellectual property rights.211 In addition, the hurdles China puts in place that 
hinder American and other foreign businesses from setting up properly and 
independently in China are a cause for tension.212 China’s non-tariff barriers 
and practices prevent foreign businesses enjoying the same open markets the 
Chinese enjoy in the West. 
George Schultz, who replaced Haig as Reagan’s Secretary of State, did not 
share his predecessor’s estimate of China’s strategic importance. Reagan had 
“unnerved” Chinese leaders by his “evident affection for Taiwan and his 
reluctance to endorse the Shanghai Communiqué”, but Schultz “reined in” the 
president’s rhetoric.213 Under Schultz’s guidance, the US-China relationship 
became “less dramatic, more businesslike.” As economic issues became 
paramount, the president’s “commitment to free trade seemed more 
advantageous to Beijing than the neo-protectionism threatened by the 
Democrats,” and relations entered a calmer period. The ritual condemnations of 
US interference over Taiwan continued from the Chinese leadership and press, 
but the growth in trade, and increased social and educational exchanges meant 
the leadership in Beijing ultimately grew content with Reagan’s legacy on US-
China relations.214 
This ‘businesslike’ relationship continued for much of the post-Cold War 
era, disturbed only by the handful of crises mentioned already in this chapter. 
Issues remain, of course, and with the 2008 Economic Crisis, many of these 
issues have become exacerbated. During the George H.W. Bush and Clinton 
administrations, the predominant economic concern was the annual negotiation 
of China’s MFN status, which will form a case study below. The George W Bush 
administration’s economic dealings with China were less well-publicised as, like 
everything else, the War on Terror and conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan 
dominated political minds of the time. I will discuss in brief the issues with 
which George W Bush was confronted, after a discussion of MFN. 
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CHINA’S MOST FAVOURED NATION STATUS 
The issue has already been discussed with regards to special interests and the 
MFN debate, but it bears revisiting in this chapter. The Most Favoured Nation 
debates in the United States provided an annual period of tension in US-China 
relations as, every spring, human rights activists, anticommunist ideologues, 
supporters of Tibet and Taiwan, and other interests unfriendly to Beijing would 
“air their grievances and condemn China” in Washington and through the 
media.215 
In the wake of Tiananmen, and Bush’s successful softening of 
Congressional retaliation, members of Congress turned their attention to the 
annual debate on China’s Most Favoured Nation (MFN) trade status, seeing in it 
an opportunity to express their abhorrence of Beijing’s policies, and also push 
their human rights agenda. For many members of Congress, China had become 
the epitome of everything America opposed in international affairs: a 
“tyrannical” government, oppressing democracy at every turn; intolerant of 
religion; a “mercantilist trade cheat”; an “uncontrolled proliferator” of weapons 
of mass destruction; a rising (perhaps only) military threat; a “murderer of 
unborn children” by forcing abortions and sterilizations on its own citizens. On 
May 2nd , 1990, H.R.2212 was issued, calling for considerable progress on 
human rights in order to renew MFN.216 This was the beginning of the annual 
fight between Congress and the White House that would last until Clinton 
severed the connection between MFN and human rights. 
In order to blunt Congressional action on MFN, President George H.W. 
Bush promised to appeal to US economic interests (by pushing for increased 
market access for American companies operating in China) and also normative 
values (by insisting on Taiwan’s incorporation into GATT). When it came to 
human rights, however, he remained vague.217 It was through George H.W. 
Bush’s personal involvement (and perhaps his friendly relations with Deng) 
that US-China relations continued in a relatively stable manner, and were 
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rescued from considerable damage at the hands of a vengeful Congress. If he 
had wished, Bush could have allowed Congress to take the lead on China policy, 
and benefitted domestically/politically. However, his realist nature prevented 
him from allowing inflamed public passions to derail what he saw as an 
important relationship, essential for ensuring US national interests and security 
in East Asia. At times, the president would toughen his position – for example, 
receiving the Dalai Lama, and expressing support for Taiwan’s independent 
admission to GATT (where previously, it was supposed to be contingent on 
China joining simultaneously) – which would usually provide him with the 
domestic support he needed to weaken Congressional attacks on China.218 
Nonetheless, meaningful progress on normalising debate on China’s MFN 
remained elusive during Bush’s presidency, and it was not uncommon for Bush 
officials to operate with agendas “largely dictated by congressional pressure”, as 
James Baker effectively did in late 1991, when he was sent to China.219 
It is interesting to note that, while Congress’s anger at Beijing’s crackdown 
in Tiananmen can be considered justified, the remedies they insisted on were 
clearly not viable: if all Congressional demands were met, China would have 
become “one of the most liberal, responsible states in the international 
community. It was not going to happen.”220 This either shows an unrealistic 
appreciation of what could be achieved, or a Congress intent on ruining any 
chance of China meeting its requirements. 
After Tiananmen, American policymakers were torn between their desire 
to open China to US business interests on the one hand and, on the other, to take 
a strong stand against the autocratic government in Beijing. The first two years 
of Clinton’s presidency saw a powerful push toward human rights as a “defining 
feature” of post-Cold War era American foreign policy. “On that score, China was 
squarely in the sights of the human rights lobby.”221 (The focus on human rights 
was first promoted by Carter, but it’s probable that the reason he was unable to 
promote it more was the tight strictures of Cold War security concerns.) Indeed, 
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one of the first things newly-confirmed Assistant Secretary of State for East 
Asian affairs Winston Lord did was fly to Beijing and inform Chinese leaders 
that MFN was going to be conditioned on progress on human rights, and gave 
every impression that the Clinton team was fully prepared to levy tariffs on 
important (if not all) Chinese manufacturers.222 Clinton had pledged during his 
election campaign to connect renewal of China’s MFN status with progress on 
human rights, market access, and non-proliferation. Nancy Pelosi and George 
Marshall intended to hold him to these promises, proposing bills similar to 
those proposed during Bush’s presidency.223 When congressional Democrats 
introduced human rights legislation to suspend China’s trading privileges – 
legislation likely influenced by Clinton’s campaign rhetoric – the White House 
“successfully promoted a compromise.” The statement he issued over China’s 
trading privileges softened the human rights language to “overall significant 
progress”, an ambiguous requirement, compliance with which would be 
decided by the president; “Once the compromise was embodied in an executive 
order, the Democrats dropped the bill.”224 
At the start of Clinton’s presidency, issues with making China-policy were 
profound and they produced frustration at all levels of government, especially 
among the senior levels of the American diplomatic corps in China. According to 
one senior official, the problem with administration China policy began with the 
president, and the lack of control in policy making: There was “no capacity to 
decide anything,” which meant policy was effectively stuck in neutral (including 
the lack of a new Ambassador). The administration’s diffuse and open 
management style, the lack of a solidifying crisis, and Clinton’s continuing 
inattention to foreign affairs, meant China policy was left rudderless.225 The 
Clinton administration’s focus on domestic politics further complicated China 
policy because, when addressed, it “was filtered through the lens of domestic 
political concerns,” which led one State Department official to characterise the 
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government’s inability to “sort out domestic needs from foreign needs” as 
“management by miasma”.226 
Three competing China policy definitions emerged during Clinton’s first 
term, each embodying (to various degrees) an element of traditional US foreign 
policy – one for each key organisation in foreign policy bureaucracy. The State 
Department favoured human rights linkage; an economic/commercial agenda 
emphasising trade relations was pursued by the National Economic Council, the 
Treasury and Commerce Departments; and the Defence Department focussed 
on security interests. With a State Department and National Security Advisor 
paying little attention to security aspects of US-China relations, Clinton filled the 
policy “vacuum” left by these traditional shapers of China-policy with a set of 
advisers to pursue his economic agenda.227 To this end, the NEC operated its 
own China agenda, sending trade delegates to discuss China’s entry into the 
WTO (finalised in 2001). The economic team pushed for MFN delinkage after 
1993, when it became clear that not enough progress was being made on the 
human rights front, and a growing sense that the administration’s focus on 
human rights might be threatening the overall well-being of the bilateral 
relationship.228 
Trade between the US and China was still less than $40 billion in 1994, but 
China was one of the fastest-growing markets for US goods at the time, and “the 
prospects for more in the future were impossible to ignore.” Clinton, therefore, 
decided that not making trade with China contingent upon China’s human rights 
record was in America’s interest. Clinton promised that the US would continue 
to pressure China to reform, but announced in May that “trade would not be the 
primary source of that pressure.”229 During the announcement, he repeatedly 
criticised China’s human rights record, claiming that the policy of linkage “had 
reached the end of [its] usefulness”; but offered no suggestion as to what other 
methods of pressure would be open to future American administrations, and it 
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is widely accepted that by ending linkage, Clinton gave away the final stick 
America had to wield against China on this issue. 
Clinton’s preference for his economic agenda led many Republicans to feel 
that the new president put “undue emphasis on commercial considerations to 
the detriment of national security concerns” and exhibited an “exaggerated faith 
in the peace-inducing properties of trade and multilateral institutions”.230  
After being punished with sanctions for selling missiles to Pakistan, China 
turned to European suppliers. This resulted in extensive lobbying from US 
corporations who did not wish to lose out to competitors in the burgeoning, 
lucrative China market. This in turn led the Clinton administration to issue 
waivers, a move that was not immune to scandal – for example, waivers were 
issued to Loral Corp and Hughes Electronics to sell satellite technology to China, 
both of whom had been contributors to Clinton’s campaign. “At best, [Clinton] 
was putting corporate interests – and the jobs they claimed were at risk – ahead 
of what analysts believe to be the national interest in minimizing assistance to 
the PLA.” Clinton pointed to the precedent set by every president since Nixon in 
this respect.231 
In 1994, the National Economic Council, the Commerce Department and 
NSC staffers sympathetic to business interests “shouldered aside” the State 
Department, with “the acquiescence of the president”. These officials perceived 
little if any threat to US security from China, and stressed the importance of 
trade and investment to the bilateral relationship and also the American 
economy. Conceding that the Chinese government was “occasionally brutal”, 
these officials nonetheless pointed to improvements in overall quality of life in 
China and moderate opening of Chinese society in order to promote a strategy 
of ‘engagement’ with China.  
To begin with, Clinton found it very difficult to separate moralist and 
economic foreign policies and his domestic agenda. With this difficulty came the 
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opportunity for a re-evaluation of the US-China relationship, and we see the 
first tentative steps towards a pluralist foreign policy.232 
Given the internal advocacy for a strict China policy, not to mention 
Clinton’s campaign promises and attacks on George H.W. Bush’s “coddling” of 
Beijing, the turn-around on human rights was “striking”.233 Initially, Clinton 
played a tough hand advocated by the State Department, until Lloyd Bentsen 
(Treasury), Robert Rubin (NEC), Ronald Brown and Jeffrey Garten (Commerce), 
and other business advocates in the administration convinced the president 
that China policy could not be held hostage by a single issue (human rights).234 
When it came to the US-China economic relationship, “The White House was 
engaged in China policy, more and more meetings were kicked to a higher level, 
as appropriate with MFN... The economic people were more important and the 
White House took the lead.”235 
When Clinton came into office, China policy became the responsibility of 
Winston Lord. As stated in the Normative Relations section, above, Lord had 
split with the Bush administration following the Tiananmen Square massacre, 
and was “determined to hold Beijing to account for its transgressions at home 
and abroad.”236 However, Lord’s flexibility to operate alone was severely limited 
by Clinton’s economic and policy advisers, who reminded the president about 
his economic campaign promises. Precipitating a trade war with China would 
have not only hurt China, but severely limited achievement of Clinton’s 
economic agenda, and thereby his re-election hopes.237 Clinton’s election 
victory gave the new president the ability to mellow Democratic attacks on 
China and the MFN debate, by issuing Executive Order 12850 on May 28th 1993. 
This granted MFN control to the White House (using much the same tactics as 
Bush). At the announcement, Clinton declared that the “annual battles” over 
MFN “divided our foreign policy and weakened our approach over China. It is 
time that a unified American policy recognised both the value of China and the 
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values of America.” According to Berger, this had always been the plan, to 
eventually “have a human rights policy and a trade policy, but not linking one to 
the other”; and by bringing control into the White House, the “hot-heads” could 
be excluded from decision-making.238 
To further cement the central role of international economics in Clinton’s 
foreign policy, the newly-created NEC had “overlapping jurisdiction with the 
NSC”, which gave Rubin and Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen seats on the NSC, 
and forced the national security adviser to consider economics when 
developing security policy.239 The revitalised commercial frame created a 
“broad engagement umbrella”, under which competing agendas could flourish. 
The shift in focus to economics corresponded to a change in authority over 
China policy, which saw control drawn away from undersecretaries of State, 
and frequently transferred to the Commerce and Treasury Departments, as well 
as the NEC as trade gained prominence.240 
“By uncoupling morality from business, Clinton accelerated the rush 
of U.S. businesses into China and set back the agenda of those who 
wanted to use economic ties as a carrot to induce the Chinese 
government to change the nature of the political and legal system in 
China.”241 
GEORGE W. BUSH, ECONOMIC POLICY & CHINA 
Before his run for the presidency, George W Bush appeared to adhere to an 
engagement strategy, believing in the economic success-breeds-democracy 
thesis. In 1999, the then-Governor of Texas said, “Economic freedom creates 
habits of liberty. And habits of liberty create expectations of democracy... Trade 
freely with China, and time is on our side.”242 
China’s 2001 admittance into the WTO was the culmination of a decade 
and a half of negotiation, but it did not see an end to tensions in the US-China 
relationship. Issues pertaining to currency valuation, market access, intellectual 
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property rights, textile quotas, and trade deficits all hover over the relationship, 
threatening to inflame relations in the near future (especially in the wake of the 
2008 Economic Crisis).243 
The US China-currency and trade debates have a tendency to heat up in 
election years. In 2004, these debates were particularly vocal and heated, as 
Congressional candidates railed against China’s currency policy, and organised 
labour groups protested against China’s manufacturing policies as well as 
corporate outsourcing. In this climate, neither President Bush, nor his 
opponent, Senator John Kerry, nor elected Representatives could ignore China 
as an issue. In March 2004, the United States filed its first complaint with the 
WTO about China’s unfair discrimination against American semiconductors 
(echoing a complaint against Japan in the 1980s, when Japan was seen as the 
economic bogeyman). 
A common belief (or, at the very least, accusation) of US congressmen is 
that China artificially devalues its currency in order to remain competitive and 
by extension hurt American producers and consumers, and there are almost 
yearly debates and investigations conducted on the issue. This narrative ignores 
America’s own complicity in China’s currency policy, and the impact American 
consumption has on China’s decision to peg the yuan to the dollar.244 With 
regards to the election-cyclical nature of the prominence of these issues, 
Karabell points out: 
“If the primary goal of U.S. policy had been to get China to reconsider 
its policies, public denunciations would have been the last tool 
selected. In truth, the denunciations of China in the United States 
were aimed more at a domestic American audience than at China 
itself.”245 
Comparisons to US-Japanese relations in the 1980s do not stop at 
technology. The aborted purchase by CNOOC of the small American oil 
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company, Unocal, was sometimes compared to the “hysteria”246 that 
characterised political discourse regarding Japanese purchases of such 
American landmarks as the Rockefeller Center in New York City. However, in 
the CNOOC-Unocal instance (mentioned also in Chapter Six), members of 
Congress objected to a foreign, “particularly a Chinese” entity owning an 
American energy interest (despite Unocal actually accounting for a negligible 
percentage of American energy consumption), and pushed Unocal to accept 
Chevron’s much reduced price.247 
In September 2006, new Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson (who had 
extensive business connections with China from his time as CEO of Goldman 
Sachs) established the Strategic and Economic Dialogue (SED), which created a 
platform to address the economic challenges of the US-China relationship. 
Secretary Paulson spent an “enormous” amount of political capital in his 
attempts to bring Washington and Beijing closer together. Through the SED, 
Paulson was able to maintain a “comprehensive and friendly exchange” with 
Beijing, focusing on “the twin phantoms of exchange-rate targets and trade 
imbalances”,248 at a time when the Bush administration was distracted by the 
Middle East and its campaign against global terrorism. In addition, Paulson 
managed to discourage most “retaliatory” Congressional action against China’s 
rising trade surplus with the United States.249 By 2009, despite three meetings 
and Paulson’s considerable efforts, the SED has produced “generally modest”250 
results (frequently reporting, vaguely “subtle but significant” progress on 
issues),251 and “resolutions on key issues... have not been reached.”252 This 
reveals how “even a powerful and determined cabinet-level official, even one 
with such vast ties to Chinese officials, can do only so much.”253 Part of the 
blame for lack of progress belongs to Congress, which “embarked on a spree of 
protectionist rhetoric and China bashing”, in return for which “Beijing did little 
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to further liberalize its markets to foreign trade or address its corruption-
ridden banking system.”254 
 
CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A PLURALIST CHINA GRAND STRATEGY 
A pluralist grand strategy for China would argue that neither realism nor 
idealism adequately describes or prescribes the way the US thinks about China, 
and especially so since the global era emphasizes pluralization: we have to 
merge realism-idealism; we have to merge institutional interests within the 
collective executive; we have to merge domestic and overseas interest within 
US politics; and we have to grasp the complexity of the US-China relationship 
under globalization. 
There are certain issues that highlight the pluralist nature of US politics – 
both domestic and foreign – and how the US has yet to find a concrete grand 
strategy, or at least a solidified manner to articulate this strategy. Taiwan, as 
shown above, is an issue that has wide-reaching attention from the whole US 
foreign policy system. The United States, for the moment, appears to still be 
stuck in the false dichotomy of having to choose between containment and 
engagement, and the media often reinforces the impression that the choice is 
“either-or”, reflecting an understanding of international relations lacking in 
nuance. The reality, as we have seen over the past three chapters, is that the 
American foreign policy process “is far more intricate and involved, more 
politicised and changeable” than “even the most sophisticated theories of 
hegemonic behaviour” can encompass.255 
In the wake of the Cold War, and the end of the unifying security-based 
foreign policy, American foreign policy and, as we have seen, China policy 
especially, has become ever more impacted and complicated by domestic 
concerns and actors. This holds with Robert Jervis’s prediction that foreign 
policy will become more like domestic policy, in which “courses of action will be 
shaped less by a grand design than by the pulling and hauling of various 
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interests, ideas, and political calculations”. Or, in other words, “pluralism with a 
vengeance.”256 
Many popular and academic interpretations of US foreign policy (this 
thesis included) focus on external forces – including economic interests, 
international pressures, domestic political concerns, and public intellectuals – 
that can push presidents toward certain decisions over others, and help 
determine presidential behaviour. All of these forces are important, Dueck 
argues, but it remains worth remembering that “foreign policy is not made in 
exactly the same way as domestic policy in the United States.”257 Suettinger, 
Dueck and Paul Peterson have all argued that there is no substitute for 
presidential leadership.258 In Peterson’s words, “international theory clearly 
implies that the executive is likely to dominate the making of foreign policy,” 
irrespective of “transient factors such as the vagaries of public opinion or the 
momentary absence of interest group pressure”. This dominance is “rooted in 
the requirements imposed on the nation-state by the potentially anarchic 
quality of the international system,”259 and the position of the president as the 
sole foreign policy actor receiving comprehensive information, and capable of 
moving policy in one direction or another. This is difficult to refute. However, 
this chapter and the two preceding have shown that US foreign policy is not 
constructed in a vacuum, the President insulated from domestic political 
concerns and actors. The foreign policy process certainly retains distinct 
differences from domestic policy-making, but the truth is that domestic 
pluralisation is encroaching ever-more on the foreign policy-making process, 
and in this environment domestic actors cannot be dismissed so readily. Indeed, 
in many ways, partisan politics are far more important to eventual policy 
decisions than, for example, vested economic interests, as both political parties 
approach policy-making with a keen eye on how they will be received 
domestically, particularly during electoral cycles.260 
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When a president is engaged, a coherent policy process will emerge; with 
a disengaged president, relations can collapse or become steered by the 
parochial concerns of domestic constituencies, with their own competing 
interests, and individuals within administrations who will try to further their 
own agendas. The level of presidential engagement can have an impact on 
whether or not the plurality of foreign policy actors is positive or negative – the 
president acts as a filter for the plurality of inputs. When he’s engaged, the 
influences are still there, but they are controlled by the Executive and the 
president in particular – this can also happen when an individual takes control 
(as when Kissinger and Brzezinski took the reins); because there has not been a 
Kissingerian figure in the post-Cold War world, the onus falls on the president 
to force direction in policy. Congress has proven too fragmented and the 
interests of Representatives too parochial to ever replace the long-term 
perspective of a president, his appointed deputies, or career staff. Even during 
the post-Cold War years, when Congress has become more activist in foreign 
policy, the role of the president has remained key in the passage of policy. This 
explains, in part, why George H.W. Bush was able to stand up to Representative 
Pelosi and Senator Mitchell in the fights over China’s MFN status, and why Bill 
Clinton was able to decouple human rights from US-China economic relations 
despite considerable domestic opposition. 
Peterson claims that “policy takes precedence over politics”, because the 
international system “severely limits the sensible choices a country can make 
and shapes the processes by which these decisions are reached.”261 This is not 
necessarily clear, either. While it is true that some presidents – Nixon and 
George H.W. Bush in particular – pursued foreign policies that were grounded in 
international and long-term considerations, Presidents Clinton, Reagan and 
George W. Bush could be argued to have implemented and decided upon 
policies that were influenced more by domestic political concerns (especially 
true in the case of China). The nature of the international system can also 
explain the emergence of traditions in US foreign policy: no matter how much a 
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president may want to pursue a liberal-moralist foreign policy, economic-realist 
concerns will exert a powerful pull on national and Executive attention. 
Presidents Reagan, Clinton and George W. Bush “only rarely... intervene[d] 
to shape the course of China policy and to counter the infighting that plagued 
their administrations.” The inattentiveness of these presidents “contributed to 
mixed policy signals on China policy,”262 and can explain policy difficulties 
experienced during these administrations. Contemporary evidence suggests 
that China issues will develop during a president’s second term, with a shift in 
focus and rhetoric as trends and traditions reassert themselves when neglected. 
Clinton and George W. Bush, particularly, experienced considerable change in 
China policy in their second terms. Why this should be the case is not absolutely 
clear, but it may involve reduced political pressures (no longer worrying about 
re-election), plus thought to one’s legacy. What is clear, however, is the 
importance of a president’s staff to changing the tone or policies of an 
administration. With Clinton, Berger’s elevation brought China policy both 
under tighter control and also closer to the fore. In Bush’s second term, the 
shifting away from neoconservative policies was a result of Condoleezza Rice’s 
elevation to State and Stephen Hadley’s assumption of the top NSA position. 
In the post-Cold War world, we can see economic-realism, supplemented 
by the domestic political benefits of realpolitik and liberal-moralism, 
reasserting itself in China policy. By understanding and recognising this 
tradition in US foreign policy, the China policy of President Obama and his 
successors, its potential future course, and the enduring status quo of US-China 
relations becomes clearer (barring any catastrophic or game-changing event). 
Locating the role of the Executive Branch in the overall foreign policy system, 
therefore, is much easier than the media and special interests. While these non-
governmental sectors can help reinforce the orthodox perceptions of realism 
and liberalism in US foreign policy, it is the Executive Branch, particularly the 
President and policy principles, who cement these traditions in practice by 
forming (sometimes unconsciously) a more pluralist strategy. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis has focused on understanding the role and influence of domestic 
actors on the construction of United States foreign policy. As stated in previous 
chapters, due to the complexity of US foreign policy, particularly US China 
policy, both realism and liberalism have been found wanting as theories to 
encompass and explain American policy toward China. However, the findings of 
this thesis suggest that a pluralist approach, drawing from both international 
realism and liberalism, and incorporating and accepting aspects of domestic 
political theory and pluralism can advance the study of American foreign 
relations and the making of China policy. 
The contemporary global environment emphasizes pluralisation of 
international relations, as economic interdependence, and non-state actors and 
threats (including environmental threats) suggest that power politics alone can 
no longer account for state action. In addition, while the premise that nations 
pursue their own narrow self interests can hardly be refuted, there is evidence 
that more idealist policies are receiving increased favour. With regard the 
American foreign policy making experience and process, pluralism is even more 
essential to acquiring a fuller understanding: a merger of realism and idealism, 
institutional interests within the collective Executive, and the complex domestic 
and overseas interests operating within US politics are all essential to 
explaining US foreign policy. The reality, as has been stated before, is that the 
American foreign policy process is far more complex, politicised and changeable 
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than even the most sophisticated of international relations theories can 
encompass.1 
The importance of foreign policy trends and traditions are also clear. The 
existing differences in foreign policy dialogues are manifestations of American 
foreign policy traditions. All  foreign policy actors discussed in this thesis focus, 
to varying degrees, on threat, advantage, and values (this will be expanded 
upon, below). In order to properly draw conclusions from this research, each 
research question posed in the introduction will be addressed individually. 
 
1. What are the dominant formative processes that constitute US Foreign 
Policy in terms of intellectual trends and traditions and the multiple 
social and constitutional institutions that translate ideas about 
America’s role in the world into a foreign policy posture that is 
recognisably a ‘grand strategy’? 
The key trends and traditions that run throughout the history of American 
foreign policy are clear: it is an uneasy balance between realism and liberal-
moralism (or ‘idealism’), with the former more dominant than the latter. These 
traditions inform the construction of US foreign policy by highlighting the 
importance of protecting the balance of power, promoting economic 
development and advancement, and also promoting the expansion of American 
values, while ensuring the survival, expansion and prosperity of the nation’s 
domestic political, economic and social institutions and interests. 
Since the nation’s Founding, American grand strategy has been informed 
by the pursuit of economic continuity, specifically through the promotion of 
open and free international market economics. This tradition has taken on 
other incarnations, in order to suit other foreign policy imperatives. For 
example, capitalist expansion was one part of the Cold War ‘containment’ 
strategy, used to weaken the appeal of the Soviet economic model, and 
therefore slow or stop the spread of communism.  
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In addition to the realist tradition in American foreign policy has been its 
liberal-moral strain. This is not as long-lived as realism, as only with increased 
international prestige and power was the United States comfortable with 
pursuing liberal foreign policy objectives (although policy had often been 
cloaked in these terms). Some have argued, as mentioned in this thesis, that 
liberal rhetoric is merely a cover for more pragmatic realist foreign policies; 
however, given the popularity of liberal ideals, a case can be made for a genuine 
liberal tradition. Realism’s predominance waxes and wanes depending on other 
security concerns, but also due to the varied American goals in different regions 
of the globe.  
Economic expansion and advancement as a key driver of American foreign 
policy has been amply demonstrated in the first historical chapter and also in 
Chapters Four through Seven, as a result of the advance of globalisation 
following the end of the Cold War. This focus on economics as national interest 
adheres well to realist theory, as American officials have long considered 
economic wellbeing and expansion to be a (if not the) vital national interest.  
The occasionally uncomfortable mix of realism and idealism has seen 
American foreign policy swing between favouring interests or ideals, depending 
on the personal biases at work in the Executive Office. It has yet to find a happy 
medium between the two. At its Founding, America’s concerns were 
predominantly realist in nature: securing the fledgling nation from outside 
aggressors, implementing an economic foreign policy that would allow it to 
grow and prosper (for the American ‘experiment’ to succeed). As the United 
States developed and grew stronger, it became more secure in espousing a 
liberal foreign policy (for example, democracy promotion, humanitarian 
intervention, and the creation of and participation in international 
organisations). International pressures, not to mention domestic imperatives, 
have ensured that the realist tradition in American foreign policy has endured. 
Ever since the end of World War II, American statesmen have been 
grappling with the tensions and trade-offs between American commercial and 
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strategic interests and American ideals,2 as they attempt to bridge the divide 
between realist and idealist traditions that have become ingrained in the 
American political and public psyche. This explains why there is a need for a 
pluralist approach to foreign policy. While the Cold War allowed for the easier 
construction (though not necessarily execution) of Grand Strategy, one that 
combined the idealist promotion of democracy and a focus on human rights 
with realist strategic and economic requirements, post-Cold War foreign policy 
has found itself adrift. Without the ideological Cold War struggle, one might 
have expected a more balanced, pluralist foreign policy to emerge: the relative 
reduction in great power politics might have allowed the United States to 
incorporate more idealist traits and goals into its foreign policy, while 
continuing to focus on economic expansion and national defence. Presidents 
Clinton and George W. Bush certainly attempted to imbue American foreign 
policy with a moralist component, but international realities, domestic 
opposition, or a lack of presidential focus prevented a proper fusion.  
 
2. What does a case study approach that balances the conventional 
concern with executive decision-making in foreign policy with analysis 
of the role of social institutions, like the media and social interest 
groups, have to tell us about the pluralised nature of the foreign policy 
process in contemporary America? 
The case studies that feature in the two media chapters and Chapter Five 
indicate that the pluralised nature of the contemporary American foreign policy 
process is still in flux. Given the increased pluralisation of the process, the sheer 
number of actors involved makes it ever-more difficult to ascertain whether or 
not an actor is merely reinforcing traditional conceptions of American national 
interest, or if they are able to move the national interest – even by a fraction – 
towards a new grand conceptualisation. Walter McDougall has questioned 
whether or not the US government and its relevant agencies can formulate and 
execute grand strategy with “sufficient competence to secure the nation and 
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defend its vital interests”.3 It would appear, from the evidence in this thesis, that 
the federal government is equipped to plan, coordinate and execute grand 
strategy to serve and defend American national interests. What remains unclear 
is to what extent the government, media, and special interests can affect the 
various stages of the process; or even if a single Grand Strategy is the optimal 
foreign policy. The case study approach has allowed for a deconstructed 
analysis of the foreign policy-making system in the United States. 
The dominant realist theory of foreign policy-making argues that 
government elites dominate the foreign policy-making process, with domestic 
actors’ roles consigned to domestic policy. Elites, it is argued, have the 
resources, long-view and unemotional rationalism to make optimal foreign 
policy. The dominant framework in policy-making, according to realists, 
remains the nation-state, “defined by its borders, its bureaucracies, its armies, 
central banks, and individual currencies.”4 A state that incorporates domestic-
political considerations into the formation of its foreign policy will pursue a 
“suboptimal foreign policy due to the interaction of the actors represented 
within the state.”5  
This assumption, however, runs counter to a core hypothesis of this 
research, which posits that domestic actors do, indeed, exert a level of influence 
over a nation’s foreign policy, particularly in the United States. From even a 
cursory reading of the chapters of this thesis, one can see a level of influence 
that must be attributed to the media, business leaders, lobbying groups, labour 
unions and other interest groups, even if it is only by effecting small, 
incremental change or by framing policy debates – the “big secret of 
Washington” would appear to be true, that “there is no single elite able to plot 
world domination from the dusty reading rooms of the city’s luncheon clubs.” 
This pop-cultural reference incorporates the notion of non-governmental actors 
having a say, however small, in the construction of policy,6 which contradicts 
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the Executive-exclusive theories popular with many scholars and 
commentators. 
The plethora of actors involved in the process could be a defining 
characteristic of the United States, rather than nations as a whole, which would 
not undermine realism as a generally applicable theory of international 
relations. It is difficult to see how domestic politics can be pushed aside when 
discussing or analysing the construction of American foreign policy: there are a 
lot more domestic actors involved in making American foreign policy than 
realists accept, and many of these actors are intricately linked with government 
officials, through the ‘revolving door’ many senior government employees pass 
through between corporations or academia/think tanks on the one hand, and 
government jobs on the other. 
Therefore, we have to take a more pluralist approach when analysing the 
US foreign policy-making system, in order to include relevant domestic actors 
and give due consideration to their role in the system. It should, however, be 
stressed that it is not the finding of this thesis that media and special interest 
lobbies wield undue influence over government decision makers – far from it. 
This thesis finds that ascertaining ‘proof’ of influence is exceedingly difficult, 
because “influence is problematic both as a concept and as a phenomenon for 
measurement”, and there is “no adequate social scientific tool” that can be used 
to objectively measure influence.7 
As mentioned earlier in the thesis, and in the words of John Dumbrell, 
foreign policy in America is “the product of ambivalent traditions and forces, 
and of a policy-making environment characterised by fragmentation”,8 and 
there has been a notable pattern in American foreign policy-making of this 
fragmentation expanding, a result of a broadening of the domestic political 
audience involved in the process, especially in its early stages.9 A case-study 
approach to the study of domestic actors operating in and around US foreign 
policy has provided a deeper understanding of the real role of lobbies and the 
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media, and how they interact with the Executive branch and government 
organisations. 
As outlined in the previous chapter, different parts of the bureaucracy are 
tasked with articulating policies in their own area which can impinge on foreign 
policy. For example, while the State Department is tasked with producing and 
implementing overall US foreign policy, the Defense Department articulates and 
executes military and defence policy, which, by definition, must include a 
foreign element. The legislative branch of the government (the Congress and 
Senate) is supposed to focus on domestic issues and policy, but frequently 
attempts to influence foreign policy when it comes to approving funding of 
initiatives. The role of the president in this framework is to act as an overall 
arbiter, effectively filtering intelligence and information he receives from the 
governmental bureaucracy. To quote former British Ambassador to 
Washington, Sir Nicholas Henderson’s famous statement, “When you say the US 
administration, I am sorry to be pedantic, but there is the Pentagon view, the 
State Department view, and the White House view.”10 As has been shown in this 
research, there are also multiple media views, and multiple lobby views, all of 
which attempt to muscle in on the process. American foreign policy must also 
contend with the militarised economy (thanks, in part, to Pentagon officials and 
powerful defence industry lobbyists), and considerable and unaccountable 
private power (an issue that has only been exacerbated by the 2009 Citizens 
United Supreme Court ruling, which gave corporations the same rights as 
individuals). 
As suggested in Chapters Four and Five, the government is not insulated 
from domestic forces operating in and around the federal government. Post-
1989, the Congress is no longer content (if it ever actually was) to allow the 
Executive Branch to act alone on foreign policy. In some instances, this has been 
due to presidential inaction or indifference to foreign policy, which allowed for 
a more activist Congress. Representatives with strong views on, for example, 
China’s human rights record, could ‘muscle in’ on the foreign policy-making 
process, as members attempt to legislate the tactics of foreign policy. Some 
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Congressmen have also sought to impose a code of conduct on other nations 
(usually through sanctions), as well as highlight the liberal-moral tradition in 
American foreign policy. In addition, Congress’s role as appropriator of funds 
for foreign policies has given certain internationally-minded members more 
political muscle on foreign policy. Given the more open nature of Congress, and 
increased Congressional interest in foreign policy, comes the potential for 
increased influence by the media and special interests, which are far more likely 
to find success in influencing the actions of Congressmen, driven, as they are, by 
the need for publicity and campaign donations to feed the perpetual election-
machine in which they operate.  
Robert Jervis’s criticism of the foreign policy-making process (i.e. that it is 
shaped by the pressures exerted by various domestic interests, ideas, and 
political calculations than some grand design) appears partly accurate, and, 
given the (expanding) number of actors operating or attempting to operate in 
the foreign policy process, does suggest that America is experiencing “pluralism 
with a vengeance.”11 That being said, despite the proliferation of actors, the 
traditional framework and themes of US foreign policy remain dominant: the 
media and special interest lobbies exploit the system and this framework to suit 
their needs, which might explain why the perception has become one of special 
interest or media-led foreign policy.  
Whether or not advisers are influenced by the media reports or special 
interest lobby papers is extremely difficult to prove. However, it is fairly clear 
that, while the media may not be able to influence specific policies, they can help 
shape the biases people bring with them to government, and hence exert an 
indirect influence on deliberations. This is certainly evident from the Media 
Case Study (Chapter 4.2), which shows how the media has been able to 
reinforce a negative impression of China’s government through frequent and 
consistent reference to the Tiananmen Square incident; highlighting the 
‘brutality’ of the crackdown and the oppressive, Orwellian lengths to which the 
CCP will go to suppress dissent and any information that could be damaging to 
their interests. In addition, the often strongly partisan pundits, editorial writers, 
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and network and print ‘news analysts’ do figure in the policy process, although 
not definitively. These actors can affect the “political atmospherics”12 in 
Washington by bringing focus to bear on specific issues, but beyond that they 
do appear to lack concrete influence. The media’s role is therefore arguably one 
restricted to framing and early information provision. Once an issue becomes 
part of the administration’s agenda, however, governmental intelligence and 
information sources, not to mention administration agendas and goals, will 
sideline the media and special interest lobbies. That said, administrations are 
still forced to address and reference external agendas when framing their own 
policies. To use the example of Tiananmen once again, we can see how, in a 
relatively short period of time, media coverage and legislators’ susceptibility to 
absorbing the media narrative, has indefinitely affected American impressions 
of China as a dictatorship willing to quash dissent violently. While this has not 
prevented any administration  over the last two decades from exercising foreign 
policy on the world stage (particularly economic policy), it has certainly caused 
leaders to perform a fine balancing act to avoid appearing too accommodating 
of the Chinese government. 
Given the stark ideological cleavage between different broadcast and print 
media outlets, the influence of any given network or publication will wax and 
wane depending on which party holds power – either in Congress or the White 
House. Given the connection between think tank scholars, their respective 
ideological media outlets, and presidential administrations, the same can be 
said for academics and research institutes. That these same academics write for 
certain journals or news-publications, while also receiving advisory positions in 
administrations, allows them to pass themselves off as ‘influential’ in policy-
making. 
If the media are influential in framing an issue, or creating a tone within 
which public debate will take place, how then can we characterise the influence 
of special interest lobbies? One could reasonably assume, from the findings 
discussed in previous chapters, that special interests can have influence on 
specifics of policy, if not in overall policy construction. However, ultimately, 
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America’s traditional values and national interest (or the perception thereof) 
hold considerable sway. For example, a lobby may be able to convince 
lawmakers that certain technological goods should be exempt from sanctions or 
embargoes (such as satellite technology sales to China during the Clinton 
administration), as part of the minutiae of policy. However, such lobbying will 
likely be most successful when Congressional and/or Executive moods are 
already amenable to policies in the first place. Presidents cannot stray too far 
from orthodoxy without being punished by the system (or electorate), and 
neither can special interest lobbyists. The longest running trend of US foreign 
policy has been the focus on economics; that current US foreign policy 
frequently appears made from international economic considerations does not 
automatically suggest or prove business lobby influence, but does suggest that 
decision-makers could be more receptive to corporate lobby agendas, if 
presented in a national interest framework.  
It is also clear that business and other lobbies have become well adapted 
to exploiting governmental and presidential policy decisions in order to suit 
their own narrow agendas, but again, only in the minutiae of policy. There is 
little evidence beyond conspiracy theories that corporations can control the 
direction of a foreign, economic, or human rights policy. As with the media, 
however, special interests and think tanks can, and do, provide essential 
information from which presidents and their advisors draw when deliberating 
policy and strategy. While this may suggest undue influence as lobby 
publications will likely be biased to serve their own agendas, it is also clear that 
presidents and their advisors are able to locate such information within the 
framework of overall US national interest and foreign policy. 
In the United States, the importance of domestic policies, agendas and 
actors is therefore relevant to the formation and implementation of foreign 
policy. David Truman observed that “the outstanding characteristic of American 
politics” is the “multiplicity of co-ordinate or near co-ordinate points of access 
to governmental decisions”,13 which the case-study approach of Part Two of the 
thesis has shown and supported. That is to say, the number of avenues of 
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opportunity open to special interests and also the media through which they 
can attempt to influence or exert pressure on the foreign policy-making system 
is considerable. One could almost envision an Executive and government under 
siege by domestic forces. The multiple levels of access available to lobbyists 
(particularly in Congress) mean media and special interests can attempt to 
influence the policy process from multiple angles, especially at ‘lower’ levels if 
they find their way barred nearer the top, closer to the Oval Office. As explained 
in Chapter Six, the Executive Branch itself, and in particular Cabinet-level 
officials, are quite resistant to overtures from lobbyists – not only is access to 
them extremely difficult, but also their understanding and appreciation of the 
traditional framework of US foreign policy is much greater, making them more 
difficult to influence. Therefore, it is not surprising that lobbyists spend the bulk 
of their efforts attempting to influence members of Congress, who will be 
required to vote on accepting and funding a president’s foreign policy proposal. 
Increasingly, lobbyists or those connected to special interests will take to the 
media to get their message out – after all, physically inaccessible government 
officials still consume at least some news media, which provides the media 
outlets with a little more influence as they decide what gets published and/or 
broadcast, and therefore disseminated to the public and government officials. 
However, just because a story is reported does not guarantee governmental 
action, as explained and illustrated in the two media chapters. Partly, this is due 
to the established fact of US politics’ pluralist nature also working against 
outside influence: With such a cacophony of voices, often working at cross-
purposes, it is no wonder the policy-making process has been described as an 
almost futile cry for attention.14 
Locating the role of the Executive Branch in the overall foreign policy 
system is demonstrably easier than the media and special interests. As has been 
made clear in the previous chapter, the wealth of literature that supports the 
Executive’s centrality to the process is considerable, and certainly difficult to 
refute – the president is, after all, the actor upon whose shoulders the 
responsibility for the articulation of foreign policy constitutionally falls. After all 
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other considerations are taken into account – economic, political, international, 
and ideological pressures – the direction of foreign policy becomes very much 
tied to the choices of the president and his immediate staff.15 While the non-
governmental sectors discussed in this thesis can help reinforce the orthodox 
perceptions of realism and liberalism in US foreign policy, it is the Executive 
Branch, particularly the president and policy principles, who cement these 
traditions in practice by forming policy. Immerman has pointed out that 
“neither the formulation nor implementation of U.S. foreign policy is 
democratic”, despite the sheer number of actors attempting to influence its 
construction. Despite the pluralistic nature of American society and its political 
system, “only an elite few” actually get a specific ‘vote’ on policy decisions, after 
filtering the various positions, agendas and viewpoints presented through the 
Executive’s conception of the national interest.16 This ‘filtering’ is an important 
characteristic of the process – as this thesis has shown, these policies are not 
formed in some political vacuum, and the unrealistic level of expertise and 
individual control some scholars attribute to a single president or actor in the 
foreign policy system are evidently untrue. One could say, more accurately, that 
the foreign policy-making process is not Executive-exclusive, but rather it is 
Executive-dominated. 
The lack of conflict between the Executive Branch and a given special 
interest lobby is likely a result of mutual, largely identical conceptions of the 
world and of the American national interest.17 One can argue, therefore, that 
Parmar’s theory that certain think tanks and special interest groups are 
“pushing against an open door”, explains any perceived success at shifting or 
influencing foreign policy debate and direction. 
 
3. Why has China remained such a persistent problem for the US tradition 
of deploying grand strategy? Is this because China is a difficult case; or 
because, unlike the Soviet Union or the European Union as evident 
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negative or positive cases, China divides rather than unites the 
pluralist interests and perspectives of US foreign policy pluralism? 
At present, and in the recent past, the increase in pluralism inherent in 
American politics and the foreign policy-making process has presented a 
considerable obstacle to effective China policy-making. The reason for this is 
due both to the complexity of the US-China relationship, and also because China 
issues have proven incredibly divisive – even within media outlets or among 
lobbies representing the same business sectors, creating a plethora of mixed or 
muddled messages, and a policy environment in which a well-defined pluralist 
policy is very difficult to achieve. Nonetheless, and perhaps peculiarly, policy 
towards China has remained relatively constant – with caveats for crises or 
unexpected events. As with foreign policy as a whole, commerce and great 
power politics remain key determinants of the relationship. However, perhaps 
uniquely among the many important bilateral relationships the United States 
maintains, America’s domestic pluralism often throws up barriers to effective 
policy-making as actors attempt to hijack the debate. Over the past forty years, 
the major turning points and determinants of US-China relations have shown 
that, without “powerful, practical reasons for pragmatic accommodation and 
cooperation”, deeply-rooted and enduring differences between Washington and 
Beijing, not to mention the broader American and Chinese societies, will 
emerge.18 It is these differences that American media and special interest 
groups have learned to exploit, in their attempts to alter policy. 
The US-China relationship has been used to justify both realist and liberal 
foreign policy prescriptions. Economic and business interests promote specific 
and usually narrow policies that suit America’s traditional mercantile realism, 
although some groups, such as the US Business Council, do promote broader 
economic interests. Among the media, Forbes and the Wall Street Journal, 
particularly, help promote the economic relationship. As the only credible, 
potential large-scale threat to American security, defence industry lobbies, 
Pentagon spokesmen, and Congressional ‘hawks’ are able to push their own 
agendas, appealing to the more nationalist realist tradition, and fuelling the 
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growth of the militarised economy. The Weekly Standard, National Review, and 
Fox News provide these defence hawks with a media platform from which to 
promote their agenda.  
Perceived as a continued, unapologetic abuser of human rights, China 
continues to offer a large target for lobbies that push liberal-moralist 
prescriptions, which paint China as inimical to America’s traditional values. For 
many American elites, China is seen as un-evolved since the days of the 
Tiananmen Square Massacre which, as shown in Part Two of the thesis, remains 
prominent in the American political psyche, as well as a defining moment in 
Chinese history that continues to inform not only Washington officials, but also 
non-governmental actors and the public’s view of China. The Nation, The New 
Republic, The American Prospect, The Weekly Standard, and National Review all 
frequently print features and commentary that highlight China’s human rights 
record, and, similarly, broadcast outlets feature segments and stories 
chronicling or mentioning China’s record. This human rights record is the most 
popularly reported aspect of US-China relations, across the political spectrum, 
which might account for the perceived influence of human rights lobbyists. 
Economics plays a particularly key role in helping us understand 
America’s evolving China policy – not just because of the traditional focus on 
market access and expansion, but also because of the role played by American 
corporations in the economic development of China, and its subsequent 
integration into the global capitalist community. From the Opium Wars until 
today, with only minor interruptions, the protection of American business 
interests has been a predominant concern for China policy-makers in 
Washington. During the Cold War until normalisation, China was part of the 
Communist enemy, after which China became part of the United States’ 
triangulation policy to weaken Soviet influence. In the wake of the Cold War, 
China is no longer a ‘secondary theatre’ to wider (i.e. European/Western) global 
concerns, but in conjunction with the events of Tiananmen Square in 1989, 
China continues to be viewed negatively by a large proportion of elected 
officials, government bureaucrats, and also the American media and public. 
Even though economic reality and considerations resumed their importance 
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following normalisation, and accelerated in recent years, American 
policymakers and Congressional representatives remain unable to separate 
ideological opposition to China from general relations. Indeed, as discussed in 
Chapter 4.2, some in the media lamented the reassertion of economics as the 
driving force behind US-China relations, presenting the economic focus as an 
immoral abandonment of the essence of America. 
Given the importance and complexity of the US-China relationship, it is 
often difficult to ascertain whether special interest groups themselves have 
contributed to policy divergences over China, or if they have merely exploited 
already existing differences among policy-makers and officials.19 This is a 
particular concern when discussing the role of the media. It is very difficult to 
state with any degree of certainty to what extent the media or lobbies influence 
the direction of China policy. This difficulty in measuring the influence of non-
governmental actors might explain the readiness with which some scholars and 
commentators dismiss them as key players. Special interests, like the media, can 
tap into specific, existing biases of government officials, which is where their 
‘power’ or influence is most strongly felt. This is certainly the case when it 
comes to China.  
The media, in its role as an intermediary between the American public and 
the federal government, helps to create the political environment and even 
consensus in which politicians at every level must operate. To deviate too 
starkly from this consensus can have negative domestic (electoral) 
repercussions, whereas adhering to (or, at least, paying lip-service to) the 
media’s established framework can pay dividends. Media coverage and 
reporting can, overall, help steer the discussion and frame the China policy 
debate. As well as framing, it can create a tone for policy debate, and in this 
respect, it can have a small influence on the conduct of policy-making. A 
president or other official who ignores a hostile media will likely come to 
political harm; whereas a politician who is able to articulate a policy position 
within a framework provided by the media can reap considerable benefits. In 
other words, foreign policy is formulated with consideration for domestic 
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consequences, and political leaders are forced by the system in which they 
operate to engage in an endless process of apportioning scarce political capital 
in the most effective and beneficial way between foreign and domestic politics.  
As discussed in Chapter Four, the media’s portrayal of China as a whole is 
a mixed one that reflects the difficulties faced by policymakers. The promotion 
of closer economic ties, due to the obvious benefits (cheaper manufactures, 
China’s continued financing of American government debt, and so forth), is 
often reported alongside condemnation of China’s human rights practices, 
flagrant intellectual property theft, and China’s particularly hard-nosed realist 
approach to its foreign policy (for example in its relations with various 
objectionable regimes in resource-rich countries). With a media that is often 
critical of China, politicians are inclined to either forgo involvement in issues 
relating to China, or to take a tough stance on human rights or economic abuses 
committed by the Chinese, thereby reinforcing its negative image. While 
Congressmen have greater freedom to focus on and sensationalise ethical 
matters, the President and his foreign policy staff face the more direct and 
personal responsibility to maintain, protect and advance the national interest, 
and therefore must remain much more circumspect. 
The media help reinforce the beliefs at the core of America’s historical and 
contemporary grand strategy: the American preference for economic expansion 
is clearly accepted and even promoted by many media outlets. Some critics 
argue that this is a result of corporate ownership influencing news reporting. 
However, while this may be the case in some instances (such as the occasional 
Fox broadcast), it is equally likely a result of ingrained biases inherent in the 
American political psyche. The level of threat China is believed to present is not 
as widespread as the economic advantage the country’s rapid modernisation 
offers to the globalised American economy. It is undeniable that certain 
business interests have been highly involved in pushing for an expansion of the 
US-China economic relationship (as discussed in Chapter Five), but there is little 
evidence to suggest that they control the agenda. Rather, as stated earlier, 
business interests can influence decisions that affect their own, narrow 
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economic interests, but only within the framework of broader American 
national interests (economic or otherwise).  
It is interesting to note, at this point, that China appears to be handled 
differently to other nations. Firstly, despite the oft-positive spin given to the US-
China economic relationship, the American media’s portrayal of China is 
commonly articulated within the framework of traditional power politics and 
zero-sum terminology, where China’s gain is America’s loss, and reporting is 
frequently informed by the differences between American and Chinese 
normative values. Secondly, due to China’s size and global influence, issues 
relating to human rights and any other perceived immorality are heightened. 
This, when coupled with China’s economic clout and considerable holdings of 
US Treasury Bonds, could explain why the media are more likely to portray 
China in a negative light. Equally, because of this negative reporting, lobbyists 
that focus on America’s liberal traditional values have a platform to push their 
agendas, thereby requiring Congressional and Executive office policy-makers to 
address China in these areas. China’s international stature and considerable 
links with the United States only serve to enhance concerns – China, it could be 
argued, is held to a higher standard commensurate with its international 
standing. This does not ensure that China remains at the fore of foreign policy 
debate, however: in the past, we have seen China slip down the rankings of 
importance when the US government is distracted by more pressing demands 
in Europe and the Middle East, which leads China to be viewed through the lens 
of domestic political gain. 
It is most often voices in Congress who fervently seek to sanction China on 
human rights. Usually defined by the dominant party in Congress at the time, 
these sanctions can lean towards protectionist policies (predominantly a 
Democratic favourite). Successive administrations have acquiesced to, and 
compromised with Congressional demands to gain approval for other 
programs, in part because, “absent an immediate outside danger, domestic 
politics has become more important to political survival than handling of 
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foreign policy.”20 These examples do, however, add support to Fearon’s 
suggestion that foreign policies informed by non-elite opinions might be 
suboptimal. For Congressional members to ‘stir the pot’ over China – be it over 
human rights, outsourcing, or the ‘China Threat’ – there is little apparent 
downside, the potential for some free media exposure, and usually few wider 
ripple-effects. This is not the case with the president or Secretary of State, 
whose rhetoric and statements on any given issue, not just China, can have 
considerable impact.  
Incidentally, Chinese officials have shown themselves to be very familiar 
with how the American system works, and are not averse to employing political 
‘junkets’ to soften recalcitrant or critical American legislators, which they have 
used, most recently, to influence critics of Beijing’s currency valuation policy. 
The negativity that is widespread among most journalistic opinion-
makers, and their tendency to be critical of any presidential administration that 
engages with China, is an important consideration – it helps explain why 
virtually every presidential hopeful in the last four decades has been critical of 
the previous administration’s China policy. This negativity is principally due to 
China’s approach to human rights, religious freedom, and non-proliferation – all 
key components of America’s liberal-moralist strain of foreign policy traditions. 
While this is likely to affect an administration’s approach to China, and the way 
in which the president or a cabinet official articulates any given policy, there is 
another factor that needs to be taken into consideration, specifically, the lesser 
impact television reporting has on elites in comparison with the print media. 
Policymakers, Suettinger argues, “usually get their information from written 
sources, which are more thorough than television news programs,”21 which 
frequently follow formats that do not allow for in-depth policy discussion. The 
format in which television stories are presented considerably limits how much 
information and discussion can be provided, which leaves segments prone to 
hyperbole or shallow depictions of any issue, which can lead to exaggerations of 
perceived ‘China threats’. Given the complexity of the US-China relationship, 
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this will mean a very superficial account of the politics involved, and by 
extension a reduction in the amount of influence the media can exert on actual 
policy.22 
Foreign policy idealism, Colin Dueck argues, is “to some extent a special 
preoccupation of party elites and party activists.” The American public is more 
accepting of practical successes in foreign policy, rather than “messianic or 
moralist” goals articulated by elite media, select lobbies, and also various 
administrations (which does not, however, explain the popularity of criticising 
China on moral grounds). Because of non-governmental elites’ abilities to shape 
or to frame foreign policy debates, especially China policy, in order for national 
interests to be served properly, advocates of pragmatic policies and strategies 
must expend considerable effort and energy to “get past the filtration effect of 
the nation’s chattering classes.”23 This is where the centrality of the Executive 
Office becomes clear. 
Presidential engagement with the foreign policy-making process is 
fundamentally important to the construction of a coherent policy. A disengaged 
president will increase the likelihood of relations becoming hijacked by 
parochial concerns of domestic constituencies, with their own competing 
interests, and also individuals within administrations who will try to further 
their own agendas. The level of presidential engagement, therefore, can act as a 
moderator of domestic pluralism, filtering the domestic inputs and their 
increased tendency to encroach on the foreign policy-making process. Congress 
has proven too fragmented, with the interests of Representatives too parochial 
to ever effectively replace the long-term perspective of a president, his 
appointed deputies, or the career bureaucratic staff. Even during the post-Cold 
War years, when Congress has become more activist in foreign policy and China 
policy in particular, the role of the engaged president remains key. Given this 
environment, as we have seen, a president will sometimes resort to secret 
diplomacy in order to circumvent a hostile media environment – this is not 
without its risks as, should the secrecy become uncovered, a president’s 
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attempts at keeping, for example, China policy on an even keel can be further 
complicated (as George H.W. Bush experienced). 
While the importance of a president and his staff to changing the tone or 
policies of an administration is clear, too often do scholars and commentators 
forget or ignore that presidents cannot and do not make policy in an 
immaculate vacuum, separate and isolated from domestic political actors or 
concerns. The American system clearly precludes the Executive Branch from 
insulating itself from non-governmental actors, and while it is very difficult to 
properly identify or quantify their influence, it is quite clearly a factor. 
When looking at the formulation of foreign policy, one has to recognise 
that the Executive Branch is, unlike domestic media and lobbies, also impacted 
by external factors. Not even the United States, supposedly the most powerful 
country in the world, can act unilaterally with impunity. The options available 
to a president are often constrained by international realities, as well as 
domestic considerations. As a result, no matter how much a president, media 
outlet, or special interest lobby may want to pursue a particular policy 
(especially liberal-moralist policies), economic-realist considerations will 
inevitably exert a powerful influence in an increasingly globalised world. This 
result of realpolitik inevitably precludes certain interests from usurping control 
of US foreign policy to suit, for example, a purely liberalist agenda. 
The US-China relationship is characterised by “the sum of its 
disagreements” and is often “the product of mistakes and misperceptions”. 
Without mutually agreed-upon goals, the relationship has become “mostly 
event-driven, subject to sharp swings of attitude or sentiment, depending on the 
nature and outcome of the driving events.”24 By this reckoning, a pluralist grand 
strategy has yet to emerge, as the warring factions within American politics are 
yet to reach an understanding or stable position on China. 
Since the end of the Cold War, American China-policy has been 
characterised by a “messy mix of realism, idealism, and capitalism.” While 
China’s leaders have abandoned the ideological excesses of Mao, American 
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politicians have “never resolved the contradictory strains in its China policy”.25 
This seriously affects the construction of a workable, pluralist China policy. If 
the United States hopes to develop such a policy, it will fall to the Executive 
Branch to take charge, take domestic issues and filter them through a 
perception of the national interest. 
There is every indication that American foreign policy will continue to be 
composed of pluralistic components and agendas. The necessary formulation of 
a pluralist strategy will, however, continue to come under critical scrutiny. 
There is an undoubted attraction for scholars and policy-makers to construct a 
grand strategy or theory for American foreign policy, to rigidly adhere to one 
theory or another. In the case of China, however, this is a limited and ultimately 
flawed approach. As Irwin Steltzer has stated, this creates a “false dichotomy” of 
having to favour either containment or engagement,26 where in reality US-China 
relations are a complex web of connections, agreements and disagreements that 
cannot be encompassed by a single theory or approach. Part of this is simply 
political – the American public and elected representatives appear unwilling to 
give China a ‘pass’ on issues pertaining to China’s domestic and international 
human rights policies and values, many of which are inimical to American 
sensitivities. This is a concern that does not characterise US-EU relations, but 
has once again started to influence US-Russia relations, as the latter has become 
more assertive on the international stage. 
The quest for a Grand Strategy itself can actually muddy the waters of 
American foreign policy, making it harder for officials to move America’s 
interests forward, if a specific policy does not easily fit into preconceived 
strategies. A single, unified grand strategy may be the preferred approach to 
foreign policy of Executive Branch and national security employees, but in this 
increasingly complex world, not to mention more complex pluralist political 
system, one may simply be unattainable. Clinton’s ‘case-by-case-ism’ or ‘a la 
carte’ foreign policy approach, therefore, while derided at the time, may actually 
be a model that should be considered for the future. We have seen President 
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Obama struggle when attempting to formulate a single grand strategy, yet 
succeed when pursuing single, targeted policies. 
The United States has a myriad of complex relationships with most 
nations in the world, and to argue that a single grand strategy could encompass 
the nuances of all bilateral relationships is over-optimistic. A pluralist approach, 
which perhaps identifies a key strategic interest (for example, expansion and 
maintenance of open and free economics) will have to be altered, modified or 
expanded depending on which nation is currently on the agenda. That is to say, 
while the economic imperatives of US foreign policy with regards to China, 
Europe and Russia are clear, the myriad other issues unique to China, the EU 
and Russia may not allow for a single, overarching policy or strategy. It is 
interesting to note that George Kennan, the ‘father’ of Cold War containment 
strategy and an originator of the preference in US foreign policy for articulating 
singular grand strategies, argued that the failure to find a single, unifying grand 
strategy with which to approach an increasingly complicated international 
system is actually a good thing, and he regretted his part in promoting a 
simplification of strategy into what he described as “bumper-stickers”.27 
The Obama administration has given every indication that it is aware of 
this problem. America’s move toward a more pluralist understanding of foreign 
policy or grand strategy is in many ways already in evidence: Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton recently stated that, when dealing with China, human rights 
issues will not be taken into account when negotiating economic or security 
concerns, though at the same time not ignored. This echoes her husband’s 
administration’s decoupling of the US-China economic relationship from China’s 
human rights record. President Obama’s team has decided to focus primarily on 
concrete national interests. More liberal issues will not be ignored, but they will 
not be allowed to get in the way of America’s more important interests. 
Whether this is due to a realist calculation of expedience – due to the pressing 
need to bring the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to an end, not to mention a wish 
to deal effectively with the new wave of Middle Eastern revolutions, the need to 
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kick-start the American economy – or a belief in the futility of pursuing liberal-
idealist policies is thus far unclear. 
The open nature of the American foreign policy-making process precludes 
an immaculate, exclusively-elite-constructed foreign policy. Therefore, while 
extremely difficult to ‘measure’, the role and influence of the elite media and 
special interest lobbies must be taken into account when analysing 
governmental policies. The domestic pluralisation has, as this thesis has shown, 
become a firm and permanent factor in the construction of US foreign policy. If 
President Obama and his successors are to construct a publicly, politically and 
practically acceptable coherent foreign policy, a less rigid and more pluralist 
approach will have to be adopted. They will have to contend with the increased 
partisanship in both houses of Congress, which has proven a considerable 
impediment to consensus legislation (particularly on domestic, but also foreign 
policy); the proliferation of activist domestic special interest lobbies; and a 
media environment that many have described as ‘toxic’. This is no small task, as 
the current political arena is one beset by obstacles to sound policy-making:  
“Narrowcast media amplify strong voices at the ends of the spectrum 
and make politicians pay a price for any deviation from dogma. A 
more open and transparent Congress has meant a Congress more 
easily pressured by small interest groups and lobbyists. Ironically, 
during this period, more and more Americans identify as 
independents. Registered independents are at an all-time high. But 
that doesn’t matter. The system in Congress reflects not rule by the 
majority but rule by the minority – fanatical, organized minorities.”28 
The construction of a pluralist foreign and China policy will have to take 
into account the plethora of highly complex issues that are now very much at 
the heart of American foreign policy, the foreign policy role of domestic actors, 
and international relations in general. To attempt to do otherwise will result in 
Congressional gridlock and distraction, reactionary policies, and foreign policy 
inaction or stasis. 
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This thesis has shown how China can often be sidelined as a foreign policy 
priority – suffering a benign neglect, invariably as a result of conflicts in other 
regions (historically, usually in Europe, but contemporarily in the Middle East). 
Given the ‘superfusion’ of the American and Chinese economies; the growing 
economic, diplomatic and military power and influence of China; and the impact 
these two nations’ policies can have on the international community, it is more 
essential than ever for the current and future American administrations to 
construct a coherent, wide-reaching and pluralist China policy. 
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